{p.1}

CHAPTER IX.
OPERATIONS IN MARYLAND, PENNSYLVANIA, VIRGINIA, AND WEST VIRGINIA.*
April 16-July 31, 1861.
(Bull Run / Manassas)
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REPORTS, ETC.

SUMMARY OF THE PRINCIPAL EVENTS.**

April	17, 1861.–	Ordinance of secession adopted by Virginia Convention.
	18, 1861.–	Maj. Gen. William B. Taliaferro assigned to command of Virginia forces at Norfolk, Va.
	18, 1861.–	United States Armory at Harper’s Ferry, W. Va., abandoned and burned by its garrison.
	19, 1861.–	Conflict between United States troops and mob in Baltimore, Md.
	19, 1861.–	Maj. Gen. Robert Patterson, Pennsylvania Militia, assigned to command over the States of Delaware, Pennsylvania, and Maryland, and the District of Columbia.
	20, 1861.–	General Butler’s command arrives at Annapolis, Md. Expedition to destroy the dry-dock at Norfolk, Va.
	23, 1861.–	Maj. Gen. Robert E. Lee assigned to command of the military and naval forces of Virginia.
	26, 1861.–	Maj. Gen. Joseph E. Johnston, Virginia Volunteers, assigned to command of the State forces in and about Richmond, Va.
	26, 1861.–	Maj. Gen. Walter Gwynn, Virginia Volunteers, assigned to command of State forces in and about Norfolk, Va.
	27, 1861.–	Major-General Patterson, Pennsylvania Militia, assigned to command of the Department of Pennsylvania. Brig. Gen. B. F. Butler, Massachusetts Militia, assigned to command of the Department of Annapolis. Col. Joseph K. F. Mansfield, U. S. Army, assigned to command of the Department of Washington. Col. T. J. Jackson, Virginia Volunteers, assigned to command of State troops at and about Harper’s Ferry, W. Va.
May	1, 1861.–	Volunteer forces called out in Virginia.
	3, 1861.–	Governor of Virginia issues call for additional forces.
	4, 1861.–	Col. G. A. Porterfield assigned to command of State forces in Northwestern Virginia (W. Va.). {p.2}
	5, 1861.–	Alexandria, Va., abandoned by State troops. (Reoccupied.)
	7, 1861.–	Routes between Philadelphia, Harrisburg, and Washington, via Baltimore, re-established.
	9, 1861.–	Exchange of shots between the United States steamer Yankee and the batteries at Gloucester Point, Va.
	10, 1861.–	Maj. Gen. R. E. Lee assigned to command of the Confederate States forces serving in Virginia.
	13, 1861.–	Baltimore, Md., occupied by United States troops. Maj. Gen. Geo. B. McClellan, U. S. Army, assumes command of the Department of the Ohio, embracing a portion of West Virginia.
	14, 1861.–	Seizure of a train of cars at Harper’s Ferry, W. Va.
	15, 1861.–	Bvt. Maj. Gen. George Cadwalader, Pennsylvania Militia, supersedes General Butler in Department of Annapolis. Brig. Gen. Joseph E. Johnston, C. S. Army, assigned to command of troops near Harper’s Ferry, W. Va.
	18-19, 1861.–	Engagement at Sewell’s Point, Va.
	21, 1861.–	Col. John B. Magruder, Provisional Army of Virginia, assigned to command at Yorktown, Va.
	21, 1861.–	Brig. Gen. M. L. Bonham, C. S. A., assigned to command on the “Alexandria Line,” Va.
	22, 1861.–	Brig. Gen. B. F. Butler, Massachusetts Militia, assigned to command at Fort Monroe, Va.
	23, 1861.–	Brig. Gen. Benjamin Huger, Virginia Volunteers, assigned to command at Norfolk, Va. Demonstration on Hampton, Va.
	24, 1861.–	Advance of Union Army into Virginia, and its occupation of Arlington Heights and Alexandria.
	26-30, 1861.–	Advance upon and occupation of Grafton, W. Va., by Union forces.
	27-29, 1861.–	Occupation of Newport News, Va., by Union forces.
	28, 1861.–	Brig. Gen. Irvin McDowell, U. S. Army, assumes command of the Department of Northeastern Virginia.
	31-June 1, 1861.–	Attack on Aquia Creek batteries, Va.
June	1, 1861.–	Skirmishes, at Arlington Mills and Fairfax Court-House, Va.
	2, 1861.–	Brig. Gen. G. T. Beauregard, C. S. Army, supersedes General Bonham in command on the “Alexandria Line” (sometimes called the “Department of Alexandria,” the “Potomac Department,” and afterwards the “Army of the Potomac”).
	3, 1861.–	Action at Philippi, W. Va.
	5, 1861.–	Attack upon Pig Point batteries, Va.
	6, 1861.–	Brig. Gen. Henry A. Wise, C. S. Army, ordered to command of troops in the Kanawha Valley, W. Va.
	7, 1861.–	Reconnaissance from Yorktown to Newport News, Va.
	8, 1861.–	Virginia State troops transferred to the Confederate States. Brig. Gen. R. S. Garnett, C. S. Army, assigned to command of troops in Northwestern Virginia (W. Va.).
	10, 1861.–	Brig. Gen. Beauregard in command of all Confederate forces in Prince William, Fairfax, and Loudoun Counties, Va. Engagement at Big Bethel, or Bethel Church, Va.
	10-July 7, 1861.–	The Rockville (Maryland) expedition.
June	11, 1861.–	Maj. Gen. Banks supersedes Bvt. Maj. Gen. Cadwalader in Department of Annapolis.
	13, 1861.–	Descent of Union troops upon Romney, W. Va.
	15, 1861.–	Skirmish at Bowman’s Place, Cheat River, W. Va. Harper’s Ferry, W. Va., evacuated by Confederate forces.
	17, 1861.–	Action near Vienna, Va. {p.3}
	19, 1861.–	Skirmish at New Creek, W. Va.
	23, 1861.–	Skirmish at Righter, W. Va.
	24, 1861.–	Affair on the Rappahannock, Va.
	25, 1861.–	Descent on Mathias Point, Va.
	26, 1861.–	Skirmishes at Frankfort and on Patterson’s Creek, W. Va.
	27, 1861.–	Attack on Mathias Point, Va.
July	1, 1861.–	Arrest of the Baltimore Police Commissioners.
	2-25, 1861.–	Operations in the Shenandoah Valley.
	5, 1861.–	Skirmish near Newport News, Va.
	6-17, 1861.–	Campaign in West Virginia.
	9, 1861.–	Skirmish at Vienna, Va.
	12, 1861.–	Skirmish near Newport News, Va.
	14, 1861.–	Reconnaissances from Alexandria, Va.
	16-22, 1861.–	The Bull Run, or Manassas, campaign, Va.
	19, 1861.–	Affair on the Back River Road, Va. Affair near New Market Bridge, Va.
	20, 1861.–	Brig. Gen. William W. Loring, C. S. Army, assigned to command of “Northwestern Army” (W. Va.).
	21, 1861.–	Maj. Gen. N. P. Banks, U. S. Army, ordered to relieve Major-General Patterson in command of the Department of the Shenandoah.
	22, 1861.–	Maj. Gen. Geo. B. McClellan, U. S. Army, ordered to Washington, D. C.
	23, 1861.–	Maj. Gen. John A. Dix, U. S. Army, assumes command of the Department of Maryland. Brig. Gen. W. S. Rosecrans, U. S. Army, assumes command of the Department of the Ohio, embracing portion of West Virginia.
	24, 1861.–	Operations on Back River, Va. Retreat of General Wise’s command up the Kanawha Valley.
	25, 1861.–	Major-General Banks assumes command of the Department of the Shenandoah.
	24, 1861.–	Major-General Dix assumes command of the Department of Pennsylvania.
	27, 1861.–	Major-General McClellan assumes command of the Division of the Potomac.
	29, 1861.–	Skirmish at Edwards Ferry, Md.

* The State Of West Virginia was not admitted into the Union until June 20, 1863. For that reason, and because the Confederates did not recognize the partition of Virginia a thus made, places in the new State are frequently referred to, in the text of these Records, as being either in Virginia or in Western Virginia. The transfer of the counties of Berkeley and Jefferson from Virginia to West Virginia was not recognized by Congress until March 10, 1866.

** Of some of the skirmishes, and other minor conflicts, noted in this “Summary,” no circumstantial reports are on file, the only official record of such events being references thereto on muster rolls and returns.

APRIL 18, 1861-Destruction of the United States Armory at Harper’s Ferry, W. Va.

REPORTS, ETC.

No. 1.–	Lieut. Roger Jones, Mounted Rifles, U. S. Army.
No. 2.–	Congratulatory letter from United States Secretary of War to Lieutenant Jones.
No. 3.–	Lieut. Col. William Maynadier, U. S. Ordnance Department, of the expenditures upon and losses at the armory.

No. 1.

Reports of First Lieut. B. Jones, Mounted Rifles, U. S. Army.

HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES ARMORY, Harper’s Ferry, Va., April 18, 1861-9 p. m.

SIR: Up to the present time no assault or attempt to seize the Government property here has been made, but there is decided evidence that the subject is in contemplation, and has been all day, by a large number of people living in the direction of Charlestown; and at sundown this evening several companies of troops had assembled at Halltown, {p.4} about three or four miles from here on the road to Charlestown, with the intention of seizing the Government property, and the last report is that the attack will be made to-night. I telegraphed this evening to General Scott that I had received information confirming his dispatch of this morning, and later to the Adjutant-General that I expected an attack tonight. I have taken steps which ought to insure my receiving early intelligence of the advance of any forces, and my determination is to destroy what I cannot defend, and if the forces sent against me are clearly overwhelming, my present intention is to retreat into Pennsylvania.

The steps I have taken to destroy the arsenal, which contains nearly 15,000 stand of arms, are so complete that I can conceive of nothing that will prevent their entire destruction.

If the Government purposes maintaining its authority here, no time should be lost in sending large bodies of troops to my assistance, and as many of them as possible should be regulars.

A courier has just reported the advance of the troops from Halltown.

Respectfully, I am, I sir, your obedient servant,

R. JONES, First Lieutenant, Mounted Riflemen, Commanding.

To the ASSISTANT ADJUTANT-GENERAL, Headquarters of the Army, Washington, D. C.

–––

CHAMBERSBURG, April 19, 1861.

Finding my position untenable, shortly after 10 o’clock last night I destroyed the arsenal, containing 15,000 stand of arms, and burned up the armory building proper, and under cover of the night withdrew my command almost in the presence of twenty-five hundred or three thousand troops. This was accomplished with but four casualties. I believe the destruction must have been complete. I will await orders at Carlisle.

R. JONES.

General WINFIELD SCOTT.

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CARLISLE BARRACKS, PA., April 20, 1861.

SIR: Immediately after finishing my dispatch of the night of the 18th instant, I received positive and reliable information that 2,500 or 3,000 State troops would reach Harper’s Ferry in two hours, from Winchester, and that the troops from Halltown, increased to 300 men, were advancing and were at that time (few minutes after 10 o’clock) within twenty minutes’ march of the Ferry. Under these circumstances I decided the time had arrived to carry out my determination, as expressed in the dispatch above referred to, and accordingly gave the order to apply the torch. In three minutes, or less, both of the arsenal buildings, containing nearly 15,000 arms, together with the carpenter’s shop, which was at the upper end of a long and connected series of workshops of the armory proper, were in a complete blaze.

There is every reason for believing the destruction was complete. After firing the buildings I withdrew my command, marching all night, and arrived here at 2 1/2 p. m. yesterday, where I shall await orders. Four {p.5} men were missing on leaving the armory, and two deserted during the night.

Respectfully, I am, sir, your obedient servant,

R. JONES, First Lieut. Mounted Riflemen, Comdg. Detachment Recruits.

To the ASSISTANT ADJUTANT-GENERAL, Headquarters of the Army, Washington, D. C.

–––

CARLISLE BARRACKS, PA., April 22, 1861.

SIR: Last evening three of my missing men arrived here, having left Harper’s Ferry the previous afternoon. They report that fifteen minutes after my command left the armory nine hundred troops marched into town, and that they continued to arrive every hour during the night, so that by morning there were probably nearly five, thousand troops there. They also report that the fire in the workshops was arrested, but that the arsenal buildings containing the arms, together with their contents, were completely demolished, and that it is probable not a single gun was saved from them.

I remain, sir, with respect, your obedient servant,

R. JONES, First Lieutenant Mounted Riflemen.

To the ASSISTANT ADJUTANT-GENERAL, Headquarters of the Army, Washington, D. C.

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No. 2.

Congratulatory letter from United States Secretary of War.

WAR DEPARTMENT, Washington, April 22, 1861.

Lieut. ROGER JONES, Commanding at Harper’s Ferry:

My DEAR SIR: I am directed by the President of the United States to communicate to you, and through you to the officers and men under your command at Harper’s Ferry Armory, the approbation of the Government of your and their judicious conduct there, and to tender to you and them the thanks of the Government for the same.

I am, sir, very respectfully,

SIMON CAMERON, Secretary of War.

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No. 3.

Report of Lieut. Col. William Maynadier, U. S. Ordnance Department, of the expenditures upon and losses at the armory.

ORDNANCE OFFICE, Washington, November 16, 1861.

SIR: In answer to the letter [following] of the Hon. John P. Hale, chairman of the committee of the Senate, which you referred to this {p.6} office, I have the honor to report that the U. S. Armory at Harper’s Ferry was established in the year 1796.

The amount expended on the same is–

For land purchased at different times	$45,477
For improvements thereon for water-power, canals, embankments, walls, and water privileges, and for hydraulic machinery and buildings of an kinds	1,787,430
Total, exclusive of the amount expended in the manufacture and repair of arms	1,832,907

The latest annual inventory of the property belonging to the United States at that armory is dated June 30, 1860, in which the value of all the property on hand at that date is appraised as follows, viz:

1,6691 acres of land		$37,457
Mill-dams, canals, water-powers, and hydraulic machinery		233,279
Forges, rolling-mills, machine-shops, storehouses, dwellings, and other buildings		341,221
Amount of real estate		611,957
Machines used in workshops	$270,235
Tools used in service	109,560
		379,795
Unwrought materials on hand	100,043
Parts of arms in progress	93,573
		193,616
20, 507 arms of different models in store		285,145
Total appraised value June 30, 1860		1,470,513

By the latest returns received at this office from the armory, it appears that the number of arms in store when the armory was destroyed in April, 1861, was reduced to 4,287, the value of which was about $64,000.

We may assume that the quantity and value of all other property than the arms in store remained without material change from June, 1860, to April, 1861. The diminished number of arms in store at the latter date reduces that item in the inventory from $285,145 to $164,300, and the total appraised value of all the property from $1,470,513 to $1,207,668.

Respectfully, &c.,

WM. MAYNADIER, Lieutenant-Colonel, Ordnance.

Hon. SIMON CAMERON, Secretary of War.

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U. S. CAPITOL, November 14, 1861.

Hon. SIMON CAMERON, Secretary of War:

SIR: The committee of the Senate “to inquire into the circumstances attending the destruction of the property of the United States at the armory at Harper’s Ferry,” &c., desire to be informed by the War Department of the date of the establishment of the Harper’s Ferry Armory, the amount expended upon the same by the Government previous to its destruction, the character of the buildings, machinery, &c., and the quantity and description of arms destroyed there, and of the material on hand at that time.

Respectfully, yours,

JOHN P. HALE, Chairman.

{p.7}

APRIL 19, 1861.-Conflict between United States troops and mob in Baltimore, Md., and interruption of communication through that city with Washington.

REPORTS, ETC.

No. 1.–	Col. Edward F. Jones, Sixth Massachusetts Militia.
No. 2.–	Board of Baltimore Police Commissioners.
No. 3.–	Hon. George William Brown, Mayor of Baltimore.
No. 4.–	Message of the Mayor of Baltimore.
No. 5.–	Statement of George M. Gill.

No. 1.

Report of Col. Edward F. Jones, Sixth Massachusetts Militia.

HDQRS. 6TH REGIMENT, 3D BRIG., 2D DIV., M. V. M., Capitol, Washington, April 22, 1861.

In accordance with Special Orders, NO. 6, I proceeded with my command towards the city of Washington, leaving Boston on the evening of the 17th April, arrived in New York on the morning of the 18th, and proceeded to Philadelphia, reaching that place on the same evening.

On our way John Brady, of Company H, Lowell, was taken insane, and deeming it unsafe to have him accompany the regiment, I left him at Delanco, N. J., with J. C. Buck, with directions that he should telegraph Mayor Sargent, of Lowell, as to the disposition of him, and we proceeded thence to Baltimore, reaching that place at noon on the 19th. After leaving Philadelphia I received intimation that our passage through the city of Baltimore would be resisted. I caused ammunition to be distributed and arms loaded, and went personally through the cars, and issued the following order, viz:

Reaching Baltimore, horses were attached the instant that the locomotive was detached, and the cars were driven at a rapid pace across the city. After the cars containing seven companies had reached the Washington depot the track behind them was barricaded, and the cars containing band and the following companies, viz: Company C, of Lowell, Captain Follansbee; Company D, of Lowell, Captain Hart; Company I, of Lawrence, Captain Pickering, and Company L, of Stoneham, Captain Dike, were vacated, and they proceeded but a short distance before they were furiously attacked by a shower of missiles, which came faster as they advanced. They increased their steps to double-quick, which seemed to infuriate the mob, as it evidently impressed the mob with the idea that the soldiers dared not fire or had no ammunition, and pistol-shots were numerously fired into the ranks, and one soldier fell dead. The order “Fire” was given, and it was executed. In consequence, several of the mob fell, and the soldiers again advanced hastily. The mayor of Baltimore placed himself at the head of the column beside Captain Follansbee, and proceeded with them a short distance, assuring him that he would protect them, and begging him not to let the men fire; but the mayor’s patience was soon exhausted, and he {p.8} seized a musket from the hands of one of the men and killed a man therewith, and a policeman, who was in advance of the column, also shot a man with a revolver.

They at last reached the cars, and they started immediately for Washington. On going through the train I found there were about one hundred and thirty missing, including the band and field music. Our baggage was seized, and we have not as yet been able to recover any of it. I have found it very difficult to get reliable information in regard to the killed and wounded, but believe there were, only three killed, viz:

• James Keenan, Company L, Stoneham.
• Daniel Stevens, Company D, Lowell.
• Edward Coburn, Company D, Lowell.

Wounded.

• Capt. J. H. Dike, Stoneham, dangerous; doing well.
• Andrew Robbins, Stoneham, dangerous; doing well.
• S. H. Needham, Lawrence, dangerous; doing well.
• Michael Green, Lawrence; flesh wound.
• D. B. Tyler, Lowell; condition unknown.
• Edwin Colley, Lowell; condition unknown.
• H. W. Danforth, Stoneham; condition unknown.
• William R. Patch, Lowell; condition unknown.
• (NOTE.-The list in this letter is, of course, inaccurate. James Keenan is a cripple. Sumner H. Needham, of Lawrence, and Addison O. Whitney and Luther C. Ladd, of Lowell, were the killed.-ADJUTANT-GENERAL of Massachusetts. October 23, 1874.)
• Captain Dike is in the hands of some brother Masons, and to the Order he owes his life. The others are supposed to be at Baltimore Infirmary.
• The following were brought with us and sent to the hospital here: Gordon Reed, Company A; since discharged.
• Alonzo Joy, Company B; doing well.
• G. G. Durrell, Company 1; since discharged.
• Victor Dengras, Company I; doing well.
• W. G. Withington, Company D; since discharged.
• W. H. Young, Company L; doing well.
• Warren Holden, Company L; doing well.
• Maurice Mead, Company L; doing well.
• George Alexander, Company D; doing well.
• C. L. Gill, Company L; doing well.
• Charles Stinson, Company C; doing well.
• J. M. Moore, Company D; since discharged.
• J. W. Pennell, Company L; doing well.
• E. A. Perry, Company L; since discharged.
• William G. Butterfield, Company L; doing well.
• Stephen Flanders, Company L; doing well.
• J. W. Kimpton, Company L; doing well.
• John Fortier, Company L; doing well.
• C. H. Chandler, Company D; doing well.
• S. S. Johnson, Company L; since discharged.
• Henry Dike, Company L; doing well.
• J. F. Rowe, Company L; doing well.
• Daniel Brown, Company L; doing well.
• George Calvin, Company C; doing well.
• H. Gardner, Company C; doing well. {p.9}
• S. L. Colley, Company L; doing well.
• W. A Gourley, Company C; doing well.
• John Swett, Company A; doing well.
• W. H. Lamson, Company D; doing well.
• G. W. Lovering, Company D; doing well.
• William M. Holden, Company C; doing well.

  As the men went into the cars I caused the blinds to the cars to be closed, and took every precaution to prevent any shadow of offense to the people of Baltimore; but still the stones flew thick and fast into the train, and it was with the utmost difficulty that I could prevent the troops from leaving the cars and revenging the death of their comrades.

  After a volley of stones some one of the soldiers fired and killed a Mr. Davis, who I have since ascertained by reliable witnesses threw a stone into the car; yet that did not justify the firing at him, but the men were infuriated beyond control. On reaching Washington we were quartered at the Capitol, in the Senate Chamber, and are all in good health and spirits.

  I have made every effort to get possession of the bodies of our comrades, but have not yet succeeded. Should I succeed I shall forward them to Boston, if practicable; otherwise shall avail myself of a kind offer of George Woods, esq., who has offered me a prominent lot in the Congressional burying-ground for the purpose of interment.

  We were this day mustered into the United States service, and will forward the rolls at first opportunity after verification.

  EDWARD F. JONES, Colonel Sixth Regiment, M. V. M., in service of United States.

  Brigade Maj. WILLIAM H. CLEMENCE.

  –––

  No. 2.

  Extracts from report of the Baltimore Police Commissioners.

  OFFICE BOARD OF POLICE COMMISSIONERS, Baltimore, May 3, 1861.

  To the honorable the General Assembly of Maryland:

  The board of police of the city of Baltimore, created and appointed by your honorable body by the provisions of the fourth article of the Code of Public Local Laws, section 806, &c., deem it their duty respectfully to report:

  ...

  The board continued from the date of their above report to exercise their regular functions until Friday, the 19th April. On that day a large detachment of it is understood, about 1,800 men of the Massachusetts and Pennsylvania Militia arrived in the forenoon in the city via the Philadelphia, Wilmington and Baltimore Railroad. No member of the board of police had any information that these troops were expected on that day until from half an hour to one hour of the time at which they were to arrive. The marshal of police was immediately notified, and called out at once a large portion of his force to preserve order during their transit through the city. When they arrived, there were manifestations to interfere with their passage; and after some had been transported by cars through the streets to the Washington depot obstructions were placed on the track in the city which stopped the progress of the {p.10} remainder. These alighted to march to the depot, and to prevent any difficulty the mayor placed himself at their head, and they thus proceeded on their route. Missiles were, notwithstanding, thrown at the troops, and some of them were injured. Their assailants were fired upon, and in some instances with fatal effect. An intense and irrepressible feeling appeared to be at once aroused, and repeated conflicts between parties of citizens and the Massachusetts troops took place, several being killed on both sides.

  The marshal, who had been on active duty at the Camden-street depot, and did not know that these troops were on their route or expected, hearing of this, hastened to meet them with a force of the police, and under their escort they reached the Washington depot, and after some delay the train finally started for Washington. Attempts were made to hinder it by placing obstructions on the track of the railroad, but by the interference of the police these were soon removed.

  The city authorities were meanwhile informed that there had been another arrival of military, who were then at the Philadelphia depot. The marshal of police hastened to that point, and as it was impossible for them at that time to be taken through the streets without a general and bloody conflict, he protected them with a party of his police until they were sent back by the railroad company in the cars to Havre de Grace.

  During the afternoon and night a large number of stragglers from some of the above detachments of troops sought the aid and protection of the police; they were safely cared for at the several station-houses, and were sent off in security by the earliest opportunity to Havre do Grace or Philadelphia in the cars.

  The same night the board had a meeting, when the opinion was unanimously expressed that it was utterly impossible from the state of the public mind that any more forces from other States could, by any probability, then pass through the city to Washington without a fierce and bloody conflict at every step of their progress, and that whatever might be the result, great loss of life and imminent danger to the safety of the city would necessarily ensue. The board were equally unanimous in their judgment that, as good citizens, it was their duty to the city, and to the State of Maryland, to adopt any measures whatsoever that might be necessary at such a juncture to prevent the immediate arrival in the city of further bodies of troops from the Eastern or Northern States, though the object of the latter might be solely to pass through the city. It was suggested that the most feasible, if not the most practicable, mode of thus stopping for a time the approach of such troops would be to obstruct the Philadelphia, Wilmington and Baltimore, and the Northern Central Railroads by disabling some of the bridges on both roads. His honor the mayor stated to the board that his excellency the governor, with whom he had a few minutes before been in consultation in the presence of several citizens, concurred in these views; they were likewise those of the board, and instructions were given for carrying them into effect. This was accordingly done. The injury thus done on the railroads amounted to but a few thousand dollars on each; subsequently, as has been stated, further and greater damage was done to other structures on the roads by parties in the country or others, but this was without the sanction or authority of the board, and they have no accurate information on the subject.

  The absolute necessity of the measures thus determined upon by the governor, mayor, and police board is fully illustrated by the fact that early on Sunday morning reliable information reached the city of the {p.11} presence of a large body of Pennsylvania troops, amounting to about twenty-four hundred men, [who] had reached Ashland, near Cockeysville, by the way of the Northern Central Railroad, and were stopped in their progress toward Baltimore by the partial destruction of the Ashland Bridge. Every intelligent citizen at all acquainted with the state of feeling then existing must be satisfied that if these troops had attempted to march through the city an immense loss of life would have ensued in the conflict which would necessarily have taken place. The bitter feelings already engendered would have been intensely increased by such a conflict; all attempts at conciliation would have been vain, and terrible destruction would have been the consequence, if, as is certain, other bodies of troops had insisted upon forcing their way through the city.

  The tone of the whole of the Northern press and of the mass of the population was violent in the extreme. Incursions upon our city were daily threatened, not only by troops in the service of the Federal Government, but by the vilest and most reckless desperadoes, acting independently, and, as they threatened, in despite of the Government, backed by well-known, influential citizens, and sworn to the commission of all kinds of excesses. In short, every possible effort was made to alarm this community. In this condition of things the board felt it to be their solemn duty to continue the organization which had already been commenced for the purpose of assuring the people of Baltimore that no effort would be spared to protect all within its borders to the full extent of their ability. All the means employed were devoted to this end, and with no view of producing a collision with the General Government, which the board were particularly anxious to avoid, and an arrangement was happily effected by the mayor with the General Government that no troops should be passed through the city. As an evidence of the determination of the board to prevent such collision, a sufficient guard was sent in the neighborhood of Fort McHenry several nights to arrest all parties who might be engaged in a threatened attack upon it, and a steam-tug was employed, properly manned, to prevent any hostile demonstration upon the receiving-ship Allegheny, lying at anchor in the harbor, of all which the United States officers in command were duly notified.

  Property of various descriptions, belonging to the Government and individuals, was taken possession of by the police force with a view to its security. The best care has been taken of it. Every effort has been made to discover the rightful owners, and a portion of it has already been forwarded to order. Arrangements have been made with the Government agents satisfactory to them for the portion belonging to it, and the balance is held subject to the order of its owners.

  Amidst all the excitement and confusion which has since prevailed, the board take great pleasure in stating that the good order and peace of the city have been preserved to an extraordinary degree. Indeed, to judge from the accounts given by the press of other cities of what has been the state of things in their own communities, Baltimore, during the whole of the past week and up to this date, will compare favorably, as to the protection which persons and property have enjoyed, with any other large city in the United States.

  All of which is respectfully submitted.

  By order of the board:

  CHARLES HOWARD, President..

  {p.12}

  –––

  No. 3.

  Report of Hon. George William Brown, Mayor of Baltimore.

  [BALTIMORE, May 9 (?), 1861.]

  To the honorable the General Assembly of Maryland:

  In the report recently made to your honorable body by the board of police commissioners of the city of Baltimore it is stated that, in the great emergency which existed in this city on the 19th ultimo, it was suggested that the most feasible, if not the only practicable, mode of stopping for a time the approach of troops to Baltimore was to obstruct the Philadelphia, Wilmington and Baltimore and the Northern Central Railroads by disabling some of the bridges on both roads; and it is added that “his honor the mayor stated to the board that his excellency the governor, with whom he had a few minutes before been in consultation, in the presence of several citizens, concurred in these views.”

  As this concurrence has since been explicitly denied by his Excellency Governor Hicks in an official communication addressed to the senate of Maryland on the 4th instant, which I have just seen, it is due to myself that I should lay before you the grounds on which the statement was made to the board of police, on which they, as well as myself, acted. I seriously regret that so grave a misunderstanding exists between the governor and myself on so important a subject.

  On the evening of the 19th ultimo, and after the collision had taken place, I mentioned to Governor Hicks that I had begun to fear it might be necessary to burn the railroad bridges, but I did not then, in consequence of intelligence which had been received, think it would be; to which he replied that he had no authority to give such an order.

  At about 11 o’clock p. m. of the same day, the Hon. H. Lenox Bond, George W. Dobbin and John C. Brown, esqs., were requested by Governor Hicks and myself to go to Washington in a special train, which was provided for the purpose, to explain in person the condition of things in Baltimore, and to bear the following communications from Governor Hicks and myself, which were addressed to the President:

  SIR: This will be presented to you by the Hon. H. Lenox Bond, George W. Dobbin and John C. Brown, esqrs., who will proceed to Washington by an express train at my request in order to explain fully the fearful condition of affairs in this city. The people are exasperated to the highest degree by the passage of troops, and the citizens are universally decided in the opinion that no more should be ordered to come.

  The authorities of the city did their best to-day to protect both strangers and citizens, and to prevent any collision but in vain; and but for their great efforts a fearful slaughter would have occurred.

  Under these circumstances it is my solemn duty to inform you that it is not possible for more soldiers to pass through Baltimore, unless they fight their way at every step.

  I therefore hope and trust, and most earnestly request, that no more troops be permitted or ordered by the Government to pass through the city. If they should attempt it the responsibility for the blood shed will not rest upon me.

  With great respect, your obedient servant,

  GEO. WM. BROWN, Mayor.

  The following, from Governor Hicks, was appended to my communication:

  To his Excellency ABRAHAM LINCOLN, President of the United States:

  I have been in Baltimore since Tuesday evening last, and co-operated with Mayor G. W. Brown in his untiring efforts to allay and prevent the excitement anti suppress the fearful outbreak as indicated above, and I fully concur in all that is said by him in the above communication.

  Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

  THOMAS H. HICKS, Governor of Maryland.

  {p.13}

  At about 12 o’clock p. m. the Hon. E. Louis Lowe and Marshall George P. Kane called at my house, where Governor Hicks was passing the night, and Marshal Kane informed me that a telegram had been received that other troops were to come to Baltimore over the Northern Central Railroad. There was also a report that troops were on their way who, it was thought, might even then be at Perryville, on their way to Baltimore. Mr. Lowe, Marshal Kane, my brother, John Cumming Brown, and myself went immediately to the chamber of Governor Hicks and laid the matter before him. The point was pressed that if troops were suddenly to come to Baltimore with a determination to pass through, a terrible collision and bloodshed would take place, and the consequences to Baltimore would be fearful, and that the only way to avert the calamity was to destroy the bridges. To this the governor replied, “It seems to be necessary,” or words to that effect.

  He was then asked by me whether he gave his consent to the destruction of the bridges, and he distinctly, although apparently with great reluctance, replied in the affirmative. I do not assert that I have given the precise language used by Governor Hicks, but I am very clear that I have stated it with substantial correctness, and that his assent was unequivocal, and in answer to a question by me which elicited a distinct affirmative reply.

  After this, but before the interview was over, two gentlemen came into the room, both of them strangers to me, but one was introduced as the brother of Governor Hicks, and I am confident that the assent of the governor to the burning of the bridges was repeated in the presence of those gentlemen.

  I went immediately from the chamber of the governor to the office of the marshal of police, where Charles Howard, esq., the president of the board of police, was waiting, and reported to him the assent of the governor to the destruction of the bridges.

  Mr. Howard, or some one else, made a further inquiry as to what had been said by the governor, whereupon Mr. Lowe, Marshal Kane, and my brother, John C. Brown, all declared that they were present at the interview and beard Governor Hicks give his assent.

  The order to destroy the bridges was accordingly given, and carried out in the manner already reported to your honorable body.

  I refer to the accompanying statements of Colonel Kane and Mr. J. C. Brown in confirmation of the correctness of my recollection of what occurred at the interview with Governor Hicks.

  With great respect, your obedient servant,

  GEO. WM. BROWN, Mayor.

  [Inclosures.]

  POLICE DEPARTMENT, OFFICE OF THE MARSHAL, Baltimore, May 9, 1861.

  Near the hour of 12 p. m. on Friday, the 19th April, the day on which the collision with the Massachusetts troops occurred, I received intelligence that the president of the Pennsylvania Central Railroad Company had sent a dispatch to a gentleman here that additional troops would pass through Baltimore on their way to the capital.

  I immediately sent to the president of the police board the intelligence referred to, and called at the residence of his honor Mayor Brown, to whom I also communicated the information which I had received.

  The mayor immediately had an interview with the governor, who was then staying at his (mayor’s) house, and afterwards invited me to accompany him to the chamber of his excellency, to whom I communicated the information of the purposed coming of the troops.

  {p.14}

  A general conversation then ensued, in which it was agreed to by all present that any attempt to pass troops through the city, in the then excited condition of the public mind, would lead to the most fearful consequences, and that any such passage must be prevented or delayed. The governor fully accorded in these views.

  The conversation resulted in the governor’s distinctly and unequivocally consenting, in response to the direct question put to him by the mayor, that the bridges on the roads by which the troops were expected to come should be destroyed as the only means of averting the consequences referred to of their coming at that time.

  GEO. P. KANE, Marshal.

  –––

  BALTIMORE, May 9, 1861.

  About 12 o’clock on the night of Friday, 19th April last, I was present when a conversation took place between Governor Hicks and my brother, the mayor of Baltimore, in reference to the best course to be pursued, by which a repetition of the troubles which had occurred on that day could be prevented. It was represented to them by Marshal Kane that troops from the North were on their way to Baltimore, and might by the following morning reach the city.

  The destruction of the bridges on the Northern Central and the Philadelphia, Wilmington and Baltimore Railroads was, in the opinion of my brother, the best and most effective method to obstruct their progress. In this opinion Governor Hicks fully concurred. When asked by my brother whether or not he gave his consent to the measure, the governor expressed a desire for time for reflection. Being reminded by those present of the lateness of the hour, and the necessity for prompt action, my brother again earnestly appealed to Governor Hicks and asked him for his consent. Governor Hicks’ answer was, in substance, although I may not use his exact words, “I see nothing else to be done.” “But, sir,” said my brother, “I cannot act without your consent; do you give it?” The governor’s reply was distinctly given in the affirmative.

  J. CUMMING BROWN.

  –––

  FREDERICK, MD., May 10 [?], 1861.

  Hon. JOHN C. BROWN:

  DEAR, SIR: As reference has been made by his honor the mayor of Baltimore City to my knowledge of the facts connected with the interview between him and the governor of Maryland on the night of the 19th ultimo, it gives me pleasure to furnish the desired statement.

  I was present between 11 and 12 o’clock p. m. on Friday, the 19th of April, at the residence of a prominent citizen of Baltimore when Marshal Kane, who was one of the company, received information by one of his officers that a telegram had been sent by the president of the railroad company at Philadelphia, announcing the approach of troops to Baltimore. It was the spontaneous opinion of all present that, in the terribly excited condition of the public mind, an attempt to pass troops through the city would inevitably lead to a bloody collision, and perhaps to other very serious consequences. It was therefore proposed to repair at once to the office of the marshal of police, and to send immediately for the mayor and governor.

  It was supposed at the time that Governor Hicks was stopping at the Fountain Hotel. Marshal Kane asked me to accompany him to Mayor Brown’s house, and the other gentlemen proceeded to the marshal’s office. Marshal Kane and I accordingly went to the mayor’s residence, {p.15} and were admitted by his brother, who said that the mayor had retired. In a few moments the mayor came down to the parlor, when Marshal Kane stated to him the substance of the information received, and reminded him of the excited condition of the city, which rendered it imperatively necessary to adopt some prompt and efficient measures to delay the advent of the troops, so as to give time for the Federal Government to be correctly apprised of the state of affairs, and to arrest the threatened danger. For that purpose the partial destruction of the bridges was suggested. Mayor Brown immediately assented to the suggestion as one of absolute necessity, but said that as mayor of the city his jurisdiction terminated with its corporate limits, and that consequently he could not assume to exercise powers beyond those limits. The mayor added, “The governor, however, is here, and I will go up and see him.” In a few moments he returned and said that Governor Hicks was not well and would therefore receive us in his room. Immediately upon entering the room Mayor Brown and Marshal Kane, gave to Governor Hicks a full statement of the matter and solicited his authority to destroy the bridges. Governor Hicks replied that it was a serious affair to undertake to destroy the bridges, and he expressed some doubt as to his authority to give such an order. It was urged in reply that it was a case of absolute self-preservation; that in three or four hours’ time a large body of troops would probably be in the city inflamed with passionate resentment against the people of Baltimore for the assault made on their comrades in the Pratt-street encounter, and that as the city was filled with hundreds of excited men, armed to the teeth, and determined to resist the passage of troops, a fearful slaughter must necessarily ensue, and the safety of the city itself be put in peril, unless by the destruction of the bridges time could be gained to avoid the difficulty by peaceable arrangement of some sort. Governor Hicks fully and most distinctly assented to all this, and said, “Well, I suppose it must be done,” or words of precisely that import, to which the mayor replied, substantially, “Governor, I have, no authority to act beyond the city limits, and can do nothing in this matter except by your direction; shall the bridges be destroyed?” Governor Hicks emphatically and distinctly replied in the affirmative.

  It is absolutely impossible for any misapprehension to exist on this point.

  The mayor, Marshal Kane, and I then proceeded to the marshal’s office, where we found several highly respectable citizens gathered, to whom the mayor and marshal gave a statement of their interview with the governor. The mayor then issued written orders for the destruction of the bridges. The next morning I learned by the newspaper extras that the orders had been carried into effect.

  Respectfully, yours, &c.,

  E. LOUIS LOWE.

  –––

  No. 4.

  Extracts from the message of the Mayor of Baltimore.

  [BALTIMORE, July 11, 1861.]

  To the honorable the Members of the First and Second Branches of the City Council:

  GENTLEMEN:

  On the 19th of April last an attack was made by a mob in the streets of Baltimore on several companies of a regiment of Massachusetts troops, {p.16} who were on their way to the city of Washington in pursuance of a call for 75,000 men made by the President of the United States. On the day previous troops had been safely passed through the city under the escort of the police. In the afternoon of the same day (18th) the regiments from Massachusetts were expected, and provision was made by the police for their reception; but they did not arrive, and the board of police could not ascertain when they would come, although two of the members of the board went in person to the station of the Philadelphia Railroad Company to obtain the necessary information.

  On the morning of the 19th, about 10 o’clock, I was at my law office engaged in the performance of professional business, when three members of the city council came to me with a message from Marshal Kane, to the effect that he had just learned that the troops were about to arrive, and that be apprehended some disturbance. I immediately hastened to the board of police and gave notice. George M. Gill, esq., counselor of the city, and myself got into a carriage, and drove rapidly to the Camden station, and the police commissioners followed without delay. On reaching Camden station we found Marshal Kane in attendance, and the police coming in squads to the spot. The plan of the agents of the railroad companies was that the troops which were to arrive in the cars at the President-street station should in the same way be conveyed through the city, and be transferred to the cars for Washington at the Camden-street station. Accordingly, the police were requested by the agent of the road to be in attendance at the latter station. After considerable delay the troops began to arrive, and were transferred, under the direction of the police, to the Washington cars as rapidly as possible. There was a good deal of excitement, and a large and angry crowd assembled, but the transfer was safely effected. No one could tell whether more troops were expected or not. At this time an alarm was given that a mob was about to tear up the rails in advance of the train on the Washington road, and Marshal Kane ordered some of his men to go out on the road as far as the Relay House, if necessary, to protect the track.

  Soon afterwards, and when I was about to leave the station, supposing all danger to be over, news was brought to Commissioner Davis and myself, who were standing together, that other troops were left at the President-street station, and that the mob was tearing up the track on Pratt street. Mr. Davis immediately ran to summon a body of police to be sent to Pratt street, while I hastened alone down Pratt street towards President-street station. On arriving at the head of Smith’s wharf I found that anchors had been piled on the track so as to obstruct it, and Sergeant McComas and a few policemen who were with him were not allowed by the mob to remove the obstruction. I at once ordered the anchors to be removed, and my authority was not resisted.

  On approaching Pratt-street bridge I saw several companies of Massachusetts troops, who had left the cars, moving in column rapidly towards me. An attack on them had begun, and the noise and excitement were great. I ran at once to the head of the column, some persons in the crowd shouting, as I approached, “Here comes the mayor.” I shook hands with the officer in command, saying, as I did so, “I am the mayor of Baltimore.” I then placed myself by his side and marched with him as far as the head of Ligbt-street wharf, doing what I could by my presence and personal efforts to allay the tumult. The, mob grew bolder and the attack became more violent. Various persons were killed and wounded on both sides. The troops had some time previously begun to fire in self defense, and the firing, as the attack increased in violence became more general.

  {p.17}

  At last, when I found that my presence was of no use, either in preventing the contest or saving life, I left the head of the column, but immediately after I did so Marshal Kane, with about fifty policemen, from the direction of the Camden station, rushed to the rear of the troops, forming a line across the street and with drawn revolvers checking and keeping off the mob. The movement, which I saw myself, was perfectly successful and gallantly performed. I submit herewith Marshal Kane’s account of the affair, published on the 4th of Kay last,* which substantially agrees with my own.

  It is doing bare justice to say that the board of police, the marshal of police, and the men under his command, exerted themselves bravely, efficiently, skillfully, and in good faith to preserve the peace and protect life. If proper notice had been given of the arrival of the troops and of the number expected, the outbreak might have been prevented entirely; and but for the timely arrival of Marshal Kane with his force, as I have described, the bloodshed would have, been great. The wounded among the troops received the care and medical attention at the expense of the city, and the bodies of the killed were carefully and respectfully returned to their friends.

  The facts which I witnessed myself, and all that I have since heard, satisfy me that the attack was the result of a sudden impulse, and not of a premeditated scheme. But the effect on our citizens was for a time uncontrollable. In the intense excitement which ensued, which lasted for many days, and which was shared by men of all parties, and by our volunteer soldiers as well as citizens, it would have been impossible to convey more troops from the North through the city without a severe fight and bloodshed. Such an occurrence would have been fatal to the city, and accordingly to prevent it the bridges on the Northern Central Railroad and on the Philadelphia, Wilmington and Baltimore Railroad were, with the consent of the governor and by my order, with the co-operation of the board of police (except Mr. Charles D. Hinks, who was absent from the city), partially disabled and burned, so as to prevent the immediate approach of troops to the city, but with no purpose of hostility to the Federal Government. This act, with the motive which prompted it, has been reported by the board of police to the legislature of the State and approved by that body, and was also immediately communicated by me in person to the President of the United states and his Cabinet. I inclose a copy of the report made by the board of police to the legislature on the 3d of May last. **

  On the evening of the 19th of April, a portion of the military of the city were called out. On the 20th of April, your honorable body, by a unanimous vote, placed at my disposal the sum of $500,000 for the defense of the city, and the banks, with great patriotism and unanimity voluntarily offered to advance the money through a committee of their presidents, consisting of Messrs. Columbus O’Donnell, Johns Hopkins, and John Clark-, who notified me, in person, of the fact, on the morning of the 20th of April, at the mayor’s office. A number of citizens in all the wards volunteered for the purpose of defense, and were enrolled under the direction of the board of police; and for their use arms were partially provided. The Commander-in-Chief of the forces of the United States, with the approbation of the President, in view of the condition of affairs then existing in the city, on the earnest application of the governor of the State, of prominent citizens, and myself, ordered that hereafter the troops should not be brought through Baltimore, and {p.18} they were accordingly transported to Washington by way of Annapolis. But great danger existed to Baltimore from large bodies of unauthorized men at the North, who threatened to cut their way through the city, and visit upon it terrible vengeance for the acts of the 19th of April.

  As soon as this danger had passed away, and the excitement among our own citizens had sufficiently subsided, the military were dismissed, and the citizens who enrolled were disbanded by order of the board of police. The peace of the city had been preserved, and its safety and the persons and property of men, and men of all parties, protected under the circumstances of great peril and the most intense excitement, and it was hoped that affairs would be allowed to return as nearly as possible to their previous condition. To this end my efforts and those of the board were devoted. Large bodies of troops from the North have ever since passed through the city without molestation, and every proper precaution to accomplish that object was taken by the board of police, and carried out by the force.

  But civil war had began on the immediate border of our State. A great division of opinion in regard to it existed among the people, and the events which had occurred in the city, and their consequences, seem to have made an indelible impression on the minds of the authorities at Washington that the police force of the city of Baltimore was prepared to engage in hostility against the General Government whenever an opportunity should occur.

  The result has been very unfortunate. On the ground of military necessity, of the existence of which and of the measures required of it the Federal officers claim to be the sole judges, our city has been occupied by large bodies of troops in its central points; picket guards have been stationed along many of our streets; the arms provided by the city for its defense and those left by private individuals with the authorities for safe-keeping, the station-houses and other property of the city have been seized; operators in the police and fire-alarm telegraph office have been displaced and others substituted in their stead; the marshal of police and the board of police, with the exception of myself, have been arrested and are now imprisoned, in Fort McHenry, one only, who is in bad health, has been released on his parole; the writ of habeas corpus has been suspended; the police force, established under a law of the State, has been set aside by superseding the only power which could lawfully control it; a new police, without authority of law, has been established under the control of a marshal appointed by the commanding general, and all power to hold elections in the city has been for the present set aside by suspending the functions of the board under which alone, elections can lawfully be held.

  The grounds taken by Major-General Banks as a justification for these proceedings, and the position assumed by the board of police, respectively, will be found in the proclamations of the general and the protest of the board, which I inclose.***

  The hidden deposits of arms and ammunition referred to in the proclamation of June 27 are, I suppose, those found in the city hall, in reference to which a few words of explanation may be made. The arms consisted in part of muskets which belonged to the old police, established under the administration of Mr. Swann; of revolvers procured for the police, and of some rifles, carbines, &c., lately procured in part for the use of the police and in part for the defense of the city. The board of police considered it proper that there should be a sufficient {p.19} number of efficient weapons to arm the entire, police force in case of an emergency. There were not enough in the city hall for that purpose. An allegation has been made that some of the arms and ammunition belonged to the Massachusetts troops; but I am informed that this is not the case, except as to two muskets which were taken by the police from the hands of the mob. The ammunition at the hall, which was purchased for the defense of the city, was more than was entirely safe. Of this I was well aware, and should have ordered it to be removed if the city had any proper place of deposit; but I apprehended that any attempt at removal at this time would only lead to a seizure on the part of the officers of the General Government and to unfounded rumors and suspicions; for all the rest of the arms and ammunition belonging to the city, and all the arms left with the city authorities for safe-keeping, which were placed in depositories procured expressly for the purpose and in no way concealed, had been previously seized by the authorities of the United States under circumstances very mortifying to the pride of the people. That some of the arms and ammunition were concealed about the building is sufficiently explained by the fact that the officers in charge desired to secure them from seizure, but such concealment was made without my knowledge.

  The proclamation charges the existence of unlawful combinations of men organized for the resistance to the laws, for accumulating hidden deposits of arms, and encouraging contraband trade.

  Although I am only ex officio member of the board, and by reason of other engagements not able to be present at all their meetings, yet, from the free and fall interchange of views among us, and the custom of the members to consult me on all important questions, and my knowledge of all their proceedings, I feel that I have a right to say, of my own personal knowledge, that the board had no notice or information of any such combination, if any such existed, which I have no reason to suspect.

  Indeed, my experience of the fidelity of the board to its legal obligations during my whole official connection with it, and the common understanding between myself and my colleagues as to our course of duty since the present troubles began, justify me in saying that if any organization in this city for resistance to the laws could have been discovered by proper vigilance they would have been found out and suppressed to the extent of the powers conferred on the board by law.

  After the board of police had been superseded, and its members arrested by the order of General Banks, I proposed, in order to relieve the serious complications which had arisen, to proceed, as the only member left free to act, to exercise the power of the board as far as an individual member could do so. Marshal Kane, while he objected to the propriety of this course, was prepared to place his resignation in my hands whenever I should request it; and the majority of the board interposed no objection to my pursuing such course as I might deem it right and proper to adopt in view of the existing circumstances, and upon my own responsibility, until the board should be enabled to resume the exercise of its functions.

  If this arrangement could have been effected it would have continued in the exercise of their duties the police force, which is lawfully enrolled, and which has won the confidence and applause of all good citizens by its fidelity and impartiality at all times and under all circumstances. But the arrangement was not satisfactory to the Federal authorities.

  As the men of the police, force, through no fault of theirs, are now {p.20} prevented from discharging their duty, their pay constitutes a legal claim on the city, from which, in my opinion, it cannot be relieved.

  The new force which has been enrolled is in direct violation of the law of the State; and no money can be appropriated by the city, for its support without incurring the heavy penalties provided by the act of assembly. Officers in the fire-alarm and police telegraph department, who are appointed by the mayor and city council and not by the board of police, have been discharged, and others have been substituted in their place.

  I mention these facts with profound sorrow, and with no purpose whatever of increasing the difficulties unfortunately existing in this city, but because it is your right to be acquainted with the true condition of affairs, and because I cannot help entertaining the hope that redress will yet be afforded by the authorities of the United States upon a proper representation made by you. I am entirely satisfied that the suspicion entertained of any meditated hostility on the part of the city authorities against the General Government is wholly unfounded, and, with the best means of knowledge, express the confident belief and conviction that there is no organization of any kind among the people for such a purpose. I have no doubt that the officers of the United States have acted on information, which they deemed reliable, obtained from our own citizens, some of whom may be deluded by their fears, while others are actuated by baser motives; but suspicions thus derived can, in my judgment, form no sufficient justification for what I deem to be grave and alarming violations of the rights of individual citizens, of the city of Baltimore, and of the State of Maryland.

  Very respectfully,

  GEO. WM. BROWN, Mayor.

  * Not found, but see Kane’s statement of May 9, p. 13.

  ** No. 2, pp. 9-11.

  *** See “Arrest of the Baltimore Police Commissioners,” July 1, pp. 141,143.

  –––

  No. 5.

  Statement of George M. Gill.

  BALTIMORE, July 12, 1861.

  Hon. GEO. Wm. BROWN, Mayor of the City of Baltimore:

  In your communication to the city council of yesterday, which I did not see until after it was communicated to the council, you refer to the fact that I accompanied you on Friday, April 19, to the Camden station. There were some additional circumstances which I deem it proper to state. You desired me to accompany you, hoping that I might aid in preventing any violence on that day, or interruption to the troops then about to pass through, in case any should be attempted. Your impression was that no such attempt would be made, but nevertheless you thought every precaution should be taken, in case of any such attempt, to resist it. For the sole purpose of doing this I accompanied you.

  After we reached the Camden station there were manifestations of excitement among the crowd there assembled, and the police commissioners (excepting Mr. Hinks, then absent from the city) gave directions to Marshal Kane, in my presence, to use his whole force in keeping order and protecting the troops from being interrupted. The reply of Marshal Kane then made was, that if he and his whole force lost their lives the troops should be protected.

  After the first of the troops reached Camden station a rush of people was made at the cars in which they then were, but the police interfered {p.21} and drove them off. A cry was then raised to tear up the track outside of the Camden station, and a rush was made to accomplish this purpose; but the police a-gain interfered, and prevented this from being done.

  I supposed for some time that all the troops would pass in safety, and such was my anxious wish, and to the extent of my ability I united in the effort to produce this result.

  While I was at Camden station the events on Pratt street took place, none of which did I see, and therefore cannot speak of them further than I saw at a distance, and heard the firing of the troops as they passed up Pratt street.

  My impression on that day was and still is that the events arose from a sudden impulse which seized upon some of our people, and that after the firing commenced and blood was shed many persons took part under an impression that the troops were killing our people, and with out knowing the circumstances of provocation which induced the troops to fire. Matters reached their height after Mr. Davis was killed, and the intense excitement resulting from this and other causes produced a state of feeling which for a time was beyond control on the part of the city authorities.

  On Sunday, the 21st of April, whilst you were in Washington, where you had been summoned by the President, a regiment arrived from Pennsylvania, but were fortunately stopped at Cockeysville, about 14 miles off, by the disabled bridge at that point. Any rational man who witnessed the condition of things in Baltimore on that day can judge of the sad consequences which would have followed if the regiment had entered the city.

  Yours, very respectfully,

  GEO. M. GILL.

  –––

  APRIL 20, 1861.–Expedition to the Norfolk navy-yard, Va., and attempt to blow up the dry-dock.

  Report of Capt. H. G. Wright, U. S. Engineer Corps.

  WASHINGTON, D. C., April 26, 1861.

  COLONEL: I have the honor to report that, in obedience to the instructions [following] received from the headquarters of the Army on the 19th instant, I proceeded on the evening of the same day, on the United States steamer Pawnee, to Fort Monroe, where we arrived the next day at about 2 o’clock p. m., and communicated with commanding officer, Colonel Dimick. The object of the expedition was to secure to the United States, if possible, the navy-yard and property at Norfolk, with the ships of war then in that harbor; and, in furtherance of that object, My instructions authorized me to call upon the commanding officer at Fort Monroe for such force, to the extent of one regiment, as he could spare from the garrison without jeopardizing the safety of the fort. He accordingly assigned to the expedition one of the two regiments which had that morning arrived. This regiment, about 370 strong, under Colonel Wardrop, was promptly marched on board, and late in the afternoon the steamer proceeded to Norfolk, where she arrived some time after dark the same evening, the 20th instant.

  On reaching the yard it was found that all the ships afloat except the Cumberland had been scuttled, by order of Commodore McCauley, the commandant of the yard, to prevent their seizure by the Virginia forces, {p.22} and that they were fast sinking. One of the objects of the expedition-that of removing those vessels and taking them to sea-was therefore frustrated.

  On reporting to the commodore of the yard, I found him disposed to defend the yard and property to the last, and the troops were accordingly landed and some dispositions for defense taken. It was soon determined, however, by Commodore Paulding, who had come on the Pawnee from Washington, to finish the destruction of the scuttled ships, to burn and otherwise destroy, as far as practicable, the property in the yard, and withdraw with the frigate Cumberland, in tow of the Pawnee and a steam-tug which was lying at the yard.

  To Commander John Rodgers, of the Navy, and myself was assigned the duty of blowing up the dry-dock, assisted by forty men of the volunteers and a few men from the crew of the Pawnee. The dock, which is a massive structure of granite masonry, has a pumping gallery running along the back of one of the side walls, entering from the level of the bottom near the entrance gate, and terminating, as is understood, in the pumping-house, near the farther end of the dock. Under the circumstances of want of time for preparation and the darkness of night this gallery offered the only means for the establishment of a mine. Had the dock been full of water this advantage could not have been availed of but we found in it a depth of only about two feet. We accordingly proceeded to construct in this gallery a platform of such materials as could be collected to a height above the surface of the water, and on this we, placed the powder (2,000 pounds) which we had brought from the ship, established a train from the gallery to the outside, and connected with it four separate slow matches.

  Everything being arranged, all the men were sent to the ship, except one of the crew of the Pawnee, who was retained to watch for the signal from the commodore for lighting the matches and returning to the ship. On the signal, the matches were lighted by Captain Rodgers and myself, and we made the best of our way towards the landing, but before we could reach it the flames of the burning buildings had become so intense, that the boats had undoubtedly been driven off, and, indeed, we could not approach it. After some delay we succeeded in getting out of the yard through the burning gateway, and seized a boat, in the hope of making our escape by the river. We had proceeded but a short distance, however, when several shots were, fired at us from the Portsmouth side, and as the armed force was rapidly accumulating against us at a point below, where the river was narrow, and where we should have had to pass within effective musket range, we concluded to land on the Norfolk side and deliver ourselves up to the commanding general of the Virginia forces. He received us very kindly and courteously, and on giving him our parole he provided us with comfortable quarters at the Atlantic Hotel. This was on Sunday morning, about 6 o’clock. On Monday, at noon, he sent us with an officer to Richmond, where we were most kindly treated by the governor and his family, and by the gentlemen there present from the various parts of Virginia. We remained as guests of the governor, on parole, till Wednesday, the 24th, when we were released, and on Thursday morning we left for Washington.

  To Governor Letcher our especial thanks are due for the uniform kindness and consideration with which he treated us. Probably to protect us from any annoyance from the populace of Richmond he accompanied us to the cars at 6 o’clock in the morning, and to further shield us from possible annoyance along the road he detailed two officers of the Virginia forces to conduct us safe, to Washington, where we arrived yesterday, between 4 and 5 o’clock p. m.

  {p.23}

  From what we could learn in Norfolk, I am of opinion that the attempt to destroy the dock did not succeed. We were told that the mine did explode and that it did not. Three separate explosions took place after we got clear of the yard, one of which I presumed at the time to have been the dock mine, yet after considering all the contradictory rumors it seems probable that the structure is uninjured.

  In addition to this report, I desire to submit a rather more extended narrative, which may possess some interest hereafter.

  I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

  H. G. WRIGHT, Captain of Engineers.

  Lieut. Col. E. D. TOWNSEND, Asst. Adjt. Gen., Hdqrs. of the Army, Washington, D. C.

  –––

  HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, Washington, April 19, 1861.

  Capt. H. G. WRIGHT, Corps of Engineers, Washington;

  SIR: You are selected as an engineer officer of high science and judgment, to repair promptly to the United States navy-yard at Gosport, Va., and to tender your professional services to the commodore there in command in designing and executing a plan of defense for the same.

  You will find the commodore instructed by his Department to expect you in your professional capacity.

  I think it best that you should first call at Fort Monroe and consult Colonel Dimick on sending a portion of its garrison to assist in the defense of the navy-yard.

  If two volunteer regiments shall have joined him, he may spare one of them for that purpose perhaps, but this must depend on the threatening circumstances about him; and if but one volunteer regiment has joined, the colonel may, after consulting you, deem it safe to detach two or three companies of regulars for duty at the navy-yard Show him this letter and give him a copy of it for his warrant.

  Both of you will bear in mind that, although the navy-yard and its contents are deemed to be of very great importance, Fort Monroe is still more so to the Union.

  You will lose no opportunity of reporting to the Adjutant-General your progress in carrying out these instructions.

  WINFIELD SCOTT.

  –––

  MAY 5, 1861.-Evacuation of Alexandria, Va., by the Confederate forces.

  REPORTS.

  No. 1.–	Brig. Gen. P. St. George Cocke, C. S. A., with correspondence.
  No. 2.–	Lieut. Col. A. S. Taylor, Va. Vols., transmitted by General Cocke.

  No. 1.

  Reports of Brig. Gen. P. St. George Cocke, C. S. A., with correspondence.

  HEADQUARTERS POTOMAC DEPARTMENT, Culpeper Court-House, May 6, 1861-10 p. m.

  For the information of the commanding general-in-chief, I herewith transmit a copy of the letter of instructions sent by me on the 5th instant, by an express, “by rail,” to Colonel Taylor, commanding at {p.24} Alexandria. I report, in this connection, that I know the fact that Colonel Taylor received that letter of instruction upon the arrival of the messenger at Alexandria, on the 5th instant, by the regular train from this place on the morning of that day. Mr. F. G. Skinner, now here, and who was on the 5th instant in Alexandria, is my authority for the above statement; and Mr. Skinner tells me that he saw that letter of instruction in the hands of Colonel Taylor, and discussed with him the purport of it prior to the movement of the troops out of Alexandria on the afternoon or evening of that day (yesterday). I this day sent by telegraph to the commanding general-in-chief a full abstract of the only letter or communication I have received from Colonel Taylor alluding to or explaining the movement of the troops out of Alexandria. Nor have I been able, from any other source, except that furnished me by the arrival of Mr. Skinner, direct from Alexandria, by the train of this morning, to learn the cause of that movement; and, so far as I am informed up to this moment, there was no proper or justifiable cause whatsoever for any such movement. After waiting for further intelligence and receiving none, and duly considering and weighing all the circumstances and bearing of that movement with the information before me, I have ordered the return of the troops, as communicated by telegram, a duplicate of which has just been transmitted to the general-in-chief.

  Very respectfully, your most obedient,

  PHILIP ST. GEO. COCKE, Brigadier-General, Commanding Potomac Department.

  Col. R. S. GARNETT, Adjutant-General, Richmond, Va.

  [Inclosure.]

  CULPEPER COURT-HOUSE, VA., May 5, 1861.

  Colonel TAYLOR, Commanding at Alexandria, Va.:

  SIR: You will not move the troops out of Alexandria unless pressed by overwhelming and irresistible numbers; and even then you should retire to Manassas Junction, to hold that point, assist in obstructing and breaking up the road between that point and Alexandria, harassing the enemy should he, attempt to use the road, and not retire farther in the interior unless overpowered and forced, as a last extremity, to so retire. You will use your cavalry and infantry in this connection, and, under these orders, which I have full authority from headquarters at Richmond for giving to you, keep up your communications with the various parts in your rear, so as to call every resource to your aid and support in making a gallant and fighting retreat, should you be forced to it, and can stand at all without danger of uselessly sacrificing your command.

  Very respectfully, your most obedient,

  PHILIP ST. GEO. COCKE, Brigadier General, Commanding Potomac Department.

  –––

  HEADQUARTERS POTOMAC DEPARTMENT, Culpeper Court-House, Va., May 7, 1861.

  SIR: Shall I arrest Colonel Taylor for disobedience of orders and unsoldier-like conduct, in having evacuated Alexandria, under the circumstances, {p.25} now fully developed to you and myself by the inclosed papers? I shall await your orders in this particular connection.

  Very respectfully, your most obedient servant,

  PHILIP ST. GEO. COCKE, Brigadier-General, Commanding Potomac Department.

  Major-General LEE, Commander-in-Chief.

  [Inclosures.]

  CULPEPER COURT-HOUSE, VA., May 7, 1861-6.45 a. m.

  Col. R. S. GARNETT, Adjutant-General:

  SIR: After writing you last night, and having previously ascertained during the day and up to 10 o’clock p. m. last night that I could not communicate with the command of Colonel Taylor after Colonel Terrett left Alexandria, to go to him at Springfield, because, after several attempts, through the telegraph operator at Alexandria, to send a dispatch through various persons, none of whom could be found in Alexandria, and when the operator finally advised me that not one single man connected with the military had been left to speak to me through the wires, I immediately determined to send one of my aides, Giles B. Cooke, to put myself in communication with Colonels Taylor and Terrett; and, accordingly, Mr. Cooke left me at 2 o’clock last night, by an extra train, bearing copies of the telegrams which I had failed to put through to Colonel Terrett, because of his departure from Alexandria for Springfield, no one having been left at Alexandria in whom I could confide and through whom I might have transmitted it; and bearing also a letter of instructions sent by me to Colonel Terrett, a copy of which is herewith transmitted. Mr. Cooke will proceed to Alexandria with dispatch, after having communicated with Colonel Terrett, and will once more enable me to have one person at least in Alexandria with whom I can, converse through the wires. He is instructed to give me information upon which I can rely the moment of his arrival at Alexandria.

  Very respectfully,

  PHILIP ST. GEO. COCKE, Brigadier-General, Commanding.

  HEADQUARTERS POTOMAC DEPARTMENT.

  Colonel TERRETT, Commanding Troops at or near Alexandria, Va.:

  SIR: I have endeavored up to this moment to communicate with you by telegraph, through Alexandria, and learn through the operator there that not one single military man has been left at that end of the wire. I send Mr. Cooke, my second aide, by extra train, to put me in communication with you and your command, and to convey to you the substance of telegrams which have been stopped in Alexandria in the hands of the operator. By these you will find that I am not informed of any circumstance whatsoever that could have furnished just and sufficient cause, or any cause at all, for the movement of the troops out of Alexandria; and, as all my orders from headquarters, and all my own purposes in accordance therewith, and my late order to Colonel Taylor, enjoined the holding of the troops in Alexandria until absolutely driven out by force of arms, and even then to retire fighting, if possible without endangering the unnecessary destruction of your force, I must therefore now order that the troops return to Alexandria, if it be practicable, and if any movement of the enemy has taken place unknown to me, and which {p.26} would render that return impracticable and really dangerous, and if, as I believe, no such movement has taken place, return the troops to the position they occupied with as little delay as possible. If, however, there has been any new and threatening movement by the enemy unknown to me, and which in your judgment may render it impracticable or imprudent to return to Alexandria, communicate the fact to me, and, in the mean time, exercise a sound discretion as to your acting.

  By order of Philip St. George Cocke, brigadier-general, commanding:

  GILES B. COOKE, Aide-de-Camp.

  –––

  HEADQUARTERS VIRGINIA FORCES, Richmond, Va., May 8, 1861.

  Col. P. ST. GEORGE COCKE, Commanding Potomac Division:

  COLONEL: I am instructed by Major-General Lee to acknowledge the receipt of your communication of the 6th instant, with accompanying papers, in relation to the evacuation of Alexandria, asking whether you shall arrest Colonel Taylor, Virginia Volunteers. The general commanding directs that you will not arrest Colonel Taylor, but require from him an explanation.

  Respectfully, &c.,

  J. M. BROOKE, Virginia Navy, Acting Aide-de-Camp.

  –––

  No. 2.

  Report of Lieut. Col. A. S. Taylor, Va. Vols., transmitted by General Cocke.

  HEADQUARTERS POTOMAC DEPARTMENT, Culpeper Court-House, Va., May 13, 1861.

  Major-General LEE, Commander-in-Chief:

  SIR: I have the honor to transmit herewith the reply of Col. A. S. Taylor to my call on him, at your suggestion, for a statement of the causes and reasons which induced him to evacuate the post of Alexandria on Sunday, May 5, as reported by me to headquarters some time since.

  Very respectfully, your most obedient,

  PHILIP ST. GEO. COCKE, Commanding Potomac Department.

  [Inclosure.]

  CULPEPER COURT-HOUSE, VA., May 9, 1861.

  SIR: I have just received your communication of this date, calling upon me, by order of the general-in-chief, to give in writing my “reasons” and “causes” why I retired from Alexandria with the troops under ray command.

  In the first place, because of the inefficient condition of a large proportion of the troops and my exposed and indefensible position. Under my command there were two companies of raw Irish recruits, numbering about one hundred and twenty privates in both, armed with the altered flint-lock muskets of 1818, and without cartridges or caps; Captain Devaughn’s company (Mount Vernon Guards), eighty-six privates, {p.27} armed with the new musket-fifty-two men without accouterments and fifteen without arms, and very little ammunition; Captain Simpson’s company of rifles, numbering in all fifty-three, and well armed with the minie rifle, and about nine rounds of ammunition complete; Captain Herbert’s company of rifles, numbering eighty-five, rank and file, armed with the minie rifle, and with an average of five rounds of cartridges and four of caps; Captain Balls company of cavalry, numbering forty privates, armed with carbines and sabers, and with a very limited amount of ammunition; Captain Powell’s company of cavalry, numbering about thirty, and twenty-two horses, no arms or equipments of any kind except a few of Colt’s revolvers.

  In the second place, the men were becoming almost useless from home influences. All but Captain Simpson’s company belonged to Alexandria (and were necessarily scattered over the city), and it would have been impossible to have assembled the command at any particular point in time to have defended itself with the slightest possibility of success, or even to have made anything but a disastrous and demoralizing retreat in the face of an enemy.

  In the third place, I was possessed of apparently, such reliable information that the Government at Washington would occupy Alexandria on the 6th or 7th instant, and knowing that a large force was being concentrated at Fort Washington and that two steamers were anchored off Mount Vernon, I was induced to suppose that from that point an attempt would be made, in concert with a force from Washington City, to hem in my small and inefficient command, and thereby the services of good material be lost to my State and our cause.

  I inclose herewith an order,* which was obtained secretly by Mr. J. D. Hutton, who was formerly employed in the War Department, and which shows the intention of the Federal Government as to Alexandria. The foregoing are my reasons and the causes for retiring to. Springfield, and, in addition to which, from that position I could the more successfully assist in breaking up and destroying the road.

  Very respectfully,

  A. S. TAYLOR, Lieutenant-Colonel, Virginia Volunteers.

  Col. P. ST. GEORGE COCKE, Commanding Potomac Department of Virginia Volunteers.

  * Not found.

  –––

  MAY 9, 1861.–Exchange of shots between the United States steamer Yankee and the batteries at Gloucester Point, Va.

  Report of Bvt. Col. Justin Dimick, Second U. S. Artillery.

  HEADQUARTERS FORT MONROE, VA., May 10, 1861.

  COLONEL: I have been informed by Flag Officer Pendergrast that on the 7th instant a battery of three guns was discovered at Gloucester Point, on the York River, nearly opposite Yorktown. One of the small steamers attached to the Home Squadron (the Yankee) exchanged several shots with it yesterday, but as there was one 8-inch gun in the battery and those of the steamer were of much shorter range her commander hauled off.

  With regard to the force necessary here, the portions of the surrounding country which should be occupied, and the defenses erected for the {p.28} protection of the fort, the commanding general and General Totten are much better able to judge than myself. It appears to me, however, that the sand hills, some two thousand yards from the fort, should be occupied and a battery built there. To do this will require a larger force than I have at my disposal. Colonel De Russy suggests that a battery should be erected near the picket bridge on the Hampton side. In the vicinity is a spring (apparently inexhaustible) of fine water, which may be of the highest importance, though with the present command I entertain no apprehension of a scarcity of water, as, in addition to the supply in the fort, there is a large quantity at the hotel.

  The mail-boat from Baltimore was allowed to land the mails here yesterday, and the mail for Norfolk sent there in the steamer William Selden. She has not, however, returned, and I presume has been seized.

  I inclose herewith a copy of a letter which was yesterday transmitted by mail, and will add that I cannot urge too strongly the necessity of immediately authorizing the repairing of the wharves and of sending the laborers asked for.

  Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

  J. DIMICK, Col. Comdg.

  Lieut. Col. E. D. TOWNSEND, Asst. Adjt. Gen., Hdqrs. Army, Washington, D. C.

  –––

  MAY 13, 1861.–Baltimore, Md., garrisoned by United States troops.

  No. 1.–	Dispatches from General Scott to General Butler.
  No. 2.–	Report of Brig. Gen. B. F. Butler, Massachusetts Militia.
  No. 3.–	General Butler’s proclamation.

  No. 1.

  Reports of Brig. Gen. Walter Gwynn, commanding at Norfolk.

  WASHINGTON, D. C., May 14, 1861.

  Brig. Gen. BENJAMIN F. BUTLER, Commanding Department of Annapolis, Md.:

  SIR: Your hazardous occupation of Baltimore was made without my knowledge, and of course without my approbation. It is a God-send that it was without conflict of arms. It is also reported that you have sent a detachment to Frederick, but this is impossible. Not a word have I received from you as to either movement. Let me hear from you.

  Very respectfully, yours,

  WINFIELD SCOTT.

  –––

  WASHINGTON, D. C., May 15, 1861-2.17 a. m.

  Brigadier-General BUTLER, Commanding Dep’t of Annapolis, at Baltimore, Md.:

  I do not understand your telegram, “Send us more detachments till further orders.”

  Issue no more proclamations.

  Why assume the authority to call for re-enforcements from General Patterson?

  Answer my letter of last evening.

  Did you leave any men it Relay House? Look to their safety.

  Not a word received from you in several days.

  Patterson’s re-enforcements will beat Locust Point this morning early.

  WINFIELD SCOTT.

  {p.29}

  –––

  No. 2.

  Report of Brig. Gen. Benjamin, F. Butler, Massachusetts Militia.

  HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF ANNAPOLIS, Federal Hill, Baltimore, May 15, 1861.

  I received your telegram this morning, and hasten to reply in detail.

  In obedience to verbal directions, received from the War Department through Mr. Harriman at 1 1/2 o’clock on Monday [12th instant], at the Relay Station, I caused a portion of the force there situated-that is to say, 500 men of the Sixth Massachusetts Regiment, under Colonel Jones; 450 men of the Eighth New York Regiment, under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Waterbury; and a section of Cook’s battery, with Major Cook-to march for Baltimore at 6 o’clock.

  We disembarked from, the cars without difficulty, and took possession of Federal Hill amid the plaudits of many of the people and a violent thunder-storm. We were disturbed during the night by a report of a riot, in which the United States recruiting regiment was being attacked. This called us to arms about midnight, and the men so remained until morning in a drenching rain with the utmost patience. It turned out upon investigation that this was only a feint of the secessionists to cover a plundering of a quantity of arms between 1 and 2 o’clock from those stored by the city nearly opposite the customhouse.

  Thus the carrying off of some four or five hundred stand of arms was accomplished by the police under the direction of the board of police. I found certain other arms being shipped, apparently for improper purposes, to a place called Snow Hill. I have sent out and brought in forty minie rifles. The remaining arms stored opposite the custom-house, amounting to twenty-seven hundred stand, I have caused to be seized and sent to Fort McHenry. I have caused Mr. Ross Winans to be arrested and sent to Annapolis; but for greater safety, as I have no place of confinement save a jail, I shall cause him to be removed to Fort McHenry, there to await the action of the civil authorities, unless otherwise ordered. I have found several manufactories of arms, supplies, and munitions of war for the rebels, who are being constantly supplied from the city.

  A specimen of an explosive minie rifle-ball, the experiments with which, under Crosby, at Woolwich, were so satisfactory, I herewith inclose for your inspection. This manufactory (carried on, I am ashamed to say, by a Massachusetts man) I shall cause to be stopped. I propose this morning to seize a quantity of powder stored in Greenmount Cemetery, of which I will report to you. I had an interview with the mayor and some other gentlemen. He, informed me that he did not consider it the duty of the city authorities actively to co-operate in preventing the forwarding of arms and munitions of war to the rebels.

  I have issued a proclamation, a copy of which I inclose [No. 3], and which I trust you will approve. It became necessary, in my judgment, in order to set right the thousand conflicting stories and rumors of the intentions of the Government as to Baltimore, which were taken advantage of by the mob to incite insubordination and encourage a spirit of insurrection, and which showed itself upon our taking possession of the Government arms, but was instantly suppressed upon a show of force.

  I have not assumed to order re-enforcements from General Patterson. I have no need of either them or him, and can get along very well without either, with accustomed deliberation. I have had no report of the arrival of his troops early this morning. I have received no letter from {p.30} the Lieutenant-General for many days, and the first telegram this morning, to which I have replied with some degree of promptness. General Shriver, at Frederick, has telegraphed me frequently for aid to protect Monocacy Bridge. I sent his telegram to the Lieutenant-General asking for instructions, and that is the telegram misunderstood. I have provided for the safety of my camp at the Relay. I have asked for and obtained the Eighth Massachusetts Regiment from General Mansfield, on the promise that he should receive in their stead the Eighth New York.

  From some unexplained reason General Mansfield retained from the Eighth Massachusetts their camp equipage, which is the property of the State of Massachusetts, which retention has somewhat disordered my plans. But the Eighth Massachusetts are at the camp at the Relay House, and unless I have entirely mistaken my men, they, together with the balance of Jones’ Sixth Regiment and that part of the New York Eighth (consisting of about five hundred men) which I have left there, together with two sections of Cook’s battery, will be able, to hold that point against all comers, if not in safety, with success. I should be deeply grieved if in any of my acts I should exceed propriety of action by going either too fast or too far. I shall await and obey instructions implicitly, and keep the General-in-Chief advised of every movement so far as possible, so that I may have the instructions and directions to which the country looks for control and safety in the peril of the hour.

  I have the honor to announce further the completion of the railroad connection between Washington and tide-water at Annapolis. With the means of transportation now provided, we can move 5,000 troops daily between Washington and Annapolis. As soon as I receive further communication I will send a more detailed report. I have also the honor to communicate the capture of the steam gun, and the fact that I have found men in the Sixth Massachusetts Regiment who have been able to put it in operation, and it is now in full working order.

  I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

  BENJ. F. BUTLER, Brigadier-General, Commanding.

  Lieutenant-General SCOTT.

  –––

  No. 3.

  General Butler’s proclamation.

  DEPARTMENT OF ANNAPOLIS, Federal Hill, Baltimore, May 14, 1861.

  A detachment of the forces of the Federal Government under my command have occupied the city of Baltimore for the purpose, among other things, of enforcing respect and obedience to the laws, as well of the State-if requested thereto by the civil authorities-as of the United States laws, which are being violated within its limits by some malignant and traitorous men, and in order to testify the acceptance by the Federal Government of the fact that the city and all the well-intentioned portion of its inhabitants are loyal to the Union and the Constitution, and are to be so regarded and treated by all. To the end, therefore, that all misunderstanding of the purpose of the Government may be, prevented, mid to set at rest all unfounded, false, and seditious rumors; to relieve all apprehensions, if any are felt, by the well-disposed portion {p.31} of the community, and to make it thoroughly understood by all traitors, their aiders and abettors, that rebellious acts must cease, I hereby, by the authority vested in me as commander of the Department of Annapolis, of which Baltimore forms a part, do now command and make known that no loyal and well-disposed citizen will be disturbed in his lawful occupation or business; that private property will not be interfered with by the men under my command, or allowed to be interfered with by others, except in so far as it may be used to afford aid and comfort to those in rebellion against the Government, whether here or elsewhere, all of which property, munitions of war, and that fitted to aid and support the rebellion, will be seized and held subject to confiscation; and, therefore, all manufacturers of arms and munitions of war are hereby requested to report to me forthwith, so that the lawfulness of their occupation may be known and understood, and all misconstruction of their doings be avoided. No transportation from the city to the rebels of articles fitted to aid and support troops in the field will be permitted, and the fact of such transportation, after the publication of this proclamation, will be taken and received as proof of illegal intention on the part of the consignors, and will render the goods liable to seizure and confiscation.

  The Government being ready to receive all such stores and supplies, arrangements will be made to contract for them immediately, and the owners and manufacturers of such articles of equipments and clothing and munitions of war and provisions are desired to keep themselves in communication with the Commissary-General, in order that their workshops may be employed for loyal purposes, and the artisans of the city resume and carry on their profitable occupations.

  The acting assistant quartermaster and commissary of subsistence of the United States here, stationed has been instructed to proceed and furnish at fair prices 40,000 rations for the use of the Army of the United States, and further supplies will be drawn from the city to the full extent of its capacity, if the patriotic and loyal men choose so to furnish supplies.

  All assemblages, except the ordinary police, of armed bodies of men, other than those regularly organized and commissioned by the State of Maryland, and acting under the orders of the governor thereof, for drill and other purposes, are forbidden within the department.

  All officers of the militia of Maryland having command within the limits of the department are requested to report through their officers forthwith to the general in command, so that he may be able to know and distinguish the regularly commissioned and loyal troops of Maryland from armed bodies who may claim to be such.

  The, ordinary operations of the corporate government of the city of Baltimore and of the civil authorities will not be interfered with, but, on the contrary, will be aided by all the power at the command of the general, upon proper call being made, and all such authorities are cordially invited to co-operate with the general in command to carry out the Purposes set forth in the proclamation, so that the city of Baltimore may be shown to the country to be, what she is in fact, patriotic and loyal to the Union, the Constitution, and the laws.

  No flag, banner, ensign, or device of the so-called Confederate States, or any of them, will be permitted to be raised or shown in this department, and the exhibition of either of them by evil-disposed persons will be deemed and taken to be evidence of a design to afford aid and comfort, to the enemies of the country. To make it more apparent that the Government of the United States by far more relies upon the loyalty, patriotism, {p.32} and zeal of the good citizens of Baltimore and vicinity than upon any exhibition of force calculated to intimidate them into that obedience to the laws which the Government doubts not will be paid from inherent respect and love of order, the commanding general has brought to the city with him, of the many thousand troops in the immediate neighborhood, which might be at once concentrated here, scarcely more than an ordinary guard, and until it fails him, he will continue to rely upon that loyalty and patriotism of the citizens of Maryland which have never yet been found wanting to the Government in time of need. The general in command desires to greet and treat in this part of his department all the citizens thereof as friends and brothers, having a common purpose, a common loyalty, and a common country. Any infractions of the law by the troops under his command, or any disorderly, unsoldierlike conduct, or any interference with private property, he desires to have immediately reported to him, and pledges himself that if any soldier so far forgets himself as to break those laws that he has sworn to defend and enforce, he shall be most rigorously punished.

  The general believes that if the suggestions and requests contained in this proclamation are faithfully carried out by the co-operation of all good and Union-loving citizens, and peace and quiet and certainty of future peace and quiet are thus restored, business will resume its accustomed channels, trade take the place of dullness and inactivity, efficient labor displace idleness, and Baltimore will be in fact, what she is entitled to be, in the front rank of the commercial cities of the nation.

  Given at Baltimore the day and year herein first above written.

  BENJ. F. BUTLER, Brigadier-General, Commanding Department of Annapolis.

  E. C. PARKER, Lieutenant-Colonel, Aide-de-Camp.

  –––

  MAY 14, 1861.–Seizure of railroad train at Harper’s Ferry, W. Va.

  Report of Brig. Gen. B. F. Butler, Massachusetts Militia.

  BALTIMORE, May 15, 1861-1.25 a. m.

  I have just received the following telegram:

  FREDERICK, May 14-11.10 p. m.

  Danger is apprehended at the Monocacy Bridge to-night. An engine and cars were seized at Harper’s Ferry at 2 o’clock to-day. All connections west are cut off since 8 o’clock to-night. We are guarding the wires as far as our forces enable us. Please send us immediate relief. Answer quick as possible by telegraph.

  EDWARD SHRIVER, Brigadier-General.

  What instructions have I upon this point, which is not within my department? Please answer immediately. Ross Winans is now in Annapolis under arrest.

  B. F. BUTLER, Brigadier-General, Commanding.

  Lieutenant-General SCOTT.

  {p.33}

  MAY 18-19, 1861.-Engagement between the United States steamer Monticello and the battery at Sewell’s Point, Va.

  REPORTS.

  No. 1.–	Brig. Gen. Walter Gwynn, commanding Confederate forces at Norfolk.
  No. 2.–	Capt. Peyton H. Colquitt, commanding at Sewell’s Point.

  No. 1.

  Reports of Brig. Gen. Walter Gwynn, commanding at Norfolk.

  NORFOLK, VA., May 20, 1861.

  The enemy fired on the unfinished battery at Sewell’s Point on the 18th, but did no damage. There were at that time no gun’s mounted or nearer than Norfolk. I sent forward three guns immediately and two of the rifled cannon. Got them in position at 5 p. m. on the 19th. Soon after the enemy opened fire, which was returned and kept up one and a half hours, when the vessel from which the guns were fired withdrew. A fuller report will be made to-morrow. Just returned from Sewell’s Point. Reports in from the pickets at all points.

  No immediate attack apprehended. Troops thrown forward and in position. Confident of making defense good. I am strengthening, to some extent, my position. Want six hundred laborers, and am re-enforcing the batteries, which takes off so many men that additional troops are required.

  WALTER GWYNN.

  R. S. GARNETT, Adjutant-General Virginia Forces.

  –––

  HEADQUARTERS FORCES OF VIRGINIA AROUND NORFOLK, May 20, 1861.

  SIR: I have the honor to inform you that, late in the evening of the 18th instant, I received intelligence of an attack, made by the enemy’s steamer Monticello, on the unfinished works at Sewell’s Point. This battery was not sufficiently advanced at the time to receive its armament and garrison. The Monticello carried three guns, one of which was a heavy 10-inch Dahlgren. With these she kept up a constant fire with solid shot and shell for more than an hour, when a steam-tug, from Old Point, carrying one gun, came to her aid, and the two vessels continued the cannonade until the close of the day, without any serious injury to the works. The tug then returned to Old Point, and the Monticello moored, with broadside on, with the intention, apparently, of continuing the attack, in order to demolish the works or prevent their progress. Early on the morning of the 19th I hurried on the guns and equipment, and repaired to Sewell’s Point, to expedite the works for their reception, and by 5 p. m. succeeded in getting three 32-pounders and two small rifled guns into position, while detachments of infantry and artillery, ordered from neighboring posts, occupied the battery and contiguous points. During all this time the Monticello, apparently not suspecting the operations going forward, was engaged in preparing for another effort, by calculating the range and distance and adjusting her guns to suit. With instructions to Captain Colquitt, of Georgia, to whom I gave the command of all the forces and guns at the post, to continue {p.34} the preparations, reserving his fire until the enemy renewed the cannonade, I returned to Norfolk. At 5.30 o’clock the Monticello again opened fire from all her guns, and with much greater precision than on the preceding day. It was instantly returned, and with such effect that she was driven off and returned to Old Point. The engagement continued for an hour and a half without intermission on either side, and, though the enemy’s fire was well directed, one shell bursting within an embrasure and several others directly over the battery, while solid shot repeatedly passed through the embrasures and struck the crest and sides of the merlons, hurling masses of earth from the outside among the gunners, I am happy to inform you that no casualty of moment occurred to the troops, nor was material injury done to the battery. What damage or loss was sustained by the enemy I was not able to discover, but his retreat indicated that our fire had become too warm for further endurance. As early as I received information of the second attack and repulse, I ordered forward more troops, and hastened, during the night, to Sewell’s Point, to make such other dispositions as might be necessary to defend the post against any further and more formidable assaults which the enemy’s large naval and military forces at Old Point would enable him to make.

  I cannot close this brief account of the engagement without expressing my admiration of the enthusiasm and bravery manifested by the troops. Where officers and men displayed so much merit it would be invidious to discriminate, and I therefore refer you to the accompanying report of Captain Colquitt for further particulars. His position, as commanding officer of the post, gave him an opportunity of displaying the qualities which adorn the soldier, and the general appreciation of his gallantry and merit by those under his command enable me to commend him most warmly to your consideration.

  In conclusion, I would state that, in consequence of the want of a Virginia or Confederate flag for the occasion, the flag of Georgia, belonging to Captain Colquitt’s company, was planted on the ramparts during the engagement, and, while the hottest fire was prevailing, two members of his company, whose names I will forward you when reported to me as deserving particular notice, fearlessly passed to the outside of the battery, and deliberately removed the sand and other obstructions to the range of one of the guns while shot and shell were striking all about them.

  I am, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

  WALTER GWYNN.

  Major-General LEE, Commanding Forces of Virginia, Richmond, Va.

  –––

  No. 2.

  Report of Capt. Peyton H. Colquitt, Commanding at Sewell’s Point.

  SEWELL’S POINT, VA., May 19, 1861.

  SIR: I have the honor to report to you an engagement this evening between the Confederate troops, consisting of the City Light Guards, Columbus, Ga.; Wood’s Rifles, Captain Lamb; detachment of the Norfolk Juniors, under Lieutenant Holmes; detachment of Light Artillery Blues, under Lieutenant Nash, all under my command, and the steamer Monticello and Federal steam-tug, which lasted for one hoar and a half, {p.35} in which nobody was hurt on our side. The enemy fired with great accuracy, several balls passing through the embrasures of the fort, one striking a 32-pounder within the battery, and one shell bursting in the fort. From three to five shots from our battery took effect, we, think; others struck around the steamer. The troops acted with great bravery, and I had to restrain them in their enthusiasm. The flag of Georgia was hoisted over the fort in the absence of the Confederate flag. Our firing was less frequent than that of the enemy, as our ammunition was scarce; only two rounds left after the engagement. Your aides, Maj. William E. Taylor, R. R. Collier, and Col. Thomas Newton, were present and aided in the struggle.

  I have the honor to be, your, obedient servant,

  PEYTON H. COLQUITT.

  Major-General GWYNN, Commanding forces, Norfolk Harbor.

  P. S.-Two members of the City Light Guards (Georgia) dug away the sand in front of one of the port-holes during the hottest of the fire.

  –––

  MAY 23, 1861.-Demonstration upon Hampton, Va.

  REPORTS.

  No. 1.–	Maj. J. B. Cary, Virginia Artillery.
  No. 2.–	Col. John B. Magruder, commanding Confederate forces.

  No. 1.

  Report of Maj. J. B. Cary, Virginia Artillery.

  HAMPTON, VA., May 23, 1861.

  SIR: I have the honor to inform you that quite a full regiment of the enemy, estimated, by count of companies, to contain eight hundred men, under command of Colonel Phelps, made a demonstration against this place this afternoon, between 4 and 5 o’clock, which seemed at first to wear a very ugly aspect, but which, happily, resulted in no damage, save the alarm of our women and children and the excitement of our citizens.

  I had nearly perfected my arrangements for the defense indicated in your instructions, by making preparations for the destruction of all the bridges leading across the main tributary of Back River as well as the Hampton Bridge. Unfortunately, the absence during the day of the party chosen for the firing of the latter, and the consequent failure to have the combustibles on the spot, delayed operations so far that the enemy were in sight before the fire could be started, though it would have made sufficient progress, I think, to have arrested their entrance into the town. At this stage, meeting with Lieutenant Cutshaw, at his suggestion I sent him forward as my aid to demand of the colonel the intent of his approach with so large a body of men, and being assured that he came with no hostile purpose, but simply, as he said, by order of General Butler, to reconnoiter, and having received the subsequent assurance from him in person that be would make no attack upon our people nor injure, their property in any way unless he himself was molested, and coinciding in your view that defense at this point was Useless and hopeless, I aided him in extinguishing the fire, and gave the {p.36} assurance that be should not be fired upon by the volunteer force under my command (which, by the way, had by that time nearly retreated to the line of defense which I intended to occupy and where I designed making the first resistance). I also urged our citizens to abstain from any attack, which counsel, I am pleased to say, prevailed with them. The entire body then marched into the town as far as the intersection of our main streets, halted for a short while, and then returned. I have since learned that this body was supported by about three hundred men, with a battery of six brass pieces, and that there was a still further reserve on the march. But this latter information I do not consider so reliable. I have only to add, in this connection, that the force at my command, as estimated by information since derived from the several captains, was only one hundred and thirty men on the approach of the enemy. This demonstration, in my judgment, indicates the propriety of removing the camp farther from Hampton than the point already agreed upon. Our people have responded very indifferently to the call for aid in erecting intrenchments at the points indicated by you, and the proposed location of the camp is distinctly visible from the dome of the Chesapeake Female College, if not from the ramparts of the fort, and I do not doubt but that the erection of the first tent would be the signal for another such demonstration. Under this conviction I shall delay operations on the camp until I receive your reply, though nearly all the timber is at hand, and operations would have commenced in the morning. The order directing the removal of the cannon had been carried into execution, and they were beyond the reach of seizure.

  I make no comments, restricting myself to a brief statement, merely remarking that Lieutenant Cutshaw, who was present most of the time, will be at the Grove Wharf to-morrow, and can give detailed information on all points not sufficiently elucidated. As soon as they left I sent a dispatch to the battalion to return in order to the town for the discharge of their usual duties.

  I have the honor to remain, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

  J. B. CARY, Major Artillery, Virginia Volunteers.

  Lieut. Col. BENJ. S. EWELL, Active Virginia Volunteers, Williamsburg, Va.

  –––

  No. 2.

  Reports of Col. John B. Magruder, commanding Confederate forces.

  STEAMER LOGAN, West Point, Va., May 24, 1861-5 p. m.

  SIR: A person, said to be reliable by the captain of this boat, states that he fled from Hampton last night, and that twenty-five hundred troops had taken possession of it. I have to request that two lighters, with three hands each, be sent to Jamestown Island as soon as possible, to establish communication with that place and the mainland. At present supplies for Williamsburg have to be carried eight miles, I believe at King’s Mills, and of course liable to be seized by the enemy. They can be furnished at once in Richmond and sent down by the daily steamers. I have earnestly to request that a portion of the cavalry already organized should be sent to me at Yorktown or Williamsburg. No reliable information can be attained without them. This steamer {p.37} can carry twenty-five hundred men per day, with smaller vessels sent to take their baggage. She can carry three troops of horse a day, fifty horses each. I shall need at least four companies of cavalry to operate against the advance of troops from Hampton, to cut off their parties, to harass them on the march, and to beat up their quarters at night; and, to make these more effective, I know of no greater service the section of navy howitzers at Gloucester Point can do more than to operate with this cavalry. The advance could even be checked by this small force thus constituted. I should mount the artillery with the means of the country for this purpose. This can be done at once. I have no doubt they cannot be of much use anywhere as fixed batteries, and could at anytime be recalled to Richmond, if required there. Should it be deemed advisable to send cavalry immediately, as I earnestly hope may be the case, I have the honor to state that both Lieutenant-Colonel Ewell and Lieutenant-Colonel Pegram have stated to me their desire to command such a detachment under my command.

  I have the honor to be, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

  J. B. MAGRUDER, Colonel, Commanding Troops on York and James Rivers.

  To Colonel GARNETT.

  –––

  STEAMER LOGAN, Yorktown, Va., May 24, 1861-11.30 p. m.

  SIR: Since arriving at this point I have learned that the news which was forwarded to you from West Point was incorrect. Only one thousand troops were marched into Hampton, which they only occupied for a short time. A small surveying party was landed at Newport News. There is no cavalry between this and Hampton. One company there. Not a horseman nor a wagon here. Mr. Anderson, the bearer, win give further particulars.

  I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

  J. B. MAGRUDER, Colonel, Commanding.

  Colonel GARNETT.

  –––

  MAY 24, 1861.-Advance of Union Army into Virginia and occupation of Arlington Heights and Alexandria.

  REPORTS.

  No. 1.–	Maj. Gen. Charles W. Sandford, New York Militia.
  No. 2.–	Maj. Gen. Samuel P. Heintzelman, U. S. Army.
  No. 3.–	Col. Orlando B. Willcox, First Michigan Infantry.
  No. 4.–	Lieut. Col. N. L. Farnham, First Zouaves, New York Militia.
  No. 5.–	Brig. Gen. M. L. Bonham, C. S. Army.
  No. 6.–	Col. George H. Terrett, C. S. forces.

  No. 1.

  Report of Maj. Gen. C. W. Sandford, New York Militia.

  HEADQUARTERS FIRST DIVISION N. Y. S. M., Washington, May 28, 1861.

  GENERAL: Pursuant to your order, and the arrangements made with yourself and General Mansfield, I accompanied the center column which {p.38} crossed the Potomac by the Long Bridge, on the morning of the 24th instant, assuming the command of the troops on the Virginia side. The troops took position as follows:

  On the right, the Sixty-ninth Regiment N. Y. S. M., which crossed the Potomac Aqueduct, was posted near the canal culvert. The other two regiments of that wing (the Twenty-eighth N. Y. S. M. and the Fifth N. Y. S. M.) were thrown forward on the road to Leesburg, about two miles from the river. In the center, the Seventh N. Y. S. M. was placed at the head of the Long Bridge. The Twenty-fifth N. Y. S. M. was posted at the toll-gate and Vose’s Hill, on the Columbia turnpike. Three regiments of the New Jersey Brigade, under Brigadier-General Runyon, together with the Twelfth N. Y. S. M., occupied the Alexandria road as far as Four-Mile Run; the pickets of the Twelfth extending as far as the point where the canal crosses the Alexandria road. The left wing, consisting of the Eleventh Regiment N. Y. Vols. and the First Regiment Michigan, occupied the city of Alexandria, supported by the U. S. steamer Pawnee.

  Immediately after crossing the river, I proceeded to an inspection of the whole line, commencing on the right. I found the Sixty-ninth N. Y. S. M. halted in position, waiting for the arrival of the intrenching tools in order to commence the works of defense which had been projected by the U. S. Engineers. Thence, following up the Leesburg road, I found the Twenty-eighth and Fifth Regiments N. Y. S. M. about a mile and a half in advance of the Sixty-ninth. At this place I found that Lieutenant Tompkins, of the Second LT. S. Cavalry, supported by two companies of infantry of the Twenty-eighth, had advanced up the Leesburg road towards the Loudoun and Hampshire Railroad. I pushed forward with my staff, and found him at the point where the Leesburg road crosses the railroad. He had just intercepted a passenger train of cars on its way to Alexandria, and Lieutenant Houston, of the U. S. Engineers, had destroyed the track in front and rear of the cars and had destroyed two bridges by fire. I examined the passengers, and after conversation with them and the examination of private papers voluntarily exhibited to me, I thought it proper, with one exception, to impose no further restraint upon them than to detain them there until 5 o’clock p. m. of that day. This I did in order to prevent their carrying information of our movements into the neighborhood. Among them was a sergeant of the Fairfax Rifles, whom I sent to General Mansfield at Washington. I took pains here, and everywhere else, in my intercourse with the citizens, to impress upon their minds that the object and intention of the presence of the United States troops were to insure good order, and to afford protection to their persons and property in the pursuit of their ordinary avocations, and I am happy to say that I have been met everywhere by most of the people with expressions of kindness and cordial welcome.

  Returning thence, past the positions of the Twenty-eighth and Fifth Regiments, I examined the cross-roads in the neighborhood of Arlington. Finding the mansion vacated by the family, I stated to some of the servants left there that had the family remained I would have established a guard for their security from annoyance; but, in consequence of their absence, that I would, by occupying it myself, be responsible for the perfect care and security of the house and everything in and about it. I then returned, by the head of the Long Bridge, where the troops were now engaged in throwing up intrenchments, under the direction of Capt. B. S. Alexander, of the U. S. Engineers. {p.39} Thence I proceeded down the Alexandria road, visiting the posts of the New Jersey Brigade, the Twelfth N. Y. S. M., the First Michigan Regiment, and the Eleventh Regiment N. Y. Vols. (Ellsworth’s) to Alexandria. I then received the confirmation of the morning’s report, which had reached me, of the fall of the gallant Ellsworth.

  On the following day (the 25th) I repeated the inspection of the greater part of the lines, particularly the right wing, where intrenchments were being thrown up by the Sixty-ninth Regiment, under the direction of Captain Woodbury, of the U. S. Engineers. On this day the Fifth Massachusetts Regiment took post between Four-Mile Run and Alexandria, thereby filling an interval between the Twelfth Regiment and the city of Alexandria, which I had reported to you on the previous evening as being too great for mutual support. On the 26th the Eighth N. Y. S. M., which at my request you directed to cross the Potomac, was encamped by me on Arlington Heights in rear of the mansion, and on the 27th the light battery of that regiment arrived, under the command of Captain Varian, and was posted in its camp, two of the guns, with sufficient protection, being thrown forward to cover our pickets. On the evening of the same day the First New Jersey Regiment relieved the Seventh N. Y. S. M. in the trenches at the head of the Long Bridge, and the latter returned to its post at Camp Cameron.

  During the 26th I completed my examination of the roads and woods in the vicinity of Arlington and near the position of the Fifth and Twenty-eighth Regiments, and upon consultation with Capt. W. H. Wood, of the Third U. S. Infantry, concluded to change the position of those regiments to a point more capable of support from the Eighth on the left and from the Sixty-ninth on the right, and to cut a road through the woods in a direct line from the outposts in rear of Arlington House to the new position on the Leesburg road. This road is now in the course of construction. The company of Second U. S. Cavalry, under the command of Captain Brackett, being insufficient to perform the extended guard and picket duty which devolved upon it, and being desirous to extend the patrols which Captain Brackett had sent forward, I authorized him to direct the lieutenant commanding Company G of the Second Cavalry to report his command for duty with Captain Brackett, who was thereby enabled to direct more efficient and extended patrols and pickets, by which I now think the whole of the central division of the country in front of the line is occupied. Sherman’s battery of light artillery rendered prompt and efficient service throughout the movement, and one of the sections captured the troop of Virginia Cavalry at Alexandria.

  I have caused to be circulated extensively throughout the country the proclamation to the inhabitants, which was submitted to and approved by the President, the Cabinet, and yourself, and of which I transmit a copy.*

  I have the honor to be, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

  CHAS. W. SANDFORD, Major-General.

  Lieut. Gen. WINFIELD SCOTT, Commander-in-Chief of the Army, Washington, D. C.

  * Not found.

  {p.43}

  –––

  No. 2.

  Report of Maj. Gen. S. P. Heintzelman, U. S. Army.

  HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF WASHINGTON, Washington, July 20, 1863.

  GENERAL: I understand that no report has been made of the crossing of the Potomac at the Long Bridge and occupation of Arlington Heights and Alexandria on the morning of the 24th of May, 1861. I was at that time acting inspector-general to Brig. Gen. J. K. F. Mansfield, commanding the Department of Washington, and as the troops that crossed the bridge moved under my direction, I have the honor to make the following report:

  On the afternoon of the 23d, I went with General Mansfield to the Engineer Department, and he there explained to me the plan of operations. This, I understood from him, did not include the occupation of Alexandria. Before the troops moved, however, this part of the plan was changed.

  The troops which crossed, from the original manuscript now in my possession [were]:

  By the Aqueduct.-Staff commanding Captain Wood, now Maj. W. H. Wood, Seventeenth U. S. Infantry. Engineers Woodbury, Blunt, and Houston. Forty-eight pioneers of Fourteenth Regiment New York, Colonel Wood; Sixty-ninth Regiment New York, Colonel Corcoran, and 260 workmen, unarmed; Fifth Regiment New York, Colonel Schwartzwalder; Twenty-eighth Regiment New York, Colonel Burns; one company cavalry; one section artillery.

  By the Long Bridge.-Staff commanding Colonel Heintzelman. Engineers Alexander, Prime, and Robert. Twelfth Regiment New York, Colonel Butterfield; Twenty-fifth Regiment New York, Colonel Bryan; Seventh Regiment New York, Colonel Lefferts; Third Regiment New Jersey, General Runyon; one company cavalry; one section artillery.

  By steamer.-First New York Zouaves, Colonel Ellsworth. This regiment was encamped on the Potomac below the Eastern Branch, and was landed on the wharves of Alexandria under the guns of the gunboat Pawnee.

  Also by the Long Bridge.-First Michigan and Pioneers, Colonel Willcox; one company cavalry; one section artillery.

  Captain Brackett commanded the company of cavalry (I, Second Cavalry) that crossed the Long Bridge, and the artillery, I think, belonged to Maj. T. W. Sherman’s battery.

  During the day I warned the regiments to be prepared to march at a moment’s notice, and at 9 p. m. officers were sent to the colonels, directing them to march their troops to the Washington end of the Long Bridge.

  The orders were to enter on the bridge at 2 a. m. on the 24th of May. A few minutes before the hour the head of the column halted at the Washington end of the* bridge, and precisely at the hour the troops advanced, the Twelfth New York, Colonel Butterfield, leading. Col. C. P. Stone, in command of the District Volunteers, had made such admirable arrangements that he, was enabled to take possession of the Virginia end of the bridge before any alarm was given, and thus prevented the rebels from firing it. He immediately pushed forward on the different roads strong pickets. On the road towards Arlington they extended as far as the bridge across the canal.

  Capt. S. Owen, who commanded some of the District Cavalry, accompanied {p.41} me, and had with him men well acquainted with the country. The morning was beautiful moonlight. At the forks of the road, where Fort Runyon has since been built, I turned the Twenty-fifth New York, Colonel Bryan, to the right.

  I gave directions to Captain Owen to lead Colonel Butterfield’s regiment as far as the Four-Mile Run, and it to take post on the right of the road, and then to conduct Colonel Willcox, with the First Michigan, to Alexandria, there to unite with the First New York Zouaves, Colonel Ellsworth, and occupy Alexandria. This was done without opposition, capturing in the town a few rebel cavalry. Some 700 rebel infantry in the town had received notice of the approach of the troops, and were ready to take the cars. They escaped on the Orange and Alexandria, Railway, burning the bridges behind them. Our troops pursued a short distance, also burning such bridges as they had spared.

  Capt. H. G. Wright, U. S. Engineers, accompanied me. We advanced with the Twenty-fifth New York on the Columbia turnpike, and took post between Roach’s and Dr. Antisell’s, where Fort Albany now stands. Captain Brackett’s company of cavalry was posted a short distance in the advance on the turnpike. The movement was made so quietly, that the troops had stacked arms an hour before the inhabitants were aware that we had crossed the river.

  As far as I can learn, there were only a few men located at the Virginia end of the Long Bridge. The horses of two of them we captured to the right of the Arlington road where it leaves the Columbia turnpike, and a few hours later the men fell into our lines, and were also captured. Communication was immediately made to the right with Captain Wood and to the left with Colonel Willcox.

  Thus was commenced the first operation against the rebels in front of Washington.

  I have the honor to be, general, respectfully, your obedient servant,

  S. P. HEINTZELMAN, Major-General, Volunteers.

  Gen. L. THOMAS, Adjt. Gen. U. S. Army, Washington.

  –––

  No. 3.

  Report of Col. O. B. Willcox, First Michigan Infantry.

  ALEXANDRIA, VA., May 24, 1861-5.18 a. m.

  Alexandria is ours. One company, Captain Ball, mounted, thirty-five men and thirty-five horses [captured]. I regret to say Colonel Ellsworth has been shot by a person in a house.

  Yours,

  O. B. WILLCOX.

  General MANSFIELD.

  I understand there are troops of the enemy at junction.

  –––

  No. 4.

  Report of Lieut. Col. N. L. Farnham, First Zouaves, New York Militia.

  ALEXANDRIA, VA., May 24, 1861-5.18 p. m.

  SIR: It is my painful duty to inform you that Colonel Ellsworth, late commanding officer of the First Zouave Regiment, New York Militia, {p.42} is no more. He was assassinated at the Marshall House after our troops had taken possession of the city.

  I am ignorant of the details of the orders issued to the regiment, and await further instructions. My men are posted advantageously in the streets.

  I remain, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

  NOAH L. FARNHAM, Lieutenant-Colonel, Commanding First Zouaves.

  Brig. Gen. MANSFIELD, Commanding Department, Washington.

  –––

  No. 5.

  Reports of Brig. Gen. H. E. Bonham, C. S. Army, commanding at Manassas, Va.

  MANASSAS, VA., May 24, 1861.

  By all accounts, the enemy crossed the river last night in large force. They stopped the Leesburg train six miles from Alexandria, a reliable man informs me, who saw them. They may be moving on Leesburg; possibly on us. I have just heard from Hunton. He has taken necessary measures to prevent surprise by rail, but they will not move that way. If they attack us, we will defend the place to the last; but our troops are badly armed and deficient in ammunition. They have captured Ball’s dragoons. Send the ablest engineer to be had.

  M. L. BONHAM.

  General LEE.

  –––

  MANASSAS, VA., May 24, 1861.

  Dispatch received.* Colonel Terrett says two troops of cavalry crossed the Chain Bridge about 12 o’clock in the night. I have ordered some dragoons of Captain Green’s company to burn the bridges as soon as practicable. Will immediately send your dispatch to Colonel Hunton, however, who I hope has already accomplished the object. If you can, send some good artillerist and an engineer.

  M. L. BONHAM.

  General LEE.

  * Of same date. See “Correspondence, etc.,” post.

  –––

  MANASSAS JUNCTION, VA., May 25, 1861.

  COLONEL: Colonel Terrett, with as many of his troops as he could bring off with him, arrived at 11 o’clock, the enemy occupying Alexandria with one thousand troops, as is supposed by Colonel Terrett. If the enemy advance on this line it is manifest that a much larger force is necessary here. There are but six hundred infantry here, seven companies of Preston’s command having gone to Harper’s Ferry. We need artillery very much. There are four small pieces only here. I can order up the two companies of cavalry from Occoquan and Accotink. There is but one troop of cavalry here. With a good engineer I could get on better. Will do the best I can.

  In haste, your obedient servant,

  M. L. BONHAM.

  {p.43}

  –––

  MANASSAS, VA., May 25, 1861.

  The information from trustworthy vedettes indicates the enemy at Falls Church and Ball’s Cross Roads not to exceed five or six hundred. A rumor that a large body was advancing towards Leesburg needs confirmation. As yet a number of our troops are destitute of camp equipage and with but little ammunition, but exhibit admirable spirits.

  M. L. BONHAM.

  Major-General LEE.

  –––

  MANASSAS, VA., May 25, 1861.

  According to the most reliable information from my vedettes, the enemy are not over five hundred strong at Falls Church and Ball’s Cross Roads each. No news of any attempt by Occoquan. Leesburg safe at 4 o’clock this morning. The Alexandria ( Va.) troops are here, without cooking utensils, and many without arms. Please send to the quartermaster of this place cooking utensils and other camp equipage for six hundred men, as destitute men are hourly joining me. Caps, ammunition, and arms greatly needed.

  M. L. BONHAM.

  General LEE.

  –––

  No. 6.

  Reports of Col. George H. Terrett, C. S. forces, commanding at Alexandria.

  MANASSAS, VA., May 24, 1861.

  The Northern troops, six thousand strong, marched into Alexandria at 4.30 o’clock this morning. The Virginia forces, five hundred in number, retreated in good order, their rear guard in sight of and within two hundred yards of the advance guard of the enemy. A large cavalry force crossed the Chain Bridge at 12 o’clock last night. Destination supposed to be somewhere on the line of the Loudoun and Hampshire Railroad.

  GEO. H. TERRETT.

  Major-General LEE.

  –––

  MANASSAS JUNCTION, VA., Camp Pickens, May 28, 1861.

  SIR: In obedience to instructions from headquarters, of this day’s date, in regard to the capture of Captain Ball and his troop, I have to report that, on the morning of the 24th instant, about 1.30 a. m., Captain Ball came to my quarters and reported that one of the vedettes, stationed at the Chain Bridge, about three miles west of Georgetown, D. C., had informed him that a squadron of cavalry had crossed over to the Virginia shore. I immediately ordered my command under arms, to await further orders. About 5.30 a. m. an officer was sent from the steamer Pawnee, Northern Navy, to inform me that an overwhelming force was about entering the city of Alexandria, and it would be madness to resist, and that I could have until 9 a. m. to evacuate or surrender. I then ordered the troops under my command to assemble at the place designated by me on assuming command in Alexandria, that I might either resist or fall back, as circumstances might require. As soon as the {p.44} troops were formed, which was promptly done, I repaired to the command, and then, ascertaining that the enemy were entering the city by Washington street, and that several steamers had been placed so that their guns could command many of the principal streets, I ordered the command to march, and proceeded out of the city by Duke street. Captain Ball accompanied me as far as his quarters, a little west of the railroad depot, where he halted, and I proceeded to the cars, which were about half a mile from the depot, where I had ordered them to be stopped, and, from orders given before marching out of the city, the cavalry was to follow in my rear, for the purpose of giving me information in regard to the movements of the enemy. Captain Powell followed my instructions, and why Captain Ball did not I am unable to report.

  Respectfully, colonel, your obedient servant,

  GEO. H. TERRETT, Colonel, Commanding Alexandria.

  Lieut. Col. THOMAS JORDAN, Assistant Adjutant-General.

  –––

  MAY 26-30, 1861.–Advance upon and occupation of Grafton, W. Va., by United States forces.

  No. 1.–	Maj. Gen. George B. McClellan, U. S. Army
  No. 2.–	Col. C. Q. Tompkins, commanding Confederate forces in the Kanawha Valley.
  No. 3.–	Col. George A. Porterfield, commanding Confederate forces at Philippi.

  No. 1.

  Reports of Maj. Gen. George B. McClellan, U. S. Army.

  HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE OHIO, Cincinnati, May 27, 1861.

  COLONEL: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of the General-in-Chief’s letter of the 21st,* together with telegram of the 24th and 26th. My time has been so much occupied, both by day and night, that I have been unable to reply to the General’s letter, nor can I at the present moment do more than acknowledge its receipt.

  I was engaged in maturing plans to carry out the General’s telegraphic instructions, when I learned by telegram that two bridges on the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, near Farmington Station, had been burned on Saturday night. I received this information late yesterday afternoon at Camp Dennison. I at once returned to the city. Colonel Kelley, of the First Virginia Volunteers, with his own regiment and four companies of the Second, are ordered by telegraph to move without delay from Wheeling towards Fairmont, guarding the bridges as they proceed. Colonel Irvine, Sixteenth Ohio, at Bellaire, was ordered to support the movement. Colonel Steedman, Fourteenth Ohio, supported by the Eighteenth and two light guns, was ordered to occupy Parkersburg and the lines of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, towards Grafton. I should premise that I had received information that the rebels intended to destroy the rest of the bridges on the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad.

  {p.45}

  I inclose copies of my telegraphic and written orders to these officers; also of a proclamation ordered to be distributed among the inhabitants as the troops advance, and of an address to be issued to the troops. These are very hurriedly prepared, but I hope they will meet the approval of the Lieutenant-General.

  Colonel Kelley left Wheeling at about 7 a. m. to-day. Colonel Irvine crossed to Benwood at about 10 o’clock. Colonel Steedman moved to Parkersburg at about 10 o’clock. By telegraph this morning I directed the necessary supplies to re-establish the telegraphic communication, and to repair the bridges, &c., to be forwarded at once from Wheeling.

  General Morris holds himself ready to move from Indianapolis, on receipt of telegraphic orders, with from two to five regiments, should it become necessary. The regiments at Camp Dennison are in the midst of the process of reorganization for three years’ service. By to-morrow night one fine regiment will be ready to move, and the others will soon be prepared. I hope, however, that the force already detailed towards Grafton will suffice for the end in view. I telegraphed this morning to Major Oakes, making him an acting aide-de-camp temporarily, that he might be able to interfere authoritatively should it prove necessary.

  Hoping that my course will meet the approval of the General, I remain, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

  GEO . B. MCCLELLAN, Major-General, U. S. Army, Commanding Department.

  Col. E. D. TOWNSEND, Assistant Adjutant-General.

  P. S.-Nothing is yet known by the public of this movement. I have thus far succeeded in keeping it secret, and hope to do so until Grafton is occupied or the troops considerably advanced.

  P. P. S.-Have this instant heard from Colonel Kelley, as follows:

  MANNINGTON, VA.

  Agreeably to your orders, I left my camp this morning at 5 o’clock with my regiment and Captain Hayes’ company of the Second Regiment. Just arrived here without accident or casualty. Found the road in good order. Bridges all safe, and guarded by the railroad-company men and loyal citizens. Will move forward four miles to the burned bridges. This town will be occupied by Colonel Irvine, who follows. We will repair bridges soon as possible.

  [Col. B. F. Kelley, First Virginia Infantry.]

  I also hear that Parkersburg is occupied and all quiet.

  GEO. B. McCLELLAN.

  * Letter not found. For telegrams see “Correspondence, etc.,” post.

  [Inclosure No. 1.]

  Instruction to Col. B. F. Kelley, First Virginia Infantry.

  HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE OHIO, Cincinnati, May 26, 1861.

  Col. B. F. KELLEY, First Regiment Virginia Volunteers:

  COLONEL: I have, telegraphed you this evening, instructing you to make a forward movement on Fairmont. The principal reason for this order was the burning of the bridges, which caused me to anticipate, by some two or three days, the more carefully-prepared measures I had contemplated, with the intention of not only securing the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, but also of driving all the armed secessionists out of Western Virginia.

  In your present movement you will be careful to run no unnecessary risk, for it is absolutely necessary that we should not meet even with a {p.46} partial check at the outset. If you find yourself in front of any hostile force that, either by superiority of numbers, position, or artillery, is likely to render an attack doubtful, you will remain in observation, and at once send for assistance, which can be promptly rendered to any desirable extent. The chief object of your advance is to prevent any further destruction of the railroad. You will not move on Grafton without restoring the bridges in your rear, unless you receive positive information that Colonel Steedman’s command has actually reached Grafton, or a neighboring point, where you can without doubt unite with him.

  Colonel Steedman occupies Parkersburg to-morrow morning with two regiments, and will then proceed to take possession of the line of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad as far towards Grafton as he can with safety.

  You will exercise the utmost vigilance in preserving the discipline of your men, see that the property and rights of the inhabitants are in every respect carefully protected, and use every effort to conciliate the people and strengthen the Union feeling. You will at once make a requisition upon the chief quartermaster of this department for such supplies as may be necessary for your command. In the mean time, make the best use you can of the means now in your possession. Colonel Irvine will be under your orders.

  With every confidence that you will leave nothing undone to carry out the very delicate and important duty with which you are intrusted,

  I am, colonel, very respectfully,

  GEO. B. McCLELLAN, Major-General, U. S. Army, Commanding Department.

  HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE OHIO, Cincinnati, May 26, 1861.

  Col. B. F. KELLEY, First Regiment Virginia Volunteers, Wheeling:

  If you have reliable information that bridges of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad have been burned, you will at once procure transportation on that railroad, and move your whole command, including the separate companies of Virginia volunteers not attached to your regiment, as near to Fairmont as can be done without endangering the safety of your command. Leave a sufficient guard to protect the bridges and other structures most liable to destruction. Colonel Irvine, of the Sixteenth Ohio, is ordered to cross the river and support you. Telegraph me constantly as to the state of affairs, and how much support you need. Conduct the preliminaries of your movement with as much secrecy as possible, and see that the telegraph conveys no intimation of it in any direction. Consult Major Oakes freely. The move must be made with the greatest promptness to secure the bridges. Take at least one week’s rations. Accouterments will follow you to-morrow. I count on your prudence and courage. Preserve the strictest discipline. See that the rights and property of the people are respected, and repress all attempts at negro insurrection.

  GEO. B. McCLELLAN, Major-General, U. S. Army, Commanding Department. {p.47} [Inclosure No. 2.]

  Instructions to Colonel J. Irvine, Sixteenth Ohio Infantry.

  HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE OHIO, Cincinnati, May 26, 1861.

  Colonel IRVINE, Sixteenth Regiment O. V. M., Bellaire:

  Colonel Kelley is ordered to occupy the bridges on the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad as far towards Fairmont as can be done with safety. You will cross the river, and support the movement with your entire command. Leave a detachment to guard the bridge over the Ohio and secure Wheeling. Advance the rest of your command at least as far as Fish Creek. Render all assistance in preserving the bridges. I do not expect you to be driven back. Support will soon reach you if necessary. Preserve the strictest discipline. Take one week’s rations. See that the rights and property of the people are respected, and repress an attempts at negro insurrection.

  GEO. B. McCLELLAN, Major-General, Commanding Department.

  HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE OHIO, Cincinnati, May 26, 1861.

  Colonel IRVINE, Commanding Sixteenth Regiment O. V. M., Bellaire:

  COLONEL: I have to-night telegraphed you to cross to Wheeling with your command and support a forward movement to be made by Colonel Kelley. As Colonel K. has been mustered into the United States service, you will please report to him with your regiment for duty, and follow his instructions. I am sure, colonel, that I can rely upon your giving your full and cordial support to this advance, and that the reputation of the Ohio troops will lose nothing in your hands. Please be careful to preserve the most rigid discipline, and do all in your power to strengthen the Union sentiment.

  I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

  GEO. B. McCLELLAN, Major-General, U. S. Army, Commanding Department.

  [Inclosure No. 3.]

  Instructions to Col. J. B. Steedman, Fourteenth Regiment Ohio Infantry.

  HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE OHIO, Cincinnati, May 26, 1861.

  Colonel STEEDMAN, Commanding Fourteenth Regiment, Marietta:

  You will on receipt of this cross the river and occupy Parkersburg. The Eighteenth [Ohio] Regiment at Athens is ordered to report to you. You will at once move forward by rail towards Grafton, as far as can be done with prudence, leaving sufficient guards at Parkersburg and the bridges as you advance. Avail yourself of the assistance of the armed Union men. Preserve the strictest discipline, and do all in your Power to conciliate. If you have to fight, remember that the honor of Ohio is in your hands. Communicate fully. See that the rebels receive no information by telegraph. Take one week’s rations. See that the {p.48} rights and Property Of the People are respected, and repress all attempts at negro, insurrection.

  GEO. B. McCLELLAN, Major-General, U. S. Army, Commanding Department.

  [Inclosure No. 4.]

  Instructions to Brig. Gen. T. A. Morris.

  HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE OHIO, Cincinnati, May 26, 1861.

  Brigadier-General MORRIS, Indianapolis:

  You will probably be ordered to-morrow to move with, say, two regiments to Wheeling or Parkersburg. Circumstances may change this, but be ready. Keep this secret; and when you do move, give out Pittsburgh, or some other point, as your destination.

  GEO. B. McCLELLAN, Major-General, U. S. Army, Commanding Department.

  [Inclosure No. 5.]

  Proclamation to the People of Western Virginia.

  HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE OHIO, Cincinnati, May 26, 1861.

  To the Union Men of Western Virginia:

  VIRGINIANS: The General Government has long enough endured the machinations of a few factious rebels in your midst. Armed traitors have in vain endeavored to deter you from expressing your loyalty at the polls. Having failed in this infamous attempt to deprive you of the exercise of your dearest rights, they now seek to inaugurate a reign of terror, and thus force you to yield to their schemes, and submit to the yoke of the traitorous conspiracy dignified by the name of Southern Confederacy

  They are destroying the property of citizens of your State and raining your magnificent railways. The General Government has heretofore carefully abstained from sending troops across the Ohio, or even from posting them along its banks, although frequently urged by many of your prominent citizens to do so. I determined to await the result of the late election, desirous that no one might be able to say that the slightest effort had been made from this side to influence the free expression of your opinion, although the many agencies brought to bear upon you by the rebels were well known.

  You have now shown, under the most adverse circumstances, that the great mass of the people of Western Virginia are true and loyal to that beneficent Government under which we and our fathers have lived so long. As soon as the result of the election was known the traitors commenced their work of destruction. The General Government cannot close its ears to the demand you have made for assistance. I have ordered troops to cross the river. They come as your friends and brothers-as enemies only to the armed rebels who are preying upon you. Your homes, your families, and your property are safe under our protection. All your rights shall be religiously respected.

  Notwithstanding all that has been said by the traitors to induce you to believe that our advent among you will be signalized by interference with your slaves, understand one, thing clearly-not only will we, abstain {p.49} from all such interference, but we will, on the contrary, with an iron hand, crash any attempt at insurrection on their part. Now that we are in your midst, I call upon you to fly to arms and support the General Government.

  Sever the connection that binds you to traitors. Proclaim to the world that the faith and loyalty so long boasted by the Old Dominion are still preserved in Western Virginia, and that you remain true to the Stars and Stripes.

  GEO. B. McCLELLAN, Major-General, Commanding.

  [Inclosure No. 6.]

  Address to the Soldiers of the Expedition.

  HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE OHIO, Cincinnati, May 26, 1861.

  SOLDIERS: You are ordered to cross the frontier and enter upon the soil of Virginia. Your mission is to restore peace and confidence, to protect the majesty of the law, and to rescue our brethren from the grasp of armed traitors. You are to act in concert with the Virginia troops, and to support their advance. I place under the safeguard of your honor the persons and property of the Virginians. I know that you will respect their feelings and all their rights. Preserve the strictest discipline; remember that each one of you holds in his keeping the honor of Ohio and of the Union.

  If you are called upon to overcome armed opposition, I know that your courage is equal to the task; but remember that your only foes are the armed traitors, and show mercy even to them when they are in your power, for many of them are misguided. When under your protection the loyal men of Western Virginia have been enabled to organize and arm, they can protect themselves, and you can then return to your homes with the proud satisfaction of having preserved a gallant people from destruction.

  GEO. B. McCLELLAN, Major-General, U. S. Army, Commanding Department.

  –––

  HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE OHIO, Cincinnati, May 30, 1861.

  COLONEL: I have the honor to report the successful occupation of Grafton without the loss of a single life. My previous dispatches have informed you of the circumstances under which the movement was undertaken and the orders given for carrying it into effect. The movement was greatly delayed by the necessity of repairing the burned bridges. I constantly advised Colonel Kelley to use great caution, and I am happy to say that he has been able to combine it with unusual energy.

  He promptly arrived at the burned bridge; at once, set a working party at preparing timber for repairs, moved an advanced guard forward to the very important bridge over the Monongahela, at Fairmont, and seized all the secessionists he could find. At 11 o’clock this morning he moved forward, and reached Grafton at 2.30 p. m. The secessionists had evacuated the place before his arrival.

  The colonel will pursue them on the Beverly road in the morning and endeavor to capture at least some arms that they sent away before they {p.50} retreated. I cannot commend too highly the prudence and energy displayed by Colonel Kelley in this movement. He has in every instance carried out his instructions, and has displayed very high military qualities. I beg to recommend to the General that he may be made a brigadier-general of the Virginia Volunteers.

  It is a source of very great satisfaction to me that we have occupied Grafton without the sacrifice of a single life. Colonel Steedman’s advance from Parkersburg has not been so prompt as that of Colonel Kelley. He has met with many difficulties on his route.

  I am happy to say that the movement has caused a very great increase of the Union feeling. I am now organizing a movement on the valley of the Great Kanawha; will go there in person, and endeavor to capture the occupants of the secession camp at Buffalo, then occupy the Gauley Bridge, and return in time to direct such movements on Kentucky and Tennessee as may become necessary.

  I will make a more detailed report when I receive Colonel Kelley’s full report.

  I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

  GEO. B. McCLELLAN, Major-General, U. S. Army.

  Lieut. Col. E. D. TOWNSEND, A. A. G.

  –––

  No. 2.

  Reports of Col. C. Q. Tompkins, commanding Confederate forces in the Kanawha Valley.

  STAUNTON, VA., May 29, 1861.

  Troops are rapidly gathering along the Ohio border, several hundred at Gallipolis, and a large camp at Oak Hill. David Kirkpatrick, bearer of above to Staunton, will be in Richmond to-morrow, with letters from Colonel Tompkins.

  C. Q. TOMPKINS, Colonel, Virginia Volunteers.

  Col. R. S. GARNETT.

  –––

  KANAWHA COURT-HOUSE, VA., May 30, 1861.

  SIR: The threatening aspect of affairs in this quarter induces me to send Lieutenant-Colonel McCausland to explain in detail matters that could not be discussed by letter. He will inform you of the disaffection of this population and the difficulty of procuring reliable troops for the emergency. There can be no doubt now that it is the intention of the enemy to occupy as much of this country as he may find open to invasion, and your attention is specially called to the necessity of sending, as early as practicable, a force at least sufficient to hold this valley in security. I have now under my command here three hundred and forty men, and when the companies now in process of formation in this valley shall have been completed it is probable their numbers will not exceed one thousand men. It is doubtful, in my mind, whether the militia will obey a call to the field. For these reasons it would seem proper that re-enforcements should be, sent from such sources as you may deem proper. I beg leave, respectfully, to urge the importance of sending us rifles, with {p.51} suitable ammunition, and I again request that staff officers for this department may be drawn from the troops comprising this command.

  Very respectfully,

  C. Q. TOMPKINS, Colonel, Virginia Volunteers, Commanding.

  His Excellency Governor LETCHER.

  [Inclosure.]

  CHARLESTON, KANAWHA COUNTY, VA., May 30, 1861.

  Men of Virginia! Men of Kanawha ! To Arms!

  The enemy has invaded your soil and threatens to overrun your country under the pretext of protection. You cannot serve two masters. You have not the right to repudiate allegiance to your own State. Be not seduced by his sophistry or intimidated by his threats. Rise and strike for your firesides and altars. Repel the aggressors and preserve your honor and your rights. Rally in every neighborhood with or without arms. Organize and unite with the sons of the soil to defend it. Report yourselves without delay to those nearest to you in military position. Come to the aid of your fathers, brothers, and comrades in arms at this place, who are here for the protection of your mothers, wives, and sisters. Let every man who would uphold his rights turn out with such arms as he may get and drive the invader back.

  C. Q. TOMPKINS, Colonel, Virginia Volunteers, Commanding.

  –––

  No. 3.

  Report of Col. George A. Porterfield, commanding Confederate forces at Philippi.

  HEADQUARTERS OF VIRGINIA FORCES, Philippi, Va., May 29, 1861.

  COLONEL: On the 27th instant I received reliable information of a contemplated movement among those hostile to us, by which a large body of men were intended to be precipitated upon me in the rear, by the railroad, without notice, and in a few hours’ time. I was also assured that about fifteen hundred Federal troops had collected at Marietta, some at Bellaire, one thousand or fifteen hundred on the island opposite Wheeling; in fact, that there were considerable bodies of men everywhere on that border that could be easily collected and launched therefrom. In this state, of things I ordered some of the bridges of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad northwest of Fairmont to be destroyed, which order, as carried into effect by the destruction of two between Farmington and Mannington, about thirty-five miles northwest of Grafton.

  I also sent out an expedition to destroy a bridge of the Northwestern Virginia railroad, fifty or sixty miles west of Grafton. The object of this expedition has, I am informed, been accomplished, although my party has not yet returned. I caused a small bridge of the same road, about fifteen miles west of Grafton, to be destroyed, but I learn that it has been repaired by the company, so that trains pass over it.

  On the evening of the 27th I received information of the arrival, by the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, of a body of troops, variously estimated at from one thousand to three thousand, at the burned bridges {p.52} near Mannington. It was supposed that these men would be followed by others as soon as the house-cars which contained them could be returned to the Ohio River. In this state of things I inquired of General Johnston, by telegraph (the Grafton end of which only was under the control of our friends; so far as I know) if he could re-enforce me. For reply, I was informed that no men could be sent from his command at Harper’s Ferry.

  On the 28th, learning from the most reliable persons that the invading force had reached Fairmont, twenty miles northwest of Grafton, and thinking that the latter point, from its topography and the character of its population (a good part of which would have united with our enemies upon their appearance) was not an eligible one for us’, and considering our very inadequate supply of provisions and ammunition, particularly caps, and that our number of infantry was small (not more than about five hundred and fifty), and the want of any sort of training or military discipline among our men, and being informed that other bodies of men besides those first spoken of had passed the burned bridges by means of temporary repairs of them, and approached Fairmont, I concluded to remove the State arms and stores to Philippi, about fifteen miles in our rear, there establish a depot, in a friendly country, to concentrate such volunteers as were on the way or could be easily and speedily attracted to that point, and there to organize and strengthen my command. I met on the way an unarmed company of volunteers from Upshur, and at Philippi I was joined by a well-armed company of horse from Rockbridge. I have been compelled to send home, for want of arms to supply them with, a company of horse from Pocahontas, and to dismiss to their homes for a short time a like company raised in Barbour.

  As soon as I can organize my command, which I hope to do soon, I will return to some more eligible point in the neighborhood of Grafton, which will enable me to command both railroads, and in the mean time I hope to be able more effectually to cut off the railroad communications east and west of that place. The railroad is unquestionably used by the company against us, and I may be obliged, for the safety of the command at Harper’s Ferry, to make further destruction of it.

  Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

  G. A. PORTERFIELD, Colonel of Volunteers.

  Col. R. S. GARNETT.

  –––

  MAY 27-29, 1861.–Expedition to and occupation of Newport News, Va.

  Reports of Maj. Gen. B. F. Butler, U. S. Army, commanding Department of Virginia.

  HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF VIRGINIA, May 27, 1861.

  SIR: The expedition (of which I gave you information in my former dispatch) to Newport News got off in fine style this morning about 7 o’clock. I have added to the expedition the Eighth New York Regiment, 780 strong, which came here on board the Empire City on Sunday afternoon, and they proceeded without debarking. I also added two 6-pounder and two 12-pounder guns, with a detachment of twenty-five men from Colonel Dimick’s command, who are intended to act as drill-masters to the volunteers in the exercise of the guns. My purpose is to intrench {p.53} and hold that point, and ultimately to mount a few heavy guns, which will command that channel of approach to James River.

  Since I wrote my last dispatch the question in regard to slave property is becoming one of very serious magnitude. The inhabitants of Virginia are using their negroes in the batteries, and are preparing to send their women and children South. The escapes from them are very numerous, and a squad has come in this morning to my pickets, bringing with them their women and children. Of course these cannot be dealt with upon the theory on which I designed to treat the services of able-bodied men and women who might come within my lines, and of which I gave you a detailed account in my last dispatch. I am in the utmost doubt what to do with this species of property. Up to this time I have had come within my lines men and women with their children-entire families-each family belonging to the same owner. I have therefore determined to employ, as I can do very profitably, the able-bodied persons in the party, issuing proper food for the support of all, and charging against their services the expense of care and sustenance of the non-laborers, keeping a strict and accurate account as well of the services as of the expenditures, having the worth of the services and the cost of the expenditures determined by a board of survey, hereafter to be detailed. I know of no other manner in which to dispose of this subject and the questions connected therewith. As a matter of property to the insurgents it will be of very great moment, the number I now have amounting as I am informed, to what in good times would be of the value of $60,000. Twelve of these negroes, I am informed, have escaped from the erection of batteries on Sewell’s Point, which this morning fired upon my expedition as it passed by out of range. As a means of offense, therefore, in the enemy’s hands, these negroes, when able-bodied, are of the last importance. Without them the batteries could not have been erected, at least for many weeks. As a military question, it would seem to be a measure of necessity to deprive their masters of their services. How can this be done? As a political question and a question of humanity, can I receive the services of the father and mother and not take the children? Of the humanitarian aspect I have no doubt. Of the political one I have no right to judge. I therefore submit all this to your better judgment; and as these questions have a political aspect, I have ventured-and I trust I am not wrong in so doing-to duplicate the parts of my dispatches relating to this subject, and forward them to the Secretary of War.

  It was understood when I left Washington that the three Massachusetts regiments, two of which are at the Relay House, should be forwarded to me, here, and also Cook’s light battery, of which I have the utmost need, if I am expected even to occupy an extended camp with safety. May I ask the attention of the Commanding General to this subject, and inquire if the exigencies of the service will permit these troops to be sent to me immediately? I have to report the arrival of no more troops except the New York Eighth since my last dispatch. The steamship Wabash, which was expected here to take the place of the Minnesota, has not yet reported herself. The Harriet Lane has reported herself here from Charleston, and is employed in convoying the Newport News expedition. I find myself extremely short of ammunition, having but a total in magazine of 85,000 rounds, of which 5,000 rounds only are for the smooth-bore musket, and the major part of my command are provided with that arm. May I desire the attention of the Lieutenant-General to this state of facts, and ask that a large amount of ammunition for that arm-I would suggest “buck and ball”-be ordered forward {p.54} from the Ordnance Department? The assistant adjutant-general has made a requisition for this purpose. I will endeavor, to keep the Lieutenant-General informed daily of any occurrences of interest, provided I am not interfered with by the irregularity of the mails and modes of conveyance.

  I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

  BENJ. F. BUTLER, Major-General, Commanding.

  Lieutenant-General SCOTT.

  –––

  HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF VIRGINIA, May 29, 1861.

  SIR: The expedition to Newport News, of which I spoke in my last, eight miles from this place, landed without opposition. I have caused an intrenched camp to be made there, which, when completed, will be able to hold itself against any force that may be brought against it, and afford even a better depot from which to advance than Fortress Monroe. The advantages of the News are these: There are two springs of very pure water there; the bluff is a fine, healthy location. It has two good, commodious wharves, to which steamers of any draught of water may come up at all stages of the tide; it is as near any point of operation as Fortress Monroe, where we are obliged to lighter all vessels of draught over ten feet, and have but one wharf. The News, upon which I propose to have a water battery of four 8-inch guns, commands the ship channel of James River, and a force there is a perpetual threat to Richmond.

  My next point of operation I propose shall be Pig Point, which is exactly opposite the News, commanding Nansemond River. Once in command of that battery, which I believe may be easily turned, I can then advance along the Nansemond River and easily take Suffolk, and there either hold or destroy the railroad both between Richmond and Norfolk, and also between Norfolk and the South. With a perfect blockade of Elizabeth River, and taking and holding Suffolk and perhaps York, Norfolk will be so perfectly hemmed in, that starvation will cause the surrender, without risking an attack on the strongly-fortified intrenchments around Norfolk, with great loss and perhaps defeat.

  If this plan of operations does not meet the approval of the Lieutenant-General I would be glad of his instructions specifically. If it is desirable to move on Richmond, James and York Rivers, both thus held, would seem to be the most eligible routes.

  I have no co-operation substantially by the Navy, the only vessels here now being the Cumberland and Harriet Lane, the former too unwieldy to get near shore to use her heavy guns, the other so light in her battery as not to be able to cope with a single battery of the rebels.

  I have yet need of surf-boats for sea-coast and river advances, and beg leave to suggest this matter again to you.

  This evening the First New York Regiment, three years’ men, came in on board the State of Georgia. It is in a most shameful state as regards, camp equipage, camp kettles, &c.

  Another matter needs pressing attention. The bore of a majority of the muskets in my command is smooth, of the issue of 148, and I have only 5,000 rounds of buck and ball and no other ammunition to fit this arm. Might I request immediate action upon this vital subject?

  I have the honor to be, your obedient servant,

  BENJ. F. BUTLER. Major-General, Commanding.

  General WINFIELD SCOTT.

  {p.55}

  MAY 31-June 1, 1861.-Attack on Aquia Creek batteries, Va.

  No. 1.–	Col. Daniel Ruggles, commanding Department of Fredericksburg
  No. 2.–	Col. William B. Bate, commanding Walker’s Legion.
  No. 3.–	M. W. Cluskey.

  No. 1.

  Reports of Col. Daniel Ruggles, commanding Department of Fredericksburg.

  HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF FREDERICKSBURG, Fredericksburg, Va., May 30 [?], 1861.

  SIR: I have the honor to report that two small steamers of the enemy attacked the Aquia Creek Railroad battery last evening about sunset, and fired some fourteen shot and shell. Our battery returned the fire with twelve shot and shell. The contest terminated about 9 o’clock, when the enemy departed. One man was slightly wounded in the hand by the fragments of a shell. I prepared to cover our front with my whole force, comprising the Tennessee Regiment and a battalion of volunteers, assembled at Camp Mercer, and proceeded, with some seven hundred men, to the point attacked, having in view sending back the train for the remaining five hundred. The conflict having terminated before we reached the scene of action, I returned with the forces above specified, reaching this town about 5 a. m. The spirit and conduct of the troops have been admirable in connection with this little affair. Much agitation prevails along the Potomac coast from apprehension that the enemy will land, in large and small numbers, to devastate and plunder. I respectfully recommend that guns of heavy caliber be furnished (say 12s, 18s, and 32s), for use at various points on the coast for surprising and harassing the enemy.

  Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

  DANIEL RUGGLES, Colonel, Provisional Army, Commanding Forces.

  Col. R. S. GARNETT, Adjutant-General Virginia Forces.

  –––

  FREDERICKSBURG, Va., June 1, 1861.

  SIR: The report has arrived this moment that five of the enemy’s steamers, with two transport ships, one of which is of considerable size, had appeared off Aquia Creek battery, with the evident intention of attacking it. When the train left (11 a. m.), soon after, heavy firing was heard from that point. I am in want of at least one thousand well-disciplined volunteers as soon as it is possible to send them. Twenty thousand musket-rifle caps are absolutely necessary for the use of troops with percussion arms. I go to the battery at once. Communicate with Major Barton, acting assistant adjutant general, to this office.

  DANIEL RUGGLES, Colonel, Provisional Army.

  Col. R. S. GARNETT, Adjutant-General.

  –––

  HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF FREDERICKSBURG, Fredericksburg, Va., June 1, 1861.

  SIR: The enemy attacked the naval battery at Aquia Creek yesterday about 10 a. m. The enemy had three war steamers and some small {p.56} transports, not containing, however, many troops. They had some long boats or launches; but, so far as observed, made no preparation for lauding. The fire on both sides was skillfully directed, and continued up to about 1 p. m., when the steamers hauled off, and, it is supposed, in a partially disabled condition. I took all the available forces, comprising sing the four companies of infantry and one of cavalry, from this vicinity, and Colonel Bate’s Tennessee (Walker) Legion with me, reaching the Potomac soon after the firing ceased. The conduct of the troops in the batteries-that of Captain Walker, with his 6-pounder rifle-guns, having been brought early into the action-is represented as having been admirable, including the covering and protecting force on the field. I have transferred the Tennessee (Walker) Legion to Brooke’s Station, where I have re-established Camp Jackson. From that point lateral movements may be easily made to cross the coasts, and forward movements to cover the batteries, with great facility.

  The ladies are now making tents, cartridges, and belts, and I hope soon to have our forces sheltered and better equipped. I left Aquia Creek late last evening, and return there this morning.

  Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

  DANIEL RUGGLES, Colonel, Provisional Army, Commanding Forces.

  Col. R. S. GARNETT, Adjutant-General Virginia Forces.

  –––

  HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF FREDERICKSBURG, Fredericksburg, Va., June 2, 1861.

  SIR: I have the honor to state, for the information of the commanding general, that four of the enemy’s armed steamers commenced firing on our batteries at Aquia Creek Yesterday morning, at about 9 o’clock, and continued until about 4 p. m. On our side nobody was hurt and no material damage was done to our batteries. The enemy gave no indications of an intention to land., but hauled off to the Maryland shore at the close of the action. This demonstration, thus persevered in, is made, I doubt not, in view of collateral action and movements. I arrived on the field about midday, and returned to this place at night. The batteries were commanded by Captain Lynch and other naval officers. The conduct of my entire force, under the command of Colonel Bate, of the Walker Legion, until my arrival on the field, was admirable throughout the day. The enemy is represented to have thrown five hundred and ninety-seven shots and shells, and our battery, under Captain Lynch, seventy-five.

  Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

  DANIEL RUGGLES, Colonel, Provisional Army, Commanding Forces.

  Col. R. S. GARNETT, Adjutant-General Virginia Forces.

  P. S.-The colors were cut away from one of the enemy’s ships by a shot from our battery.

  D. RUGGLES, Colonel, Commanding.

  –––

  HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF FREDERICKSBURG, Fredericksburg, Va., June 4, 1861.

  SIR: I have the honor to state, for the information of the general commanding, that, since Saturday last, no attack has been made on our {p.57} batteries at Aquia Creek, and that the steamer Pawnee only has been lying off at that point, repairing damages, and in communication with various steamers and other vessels passing up and down the Potomac. It has just been reported to me, however, that after I left the creek yesterday, and at about 9 o’clock at night, two or more war steamers, with a vessel in tow, came down the Potomac and joined the Pawnee. Thus far I have no report of the renewal of the attack this morning. It is my intention to throw the Arkansas regiment, Colonel Fagan’s, now at Camp Jackson, upon the Potomac coast, near Chopawamsic, as soon as it is in condition to do so.

  I am much in want of an effective battery of 24-pounder howitzers for service, in conjunction with that force, to prevent the enemy from landing. The Fredericksburg Artillery, of 6-pounders, will be wanted at Aquia Creek to prevent lauding there, if an attack is made. The movements of the enemy indicate that an attempt will soon be made in force to land at, or in the vicinity of Mathias Point in a brief period of time. I respectfully recommend that that point be covered by a good regiment of infantry, with a good battery of field-guns, until measures are taken to establish a good and sufficient battery at that point to command-the channel, for the establishment of which I respectfully renew my former recommendation. Under authority given me, I have fabricated here carriages for a battery of 6-pounder guns, and respectfully request that guns may be furnished me without delay for use in the field.

  Since it has become impracticable to establish a battery at the White House to command the Potomac, I respectfully recommend that a competent engineer be sent me to examine the vicinity of Evansport with that view, and, if found suitable, that a battery may be established there with as little delay as is practicable. That point is important in connection with the position at Manassas Junction, as well as the avenues of approach from the Potomac to this town.

  Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

  DANIEL RUGGLES, Provisional Army, Commanding Forces.

  Col. R. S. GARNETT, Adjutant-General Virginia Forces.

  –––

  No. 2.

  Report of Col. William B. Bate, commanding Walker Legion.

  CAMP JACKSON, ON THE POTOMAC, June 11, 1861.

  DEAR SIR: I suppose you have heard all the particulars of the Aquia Creek fight and the part borne by the Walker Legion. One company of it was in one of the batteries, and the celebrated rifled cannon, so effective upon the enemy, was managed by one of our young lieutenants The remainder of the regiment was held in reserve, though within range of their guns, at a point of concealment, to prevent a lauding if such was attempted. The boys were too eager, and courted a hand-to-hand fight. I made a report to Colonel Ruggles, and forbear further trespass now. I want the Walker Legion to be in the column which advances upon Washington. I believe we will have skirmishes here now-nothing more. We will sink their ships on another effort if they come in range. I had Walker’s rifle battery under my command placed with two rifle, companies to sustain, and one company of mounted men {p.58} with carbines within hailing distance on Symmes’ Point under cover-a masked battery-Saturday night after the fight, thinking they would return to their same position next morning. That night we worked three hundred men all night to have two columbiads and this battery of Walker’s in place, but the enemy, being so crippled, did not return.

  The arrangement Sunday morning would have sunk their ships in an hour had they resumed their position. We are drilling daily, and almost hourly, and will look to you to give us a chance.

  I want one-half hour’s talk with you, and if you will telegraph General Holmes to send me individually to Richmond for a day I can get to go; otherwise I don’t think the old Tycoon (Holmes) will let me, and I never disobey orders. You may be sure I will not leave when there is a prospect of a fight. Everything is peaceable now except the Pawnee, which still coils about our shore like a wounded viper. We have vedettes near here.

  I get information from above and below this point for twenty miles every day through couriers, and can know when it is safe to leave for Richmond only a day.

  Pardon the length of this free-and-easy letter. I know it is a trespass on your much-engaged time. Let me bear from you. Send the dispatch spoken of or write letter, and oblige

  WM. B. BATE.

  Hon. L. P. WALKER, Secretary of War.

  P. S.-I am expecting that field battery promised me at Montgomery. I have a company preparing for it.

  –––

  No. 3.

  Report of M. W. Cluskey.

  AQUIA CREEK, June 1, 1861.

  My DEAR SIR: I had the pleasure of witnessing at this point to-day most of the engagement between one of our batteries and three Lincoln men-of-war, one of them supposed to be the Pawnee, the other the Anacostia, and the other unknown. Our forces acted manfully and suffered no injury, though some of the enemy’s shot was well directed, and where it seemed providentially averted from doing mischief. The fight was a continuation of the one the day before. Our battery fired the first shot to-day, then all of its garrison mounted the fort and cheered in defiance of the enemy. The shot was promptly returned, and the enemy kept up a brisk cannonading, firing, before the close, five hundred and ninety-two shots, comprised of shell and balls of the largest dimensions. The only damage to our side was the death of a chicken, though a stray ball killed a horse on the opposite side of the creek. Our own battery fired but seventy-six shots, three of which are said to have been fired with effect. The firing ceased at 3 1/2 p. m., when a barge from the Pawnee went to the Maryland shore, and returning, the Anacostia proceeded up the river, supposed to be bound for Washington, for a fresh supply of ammunition.

  One of the guns on our battery was under the command of one of the Walker Legion, Cadet Patton Robertson, of Nashville, who fired the rifled cannon with remarkable precision, and displayed, for a young man not yet of age, the most dauntless and cool bravery. The big gun on the {p.59} new battery, which is garrisoned by the Carolina Greys, of our regiment, under command of Captain Hunt, was placed in position about 5 o’clock this afternoon, and will thunder in the anticipated engagement of tomorrow. Another one for the same battery will be planted to-morrow. These guns are in the most splendid locality to command the river that could well be wished for.

  To-morrow Captain Walker’s command of rifled cannon will be at a prominent point of land at the mouth of the creek on the opposite side, which will bring him within a mile and a quarter of the location of the Lincoln vessels in the engagement of to-day. Pits will also be dug tonight at the same place for the use of two of the rifle companies of the Walker Legion. We are all at the creek, though our encampment is four miles back.

  The vindictiveness of the enemy is shown by the quickness with, which they throw their shells at any body of men who may appear on the height to view the engagement. One of our companies was fired at with a shell the moment they emerged from the woods to obtain a more satisfactory view of the fight, which exploded over them, and miraculously scattered so as not to hurt one of the number.

  Colonel Bate has been assigned the command of the brigade here, composed of his own regiment and the Virginia troops present, and is working with a zeal consistent with the energy and enthusiasm of his nature. I have written these lines thinking you would be glad to learn that the regiment which has appropriated your name as its designation is confided with the most important posts of duty in the engagement at this point and vicinity.

  Your friend,

  M. W. CLUSKEY.

  Hon. Secretary L. P. WALKER.

  –––

  JUNE 1, 1861.-Skirmish at Fairfax Court-House, Va.

  REPORTS.

  No. 1.–	Brig. Gen. Irvin McDowell, IT. S. Army, commanding Department Northeastern Virginia.
  No. 2.–	Lieut. Charles 11. Tompkins, Second U. S. Cavalry.
  No. 3.–	General McDowell’s indorsement on Lieutenant Tompkins’ report.
  No. 4.–	Brig. Gen. M. L. Bonham, C. S. Army, commanding
  No. 5.–	Lieut. Col. R. S. Ewell, C. S. Army.

  No. 1.

  Report of Brig. Gen. Irvin McDowell, IT. S. Army.

  HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT N. E. VIRGINIA, Arlington, June 1, 1861-12 m.

  SIR: The following facts have just been reported to me by the orderly sergeant of Company B, Second Cavalry, commanded by Lieutenant Tompkins, the commanding officer being too unwell to report in person. It appears that Company B, Second Cavalry, commanded by Lieutenant Tompkins (aggregate about 75) left its camp about 10 1/2 last night on a scout, and reached Fairfax Court-House about 3 a. m., where they found several hundred men stationed-Captain Ewell, late of the U. S. Dragoons, said to be in command. A skirmish took place, in which a {p.60} number of the enemy were killed; how many the sergeant does not know. Many bodies were seen on the ground, and several were taken into the court-house and seen there by one of our cavalry, who was a prisoner in the court-house for a short time, and afterwards made his escape.

  Five prisoners were captured by our troops. Their names are as follows, viz:

  ...

  Having no good means of keeping the prisoners here, they are sent to general headquarters for further disposition. As soon as Lieutenant Tompkins recovers, a less hurried report than this will be submitted by Colonel Hunter, commanding brigade.

  I have the honor to be, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

  IRVIN McDOWELL, Brigadier-General, Commanding.

  Lieut. Col. E. D. TOWNSEND, Asst. Adjt. Gen., Hdqrs. of the Army, Washington.

  –––

  No. 2.

  Report of Lieut. Charles H. Tompkins, Second U. S. Cavalry.

  CAMP UNION, VA., June 12, 1861.

  SIR: I have the honor to report, pursuant to verbal instructions received from the colonel commanding, that I left this camp on the evening of the 31st May in command of a detachment of Company B. Second Cavalry, consisting of fifty men, with Second Lieut. David S. Gordon, Second Dragoons, temporarily attached, for the purpose of reconnoitering the country in the vicinity of Fairfax Court-House. Upon approaching the town the picket guard was surprised and captured. Several documents were found on their persons, which I herewith inclose. On entering the town of Fairfax my command was fired upon by the rebel troops from the windows and house-tops. Charged on a company of mounted rifles, and succeeded in driving them from the town. Immediately two or three additional companies came up to their relief, who immediately commenced firing upon us, which fire. I again returned. Perceiving that I was largely outnumbered, I deemed it advisable to retreat, which I did in good order, taking five prisoners, fully armed and equipped, and two horses. Nine horses were lost during the engagement and four wounded. The force actually engaged at the commencement of the engagement were two companies of cavalry and one rifle company, but re-enforcements coming in from camps adjacent to the court-house, which I have from reliable authority, increased their force to upwards of 1,000 men. Twenty-five of the enemy were killed and wounded. Captains Cary, Fearing, and Adjutant Frank, of the Fifth N. Y. S. M., accompanied the command as volunteers, and did very effective service. I regret to state that Captain Cary was wounded in the foot.

  Lieut. D. S. Gordon, of the Second Dragoons, temporarily attached to Company B, Second Cavalry, accompanied me, and rendered me valuable services. The prisoners, horses, arms, and equipments taken have been this day turned over to the proper authority.

  I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

  CHARLES H. TOMPKINS, First Lieutenant, Second Cavalry, Commanding Company B.

  Col. D. HUNTER, Third Cavalry, Commanding Brigade.

  {p.61}

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  No. 3.

  General McDowell’s indorsement on Lieutenant Tompkins’ report.

  HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT N. E. VIRGINIA, Arlington, June 7, 1861.

  Col. D. HUNTER, Third United States Cavalry, commanding Brigade:

  SIR: I have the honor to inform you that Lieutenant Tompkins’ report of the affair at Fairfax Court-House on the night of the 30th ultimo has been forwarded to the headquarters of the Army, indorsed as follows:

  HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT N. E. VIRGINIA, Arlington, June 5, 1861.

  Lieutenant Tompkins behaved most gallantly in the spirited encounter in which he involved himself. He had two horses shot under him, and is now temporarily disabled from a contused foot, caused by one of the horses which was shot falling on him.

  The skirmish has given considerable prestige to our regular cavalry in the eyes of our people and of the volunteer regiments, but the lieutenant acted without authority, and went further than he knew he was desired or expected to go, and frustrated unintentionally, for the time, a more important movement. He has been so informed by me, verbally; and whilst in the future he will not be less gallant, he will be more circumspect.

  Respectfully forwarded to the headquarters of the Army.

  IRVIN McDOWELL, Brigadier-General, Commanding.

  I am further directed to say that the General-in-Chief has fully concurred in the opinion of the general commanding the department.

  It is perceived that Lieutenant Tompkins’ first report in this case has been given to the public through the columns of the New York Tribune. I am directed to ask you to give such instructions that this may not become a practice. Official reports and papers of this nature are not to be considered within the control of those who make them, but of those to whom they are made.

  I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

  JAMES B. FRY, Assistant Adjutant-General.

  –––

  No. 4.

  Reports of Brig. Gen. M. L. Bonham, C. S. Army.

  MANASSAS JUNCTION, VA., June 1, 1861.

  Captain Marr was killed; Colonel Ewell wounded in the shoulder, and One Private badly in the right breast. The delay in this work makes me hesitate as to sending forward the main body of our troops at once to Ewell’s line. I shall strengthen him to-night. I inclose you, for what it is worth, the following dispatch:

  General BONHAM:

  Within five days the troops of Fairfax, Centreville, and Manassas are to be attacked. The principal attack at Manassas. This by authority of one who does not wish his name as giving information. Mr. – reports no troops this side of Fans Church. He met the retiring cavalry, much cut up. Fifteen led horses. One dead man and another badly wounded were in a wagon. Many wounded men and horses.

  R. S. EWELL.

  {p.62}

  I have one prisoner, who says they have on this side of the river the Second Cavalry (Companies B, E, I and G) and several batteries of artillery. Arm our cavalry with shot-guns or muskets, if nothing else can be bad.

  M. L. BONHAM.

  General LEE.

  –––

  HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF ALEXANDRIA, Camp Pickens, Va., June 2, 1861.

  SIR: The reports of the attack on Fairfax Court-House by the enemy’s cavalry, on the 1st instant, from Colonels Ewell and Gregg,* already transmitted, should have, been accompanied by this report, but a pressure of urgent business has hitherto prevented my sending it forward. Accompanying this is a fuller report from Colonel Ewell. Having taken an advanced position at Centreville, with Gregg’s regiment of infantry, and at Bull Run with Kershaw’s regiment, I had directed Colonel Ewell, commanding the cavalry of this department, with one company of light infantry (Captain Marr), and two companies of cavalry (Captains Thornton and Green) to take position at Germantown, or at Fairfax Court-House, one and a half miles in advance of Germantown, whichever he might deem best, upon examining the positions. I had also ordered Captains Cabell and Ball, with their troops of cavalry, to report to Colonel Ewell the evening preceding the attack; but unavoidable circumstances prevented their reaching the place that evening. The reports of Colonel Ewell being full, I do not deem it necessary to add a great deal to what he has said. Unfortunately the two companies of cavalry were poorly armed, which prevented their taking so active a part as they would, doubtless, otherwise have done.

  Lieutenant-Colonel Ewell was wounded in the shoulder. Not only on this occasion, in the face of the enemy, but at all other times he has exhibited promptness, energy, and gallantry in the discharge of his duties. Captain Marr fell early in the action, deeply lamented by all who knew him. His loss to the service will be sensibly felt. His corps of light infantry (the Warrenton Rifles) bore themselves like veterans, twice repulsing the enemy, and finally compelling them to fly across the fields, after fruitless efforts to return through the village by the streets through which they had entered. By Colonel Ewell and others present the bearing and usefulness of Ex-Governor Smith on the occasion are spoken of in the highest terms.

  Killed, Captain Marr; wounded, Lieutenant-Colonel Ewell; missing (taken prisoners), five. One of the enemy known to have been killed; wounded, not known-several reported; prisoners, three, each of whom I saw and examined.

  The enemy was eighty to eighty-five strong, well armed, and commanded by Lieutenant Tompkins, Second U. S. Cavalry.

  I again respectfully urge the thorough arming of Green’s, Thornton’s, and Powell’s troops of cavalry with double-barreled shot-guns, musketoons, or lances and pistols.

  I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

  M. L. BONHAM, Brig. Gen., C. S. A., Commanding First Brigade, Dept. of Alexandria.

  Col. R. S. GARNETT, Adjutant-General Virginia Forces.

  * Colonel Gregg’s report not found.

  {p.63}

  –––

  No. 5.

  Reports of Lieut. Col. R. S. Ewell, C. S. Army.

  FAIRFAX COURT-HOUSE, VA., June 1, 1861.

  SIR: I have the honor to make the following report: Between 3 and 4 o’clock this morning the pickets on the Little Falls Church road gave an alarm, stating that the cavalry of the enemy had captured our advance pickets, and were rapidly approaching the town. This was immediately followed by the appearance of the enemy, and here rapid firing took place. They did not stop, but passed through towards Germantown. I found Captain Marr’s company of Rifles (receiving valuable aid from his excellency Ex-Governor Smith), anti took a position on the road by which the enemy had gone towards Germantown. In a few minutes the enemy returned, and firing took place on both sides, and the enemy fell back. Having reformed, the enemy again advanced, and more firing took place on both sides. They again retreated, and made their way through the fields, by pulling down the fences. Captain Harrison has been sent with his company, to intercept them, and Captain Wickham has been sent on their trail. Some prisoners and some horses have been taken; what number I do not know. Also several carbines and pistols have been picked up in the road. Captain Marr, of the Warrenton Rifles, has been found dead near his company’s quarters, having been shot by a detachment of the enemy. I received a flesh wound in the shoulder from a bullet. Dr. Gunnell says that it will keep me from taking the saddle for several days. This is the result as far as known. I am having the roads patrolled. A United States saddle has just been brought in to me. The enemy were driven back twice by the Warrenton Rifles, who did good service.

  I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

  R. S. EWELL, Lieutenant-Colonel.

  Col. THOMAS JORDAN, Assistant Adjutant-General.

  P. S.-A report has just been made me that two of the enemy have been found dead on their trail.

  –––

  JUNE 1, 1861.

  SIR: Between 3 and 4 o’clock this morning the pickets on the Little Falls Church road gave the alarm, stating that the cavalry of the enemy had taken the advanced pickets and were rapidly approaching the town. This was soon followed by their appearance, firing at the windows and doors of the hotel, where were no resistance or troops. They did not stop, but passed through toward Germantown. I formed Captain Marr’s company of light infantry (receiving valuable aid from his excellency Ex-Governor Smith) and took a position on the road to intercept the enemy’s return. They soon reappeared, forming in the street below the court-house, and, on the interchange of shots, they retreated up the pike. In a few moments they formed a second time at the same spot, and, after firing on both sides, the enemy ran off ingloriously, pulling down fences, and making their escape through the fields by Flint Hill. I had ordered up a squadron from the station, which was sent in pursuit, but the enemy outrode it. They left no dead on the ground, but carbines, pistols, sabers, &c., were lying around. I know of four horses left by them, two in the service of General Beauregard, one wounded and one unfit for use, being {p.64} both obstinate and unmanageable, besides two dead, close to the field, and have heard of several left dead on the road. An officer’s saber was picked up on the road by which they ran away. Three, prisoners were brought in, who separately reported their strength at eighty, rank and file. They were, driven off by less than fifty of Captain Marr’s company of Warrenton Rifles. These had no bayonets or other arms than the rifle, while the eighty men of the enemy had a revolver and carbine each, or five, hundred and sixty shots without loading. The two cavalry companies here (Rappahannock and Prince William) had very few fire-arms and no ammunition, and took no part in the affair. The enemy captured one vedette and picked up four of the Prince William Cavalry the first time they charged through the town. Captain Marr was found shot through the heart a short distance from the field. I understand he had started, with a portion of his company, toward the enemy and was intercepted by their pickets. This also explains, in part, why there were so few rifles present at the fight. Lieutenant-Colonel Ewell received a flesh wound through the shoulder when they made their last attack.

  The above includes all our loss of killed and wounded. Official statements, published in the papers, vary in the loss of the enemy-killed from one to three, and six or eight wounded. A gentleman reported that they impressed his wagon to carry off the dead and wounded. Their report states one to have been missing. Three prisoners were brought to me, so that they sink to official falsehoods to conceal the truth. The New York Times of the 4th gives their loss at six killed and wounded. I send below a report made to me by a clergyman who met them on their retreat:

  They appeared about forty, had twelve to fifteen led horses, and a wagon, with one corpse and some wounded men; some wounded men on horseback, supported by Soldiers mounted behind.

  Respectfully,

  R. S. EWELL, Lieutenant-Colonel Virginia Forces, Commanding.

  Lieut. Col. THOMAS JORDAN, Assistant Adjutant-General.

  –––

  JUNE 3, 1861.-Action at Philippi, W. Va.

  REPORTS, ETC.

  No. 1.–	Maj. Gen. George B. McClellan, U. S. Army.
  No. 2.–	Brig. Gen. T. A. Morris, Indiana Militia.
  No. 3.–	Col. J. M. Heck and Majs. R. E. Cowan and M. G. Harman, C. S. forces.
  No. 4.–	Maj. M. G. Harman, commanding Virginia forces at Staunton.
  No. 5.–	Col. George A. Porterfield, Virginia forces, and reply of General Lee.
  No. 6.–	Findings of a Court of Inquiry.

  No. 1.

  Reports of Maj. Gen. George B. McClellan, U. S. Army.

  HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE OHIO, Cincinnati, June 3, 1861.

  I have just received a telegram, dated to-day, from General T. A. Morris, Indiana Volunteers, commanding United States troops at Grafton, Va., in which he says:

  We surprised the rebels, about two thousand strong, at Philippi this morning. Captured a large amount of arms, horses, ammunition, provisions, and camp equipage. {p.65} The attack was made after a march during the entire night in a drenching rain. The surprise was complete. Fifteen rebels killed. The gallant Colonel Kelley, of the First Virginia Volunteers, I fear, is mortally wounded. No other important casualties on our side.

  The dispatch from General Morris informs me that the troops at last advices were in hot pursuit of the rebels.

  GEO. B. McCLELLAN, Major-General, Commanding.

  Col. E. D. TOWNSEND, Assistant Adjutant-General.

  –––

  HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE OHIO, Cincinnati, Ohio, June 10, 1861.

  SIR: Inclosed I have the honor to forward the report of Brig. Gen. T. A. Morris, Indiana Volunteers, commanding the U. S. volunteer forces in the vicinity of Grafton, Va., giving a detailed account of the operations connected with the attack and occupation of Philippi.

  After the two branches of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad leading from Wheeling and Parkersburg had been secured and Grafton occupied by our troops, I learned that the insurgents had retreated to Philippi, and received very considerable accessions to their numbers.

  To prevent their further outrages upon the railroads or upon the property of loyal citizens, I directed an immediate movement to dislodge and disperse them from their new position. This was executed under the orders of General Morris, Colonel Kelley, of the First Virginia Volunteers, having the immediate command of the attacking columns; and the result, as will be seen from General Morris’ report, was in many respects highly creditable to the troops engaged, and perfectly successful. The insurgents, about 2,000 in number, were surprised in their camp, routed, and in great confusion driven before our troops for several miles towards Beverly.

  Although quite a number of them were killed and wounded and a large portion of their munitions captured, yet it is much to be, regretted that the exhausted condition of our men, consequent upon a long night march through mud and rain, prevented them from overtaking and capturing the mass of the fugitives. It is believed, however, that the effect of this decisive engagement will be to inspire the Union people of the country with confidence in our ability to afford them protection.

  Had the attack been supported by a few companies of cavalry, it is probable that many of the enemy would have been captured or cut to Pieces. As I have no available troops of that description in my department, I would very respectfully urge upon the consideration of the general commanding the importance of a mounted force (regular cavalry if they can be furnished) to insure the success of future operations in this department.

  Colonel Kelley, who conducted the movement on Philippi with marked ability and zeal, received a severe wound early in the action, which at the time was supposed to be mortal, but I am now happy to say that he is considered out of danger. From the moment he received my orders at Wheeling to move on Grafton up to the time he was wounded he has exhibited in an eminent degree the qualities of an efficient commander, and I take this opportunity of renewing my recommendation for his promotion to the rank of brigadier-general in the Virginia Volunteer Militia.

  Colonel Dumont deserves great credit for his conduct in the attack and Pursuit of the rebels. {p.66}

  Col. F. W. Lander, volunteer aide-de-camp, rendered very valuable assistance in the movement from Parkersburg and in the attack on Philippi, where he displayed marked gallantry, and captured the officer who shot Colonel Kelley.

  I am, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

  GEO. B. MCCLELLAN, Major-General, U. S. Army.

  Lieut. Gen. WINFIELD SCOTT, Commander-in-Chief U. S. Army, Washington, D. C.

  –––

  No. 2.

  Report of Brig. Gen. T. A. Morris, Indiana Militia.

  HEADQUARTERS U. S. VOLUNTEERS, Grafton, W. Va., June 7, 1861.

  GENERAL: I have the honor to report that I arrived at Grafton on the evening of the 1st day of June, and found that Colonel Kelley, of the First Virginia Regiment, had organized an expedition for that night against the enemy at Philippi. The available forces then at his command consisted of six companies of his own regiment and nine companies of the Ninth Indiana Volunteers, commanded by Colonel Milroy. After a full conference with Colonel Kelley as to the position of the enemy, his strength, and the character of the approaches to his position, I deemed it advisable to postpone the attack until the succeeding night.

  Having satisfied myself during the evening that we were in the midst of spies, who readily obtained every information in regard to our movements, I endeavored to arrange the expedition so as to give a false impression, and thereby secure the advantage of a surprise of the enemy. With this view the following order was given to Colonel Kelley:

  HEADQUARTERS U. S. VOLUNTEERS. Grafton, W. Va., June 2, 1861.

  Col. B. F. KELLEY, Commanding First Regiment Virginia Volunteers:

  COLONEL: With six companies of your regiment, nine companies of Colonel Milroy’s Ninth Indiana, and six companies of Colonel Irvine’s Sixteenth Ohio, you will proceed this morning to a point about six miles eastward from this place on the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, and march by the shortest and most practicable route towards Philippi. You must regulate your march according to your own discretion, and your bivouac or rest at night in such manner that you are sure of coming before the town of Philippi as near 4 o’clock to-morrow morning as possible. Should you this evening receive certain information that the rebels have retreated eastward from Philippi you will make the resting time of your troops as short as possible, in order to follow them up with all the speed the strength of your troops will allow. In such case you win as early as possible inform Colonel Dumont on the other bank of the river, and direct his co-operation with you in the pursuit, which, if in your discretion you are in sufficient force, you will continue until they are beyond Beverly, and you will also apprise these headquarters, in order that supplies may be forwarded to you.

  By command of Brig. Gen. T. A. Morris:

  JOHN A. STEIN, Acting Assistant Adjutant-General.

  This column (the left of the attack) moved by railroad train on the 2d at 9 o’clock a. m. towards, and was generally understood to be an advance on, Harper’s Ferry.

  After leaving the cars the distance to Philippi was about twenty-five miles, on a road but little traveled. The instructions required a rapid {p.67} march during the day and early part of the night to a point from which, after a sufficient rest, Philippi could be certainly reached at 4 o’clock next morning.

  My information induced me to believe that two attacking columns, one on the left, the other on the right side of Philippi, would secure every exit which the enemy could use in retreat. I therefore organized the right column, under Colonel Dumont, in conformity with the following order:

  HEADQUARTERS U. S. VOLUNTEERS, Grafton, W. Va., June 2, 1861.

  Colonel DUMONT, Comdg. Seventh Regiment Indiana Volunteers, near Grafton, Va.:

  COLONEL: You will proceed by railroad this evening at 8.30 o’clock to Webster, with eight companies of your regiment. At Webster you will be joined by Colonel Steedman, with five companies of his regiment and two field pieces, also by Colonel Crittenden, with six companies of his regiment. From Webster you will, with this command, march on Philippi, using your own discretion in the conduct of the march, keeping in view that you should arrive in front of the town at 4 o’clock precisely tomorrow morning.

  Information is received that the rebels are in some force at Philippi.

  The object of your column will be to divert attention until the attack is made by Colonel Kelley, and should resistance be offered you are to aid him to the extent of your ability. In the conduct of your column you must use your discretion, being governed by such circumstances as may occur. When joined by Colonel Kelley, the whole force will be under his command.

  The companies of your regiment will take two full days’ rations. Should you receive instructions from Colonel Kelley that the rebels have retreated, you will join him at once, and act under his command.

  By command of Brig. Gen. T. A. Morris:

  JOHN A. STEIN, Acting Assistant Adjutant-General.

  This force, in leaving Grafton after dark, had reasonable assurance of reaching the enemy in advance of any information from their friends, and, as events proved, did so. The enemy was entirely off his guard, and was completely surprised, as the reports of those engaged in the attack attest.

  The failure to capture the entire rebel force can only be attributed to the storm during the night. This unforeseen misfortune served to call forth an endurance seldom exhibited, and I feel that the heroism of officers and men was as truly displayed in a march of fifteen miles in Pitchy darkness, drenching rain, and over a mountainous country as in the irresistible attack and hot pursuit of the discomfited enemy. The last five miles of Colonel Dumont’s column was made in one hour and a quarter. Many men fainted, and were left on the road. Others threw away their haversacks and provisions to keep up, rushing forward with a determination that showed what spirit animated the command. I regard it as remarkable that under such circumstances the two columns were but fifteen minutes apart at the time assigned for their meeting. Am able reconnaissance in advance of Colonel Dumont’s column was made, by Col. F. W. Lander, whose voluntary aid I gladly accepted, and to whose advice and assistance I am greatly indebted. The immediate direction of the artillery was confided to him. After the bridge was taken he, pressed forward and joined Colonel Kelley, rode into the enemy’s ranks, and captured the prisoner reported to have shot Colonel Kelley. He had great difficulty in restraining the Virginia Volunteers from summarily dispatching the man, who is a noted secessionist and a quartermaster of the rebel forces.

  From the reports of Colonel Dumont (who, by the fall of Colonel Kelley, had command) you will perceive there is much difficulty in an accurate statement of the enemy’s losses. His killed is estimated from {p.68} fifteen to forty, which were carried off, supposed by friends, during the confusion incident to the pursuit of the enemy. A large amount of camp equipage, provisions, arms, wagons, horses, and medical stores were captured, an inventory of which will be made as soon as possible.

  Whilst I am happy to state that we have none killed, I am extremely sorry to report that the gallant Colonel Kelley, of the First Virginia Regiment, whilst leading the attack of his column, fell severely wounded by a pistol-shot in the right breast. The wound, supposed at first to be mortal, I am glad to know will only deprive us of his valuable counsels and assistance for a few weeks. Although he still suffers, his ultimate recovery may be now regarded as certain. Much of the success of our attack is due to him. His thorough knowledge of the country, his skill in rendering that knowledge available, his cool and unflinching courage, will deprive us for the time of a great support in our enterprise. [Sic.]

  To Colonel Dumont, who led the column on the right, too much praise can scarcely be given. For his energy, tact, and cool daring we are greatly indebted.

  I feel it would be a trespass upon your patience to enumerate all who deserve especial praise, and would refer you to the report herewith forwarded for minute information, both as respects individuals and the various commanders engaged. I cannot, however, conclude without expressing my obligations to Capt. H. W. Benham, U. S. Engineers, for the valuable aid he has afforded me. Indeed, his great knowledge and experience are invaluable to me at all times, and particularly on this occasion.

  Immediately after the action, knowing the exhausted condition of the officers and men, I dispatched Captain Benham to the scene of action, gave him fall command, and have the satisfaction to state that he restored order, and placed all in position to repel an attack with a promptness that exhibited his consummate ability and unbounded energy.

  Justice obliges me, in conclusion, to say, that of my staff brigade inspector, Major Love; my aide-de-camp, Captain Hascall, and Acting Assistant Adjutant-General John A. Stein deserve all the encomiums that a deep sense of my dependence upon them obliges me to express. They are all thorough in their knowledge and untiring in their duties, and I feel sure that their services in my command will be duly appreciated by you, and be remembered gratefully by all.

  I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

  T. A. MORRIS, Brig. Gen., Comdg. U. S. Volunteers in Western Virginia.

  Capt. N. H. McLEAN, Asst. Adjt. Gen., Department of the Ohio, Cincinnati, Ohio.

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  No. 3.

  Joint report of Col. J. M. Heck and Majors Cowan and Harman.

  STAUNTON, VA., June 6, 1861.

  Messrs. Spalding and Cook have just reached here, leaving Philippi on Monday morning. The Federal troops surprised Colonel Porterfield’s command, opening fire upon the town with artillery, and drove us out, with a reported loss of about six killed and a considerable quantity of arms, baggage, and provisions. Much heavier loss to the enemy in men. McClellan led the Federal forces. Our forces retreated to Beverly.

  {p.69}

  The expedition under Colonel Heck leaves here on Friday for the Northwest. We urge you will send by express train two thousand men, with arms and ammunition, to drive the vandals out, or else give up our border. These gentlemen were in the engagement; say Colonel Porterfield had but little ammunition of any kind. Send an officer of experience to command our forces, or a battery and five thousand arms, if possible.

  M. G. HARMAN, Major. J. M. HECK, Colonel. R. E. COWAN, Major.

  Governor LETCHER or General R. E. LEE.

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  No. 4.

  Report of Maj. M. G. Harman, Virginia Volunteers.

  HEADQUARTERS VIRGINIA FORCES, Staunton, Va., June 6, 1861.

  SIR: Inclosed is a copy of a letter that I have written to Colonel Porterfield, at Beverly. From this you will perceive that, while I have received no communication from Colonel Porterfield informing me of the wants of his command, learning of their great need of supplies of ammunition from private sources, I have dispatched an express to him with a supply. From all the information that I have received I am pained to have to express my conviction that Colonel Porterfield is entirely unequal to the position which he occupies. The affair at Philippi was a disgraceful surprise, occurring about daylight, there being no picket guard or guard of any kind on duty. The only wonder is that our men were not cut to pieces. They were all asleep, and were only aroused by the firing of the enemy. The safety of the Northwest and of our inexperienced soldiers depends upon an immediate change of commanders, and giving the command to a bold and experienced leader.

  I start in the morning the expedition under Lieutenant-Colonel Heck, under escort of two companies of cavalry, three companies of infantry, and one artillery company, with a battery, if the Tennessee company arrives. I send a large supply of provisions, fifteen hundred muskets, clothing, and all the ammunition that I can raise. I have arranged to concentrate the militia on the route, which will join Colonel Heck, and will be armed by him as they come in. I have the arrangements in progress to start promptly the detachment, which, I am informed, will be sent up on Saturday to this point. We are sadly in want of ammunition, our whole supply being exhausted by this expedition. I hope You will have a sufficient supply forwarded as early as possible to this point.

  I would again urge rapid re-enforcements to regain possession of the Northwest, and that I shall receive authority from you to call out and arm the companies from all the valley counties, and send them to that quarter, instead of their going, as heretofore directed, to their different rendezvous. Send up five thousand flint-lock muskets from Richmond and I will have them overhauled and put in order for use. We shall need these in addition to what we have.

  Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

  M. G. HARMAN, Major, Commanding.

  Maj. Gen. R. E. LEE, Richmond, Va. {p.70} [Inclosure.]

  HEADQUARTERS VIRGINIA FORCES, Staunton, Va., June 6, 1861.

  Col. G. A. PORTERFIELD, Commanding Virginia Forces, Beverly, Va.:

  COLONEL: I send you a supply of ammunition by Messrs. Trotter and Crawford, an account of which is herewith inclosed.

  To-morrow I shall send you a field battery, accompanied by cavalry and infantry, which will be joined by other troops on the way, and the whole force will report to you at Beverly. On the day following, from two to three thousand troops will be sent to you by President Davis from Richmond. I have received a telegraphic dispatch from the commander-in-chief of our army, saying: “Send a messenger to Colonel Porterfield to be valiant and maintain his ground until relief reaches him. Send him supplies, if he wants them.”

  Having received no official communication from you, but learning from private sources, since the disaster to our arms at Philippi, that you are almost without ammunition, I have determined to send you a supply by express. I inclose duplicate receipts for the munitions sent, which you will please sign and return to me. Please keep in daily communication with me by couriers until relief reaches you.

  Very respectfully,

  M. G. HARMAN, Major, Commanding.

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  No. 5.

  Reports of Col. George A. Porterfield, Virginia Volunteers, and reply of General Lee.

  HEADQUARTERS OF VIRGINIA FORCES, Huttonsville, Va., June 9, 1861.

  SIR: I have the honor to address you as regards the state of my command. The force here now numbers about one thousand, of which one hundred and eighty are cavalry and the balance infantry. This force is not only deficient in drill, but ignorant, both officers and men, of the most ordinary duties of the soldier. With efficient drill officers they might be made effective; but I have to complain that the field officers sent to command these men are of no assistance to me, and are, for the most part, as ignorant of their duties as the company officers, and they as ignorant as the men. I hope, if I am continued in command, that good staff officers may be sent, to aid in organizing this raw force, than which there is none more so now in the service. I have not been able to even get proper returns made out to send to your headquarters, and my own reputation has been injured by the character of my command; in fact, if it had been intended to sacrifice me, I could not have expected less support than I have had. If it is expected that the troops here should take the field effectively, it is necessary that at least five thousand well-drilled men should be sent at once, as the enemy’s army is being daily re-enforced; and if aid is not soon sent, it will be impossible to keep the open field, even as a mere corps of observation, but will have to retire to the mountains, where it will be most difficult, if not impossible, to provision even this small force. I have been reliably informed {p.71} that two companies of negroes, armed and uniformed, have been seen at Fairmont. The country to the northwest is in a state of revolution, all law-abiding citizens being driven off by the traitors, assisted by Northern troops. The private property of secessionists, but otherwise inoffensive citizens, their cattle, young, unbroken horses and colts, and the clothing of women and children, have been seized and taken off from citizens of Philippi. Captain Alexander will give verbally any additional information that may be desired as to the condition of this command.

  Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

  GEO. A. PORTERFIELD, Colonel of Volunteers, Commanding.

  Col. R. S. GARNETT, Adjutant-General Virginia Forces, Richmond, Va.

  –––

  HEADQUARTERS, VIRGINIA FORCES, Randolph County, Va., June 11, 1861.

  SIR: I omitted to state in my last report that Lieut. Col. William L. Jackson, Virginia Volunteers, had reported to me for duty. He has been very active, and will become a most useful officer. Colonel Willey, who has also been very-zealous and useful, was left sick in Philippi. I have assurance that he shall be well treated.

  The enemy remains at Philippi, where they are reported to have about five thousand men, and are fortifying themselves. The same number are said to be at Grafton. From five hundred to one thousand are said to be at the Cheat River Bridge; but of this I have no reliable information. Other forces are stationed at different points on the railroads. I understand their object to be to occupy the western part of the State, to the Alleghanies or Blue Ridge, if possible. The greatest outrages have, in numerous cases, been perpetrated upon the private property of secessionists. Some militia companies have recently joined this command. A regiment from Tennessee is expected here to-morrow, having in charge, as I am informed, some pieces of heavy artillery. No pieces heavier than 6-pounders should be sent to this country, until some position is selected to be fortified and a strong and reliable infantry force sent to support it. I am not informed what quantity of ammunition is in Staunton. I have never received any other than the most limited supplies from that place. The percussion caps sent have nearly all been of small size for shot-guns and not large enough for muskets. As re-enforcements are now expected, and we shall have active service in this part of the State, I desire to be continued on duty here. It was not until after repeated calls for aid, and when left with a small militia force entirely unprepared for the field, that I asked for duty else-where. Beverly is now occupied by our cavalry.

  Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

  GEO. A. PORTERFIELD, Colonel of Volunteers, Commanding.

  Col. R. S. GARNETT, Adjutant-General, Richmond Va.

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  HEADQUARTERS VIRGINIA FORCES, Richmond, Va., June 13, 1861.

  COLONEL: Your letter of the 9th has been received. I regret much the unfortunate circumstances with which you have been beset, and appreciate {p.72} the difficulties you have had to encounter. General R. S. Garnett, C. S. Army, has been sent to take command in the Northwest, with such a force as was disposable. It is hoped that he will soon reach the scene of action, that a more agreeable state, of things will be inaugurated, and that loyal-spirited citizens of the country will be encouraged and enabled to put down the revolution which you mention. Your services will be very valuable to General Garnett, in giving him information as to the state of affairs in the country under his command, and in aiding him to achieve the object of his campaign.

  Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

  R. E. LEE, General, Commanding.

  Col. GEORGE A. PORTERFIELD, Commanding, &c., Huttonsville Va.

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  No. 6.

  Findings of the Court of Inquiry.

  GENERAL ORDERS, No. 30.}

  HEADQUARTERS OF THE FORCES, Richmond, Va., July 4, 1861.

  I.-The court of inquiry, which convened at Beverly on the 20th ultimo, at the request of Col. G. A. Porterfield, of the Virginia Volunteers, to examine into the circumstances of the retreat of the Virginia forces from Philippi on the 3d of June, under his command, has reported the following facts in the case:

  A force of Virginia troops, consisting of some six hundred effective infantry (or thereabouts), and one hundred and seventy-five cavalry (or thereabouts), sufficiently well armed, but badly and insufficiently supplied with the necessary accouterments and ammunition, was stationed at Philippi, Barbour County, Virginia, on the morning of Julie 3, 1861 (where they had been for six or seven days), under the command of Col. George A. Porterfield, of the Virginia Volunteers.

  On the morning of the day just indicated, at between daybreak and sunrise, this command was attacked and taken by surprise; no alarm or intimation of the enemy’s approach having been given by the guard or infantry pickets, until the enemy was within some four hundred yards of the place, and had commenced the fire from his artillery. By the examination it is shown that a main and picket guard, as strong as was consistent with the effective infantry force present, was regularly detailed and posted at distances sufficiently far out to accomplish the object in view, provided they knew and did their duty, which latter is strongly to be suspected, from the fact that, although in advance, they failed to give any intimation of the enemy’s approach, a conclusion which is strengthened by the official report of the mounted officers, out with the scouting parties on the night of June 2, that they had neither seen an infantry picket nor been challenged by its sentinels, going from or returning to the town that night. It appears that, immediately upon the arrival of the command at Philippi, the officer in command, Colonel Porterfield, took measures to place his force, which was raw and new in service, under a course of instruction, and to select those, in his opinion, best fitted to instruct the sentinels and guards in their duties. The testimony shows that, while there was a certain degree of confusion in some quarters, a portion of the command moved from the town in good order, and that the whole force, nearly, after passing some distance from the town, was reformed, and proceeded in order.

  {p.73}

  It is shown in the evidence that an expectation of attack or movement upon Philippi, shortly to be made, was entertained generally among the officers and others of the command, and that intelligence (how well founded is not known) was brought from time to time of the strength and supposed intent of the enemy.

  The testimony sets forth that this had so far produced its effect as to induce the officer in command to call a meeting of his officers; that the result of their consultations and deliberations was an almost, if not unanimous decision in favor of immediate retreat; that when Colonel Porterfield returned to the room (from which he had been absent a short time) their opinion was conveyed to him, to which he seemed loth to accede; yet, determined to make a further examination of the ammunition on hand, and to prepare the baggage and train for removal at a moment’s notice.

  No orders to march at any particular time were given, so far as can be gathered from the testimony, although it appears that an understanding or impression was had or entertained by some that the movement would not take place until morning, while some believed it contingent upon the weather.

  The record will disclose the fact of a difference of construction (as to the hour of return) of the orders given to the officer in command of the cavalry company, from which the scouting party or parties was taken for duty on the night of 2d instant.

  The testimony of several witnesses bears evidence of the cool, deliberate, and self-possessed conduct of Colonel Porterfield on the morning of June 3.

  The court having been directed to express its opinion, as well as report the facts, presents the following:

  1st. That the commanding officer, having received information, deemed by him sufficient to prepare for an early retreat, erred in permitting himself to be influenced by the weather, so far as to delay the execution of his plan.

  2d. That the commanding officer did order dispositions to be made to prevent surprise; but a misunderstanding as to the time at which the scouts were to be called in, and a total want of proper vigilance on the part of the infantry pickets, caused a surprise, which distinct and definite instructions, properly executed, would have avoided.

  3d. That the commanding officer erred in not advancing and strengthening his picket beyond the usual limits under the circumstances.

  4th. That the commanding officer exhibited upon the occasion decided coolness, self-possession, and personal courage, and exerted himself, as far as possible, to effect a retreat in good order.

  II.-The commanding general having attentively considered the proceedings of the court of inquiry in the foregoing case, concurs in the opinion expressed by the court and in the statement of facts deduced from the testimony. These facts show that the position at Philippi was seriously threatened by a superior force of the enemy, distant only four hours’ march; that Colonel Porterfield was aware of the danger of his position, and prudently prepared to evacuate it. His desire to prevent the occupation of the town by the enemy was worthy Of all praise, and had he promptly sent back his baggage and ineffective men, arranged his plan of defense, and taken proper measures to secure information of the advance of the enemy, he might safely have retained his position, and either given battle or retired, as circumstances might dictate. It does not appear from the record of the court that any plan Of defense was formed; but it does appear that the troops retired without {p.74} his orders, and that the instructions to his advance guard were either misconceived or not executed. To these circumstances must be attributed the disaster that followed, and they call for heavy censure upon all concerned. The commanding general remarks with pleasure upon the coolness, self-possession, courage, and energy displayed by Colonel Porterfield at the moment of attack; but he cannot exonerate him from blame in not taking proper precautionary measures beforehand. Yet, in consideration of all the circumstances of the case, he does not think it necessary to do more than to express the opinion of the court, in the hope that the sad effects produced by the want of forethought and vigilance, as exhibited in this case, will be a lesson to be remembered by the army throughout the war.

  III.-The court of inquiry, of which Col. William B. Taliaferro, Virginia Volunteers, is president, is dissolved.

  By command of General Lee:

  GEO. DEAS, Assistant Adjutant-General.

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  JUNE 5, 1861.–Attack upon Confederate Battery at Pig Point, Virginia.

  No. 1.–	Brig. Gen. Benjamin Huger, C. S. Army.
  No. 2.–	Commander R. B. Pegram, C. S. Navy.

  No. 1.

  Reports of Brig. Gen. Benjamin Huger, C. S. Army.

  HEADQUARTERS FORCES OF VIRGINIA, Norfolk, Va., June 6, 1861.

  SIR: The steamer Harriet Lane was occupied yesterday in reconnoitering our battery at Pig Point, mouth of Nansemond River, and this morning took up a position and opened fire upon the battery, doing but little damage and injuring no one. The battery replied, and, after firing some twenty shots, the steamer hauled off suddenly and proceeded to Old Point.

  Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

  BENJ. HUGER, Brigadier-General, Commanding.

  Maj. Gen. R. E. LEE, Commanding Forces of Virginia.

  P. S.-One gun, a 32-pounder, burst, without injuring any one. I have sent two to replace it.

  –––

  HEADQUARTERS FORCES NORFOLK HARBOR, Norfolk, Va., June 7, 1861.

  SIR: I have received information that, on the 5th instant, the Harriet Lane was hit twice by the battery at Pig Point. One shot struck the water-ways, passed through a tub of musket-balls, damaged the foremast, and went out through the top of the rail. Six men were wounded by the scattering of the musket balls.

  Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

  BENJ. HUGER, Brigadier-General, Commanding.

  Maj. Gen. R. E. LEE, Commanding Forces of Virginia, Richmond, Va.

  {p.75}

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  No. 2.

  Report of Commander R. B. Pegram, C. S. Navy.

  PIG POINT BATTERY, June 5, 1861.

  SIR: I have the honor to report that the Federal steamer Harriet Lane stood within range of this battery at 9 a. m. to-day, and, taking a position at the distance Of One and a half miles, commenced firing upon us with shot and shell from her 11-inch shell-gun and 32-pounders. She fired about thirty-three shot and shell, many of them well directed, but no one of our party was hurt, nor (lid the fortifications sustain any injury. A 32-pounder shot struck the muzzle of one of our 8-inch shell-guns and cracked it from the face to the chase ring. The gun at the same time was run in for loading, and, although the shot was broken in three fragments in the midst of our men, no one, sustained the slightest injury. A number of shells exploded near and around us, but all fell harmless to the ground. In return we fired twenty-three shot and shell; four or five were seen to take effect in the hull of the steamer, and, I am inclined to believe, did her some injury, from the manner in which she moved off.

  For men who had never before been in action, the Portsmouth Rifles were remarkably cool and self-possessed, and, after a few rounds, got the range of the enemy and fired admirably well. Every officer and man behaved in the most spirited and creditable manner, and were so regardless of danger, that I had often to interpose my authority to prevent their exposing themselves unnecessarily to the enemy’s fire. The action lasted about fifteen or twenty minutes.

  I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

  R. B. PEGRAM, Commander, Virginia Navy.

  Commodore FRENCH FORREST, Virginia Navy, Commandant Naval Station, Norfolk, Va.

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  JUNE 7, 1861.–Reconnaissance from Yorktown to Newport News, Va.

  Report of Capt. W. H. Werth, Chatham Grays, Virginia Cavalry.

  CAMP YORKTOWN, June 12, 1861.

  SIR: I beg leave to make the following report of a reconnaissance made by me of the enemy’s position at Newport News on Friday, 7th June, 1861:

  I had under my command twenty picked men and horses from the Old Dominion Dragoons, together with two men from my company. Captain Philips accompanied me, as did Lieutenant Cary and Lieutenant Harrison, the latter from the Charles City Cavalry. My object was to make a close examination of the enemy’s works at Newport News, which I knew would be of service to you in your future movements. I did not start with the intention of pressing my men into certain ruin by an attack upon an overwhelming force, but simply to make a reliable reconnaissance. At about 1 o’clock I had approached the enemy’s position to within two miles. I, Captain Philips, and two men were in advance of the detachment some four hundred yards, whilst two Men marched the same distance in rear.

  {p.76}

  At this juncture I saw a squad of eight men on the bank of James River, and distant from me some distance, probably a mile and a half. I examined them with my glass, and knew them to be soldiers. They immediately Red toward their fortifications. I saw at once that if I allowed them to reach the works and give the alarm, my whole command might be cut off and my reconnaissance broken up, so I at once ordered a forward movement at speed so that I might cut them off. Our advance party of five being better mounted, and having so much the start, distanced the detachment in running the two miles, and placed them probably six hundred yards in the rear. When our little advance party had ridden to within seven hundred yards of Newport News fortifications, I ordered Captain Philips and the two men of the advance guard to change direction to the right, so that he might get between the eight fugitives and the works, whilst I continued my direct advance upon the works, thinking if Captain Philips failed to intercept these men that I should certainly meet them.

  After I had approached the fortifications of the enemy to within four hundred yards, I turned to the right (the James River side) to head the eight men. I had gone in this direction probably two or three hundred yards, when suddenly I came up to within fifty yards of a party of the enemy engaged in cutting wood. I was then entirely a-lone. I halted and hid myself behind a thicket only twenty yards from the party. Here I remained long enough to count the number of men, distinguish the officers, &c. In about three minutes the eight men (whom Captain Philips had failed to intercept) raised the alarm in the Massachusetts regiment (which was encamped outside of the works, and not more than one hundred and sixty yards from the spot where, I stood), and I at once saw that I must do quickly whatever I intended doing, so I reined my horse back, and walked him out into the clearing in plain view of the whole party, and not more than twenty paces from them, picked out the commissioned officer, and shot him dead in his tracks. The whole party then yelled, “Look out, look out for the d-d Virginia horsemen; they are down upon us,” &c., and at once throw down everything they had, and commenced a retreat at a double quick. I put the spurs to my horse and rode into them at full speed (giving at the same time a loud walla-walla war-whoop), and then delivered my second shot, which brought another man (a private) dead to the ground. (I shot the first one through the heart, and the last one under the right shoulder-blade.)

  My horse by this time became totally unmanageable, and my third fire missed its aim, but killed a sorrel mule. I fired only these three shots. The party consisted of twenty-seven privates of infantry, two privates of artillery, one commissioned officer, and one non-commissioned officer of infantry-in all, thirty-one. Their uniform corresponded with mine-gray cloth with black trimming. Captain Philips and his party of two men had been joined in the mean time by the main party, and I soon crossed over to them. We then galloped after the retreating enemy, but saw one or two companies from the regiment running to the rescue, which induced me to apprehend an attack. In this I was mistaken, for instead of the party of thirty-one rallying in the two companies, the two companies partook of the panic, and rushed back towards the fortifications, yelling “Virginia horsemen” as long as I staid to hear them. The party of thirty-one had their arms stacked against a tree, whilst four of them were on guard with their muskets. I cannot say whether the guard fired or not. I did not pay much attention to them. The two companies which came to the rescue had their muskets, but forgot to fire. On the left wing of the encampment there was a field {p.77} battery of two brass 12-pounders, unlimbered, which were not over one hundred and fifty or one hundred and sixty yards from us, but the gunners had abandoned the battery. If I had not been so entirely at the mercy of the guns of the fortifications at Newport News (only about six hundred yards off), I should certainly have burned the whole encampment, for it is my firm impression the whole regiment ran into the works and abandoned everything.

  Captain Philips, I must say, proved upon this occasion that he was a man of consummate coolness and bravery, and his men are of that kind of metal which can be relied upon under any and all circumstances. Lieutenants Cary and Harrison were prepared for anything, and I am convinced would have followed to any place where their horses could have leaped.

  In making the approach I went by New Market Bridge and St. Clair’s Steam Mill, but upon returning I took a new road through the woods, fearing the troops from Hampton had formed an ambuscade for my reception. I returned to Bethel by 6 o’clock without damage, and then joined my command on Poquosin River.

  I am, sir, yours, respectfully,

  W. H. WERTH, Captain Chatham Grays, Virginia Volunteers.

  Col. J. B. MAGRUDER, Commanding Division.

  –––

  JUNE 10, 1861.-Engagement at Big Bethel, or Bethel Church, Va.

  REPORTS, ETC.

  No. 1.–	Maj. Gen. Benjamin F. Butler, U. S. Army.
  No. 2.–	Brig. Gen. Ebenezer W. Pierce, Massachusetts Militia.
  No. 3.–	Col. Frederick Townsend, Third New York Infantry.
  No. 4.–	Col. John E. Bendix, Seventh No”, York Infantry.
  No. 5.–	Capt. Judson Kilpatrick, Fifth Now York Infantry.
  No. 6.–	Letter from Confederate Secretary of War transmitting reports.
  No. 7.–	Col. John B. Magruder, C. S. Army.
  No. 8.–	Col. D. H. Hill, First North Carolina Infantry.
  No. 9.–	Lieut. Col. William D. Stuart, Third Virginia Infantry.
  No. 10.–	Maj. George W. Randolph, Howitzer Battalion, C. S. Army.
  No. 11.–	Maj. E. B. Montague, Virginia Battalion.
  No. 12.–	Capt. W. H. Werth, Chatham Grays, Virginia Cavalry.

  No. 1.

  Reports of Maj. Gen. B. F. Butler, U. S. Army.

  HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF VIRGINIA, Fortress Monroe, June 10, 1861.

  GENERAL: Having learned that the enemy had established an outpost of some strength at a place ailed Little Bethel, a small church about eight miles from Newport News, and the same distance from Hampton, from whence they were, accustomed nightly to advance both on Newport News and the picket guards of Hampton, to annoy them, and also from whence they had come down in small squads of cavalry and taken a number of Union men, some of whom had the safeguard {p.78} and protection of the troops of the United States, and forced them into the rebel ranks, and that they were also gathering up the slaves of citizens who had moved away and left their farms in charge of their negroes, carrying them to work in intrenchments at Williamsburg and Yorktown, I had determined to send up a force to drive them back and destroy their camp, the headquarters of which was this small church.

  I had also learned that at a place a short distance farther on, on the road to Yorktown, was an outwork of the rebels on the Hampton side of a place called Big Bethel, a large church near the head of the north branch of Back River; that here was a very considerable rendezvous, with works of more or less strength in process of erection, and from this point the whole country was laid under contribution. Accordingly, I ordered General Pierce, who is in command of Camp* Hamilton, at Hampton, to send Duryea’s regiment of zouaves to be ferried over Hampton Creek at 1 o’clock this morning, and to march by the road up to New Market Bridge; thence, crossing the bridge, to go by a by road, and thus put the regiment in the rear of the enemy and between Big Bethel and Little Bethel, in part for the purpose of cutting him off, and then to make an attack upon Little Bethel. I directed General Pierce to support him from Hampton with Colonel Townsend’s regiment with two mounted howitzers, and to march about an hour later. At the same time I directed Colonel Phelps, commanding at Newport News, to send out a battalion composed of such companies of the regiments under his command as he thought best, under command of Lieutenant-Colonel Washburn, in time to make a demonstration upon Little Bethel in front; and to have him supported by Colonel Bendix’s regiment with two field pieces. Bendix’s and Townsend’s regiments should effect a junction at a fork of the road leading from Hampton to Newport News, something like a mile and a half from Little Bethel.

  I directed the march to be so timed that the attack should be made just at daybreak, and that after the attack was made upon Little Bethel, Duryea’s regiment and a regiment from Newport News should follow immediately upon the heels of the fugitives, if they were enabled to get off, and attack the battery on the road to Big Bethel while covered by the fugitives, or, if it was thought expedient by General Pierce, failing to surprise the camp at Little Bethel, they should attempt to take the work near Big Bethel. To prevent the possibility of mistake in the darkness, I directed that no attack should be made until the watchword was shouted by the attacking regiment, and in case that, by any mistake in the march, the regiments that were to make the junction should unexpectedly meet, and be unknown to each other, also directed that the members of Colonel Townsend’s regiment should be known, if in daylight, by something white worn on the arm.

  The troops were accordingly put in motion as ordered, and the march was so timed that Colonel Duryea had got in the position noted upon the accompanying sketch, and Lieutenant-Colonel Washburn, in command of the regiment from Newport News, had got into the position indicated upon the sketch, and Bendix’s regiment had been posted and ordered to hold the fork of the road with two pieces of artillery, and Townsend’s regiment had got the place indicated just behind, and about to form a junction as the day dawned.

  Up to this point the plan had been vigorously, accurately, and successfully carried out. But here, by some strange fatuity, and as yet unexplained blunder, without any word of notice, while Townsend was in column en route, and when the head of the column was within one hundred yards, Colonel Bendix’s regiment opened fire with both artillery {p.79} and musketry upon Townsend’s column, which in the hurry and confusion was irregularly returned by some of Townsend’s men, who feared that they had fallen into an ambuscade. Townsend’s column immediately retreated to the eminence near by, and were not pursued by Bendix’s men. By this almost criminal blunder two men of Townsend’s regiment were killed, and eight (more or less) wounded. Hearing this cannonading and firing in his rear, Lieutenant-Colonel Washburn, not knowing but that his communication might be cut off, immediately reversed his march, as did Colonel Duryea, and marched back to form a junction with his reserves. General Pierce, who was with Townsend’s regiment, fearing that the enemy had got notice of our approach and had posted himself in force on the line of march, and not getting any communications from Colonel Duryea, sent back to me for re-enforcements, and I immediately ordered Colonel Allen’s regiment to be put in motion, and they reached Hampton about 7 o’clock. In the mean time, the true state of facts having been ascertained by General Pierce, the regiment effected a junction and resumed the line of march. At the moment of the firing of Bendix, Colonel Duryea had surprised a part of an outlying guard of the enemy, consisting of three persons, who have been brought in to me. Of course, by this firing, all hope of a surprise upon the camp at Little Bethel was lost, and upon marching upon it it was found to have been vacated, and the cavalry had pressed on toward Big Bethel. Colonel Duryea, however, destroyed the camp at Little Bethel, and advanced. General Pierce then, as he informs me, with the advice of his colonels, thought best to attempt to carry the works of the enemy at Big Bethel, and made dispositions to that effect.

  The attack commenced, as I am informed (for I have not yet received any official reports) about half past 9 o’clock. At about 10 o’clock General Pierce sent a note to me, saying that there was a sharp engagement with the enemy, and that he thought he should be able to maintain his position until re-enforcements could come up. Acting upon this information, Colonel Carr’s regiment, which had been ordered in the morning to proceed as far as New Market Bridge, was allowed to go forward. I received this information, for which I had sent a special messenger, about 12 o’clock.

  I immediately made disposition from Newport News to have Colonel Phelps, from the four regiments there, to forward aid, if necessary. As soon as these orders could be sent forward I repaired to Hampton, for the purpose of having proper ambulances and wagons for the sick and wounded, intending to go forward and join the command. While the wagons were going forward a messenger came announcing that the engagement had terminated, and that the troops were retiring in good order to camp.

  I remained upon the ground at Hampton, personally seeing the wounded put in boats and towed around to the hospital, and ordering forward Lieutenant Morris, with two boat howitzers, to cover the rear of the returning column in case it should be attacked. Having been informed that the ammunition of the artillery had been expended, and seeing the head of the column approach Hampton in good order, I waited for General Pierce to come up. I am informed by him that the dead and wounded had all been brought off, and that the return had been conducted in good order and without haste. I learned from him that the men behaved with great steadiness, with the exception of some few instances, and that the attack was made with propriety, vigor, and courage, but that the enemy were found to be supported by a battery variously estimated as of from fifteen to twenty pieces, some of which {p.80} were rifled cannon, which were very well served, and protected from being readily turned by a creek in front.

  Our loss is very considerable, amounting, perhaps, to forty or fifty, a quarter part of which, you will see, was from the unfortunate mistake, to call it by no worse name, of Colonel Bendix.

  I will, as soon as official returns can be got, give a fuller detail of the affair; and will only add now that we have to regret especially the death of Lieutenant Greble, of the Second Artillery, who went out with Colonel Washburn from Newport News, and who very efficiently and gallantly fought his piece until he was struck by a cannon-shot.

  I will endeavor to get accurate statements to forward by the next mail.

  I think, in the unfortunate combination of circumstances and the result which we experienced, we have gained more than we have lost. Our troops have learned to have confidence in themselves under fire. The enemy have shown that they will not meet us in the open field. Our officers have learned wherein their organization and drill are inefficient.

  While waiting for the official reports, I have the honor to submit thus far the information of which I am possessed.

  I have the honor to be, most respectfully, your obedient servant,

  BENJ. F. BUTLER, Major-General, Commanding.

  Lieutenant-General SCOTT.

  –––

  HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF VIRGINIA, Fortress Monroe, June 16, 1861.

  GENERAL: Upon examination of the official reports of the officers commanding the various corps who were engaged in the skirmish at Big Bethel, I find nothing to add or correct in my former dispatch, in so far as relates to the dispositions for the attack. It now turn’s out beyond controversy, as I deem, that the firing was commenced upon Colonel Townsend’s by Colonel Bendix’s men. It is not so certain whether Colonel Bendix gave the order to fire or not, although the evidence is strong upon the point that he did so. It was evidently a mistake, and in spite of the precaution that, before any order to fire was to be given in the dark, the watchword “Boston” should be shouted, and that Colonel Townsend’s men should be distinguished by a white badge upon the arm, with which order Colonel Townsend complied. Lieutenant Greble, of the Second Artillery (regulars), whose loss as a gallant officer, thorough soldier, and amiable man we all must deplore, was with Colonel Bendix’s command and participated in the mistake of Colonel Bendix, as I am informed by the colonel’s report. Colonel Townsend has desired a court of inquiry for the purpose of investigating this transaction, with which request, as soon as the exigencies of the public service will permit, I shall comply.

  As I stated in the former report, this attack was not intended to enable us to hold Big Bethel as a post, because it was not seriously in our way on any proposed road to Yorktown, and therefore there was never any intention of maintaining it, even if captured. The length of the road and the heat of the weather had caused great fatigue, as many of the troops, the previous night having been cool, had marched with their thickest clothing. I take leave to assure you that every precaution had been taken to prevent notice to the enemy of our approach. A picket guard had been sent out on the night before at 10 {p.81} o’clock to prevent the egress of persons from our camp in the direction of Yorktown, but we have since learned that information had been communicated to the enemy off our approach, and we believe that we have under arrest the person who communicated the intelligence-a discharged soldier of the United States many years since, who resided in Hampton. If the evidence is satisfactory to a court-martial, he will be dealt with with such severity of punishment as will be a lesson to the many who surround us, and who are engaged in the same nefarious business.

  From subsequent information I am certain that the force which was at first in Great Bethel did not exceed a regiment, and had the order been executed which I had given to General Pierce of attack, that, “if we find the enemy and surprise them, we will fire a volley if necessary, not reload, but go ahead with the bayonet,” I have no doubt of the capture of the battery. But in attempting to obtain information upon the road as to the force in Big Bethel, the exaggerated statements of the inhabitants and the negroes as to the numbers intrenched were taken, instead of the estimates and information of the commanding general, so that it was believed by the officers in command and by the men that there were 4,000 or 5,000 there in force. From the intelligence given the enemy, and the unfortunate occurrence of the morning, two regiments to re-enforce them were at last brought up, but not until about the time our troops retired. I make no doubt that the battery would have, been taken but for another unfortunate mistake, as reported to me, wherein the colonel of a regiment mistook two companies of his own men, which had been separated from him by a thicket, for a flanking party of the enemy, making a sortie from the battery, and because of that mistake retired; so that it would seem that the skirmish was lost twice because our officers mistook their friends for their enemies. I am informed, and fully believe, that immediately upon the retiring of our troops, for the purpose, as was supposed by the enemy, of turning the flank of the battery, the battery was immediately evacuated, and remained so evacuated until the second day. If it was so done it would be a matter of no consequence, because, as General Scott had been informed, as I have already previously stated, it was no part of our intention to occupy it. The major part of the officers and men behaved with the greatest gallantry and good conduct, and I have to mention in terms of commendation the gallantry and courage of Colonel Townsend, the coolness and firmness of Lieutenant-Colonel Washburn, and the efficiency of Captain Haggerty, of my staff, who was acting as aid to General Pierce, a part of his own being sick.

  The country has to deplore the loss of Maj. Theodore Winthrop, my acting military secretary, who led the advance corps with Colonel Duryea, and who the moment before his death, had gone forward on the right with the detachment of Vermont and Massachusetts troops, under order of Lieutenant-Colonel Washburn, and who at the moment of his death was engaged in finding the best manner of entering the battery, when he, fell mortally wounded. His conduct, his courage, his efficiency in the field, were spoken of in terms of praise by all who saw him.

  Subsequent knowledge has shown beyond all question that if, at the time our troops retired, an advance had been ordered, the battery would have been taken; but this is the result of subsequent knowledge, and is not to be taken as evidence of the want of efficiency of those in command of our troops. It is a pleasure to be able to announce that our loss was much less even than was reported in my former dispatch, {p.82} and appears by the official report furnished herewith. Our loss of those permanently injured is twenty-five. I have the honor again to inform you that we have gained much more than we have lost by the skirmish at Big Bethel, and while the advance upon the battery and the capture of it might have added eclat to the occasion, it would not have added to its substantial results. I have been very careful to procure an accurate account of the dead, wounded, and missing, in order that I may assure those friends who are anxious for the safety of our soldiers and an exact account may be given of all those injured. There is nothing to be gained by any concealment in this regard. The exact truth, which is to be stated at all times, if anything is stated, is especially necessary on such occasions. In this behalf I think we are not to take a lesson from our enemies. I am happy to add that upon sending a message to Yorktown I found that the courtesies of civilized warfare have been and are intended to be extended to us by the enemies of the country now in arms, which in this department at all times shall be fully reciprocated. I have omitted a detailed statement of the movements of the various corps in this attack, because, while it might be interesting, yet, without a map of the ground and details, would serve no useful purpose. I forward herewith the official reports of General Pierce and Colonels Bendix and Townsend, which contain all that may be material.

  I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

  BENJ. F. BUTLER, Major-General, Commanding.

  Lieutenant-General SCOTT.

  [Inclosure.]

  Casualties in the United States forces at Big Bethel, June 10, 1861.

  Commands.	Killed	Wounded	Missing	Aggregate	Remarks
  Staff	1			1	Maj. Theodore Winthrop.
  Infantry
  Fourth Massachusetts	1			1
  First New York	2	1		3
  Second New York	2	1		3
  Third New York	2	27	1	30
  Fifth New York	6	13		19
  Seventh New York	3	7	2	12
  First Vermont	2	3	1	6
  Second U. S. Artillery	1			1	Lieut. John T. Greble.
  Total	18	53	5	76

  No. 2.

  Report of Brig. Gen. E. W. Pierce, Massachusetts Militia.

  CAMP HAMILTON, June 12, 1861.

  SIR: Sunday forenoon, June 9, 1861, I received an order requiring my attendance at your headquarters forthwith, where I arrived at about 11 o’clock, and found you and Colonel Duryea, of my command, consulting upon a plan of proposed attack upon places known as Big Bethel and Little Bethel, and received from Captain Butler, of your staff, the following plan of operations:

  A regiment or battalion to march from Camp Hamilton (Duryea’s) each {p.83} to be supported by sufficient reserves, under arms in camp and in advance guard out on the line of march. Duryea to push out two pickets at 10 p. m., one also two and a half miles beyond Hampton, on the county road, but not so far as to alarm the enemy. This is important. Second picket half as far as the first; both pickets as much out of sight as possible. No one, whomsoever, to be allowed to pass out through their lines. Persons to be allowed to pass inwards, unless it appeared they intend to go around about and dodge through the point. At 12 O’clock p. m. (midnight) Colonel Duryea will march his regiment, with twenty rounds cartridges, in the county road toward Little Bethel; scows to be provided to ferry them across Hampton Creek.

  March to be rapid, but not hurried.

  A howitzer, with canister and shrapnel, to go, and a wagon with planks and materials to repair New Market Bridge. Duryea to have the 200 rifles; he Will pick the men to whom they are intrusted. Rockets to be thrown up from Newport News. Notify Commodore Pendergrast of this, to prevent general alarm. Newport News movement to be made somewhat later, as the distance is somewhat less. If we find the enemy and surprise them, we will fire a volley if desirable, not reload, and go ahead with the bayonet. As the attack is to be made at night, or the gray of the morning, and in two detachments, our people should have some token, say a white rag, or nearest approach to white attainable, on the left arm. Perhaps the detachments who are engaged in the expedition should be smaller than a regiment.

  If we capture the Little Bethel men, push on to Big Bethel and similarly capture, them. Burn up both the Bethels. Blow up, if brick. To protect our rear in case we take either field pieces, and the enemy should march the main body, if there are any, to recover them, it would be well to have a party of competent artillerists, regular or otherwise, to handle the captured guns on the retirement of our main body; also spikes to spike them. George Scott is to have a revolver. And in pursuance of these orders is issued the following order early Sunday evening:

  GENERAL ORDERS, No. 12.

  HEADQUARTERS CAMP HAMILTON, June 9, 1861.

  A plan of attack to-night is herewith inclosed and forwarded to Colonel Duryea, commanding Fifth Regiment of New York State Volunteers, who will act accordingly. Colonel Townsend, commanding Third Regiment of New York State Volunteers will March his command in support of Colonel Duryea. Colonel Carr, commanding the Second Regiment New York State Volunteers, will detach the artillery company of his regiment with their field pieces, and take their position at the burned bridge, near Hampton. Colonels Allen, Carr, and McChesney will hold their entire command in readiness fully prepared to march at a moment’s notice. All the troops will be supplied with one day’s rations, and each man with twenty rounds of ban cartridges; and, that no mistake may be made, all the troops, as they charge, will shout “Boston.” Colonels Allen, Carr, Townsend, Duryea, and McChesney will govern themselves accordingly.

  By command of Brig. Gen. E. W. Pierce:

  R. A. PIERCE, Brigade Major.

  And, in compliance with this order, Colonel Duryea sent out two pickets at 10 o’clock p. m., two and one-half miles beyond Hampton, on the county road, with orders to keep out of sight as much as possible, allowing persons to pass in, but none to pass out. At twenty minutes Past 12 o’clock (midnight) Colonel Duryea passed the remainder of his command over the river at Hampton, and pushed on for Little Bethel, having now upon that side of the river some 850 men. He was followed about two hours after by the Third Regiment New York State Volunteers, Colonel Townsend, with 650 men, and a detachment from Colonel Carr’s regiment, with two mountain howitzers, under the direction of {p.84} a non-commissioned officer and four privates of the U. S. Army, accompanied by myself, with an aide-de-camp; and we had proceeded on about four miles, having taken the precaution to keep a mounted officer considerably in advance to reconnoiter the road until we had reached New Market Bridge, where we came up with a considerable number of Colonel Duryea’s men, who were left to guard the bridge. Passing on myself, with aide-de-camp still being considerably in advance, we discovered a large body of armed men by the roadside, who appeared to be emerging from the woods and taking up their position on the road, and, believing them to be friends, we were passing on, when we suddenly discovered that they were occupying the road with a fieldpiece, just ready to open fire upon us, and we were immediately saluted by a volley from their small-arms and a discharge from their field piece, quickly followed by an indiscriminate fire from Colonel Townsend’s regiment. I rode back, ordered them to cease firing, charge bayonets, and shout Boston. Colonel Townsend’s men fell to the right and left of the road in confusion, but in a few minutes rallied and reformed, by directions of myself and Colonel Townsend, under a very heavy fire. I then ordered the column to withdraw to a position about one-half a mile back across the bridge, on rising ground, where they could sustain themselves, destroying the bridge as we passed. This movement I caused to be made, hoping to draw the supposed enemy from their positions, and also to await re-enforcements, which I had sent for, from Hampton. When we found the supposed enemy advancing, I threw out skirmishers, who, to my surprise, I soon found uniting themselves with the supposed enemy, who in a few minutes proved to be friends, and a portion of the forces from Newport News, commanded by Colonel Bendix. The result of this fire upon us was, 2 mortally wounded (1 since dead); 3 dangerously; 4 officers and 12 privates slightly; making a total, 21.

  Leaving the rest to collect the wounded and refresh the tired men, I had an interview with the commanding officers present-Colonels Townsend, Duryea, and Lieutenant-Colonel Washburn-and was strongly advised by Duryea and Washburn not to proceed, as the enemy, being now warned of our approach, would gain strength from Yorktown, and that the original design of surprise had now become fully frustrated. I decided that it was my duty to follow my written instructions, and in this decision was sustained by Major Winthrop and Captain Haggerty, your aides-de-camp.

  In answer to the remonstrance of Colonel Duryea and Washburn, that re-enforcements would come from Yorktown, I replied that we had already sent for re-enforcements from Camp Hamilton, and I hoped that ours at least might equal theirs. We then marched on, being joined by the forces from Newport News; and in reply to the question from Colonel Washburn, how are we to proceed, I said, follow the original design of General Butler to the extent of our several abilities.

  Soon after arrived at Little Bethel. That we burned, finding no resistance, and halted the column, bringing the artillery to the front. We soon after obtained the testimony of a woman at a farm-house that Big Bethel was garrisoned by some 4,000 men, and from a negro obtained substantially a like information. When we arrived within a mile of County Bridge the column halted, and Captains Kilpatrick and Bartlett having discovered that the enemy were holding a strong position in battery at the head of the road, we now drew up in line of battle at the skirts of the wood, the artillery and howitzers being pushed some thirty, rods up the road. Captains Winslow, Bartlett, and Kilpatrick having been ordered to advance as skirmishers, the regiment of Colonel Duryea {p.85} was by my orders moved out to the right of the main road, the right flank resting behind a dense wood which skirted the road, where it remained in line of battle in an open field about 800 paces from the battery.

  The forces from Newport News were brought into a second line of battle in the field to the left of the road, and were soon after moved by a flank so as to cross the road to cover the front, then being vacated by the Fifth Regiment, now being marched by a flank through and covered by the woods on the right, the Fifth Regiment being supported on the right by the forces from Newport News. The latter, being marched through the woods for that purpose, made several attempts to charge the batteries, but were prevented by creek. Meanwhile the artillery in the road was operated by the directions of Lieutenant Greble, who lost his life just at the close of the action.

  While this was being done on the right, I directed Colonel Townsend, with his regiment, to advance and take a position in a lane at right angles to the main road leading to the battery, where he was directed to send out skirmishers to ascertain the strength of the enemy’s right, and for that purpose detailed Captains John G. Butler and Edwin S. Jenny, with their companies, to cross the field immediately, and to so skirmish as to draw the enemy’s fire, which was gallantly performed. The enemy’s fire was delivered vigorously. Colonel Townsend now moved his regiment up to the point where the skirmishers were engaged-a movement which the regiment performed in line of battle as if on parade, in the face of a severe fire of artillery and small-arms, in a manner entirely satisfactory-and were joined by about one hundred of the Fifth Regiment as skirmishers on the right of Colonel Townsend’s command.

  By the time Colonel Townsend’s regiment had arrived at its position it became apparent that the battery had been strongly re-enforced, and that any effort to take it was useless. Besides, a company of that regiment had been separated from the regiment by a thickly-hedged ditch, and as the regiment moved forward towards the skirmishers this company marched into the adjoining field in a line with the regiment. This was not known to Colonel Townsend, who supposed, when the regiment approached, that it was the entire regiment. Consequently, upon seeing among the breaks in the hedges the glistening of bayonets in the adjoining field, [he] immediately concluded that the enemy were outflanking him, [and] conceived it to be his duty to retire and repel their advance, when by his order his regiment resumed their original position. Shortly after I directed all the forces to retire.

  Colonel Duryea having said that his men were tired out, completely exhausted and that they must be taken to the rear, Colonel Allen, of the First New York Regiment, advancing at this time, I immediately directed him to throw his regiment into the lane to the left of the main road leading to the battery, and the Second Regiment, Colonel Carr commanding, were by order promptly formed in line of battle, covering the ground lately occupied by the Fifth Regiment, with their field pieces, upon the left. I then ordered the killed and wounded picked up placed in whatever vehicle could be procured for their conveyance, the regiments of Colonels Allen and Carr mean while keeping the enemy at bay. On the retreat the regiment of Colonel Duryea led the column, followed by that of Colonel Townsend and the forces from Newport News, the regiments of Colonels Allen and Carr forming the rear guard of the retreating column. Some difficulty was experienced in keeping the men in proper order during the retreat, the men being so exhausted by thirst as to rush out of the ranks wherever water was to be had.

  For killed, wounded, and missing please refer to my former report.

  {p.86}

  In closing this report, I wish to bear my testimony to the gallant and soldierlike conduct of Colonel Townsend, who was indefatigable in encouraging his men and leading them in the hottest scenes of the action. I also desire to acknowledge the valuable service rendered me by the lamented Major Winthrop and Captain Haggerty, of your staff, in carrying orders to posts of exposure and danger. Colonel Carr, in covering the retreat, showed himself a good soldier, ready and willing to do his duty. In the death of Lieutenant Greble, of U. S. Army, who bravely fell at his gun, I recognize the loss of an able and gallant officer, whose conduct in the battle is deserving of all praise, and whose memory should be perpetuated by a grateful country.

  Respectfully, yours,

  EBENEZER W. PIERCE, Brigadier-General.

  BENJ. F. BUTLER, Major-General, Commanding Department of Virginia.

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  No. 3.

  Report of Col. Frederick Townsend, Third New York Infantry.

  HDQRS. THIRD REGIMENT N. Y. VOLUNTEERS, June 12, 1861.

  SIR: I have the honor to report, for the information of Brigadier-General Pierce, that on the evening of Sunday, June 9, I received orders from him to have my command in readiness, with one day’s rations, to move that night, to form part of a column composed of two regiments from Newport News and Colonel Duryea’s and my own, intended to make a reconnaissance in force towards Yorktown. In obedience to these orders, with the concerted sign of a white badge upon our left arms, at midnight I marched my regiment to Hampton, where the general met the command and accompanied it.

  On approaching a defile through a thick wood, about five or six miles from Hampton, a heavy and well-sustained fire of canister and small-arms was opened upon the regiment while it was marching in a narrow road upon the flank, in route step, and wholly unsuspicious of an enemy, inasmuch as we were ordered to re-enforce Colonel Duryea, who had preceded us by some two hours, and who had been ordered to throw out as he marched an advance guard two and a half miles from his regiment and a sustaining force half way between the advance and the regiment; therefore, had Colonel Duryea been obliged to retreat upon us before we reached his locality, we should have heard distant firing or some of his regiment would have been seen retreating. The force which fired upon us was subsequently ascertained to be only the regiment of Colonel Bendix, though a portion of the Vermont and Fourth Massachusetts regiments were with it, having come down with two 6-pounder field pieces from Newport. News to join the column. These regiments took up a masked position in the woods at the commencement of the defile. The result of the fire upon us was, two mortally wounded (one since dead), three dangerously, and four officers and twelve privates slightly, making a total of twenty-one.

  At the commencement of the fire the general, Captain Chamberlain, his aide-de-camp, and two mountain howitzers, were about two hundred and fifty paces in advance of the regiment. The fire was opened upon them first, by a discharge, from small-arms, and immediately followed {p.87} by a rapidly-sustained volley upon my regiment and the field pieces. My men then generally discharged their pieces and jumped to the right and left of the road, and recommenced loading and firing. In a few minutes the regiment was reformed in the midst of this heavy fire, and by the general’s directions retired in a thoroughly military manner, in order to withdraw the supposed enemy from his position.

  On ascertaining that the enemy were our friends, and providing for the wounded, we joined Colonel Duryea and Colonel Bendix, the former having returned, and proceeded on the reconnaissance at Big Bethel. Some seven or more miles on we found the enemy in force, well fortified, with a battery, said to be of twenty guns, in position, some of them rifle cannon. The information relative to the guns in position at the Bethel battery was given to me on the ground by Colonel Duryea, who informed me that he received it from a reconnoitering officer whom he had sent to the front to ascertain the position of things. On arriving at this point, in order to feel the enemy, battle was immediately given by the orders of the general. We were ordered to take up a position in a field about eight hundred paces from the battery. I was then directed by the general to advance to a position in a road at right angles to the main road leading to the battery, and about two hundred paces from it, on the left of Colonel Duryea. I was then directed to send out skirmishers to ascertain the strength of the enemy’s right, for which purpose I detailed Capts. John G. Butler and Edwin S. Jenny, with their companies, to cross the field immediately in front of the right of the battery, and so to skirmish as to draw the enemy’s fire, which duty they gallantly performed. The enemy’s fire was delivered vigorously almost immediately upon these companies entering the field . On crossing it myself, and considering that there might be a possibility of our capturing the battery; I moved the regiment up to the point where, our skirmishers were engaged-a movement which the regiment performed in line of battle as if on parade, in face of a severe fire of artillery and small-arms, and in a manner entirely to my satisfaction.

  By the time the regiment had arrived at its position it became evident that the right portion of the battery had been strongly re-enforced by men from the enemy’s left, and that an effort to take the battery then was useless; besides, a company of my regiment had been separated from the regiment by a thickly-hedged ditch, and as the regiment moved forward toward the skirmishers, this company marched in the adjoining field on a hue with the regiment.

  This was not known to me until after the engagement. I supposed when the regiment approached that it was the entire regiment. Consequently, upon seeing among the breaks in the hedge the glistening of bayonets in the adjoining field, I immediately concluded that the enemy were outflanking us, and conceived it to be my duty immediately to retire and repel that advance. I resumed, therefore, my original position on the left of Colonel Duryea. Shortly after all the forces were directed to retire, the design of the reconnaissance having been accomplished.

  I of course forbear speaking of the movements of other corps, excepting as immediately connected with my regiment, and it were especially gratuitous, inasmuch as the general was upon the field and directed the movements of the various commands in person.

  I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

  FRED’K TOWNSEND, Colonel Third Regiment.

  Maj. R. A. PIERCE, Brigade Inspector, &C.

  {p.88}

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  No. 4.

  Report of Col. John E. Bendix, Seventh New York Infantry.

  CAMP BUTLER, NEWPORT NEWS, Headquarters Seventh Regiment N. Y. V., June 12, 1861.

  SIR: On the evening of the 10th instant I proceeded, according to instructions, to the cross-roads, and took my position as reserve with one field piece. The advance, consisting of 300 men of the Vermont, 300 of the Massachusetts, and 150 men belonging to my regiment, under command of Lieutenant-Colonel Washburn, of the Vermont regiment, had gone on with one field piece. I was taking my position when we, saw what I supposed some cavalry. I asked the gunner if he was loaded. The answer was, “No, sir.” Then I directed him to load, but before this was done the firing commenced. Lieutenant Greble, of the U. S. Army, rode forward for assistance. The firing lasted some fifteen minutes-am not certain which commenced the fire. I did not give the word to fire, but think likely my men fired first, and finding the fire returned, and not expecting friends from that quarter, I stopped the firing as soon as I could, and directed one company to guard the rear and one company to go out in the field on the right and find out where the enemy (as I supposed them to be) were situated. Then sent a squad down the road and found to my horror that there had been a sad mistake, having fired upon General Pierce and staff and Colonel Townsend’s regiment. Our advance then returned to my assistance. Lieutenant-Colonel Kapff, on my right, then reported that he had taken two prisoners (citizens) with double barreled shot-guns in their hands. One of the pieces had one barrel discharged. The prisoners were sent to Fort Monroe. My men took one gold and one silver watch, with pocketbook, containing some silver and paper money, from them, which I have, subject to orders.

  I was then ordered to bring up the rear of the column, and proceed to Big Bethel. We had marched some six or seven miles, when I was ordered to the front with the field piece, and before we had got ready for action the enemy opened their fire upon us, striking one man down by my side at the first shot. Not expecting this, it caused some confusion and having received no orders, I did the best I could as skirmishers in the woods. I then looked for General Pierce, and by his direction took my position on the enemy’s left flank with some two hundred Vermont and Massachusetts troops, and we were not strong enough to make an attack, and after firing some time, withdrew back into the woods. When we got into the woods I found the troops retiring, and followed. I then saw General Pierce, who told me to retire, which I did in the main column until we came to the cross-roads, when our detachment came to Newport News.*

  I am, sir, most respectfully, your obedient servant,

  JOHN E. BENDIX, Colonel.

  Colonel PHELPS.

  * List of casualties, here omitted, is embraced in statement following General Butler’s reports, p. 82.

  {p.89}

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  No. 5.

  Report of Capt. Judson Kilpatrick, Fifth New York Infantry.

  HEADQUARTERS, CAMP HAMILTON, June 11, 1861.

  SIR: In accordance with your order, I have the honor to submit the following report of my command, acting as the advance guard on the evening of the 9th, and a brief account of my command during the engagement on the following day at the new County Bridge. I left camp with my command at 10 p. m., consisting of fifty men of Company H, one lieutenant (Cambreleng), four sergeants, and four corporals; Company I, Captain Bartlett, one lieutenant (York), four sergeants, and two corporals. Crossed the river at Hampton half past 10 p. m., reached New Market Bridge at 1 a. m., threw out scouts in all directions, and waited for the main body, which arrived at 3 a. m.

  According to your orders I advanced on the road to new County Bridge, the point where the enemy was reported to have made a stand. A little before daylight, when within a mile and a quarter of the bridge, we discovered the outlying picket guard of the enemy, and were challenged “Who comes there?” I replied, “Who stands there?” A horseman attempted to leave. Corporal Ellerson, of Company H, sprang in advance, directing him to halt. I, supposing the enemy to be in force, gave the command to fire and charge. In a moment the affair was over; twenty or thirty shots had been given and exchanged; the officer of the guard was captured and disarmed. At this time, hearing firing in the rear, and supposing that our rear guard was attacked, I returned to follow the main body, under Colonel Duryea, who was advancing by forced march in the direction of the firing, only to discover that by mistake our own forces, coming in different directions, and supposing each to be the enemy, had fired several shots before the mistake was discovered. I again advanced, and at 8 a. m. met with and drove in the picket guards of the enemy. I then detached a portion of my command, made an armed reconnaissance, and found the enemy with about from three thousand to five thousand men posted in a strong position on the opposite side of the bridge, three earthworks and a masked battery on the right and left, in advance of the stream thirty pieces of artillery and a large force of cavalry, all of which information I reported to you at once.

  I was ordered to advance and engage the enemy in throwing out skirmishers on the right and left of the road leading to the bridge. We rapidly advanced, supported by the advance guard of Colonel Duryea and three pieces of artillery, under Lieutenant Greble, of the Second Regiment U. S. Artillery. The enemy soon opened fire on us from the rifle cannon in front. We answered his discharges by a cheer and continued to advance, clearing all before us, till we reached a point just on the edge of the woods, where the fire was so hot and heavy that we were compelled to halt, and there, we remained, as directed by Lieutenant-Colonel Warren, till that gallant officer had made dispositions to turn their flanks. The enemy’s fire at this time began to tell upon us with great effect. My men were falling one after another, as was the case with the rest of the command.

  After remaining in this position about two hours, and our object having been accomplished-numbers of our men being killed and wounded, having received a grape through my thigh, which tore off a portion of the rectangle on Colonel Duryea’s left shoulder, passed through my leg, and killed a soldier in my rear-I withdrew my men to the skirts of the {p.90} wood. We managed to reach Lieutenant Greble’s battery, and bring to his aid several of my men. The charge was then sounded. Lieutenant Greble opened fire with grape and canister within two [hundred] yards of the enemy’s lines. Captains Winslow, Bartlett, and myself charged with our commands in front, Captain Denike and Lieutenant Duryea (son of Colonel Duryea), and about two hundred of the Troy Rifles upon the right, Colonel Townsend with his men to the left. The enemy were forced out of the first battery, all the forces were rapidly advancing, and everything promised a speedy victory, when we were ordered to fall back. Where this order came from I do not know. We maintained our position till Colonel Townsend began to retire with his whole command. Being left there alone, and no prospect of receiving aid, we ordered the men to fall back, which they did, and in good order, forming their line of battle about one hundred and fifty yards in the rear. A few minutes afterwards orders came from General Pierce to cease firing and retire.

  It gives me great pleasure to mention the gallant conduct of Captain Bartlett, who came up with the reserve, re-enforcing my line, and was ever at the point of danger encouraging his men. Lieutenant York, in command of my left, and Lieutenant Cambreleng, in command of my right, displayed the greatest bravery. Lieutenant York’s sword was broken by a grape shot, and he was slightly wounded in the leg. I shall ever be grateful to Captain Winslow, who rescued me after our forces had left. He came to my aid, assisted by Sergeants Onderdonk and Agnus, at the last moment, but in time to rescue me from the enemy.

  I would also favorably mention Private Wood, who brought me valuable information, and who fired the first shot; Private John Dunn, whose arm was shattered by a cannon ball, and who bore himself with the greatest bravery, and who said to Surgeon Gilbert, while amputating his arm, that he could not have lost it in a nobler cause. The whole command, men and officers, did themselves the greatest credit, and I am satisfied can conquer anything except impossibilities.

  Respectfully submitted.

  J. KILPATRICK, Captain Company H.

  Col. A. DURYEA.

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  No. 6.

  Letter of the Confederate Secretary of War.

  CONFEDERATE STATES OF AMERICA, WAR DEP’T, Richmond, March 31, 1862.

  To the honorable the Speaker of the House of Representatives:

  SIR: In reply to the resolution of the House of Representatives, I have the honor to communicate herewith copies of the official reports on file in this Department of the battle of Bethel on the 10th of June, 1861.

  Very respectfully, your obedient, servant,

  GEO. W. RANDOLPH Secretary of War.

  {p.91}

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  No. 7.

  Reports of Col. J. B. Magruder, C. S. Army.

  HEADQUARTERS BETHEL CHURCH, June 10, 1861.

  SIR: I have, the honor to inform you that we were attacked by about 3,500 troops of the Federal Army, with several pieces of heavy artillery, firing grape shot, this morning at 10 o’clock, and at 12 1/2 routed them completely, with considerable loss on their side. The prisoners report their force to be 5,000. It was certainly 3,500. Ours about 1,200 engaged; 1,400 in all.

  Mr. George A. Magruder, jr., a volunteer aide, who is as conspicuous for his gallantry as for his efficiency, will deliver this in person.

  Thirty-five hundred men are on my right flank; 10,000 on my left. Please send re-enforcements immediately. Yorktown and Williamsburg, in my rear, have troops quite insufficient in numbers to defend them.

  I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

  J. BANKHEAD MAGRUDER, Colonel, Commanding Hampton Division.

  Hon. L. P. WALKER, Secretary of War.

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  HEADQUARTERS CAMP BETHEL, Bethel Church, June 10, 1861.

  SIR: The enemy, thirty-five hundred strong, attacked us at our post, and after a very animated conflict of two hours and a half was repulsed at all points and totally routed. Four companies of cavalry are now in hot pursuit toward Newport News. I cannot speak too highly of the devotion of our troops, all of whom did their duty nobly, and whilst it might appear invidious to speak particularly of any regiment or corps where all behaved so well, I am compelled to express my great appreciation of the skill and gallantry of Major Randolph and his howitzer batteries, and Colonel Hill, the officers and men of the North Carolina regiment. As an instance, of the latter I will merely mention that a gun under the gallant Captain Brown, of the howitzer battery, having been rendered unfit for service by the breaking of a priming wire in the vent, and not being defended by infantry from the small number we had at our command, Captain Brown threw it over a precipice, and the work was occupied for a moment by the enemy. Captain Bridgers, of the North Carolina regiment, in the most gallant Manner retook it and held it until Captain Brown had replaced and put in position another piece, and then defended it with his infantry in the most gallant manner. Colonel Hill’s judicious and determined action was worthy of his ancient glory, and Colonel Stuart Major Montague, Major Cary, Captains Walker and Atkinson, with every officer and every man under their command, did good service in the front of the fight.

  The able and efficient manner in which Captains Douthatt, Phillips, and Jones, of the cavalry, performed the duties of infantry, and Lieutenant Chisman, of the Wythe Rifles, in protecting the rear of the position, is deserving of high commendation.

  There were many acts of personal gallantry, some under my own observation, and others which were reported to me, that I will take occasion to mention in a subsequent communication. At present I expect another attack, and have no time.

  {p.92}

  I am extremely indebted to the two brothers Robert H. and William R. Vaughan, my acting commissary and quartermaster, for the most gallant and efficient services, no less than to my youthful aides, Mr. George A. Magruder, jr., and Hugh Stannard, who were always in the front of the fight, and upon whom I request the Government to bestow commissions, as they are desirous of entering the regular service.

  In the hurry of this communication I may have omitted to mention many gallant men.

  I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

  J. BANKHEAD MAGRUDER, Colonel, Commanding.

  Col. R. S. GARNETT.

  Number of killed and wounded on our side-one killed and seven wounded. Enemy-ten dead bodies found, as reported to me, and perhaps fifty wounded. Three prisoners. Our force, all told, about one thousand two hundred men. Enemy-three thousand five hundred, with 18 and 24 pounder guns, besides light guns.

  J. B. M.

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  HEADQUARTERS YORKTOWN, June 12, 1861.

  SIR: I had the honor to transmit by Mr. Hugh Stannard a short account of a battle with the enemy at Bethel Bridge, on the 10th. This was written on the field, and I had not then had time to ascertain the number of killed and wounded on the other side. I think I reported ten killed and many wounded. I have, now to report that eighteen dead were found on the field, and I learn from reliable citizens living on the road that many dead as well as a great many wounded were carried in wagons to Hampton. I think I can safely report their loss at from twenty-five to thirty killed and one hundred and fifty wounded. I understand the enemy acknowledge one hundred and seventy-five killed and wounded. It is a source of great gratification to me to be able to say that our own loss as far as heard from was only one killed and seven wounded, but too much praise cannot be bestowed upon the heroic soldier whom we lost. He was one of four who volunteered to set fire to a house in our front which was thought to afford protection to our enemy, and advancing alone between the two fires he fell midway, pierced in the forehead by a musket ball. Henry L. Wyatt is the name of this brave soldier and devoted patriot. He was a member of the brave and gallant North Carolina regiment.

  I omitted to mention in my hurried dispatch of the 10th the name of Captain Jones, of – Cavalry, who rendered important service before and during the battle. I regret to say that one of his vedettes was cut off by the enemy, and is presumed to have been taken prisoner.

  I cannot omit to again bring to the notice of the general commander-in-chief the valuable services and gallant conduct of the First North Carolina Regiment, and Major Randolph, of the howitzer batteries. These officers were not only prompt and daring in the execution of their duties, but most industrious and energetic in the preparations for the conflict. The firing of the howitzer batteries was as perfect as the bearing of the men, which was entirely what it ought to have, been. Captain Bridgers, of the North Carolina regiment, retook in the most daring manner, and at a critical period of the fight, the work from which Captain Brown, of the artillery, had withdrawn a disabled gun to prevent its falling into the hands of the enemy, and which work had been subsequently {p.93} occupied by the enemy. This work was soon again occupied with another piece by Captain. Brown, who resumed an effective fire. Captain Bridgers deserves the highest praise for this timely act of gallantry.

  The Louisiana regiment arrived after the battle was over, having made a most extraordinary march. They returned to Yorktown the same night, making a distance of twenty-eight miles. It was not thought prudent to leave Yorktown exposed any longer. I therefore occupied the ground with cavalry, and marched the remainder of my forces to Yorktown. We, took several prisoners, among them some wounded.

  Our means of transportation were exceedingly limited, but the wounded enemy were carried with our own wounded to farm houses in our rear, where the good people, who have lost almost everything by this war, and who could see the smoking ruins of their neighbors’ houses, destroyed by the enemy both in his advance and retreat, received them most kindly and bound up their wounds. I also ordered the humane Captain Brown to bury as many of the enemy’s dead as could be found near our camp, which was done.

  The cavalry pursued the enemy for five miles, but were stopped by the bridge across Back River at New Market, which was destroyed by the flying enemy after crossing it.

  I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

  J. B. MAGRUDER, Colonel, Commanding.

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  No. 8.

  Report of Col. D. H. Hill, First North Carolina Infantry.

  SIR: I have the honor to report that, in obedience to orders from the colonel commanding, I marched on the 6th instant, with my regiment and four pieces of Major Randolph’s battery, from Yorktown, on the Hampton road, to Bethel Church, nine miles from Hampton. We reached there after dark on a wet night, and slept without tents. Early on the morning of the 7th I made a reconnaissance of the ground, preparatory to fortifying. I found a branch of Back River on our front, and encircling our right flank. On our left was a dense and almost impassable wood, except about one hundred and fifty yards of old field. The breadth of the road, a thick wood, and narrow cultivated field covered our rear. The nature of the ground determined me to make an inclosed work, and I had the invaluable aid of Lieutenant-Colonel Lee, of my regiment, in its plan and construction. Our position had the inherent defect of being commanded by an immense field immediately in front of it, upon which the masses of the enemy might be readily deployed. Presuming that an attempt would be made to carry the bridge across the stream, a battery was made for its especial protection, and Major Randolph placed his guns so as to sweep all the approaches to it. The occupation of two commanding eminences beyond the creek and on our right would have greatly strengthened our position, but our force was too weak to admit of the occupation of more than one of them. A battery was laid out on it for one of Randolph’s howitzers. We, had only twenty-five spades, six axes, and three picks, but these were busily plied all day and night of the 7th and all day on the 8th. On the afternoon of the 8th I learned that a marauding party of the enemy was within a few miles of us. I called for a party of thirty-four men to drive them back. Lieutenant Roberts, {p.94} of Company F, of my regiment, promptly responded, and in five minutes his command was en route. I detached Major Randolph with one howitzer to join them, and Lieutenant-Colonel Lee, First Regiment North Carolina Volunteers, requested and was granted permission to take command of the whole. After a march of five miles they came across the marauders busy over the spoils of a plundered house. A Shell soon put the plunderers to flight, and they were chased over New Market Bridge, where our little force was halted, in consequence of the presence of a considerable body situated on the other side. Lieutenant-Colonel Lee brought in one prisoner. How many of the enemy were killed and wounded is not known. None of our command was hurt. Soon after Lieutenant-Colonel Lee left a citizen came dashing in with the information that seventy-five marauders were on the Back River road. I called for Captain McDowell’s company (E), of the First Regiment of North Carolina Volunteers, and in three minutes it was in hot pursuit. Lieutenant West, of the Howitzer Battalion, with one piece, was detached to join them, and Major Lane, of my regiment, volunteered to assume command of the whole. After a weary march they encountered, dispersed, and chased the wretches over the New Market Bridge-this being the second race on the same day over the New Market course, in both of which the Yankees reached the goal first. Major Lane brought in one prisoner. Reliable citizens reported that two cart loads and one buggy load of wounded were taken into Hampton. We had not a single man killed or wounded. Colonel Magruder came up that evening and assumed command.

  On Sunday, the 9th, a fresh supply of tools enabled us to put more men to work, and, when not engaged in religious duties, the men worked vigorously on the intrenchments. We were aroused at 3 o’clock on Monday morning for a general advance upon the enemy, and marched three and a half miles, when we learned that the foe, in large force, was within a few hundred yards of us. We fell back hastily upon our intrenchments, and awaited the arrival of our invaders. Lieutenant-Colonel Stuart, of the Third Virginia Regiment, having come with some one hundred and eighty men, was stationed on the hill on the extreme right, beyond the creek, and Company G, of my regiment, was also thrown over the stream to protect the howitzer under Captain Brown. Captain Bridgers, of Company A, First North Carolina Regiment, took post in the dense woods beyond and to the left of the road. Major Montague, with three companies of his battalion, was ordered up from the rear, and took post on our right, beginning at the church and extending along the entire front on that side. This fine body of men and the gallant command of Lieutenant-Colonel Stuart worked with great rapidity, and in an hour had constructed temporary shelters against the enemy’s fire. Just at 9 o’clock a. m. the heavy columns of the enemy were seen approaching rapidly and in good order, but when Randolph opened upon them at 9.15 their organization was completely broken up. The enemy promptly replied with his artillery, firing briskly but wildly. He made an attempt at deployment on our right of the road, under cover of some houses and a paling. He was, however, promptly driven back by our artillery, a Virginia company-the Life Guards-and Companies B and G of my regiment. The enemy attempted no deployment within musketry range during the day, except under cover of woods, fences, or paling. Under cover of the trees he moved a strong column to an old ford, some three-quarters of a mile below, where I had placed a picket of some forty men. Colonel Magruder sent Captain Werth’s company, of Montague’s command, with one howitzer, under Sergeant {p.95} Crane, to drive back this column, which was done by a single shot from the howitzer. Before this a priming wire had been broken in the vent of the howitzer commanded by Captain Brown, and rendered it useless.

  A force estimated at one thousand five hundred was now attempting to outflank us and get in the rear of Lieutenant-Colonel Stuart’s small command. He was accordingly directed to fall back, and the whole of our advanced troops were withdrawn. At this critical moment I directed Lieutenant-Colonel Lee to call Captain Bridgers out of the swamp, and ordered him to reoccupy the nearest advanced work, and I ordered Captain Ross, Company C, First Regiment North Carolina Volunteers, to the support of Lieutenant-Colonel Stuart. These two captains, with their companies, crossed over to Randolph’s battery, under a most heavy fire, in a most gallant manner. As Lieutenant-Colonel Stuart had withdrawn, Captain Ross was detained at the church, near Randolph’s battery. Captain Bridgers, however, crossed over and drove the zouaves out of the advanced howitzer battery, and reoccupied it. It is impossible to overestimate this service. It decided the action in our favor.

  In obedience to orders from Colonel Magruder, Lieutenant-Colonel Stuart marched back, and, in spite of the presence of a foe ten times his superior in number, resumed in the most heroic manner possession of his intrenchments. A fresh howitzer was carried across and placed in the battery, and Captain Avery, of Company G, was directed to defend it at all hazards.

  We were now as secure as at the beginning of the fight, and as yet had no man killed. The enemy, finding himself foiled on our right flank, next made his final demonstration on our left. A strong column, supposed to consist of volunteers from different regiments, and under command of Captain Winthrop, aide-de-camp to General Butler, crossed over the creek and appeared at the angle on our left. Those in advance had put on our distinctive badge of a white band around the cap, and they cried out repeatedly, “Don’t fire.” This ruse was practiced to enable the whole column to get over the creek and form in good order. They now began to cheer most lustily, thinking that our work was open at the gorge, and that they could get in by a sudden rush. Companies B and C, however, dispelled the illusion by a cool, deliberate, and well-directed fire. Colonel Magruder sent over portions of Companies G, C, and H of my regiment to our support, and now began as cool firing on our side as was ever witnessed.

  The three field officers of the regiment were present, and but few shots were fired without their permission, the men repeatedly saying, “May I fire?” “I think I can bring him.” They were all in high glee, and seemed to enjoy it as much as boys do rabbit-shooting. Captain Winthrop, while most gallantly urging on his men, was shot through the heart, when all rushed back with the utmost precipitation. So far as my observation extended he was the only one of the enemy who exhibited even an approximation to courage during the whole day.

  The fight at the angle lasted but twenty minutes. It completely discouraged the enemy, and he made no further effort at assault. The house in front, which had served as a hiding place for the enemy, was now fired by a Shell from a howitzer, and the outhouses and palings were soon in a blaze. As all shelter was now taken from him, the enemy called in his troops, and started back for Hampton. As he had left sharpshooters behind him in the woods on our left, the dragoons could not advance until Captain Hoke, of Company K, First North Carolina Volunteers had thoroughly explored them. As soon as be gave the assurance of {p.96} the road being clear, Captain Douthatt, with some one hundred dragoons, in compliance with Colonel Magruder’s orders, pursued. The enemy in his haste threw away hundreds of canteens, haversacks, overcoats, &c.; even the dead were thrown out of the wagons. The pursuit soon became a chase, and for the third time the enemy won the race over the New Market course. The bridge was torn up behind him and our dragoons returned to camp. There were not quite eight hundred of my regiment engaged in the fight, and not one-half of these drew trigger during the day. All remained manfully at the posts assigned them, and not a man in the regiment behaved badly. The companies not engaged were as much exposed and rendered equal service with those participating in the fight. They deserve equally the thanks of the country. In fact, it is the most trying ordeal to which soldiers can be subjected, to receive a fire which their orders forbid them to return. Had a single company left its post our works would have been exposed; and the constancy and discipline of the unengaged companies cannot be too highly commended. A detachment of fifteen cadets from the North Carolina Military Institute defended the howitzer under Lieutenant Hudnall, and acted with great coolness and determination.

  I cannot speak in too high terms of my two field officers, Lieutenant-Colonel Lee and Major Lane. Their services have been of the highest importance since taking the field to the present moment. My thanks, too, are due, in an especial manner, to Lieut. J. M. Poteat, adjutant, and Lieut. J. W. Ratchford, aide, both of them cadets of the North Carolina Institute at Charlotte. The latter received a contusion in the forehead from a grape shot, which nearly cost him his life. Captain Bridgers’ company, A; Lieutenant Owens, commanding Company B; Captain Ross, Company C; Captain Ashe, Company D; Captain McDowell, Company E; Captain Starr, Company F; Captain Avery, Company G; Captain Huske, Company H; Lieutenant Whittaker, commanding Company I; Captain Hoke, Company K, displayed great coolness, judgment, and efficiency. Lieutenant Gregory is highly spoken of by Major Lane for soldierly bearing on the 8th. Lieutenants Cook and McKethan, Company H, crossed over under a heavy fire to the assistance of the troops attacked on the left. So did Lieutenant Cohen, Company C. Lieutenant Hoke has shown great zeal, energy, and judgment as an engineer officer on various occasions.

  Corporal George Williams, Privates Henry L. Wyatt, Thomas Fallan, and John Thorpe, Company A, volunteered to burn the house which concealed the enemy. They behaved with great gallantry. Wyatt was killed and the other three were recalled.

  Sergeant Thomas J. Stewart and Private, William McDowell, Company A, reconnoitered the position of the enemy, and went far in advance of our troops. Private J. W. Potts, of Company B, is specially mentioned by his company commander; so are Sergeant William Elmo, Company C; Sergeants C. L. Watts, W. H. McDade, Company D; Sergeant J. M. Young, Corporal John Dingler, Privates G. H. A. Adams, R. V. Gudger, G. W. Werley, John C. Wright, T. Y. Little, J. F. Jenkins, Company E; It. W. Stedman, M. E. Dye, H. E. Benton, J. B. Smith, Company F; G. W. Buhmann, James C. McRae, Company H.

  Casualties.-Private Henry L. Wyatt, Company K, mortally wounded; Lieut. J. W. Ratchford, contusion; Private Council Rodgers, Company H, severely wounded; Private Charles Williams, Company H, severely wounded; Private S. Patterson, Company D, slightly wounded; Private William White, Company K, wounded; Private Peter Poteat, Company G, slightly wounded.

  {p.97}

  I cannot close this too elaborate report without speaking in the highest terms of admiration of the Howitzer Battery and its most accomplished commander, Major Randolph. He has no superior as an artillerist in any country, and his men displayed the utmost skill and coolness. The left howitzer, under Lieutenant Hudnall, being nearest my works, came under my special notice. Their names are as follows:

  Lieutenant Hudnall, commanding (wounded), Sergeant S. B. Hughes, G. H. Pendleton, R. P. Pleasants, William M. Caldwell, George W. Hobson, William McCarthy, H. C. Shook (wounded), L. W. Timberlake, George P. Hughes, John Worth (wounded), D. B. Clark.

  Permit me, in conclusion, to pay a well-deserved compliment to the First Regiment North Carolina Volunteers. Their patience under trial, perseverance under toil, and courage under fire have seldom been surpassed by veteran troops. Often working night and day-sometimes without tents and cooking utensils-a murmur has never escaped them to my knowledge. They have done a large portion of the work on the intrenchments at Yorktown, as well as those at Bethel. Had all of the regiments in the field worked with the same spirit, there would not be an assailable point in Virginia. After the battle they shook hands affectionately with the spades, calling them “clever fellows and good friends.”

  The men are influenced by high moral and religious sentiments, and their conduct has furnished another example of the great truth that he who fears God will ever do his duty to his country.

  The Confederates had in all about one thousand two hundred men in the action. The enemy had the regiments of Colonel Duryea (zouaves), Colonel Carr, Colonel Allen, Colonel Bendix, and Colonel Wardrop (Massachusetts), from. Old Point Comfort, and five companies of Phelps’ regiment, from Newport News. We had never more than three hundred actively engaged at any one time. The Confederate loss was eleven wounded; of these, one mortally. The enemy must have lost some three hundred. I could not, without great disparagement of their courage, place their loss at a lower figure. It is inconceivable that five thousand men should make so precipitate a retreat without having sustained at least this much of a reverse.

  Let us devoutly thank the living God for His wonderful interposition in our favor, and evince our gratitude by the exemplariness of our lives. With great respect,

  D. H. HILL, Colonel First Regiment North Carolina Volunteers.

  Col. J. B. MAGRUDER, Commander York Line.

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  No. 9.

  Report of Lieut. Col. William D. Stuart, Third Virginia Infantry.

  HDQRS. DETACHMENT THIRD REGIMENT VA. VOLS., Yorktown, Va.

  SIR: I have the honor to report that I took the position assigned me in the engagement of the 10th to the right and in front of the line of battle, and completed the slight breastwork erected to protect the command, consisting of three companies of my detachment, commanded by Captains Walker, Childrey, and Charters numbering, rank and file, two hundred and eight men. The enemy deployed as skirmishers in the orchard, immediately in front and to our left, protected on the left by {p.98} several frame buildings and sheds. Those in front were dispersed by a fire from the first platoon of Captain Walker’s company, but we were annoyed by the fire from behind the buildings and the battery in the road to our left, but under cover of the breastworks the men remained unhurt. After the dispersion of the skirmishers a column of about fifteen hundred appeared in the road immediately in our front, extending from the left to right, with a battery of artillery in front, and advancing a line of skirmishers down the ravine on my right, protected from both view and fire, which fact was reported to me by scouts sent out for the purpose of observing their movements. The battery in front commenced advancing on the left of the ravine and immediately in our front. The battery supporting us on the left had been silenced and withdrawn some time before this. These facts being communicated to you, in obedience to your orders I retired in order through the swamp to the second position assigned me on the hill on the left of the church. Here one of my companies was detached and sent to the support of Captain Werth; another, under Captain Walker, was sent to Presson’s, near the Warwick and York Bridge.

  About this time Captain Atkinson’s company had arrived on the field, and with this and a detachment of the Wythe Rifles I recrossed the swamp, advanced, and regained my former position. I was supported at this time by a portion of Company G, of North Carolina Rifles, and with their aid again drove off some skirmishers advancing through the orchard. The firing, however, after I regained my position, was irregular on the part of the enemy, and I only permitted some few shots to be fired at a prominent position of their column and stragglers skulking behind the fences, owing to the enemy being much beyond rifle range.

  Both officers and men under my command behaved with the greatest coolness throughout the whole engagement, and none were injured.

  Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

  WM. A STUART, Lieutenant-Colonel Third Virginia Volunteers.

  Col. JOHN B. MAGRUDER.

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  No. 10.

  Report of Maj. George W. Randolph, commanding Howitzer Battalion.

  YORKTOWN, June 12, 1861.

  COLONEL: I have the honor to report that in the action of the 10th instant the Howitzer Battalion, under my command, fired eighteen solid shot and eighty shells, spherical case and canister, and was injured in the following particulars: A lieutenant and two privates were wounded, one severely and two slightly; five horses and three mules were killed or disabled; the Parrott gun (iron rifled) had its linstock splintered, and a musket ball passed through the felloe of the left wheel; a musket ball pierced the corner plate and a partition of the limber chest of one of the howitzers and lodged against a shell; two poles of caissons one set of swinglebars, one large pointing ring; a chain for a rammer, and several priming wires were broken, and one of the howitzers was spiked by the breaking of a priming wire in its vent. I have already made, a requisition for ammunition enough to fill all the chests of the battalion, and will submit, as soon as practicable, requisitions for whatever else may be required.

  {p.99}

  As the Position of the pieces was under your own observation, it is only necessary to state that the Parrott gun and one howitzer were posted in the battery immediately on the right of the road leading to Hampton; that a howitzer was placed in the battery erected on the right beyond the ravine, through which a passway was made for the purpose of withdrawing the piece if necessary; a howitzer was posted near the bridge; the rifled howitzer was placed on the left of the road behind the right of a redoubt erected by the North Carolina regiment, and a howitzer was posted in the rear of the road leading from the Half-way House, a howitzer having been previously sent to the Half-way House under the command of Lieutenant Moseley.

  Early in the action the howitzer in the battery on the right, having been spiked by the breaking of the priming wire, was withdrawn from its Position, and the infantry supporting it fell back upon the church; but it was subsequently replaced by the howitzer of Lieutenant Moseley, which arrived at a later period of the action.

  The ford on the left being threatened, the howitzer at the bridge was withdrawn and sent to that point, and the rifled howitzer was withdrawn from the left of the road and sent to assist in the protection of the rear. The same disposition was subsequently made of the howitzer at the main battery, situated immediately on the right of the road.

  The enemy came in sight on the road leading from Hampton a few minutes before 9 o’clock a. m., and their advance guard halted at a house on the roadside about six hundred yards in front of our main battery. Fire, however, was not opened upon them for ten or fifteen minutes, when from the number of bayonets visible, in the road we judged that a heavy column was within range. The action then commenced by a shot from the Parrott gun, aimed by myself, which struck the center of the road a short distance in front of their column, and probably did good execution in its ricochet. At no time could we see the bodies of the men in the column, and our fire was directed by their bayonets, their position being obscured by the shade of the woods on their right and two small houses on their left, and somewhat in advance of them. Our fire was immediately returned by a battery near the head of their column, but concealed by the woods and the houses so effectually, that we only ascertained its position by the flash of the pieces. The fire was maintained on our side for some time by the five pieces posted in front of our Position but as already stated one of them being spiked and another withdrawn to protect the ford early in the action, the fire was continued with three pieces, and at no time did we afterwards have more than three, pieces playing upon the enemy. The fire on our part was deliberate, and was suspended whenever masses of the enemy were not within range, and the execution was good, as I afterward ascertained by a personal inspection of the principal position of the enemy. The cannonade lasted with intervals of suspension from a few minutes before 9 o’clock a. m. until 1 1/2 o’clock p. m., and the fact that during this time but ninety-eight shot were fired by us tends to show that the firing was not too rapid. The earthworks thrown up by the battalion were struck several times by the cannon-shot of the enemy, but no injury was sustained. They fired upon us with shot, shell, spherical case, canister, and grape from 6 and 12-pounders at a distance of about six hundred yards but the only injury received from their artillery was the loss of one mule.

  We found in front of our main battery, in and near the yard of the small house already mentioned, five killed and one mortally wounded by the fire of our artillery. We heard of two others killed at Cramdall’s, about a mile from us, and have reason to believe there were many {p.100} others. The injury done to our artillery was from the fire of musketry on our left flank, the ground on that side between us and the enemy sinking down so as to expose us over the top of the breastwork erected by the North Carolina regiment.

  After some intermission of the assault in front, a heavy column, apparently a re-enforcement or reserve, made its appearance on the Hampton road and pressed forward towards the bridge, carrying the U. S. flag near the head of the column. As the road had been clear for some time, and our flanks and rear had been threatened, the howitzer in the main battery had been sent to the rear, and our fire did not at first check them, I hurried a howitzer forward from the rear, loaded it with canister, and prepared to sweep the approach to the bridge, but the fire of the Parrott gun again drove them back. The howitzer brought from the Half-way House by Lieutenant Moseley arriving most opportunely, I carried it to the battery on the right to re ace the disabled piece. On getting there, I learned from the infantry that a small house in front was occupied by sharpshooters, and saw the body of a Carolinian lying thirty yards in front of the battery, who had been killed in a most gallant attempt to burn the house.

  I opened upon the house with shell for the purpose of burning it, and the battery of the enemy in the Hampton road, being on the line with it, and supposing probably that the fire was at them, immediately returned it with solid shot. This disclosed their position and enabled me to fire at the house and at their battery at the same time. After an exchange of five or six shots a shell entered a window of the house, increased the fire already kindled until it soon broke out into a light blaze, and, as I have reason to believe, disabled one of the enemy’s pieces. This was the last shot fired. They soon afterwards retreated, and we saw no more of them.

  The action disclosed some serious defects in our ammunition and equipment, for which I earnestly recommend an immediate remedy. The shell of the Parrott gun have a fixed wooden fuse which cannot be extricated, the shortest being cut for four seconds. The consequence was that the shells burst far in the rear of the enemy and served merely as solid shot. Had they been plugged and uncut fuses furnished, I think that our fire would have been much more effective. The power and precision of the piece, demonstrated by the thirty rounds fired from it, render it very desirable that all of its advantages should be made available. I therefore respectfully suggest that the shell be hereafter furnished plugged and the fuses left uncut.

  It is reported to me that the Borman fuses used by one of the howitzers were defective, the shells cut for five seconds exploding as soon as those cut for two.

  The caissons of the Navy howitzers were made by placing ammunition chests upon the running gear of common wagons, and the play of the front axles is so limited that the caisson cannot be turned in the ordinary roads of this part of the country, and wherever the road is ditched or the woods impassable it cannot be reversed. There is also great danger of breaking the poles in turning the caissons quickly, as was shown in the action of the 10th instant. I am aware that the expedient of using wagon bodies was resorted to in order to save time, but as it might lead to great disaster, I recommend that their places be supplied as speedily as possible with those made in the usual way.

  The small size of the limber of the howitzers (Navy) renders it impossible to mount the men, and the pieces cannot move faster than the cannoneers can walk. In a recent skirmish with the enemy, in which we {p.101} pursued them rapidly, we could only carry two men, and having got far ahead of the others, we had to unlimber and fire with only two cannoneers at the piece. The piece having only two horses, and the carriage being very light, it is hazardous to mount any person on the limber. I therefore recommend that four horses be furnished to each Navy howitzer, one for the chief and the other three for the men usually mounted on the limber.

  We have succeeded since the action in unspiking the howitzer disabled by the breaking of the priming wire, but from the inferior metal used in making our priming wires we shall have to lay them aside altogether, and I must request that better ones be furnished. At present I can say nothing more of the conduct of the officers and men of the battalion than to express the high gratification afforded me by their courage, coolness, and precision, and to ask permission at a future time to call your attention to individual instances of gallantry and good conduct. I have requested the commandants of companies to furnish me with the names of such non-commissioned officers and privates as they think especially worthy of notice.

  I am happy at having an opportunity to render my acknowledgments to Colonel Hill, the commandant of the North Carolina regiment, for the useful suggestions which his experience as an artillery officer enabled him to make, to me during the action, and to bear testimony to the gallantry and discipline of that portion of his command with which I was associated. The untiring industry of his regiment in intrenching our position enabled us to defeat the enemy with a nominal loss on our side.

  I have the honor to be, your obedient servant,

  GEORGE W. RANDOLPH, Major, Commanding Howitzer Battalion.

  Col. JOHN B. MAGRUDER, Commanding Division at Yorktown.

  –––

  No. 11.

  Report of Maj. E. B. Montague, commanding Virginia Battalion.

  On the morning of the 10th of June my command reported to Colonel Magruder at Bethel Church, according to orders. At – in the morning information was received that the enemy in force were advancing upon us. Colonel Magruder immediately ordered me to throw up a redoubt fronting toward a ravine, over which it was supposed the enemy might attempt to turn our right flank. My men worked well, and had nearly finished the redoubt when the first gun from our batteries was fired; which took place at – o’clock a. m. The enemy returned the fire with spirit, and the shell and shot flew thick and fast about my command, who were in a peculiarly exposed condition, my redoubt flanking towards and being nearly perpendicular to the points of attack. Fortunately for my command, however, the major part of the enemy’s shot had sufficient elevation to pass over our heads, though many shell and solid shot fell within a few feet of our redoubt. One ball passed under my horse between his fore and hind feet, several others passed within a few feet of his head, and a few buried themselves in our breastwork. Had the enemy’s guns been slightly depressed he must have raked my whole line with his enfilading fire. A very short time after the firing commenced I received an order to direct one of my companies, the Chatham Grays, under the command of Captain Werth, to defend a ford one {p.102} mile below the bridge against the first battalion of the New York Zouave Regiment, and I saw no more of the company until after the fight.

  About – minutes after the fight, and after Lieutenant-Colonel Stuart had been compelled to fall back across the ravine and occupy my redoubt, Colonel Magruder ordered me to take my command about one and a quarter miles around to aid the Wythe Rifles, under the command of Lieutenant Chisman, in guarding a marsh, where he thought the enemy were attempting to turn our left flank. I immediately carried my command around to the point indicated at the double quick, joined the rifles, and deployed my whole command as skirmishers over a line of a quarter of a mile under cover of a dense foliage. We remained in this position until late in the evening, when we were ordered back by Colonel Magruder to the church. The enemy did not attempt to cross our line, and we remained quiet and inactive during the remainder of the fight.

  We had no killed or wounded. Every man in my whole command, both officers and men, was perfectly cool, calm, and collected during the whole time which we were exposed to the enfilading fire from the enemy’s battery and to diagonal fire of musketry from his left flank. I have no hesitancy in expressing my gratification at the manner in which my command, the Halifax Light Infantry, Captain Grammer; the Chatham Grays, Captain Werth; and the Old Dominion Rifles, Captain Dickerson, as well as the detachment of the North Carolina regiment, under my command, conducted themselves during the whole engagement.

  Respectfully reported.

  E. B. MONTAGUE, Major, Commanding Virginia Battalion.

  Col. J. B. MAGRUDER, Commanding Division.

  –––

  No. 12.

  Reports of Capt. W. H. Werth, commanding Chatham Grays, Virginia Cavalry.

  HEADQUARTERS, Yorktown, June 12, 1861.

  SIR: I beg leave very respectfully to make the following report of my scout:

  On Sunday afternoon, the 9th of June, 1861, I procured the corn and oats on the Back River road as ordered, and had the wagons returning to camp in two hours and a quarter from the receipt of the order. I was then joined by one company of North Carolina Infantry, one piece of the howitzer battery, and a detachment of Captain Douthatt’s cavalry, as I supposed, to assist me in making observations near Hampton, on the Back River. I approached New Market Bridge at 5 o’clock p. m., planted the howitzer so as to sweep the bridge, deployed my infantry in open order on my right flank in ambush, so that they could rake the road. The cavalry I posted in the rear, and threw out vedettes on each of my flanks to avoid a surprise.

  In this position I waited for the appearance of the enemy. I of course had no idea of endangering my command by engaging the enemy if in force. I was too weak. In a few moments alarm guns were fired by a chain of sentinels extending from New Market Bridge to Fort Monroe. In a few moments a force advanced from Hampton (supposed to be a battalion of infantry, but marching in detached companies), whilst at {p.103} the same time one or more companies approached by the road leading from Newport News. These forces were each advancing upon New Market Bridge from opposite directions, thinking I had crossed the bridge with my command. Upon observing their approach with a glass, I quietly retired from my position to a point in the rear three-quarters of a Mile. The enemy approached the bridge, and when they suddenly came in sight of each other they (each mistaking the other for me) opened fire, and kept it up for some five minutes before they discovered their error. I was sitting on my horse near the bridge, and saw the firing plainly with my glass, but did not at the time know the cause, although I suspected it. At dusk I took up the march for Bethel Church, the enemy following me, and the next morning the fight opened.

  I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

  W. H. WERTH.

  Col. J. B. MAGRUDER, Commanding Division.

  One of the prisoners taken (since dead) stated that in this brush there were six killed and thirteen wounded, and corroborated all the above statements of my report.

  W. H. WERTH.

  –––

  CAMP YORKTOWN, June 13, 1861.

  I beg leave to make the following report of the movement of the troops under my command at the battle of Bethel Church on the 10th instant:

  By the order of E. B. Montague, major of the Virginia battalion at Bethel, my company, the Chatham Grays, was placed in the redoubt to the rear of the church, to defend the right wing in case of a discomfiture. From this point I was detailed, by your orders, to take position at the ford on the creek, about one mile below the bridge. I crossed my command over the open field under a shower of shell and canister, which the enemy poured into us from their battery, but sustained no damage.

  A portion of the Fifth New York Zouave Regiment (three companies) was at this time advancing down the opposite bank of the stream for the purpose of crossing the ford, and thereby turn our left flank. I saw the movement, and at once took double quick and made the distance of over a mile in about nine minutes, beating the zouaves, and getting in position at the ford in time to cause them to halt. I obstructed the ford in all conceivable ways by felling trees, &c., and then placed my first platoon on the northwest side, under cover of an old mill-dam, whilst my second platoon I placed in ambush on the opposite side, where the road leading to the ford could have been raked for four hundred yards with deadly effect.

  At 10.10 o’clock one naval howitzer, with a detachment from the Howitzer Battalion, reported to me for duty. I at once placed the gun in position one hundred and twenty yards up the creek from my infantry, where I had a beautiful range for grape or canister on a spot in the road on the opposite side of the stream over which the enemy would of necessity pass in attempting the passage of the ford. From this point I had the pleasure of getting one good shot at the enemy, which, from the sudden rout of the party at which it was aimed, must have done much damage. I also threw down all the fences on either side of the creek, and cleared all the undergrowth and large timber, so that after the enemy had passed the range of the howitzer from its first {p.104} position I could limber up and in two minutes have it in position to deliver its fire between my two platoons and immediately upon the ford.

  At 10 to 11 a. m. the Southern Guard, Captain – reported to me for duty. I at once joined this command with my company, all entirely concealed from the enemy. At a little past 11 o’clock, so completely ambuscaded was my entire force, one of the enemy sent down to examine the ford came up to within twenty yards of my position, and did not suspect the presence of any force until I ordered him to ground arms, which he instantly did, and I had the pleasure of taking him prisoner. He had a fine minie musket, accouterments, and forty-five rounds of cartridges. I placed him under guard, and afterwards forwarded him to headquarters. All the men under my command displayed a wonderful degree of coolness for troops who had never been under fire, and I am assured, if we had been so fortunate as to have been attacked by a force five times our strength, that the command would have made a desperate resistance.

  At sundown I was ordered to withdraw.

  This special report is rendered necessary by my being detached from Major Montague’s battalion.

  With high respect, I am, sir, yours, &c.,

  W. H. WERTH, Captain Chatham Grays, Virginia Volunteers.

  JOHN B. MAGRUDER, Colonel, Commanding Division.

  –––

  JUNE 10-JULY 7, 1861-The Rockville (Maryland) Expedition.

  INCIDENTAL SKIRMISHES.

  June	14.–	Near Seneca Mills, Md.
  	17.–	At Conrad’s Ferry, Md.
  	18.–	At Edwards Ferry, Md.
  July	4.–	At Harper’s Ferry, Va.
  	7.–	At Great Falls, Md.

  REPORTS, ETC.

  No. 1.–	Instructions from General Scott to Colonel Stone, commanding expedition.
  No. 2.–	Reports of Col. Charles P. Stone, Fourteenth U. S. Infantry.
  No. 3.–	Report of Lieutenant Becker, District of Columbia Militia, of skirmish at Great Falls, Md.

  No. 1.

  Instructions from General Scott to Colonel Stone, Fourteenth U. S. Infantry.

  HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, June 8, 1861.

  SIR: The General-in-Chief directs that with the command assigned to you you march to Edwards Ferry, which you will seize and hold, and, if practicable, cross the river and continue on to Leesburg. Intercept supplies sent from Baltimore to Virginia. Be governed in ulterior operations by information gained as you proceed. If you can get intelligence, directly or indirectly, from General Patterson, which will fully justify the attempt, you will endeavor to effect a junction with his column.

  {p.105}

  The General has left much to your well-known discretion, but he enjoins upon you to proceed with caution, and by no means to hazard the safety of your expedition.

  Report as often as circumstances will permit. Heartily wishing you success, I am, &c.,

  E. D. TOWNSEND.

  Col. C. P. STONE, Fourteenth U. S. Infantry, Washington.

  –––

  HEADQUARTERS, June 11, 1861-9 p. m.

  COL. C. P. STONE, U. S. Army, Commanding, &c., Rockville, Md.:

  SIR: The following is a copy of a dispatch received this afternoon from General Patterson, which is communicated for your guidance:

  CHAMBERSBURG, June 11, 1861.

  Colonel Wallace (regiment of volunteers from Evansville, Ind.) yesterday peaceably occupied Cumberland, and acts on my instructions of the 6th instant. He will call to-day on small parties of secession militia in his vicinity. I advance on Friday, the earliest day.

  [Major-General Robert Patterson.]

  Major Porter, A. A. G., in a note says the general will not receive an his transportation before Monday, the 17th instant. The General-in-Chief thinks you are a day or two in advance of General Patterson’s movement, taking the above date in connection with the rise in the river, and he suggests that you time your advance accordingly.

  I am, &c.,

  E. D. TOWNSEND.

  –––

  WASHINGTON, D. C., June 22, 1861.

  Col. CHAS. P. STONE, Fourteenth Infantry:

  COLONEL: The General-in-Chief desires me to say he has written to General Patterson to propose a column in the direction intimated in conjunction with a movement in co-operation from Alexandria. Of course Your column would be absorbed by General Patterson in this movement. The General-in-Chief would be glad that you should furnish him any suggestions which may occur to you. Instructions have been given to General Mansfield to carry out your suggestions as to the battalion of District volunteers stationed at Seneca Mills, also to supply their place by a suitable force.

  Respectfully, &c.,

  SCHUYLER HAMILTON, Lieutenant-Colonel and Military Secretary.

  –––

  WASHINGTON, July 6, 1861.

  Col. C. P. STONE, U. S. Army:

  SIR: Your several telegrams of the 2d, 3d, and 4th instant, and letters Of the 4th and two of the 5th, have been received.*

  The General-in-Chief has been highly pleased with the whole conduct Of Your expedition, and Only regrets that it has not been in his power {p.106} to furnish you additional cavalry and artillery and to permit you to carry out the plans suggested by you. Paramount interests, however, induced him to place you with General Patterson’s column, and having done so he had no further instructions to give you.

  Measures have been taken to send a Government telegraph operator to Point of Rocks and Harper’s Ferry, as suggested by you.

  I am, &c.,

  E. D. TOWNSEND.

  * Telegrams of 2d and 4th not found; the others appear as reports, post.

  –––

  No. 2.

  Reports of Col. Charles P. Stone, Fourteenth U. S. Infantry, commanding expedition.

  HEADQUARTERS ROCKVILLE EXPEDITION, Tennallytown, June 11, 1861.

  CAPTAIN: I have the honor to report my arrival at this place with Captain Owen’s company of volunteer cavalry, and the Second, Third, Fifth, and Eighth Battalions District of Columbia Volunteers. We got into camp here yesterday at 11 o’clock a. m., with the exception of the Third Battalion, which was a little later, owing to the double duty of its commander, who performs the duties of A. Q. M. and A. C. S. to the expedition, as well as those of commander of battalion. The section of Griffin’s battery and Captain Magruder’s cavalry arrived at Rockville about 11 o’clock a. m. yesterday, and at the same hour two canal-boats at the Chain Bridge, where they await a battalion for the expedition along the canal. I propose to detach for the latter service Lieutenant-Colonel Everett, with the Fifth Battalion District of Columbia Volunteers, and have encamped him conveniently for the purpose.

  The movement will be made as soon as the regiments at Rockville are sufficiently refreshed to move rapidly in the direction of Edwards Ferry.

  The people in this immediate region are for the Government almost to a man. Those at Rockville, are reported to me as being about one-half rabid secessionists, calling themselves “States-rights” men.

  Couriers are said to have been started immediately on the arrival of the first troops at Rockville, to give notice to the enemy at Harper’s Ferry of our advance. Exaggerated reports of our number have gone forward. No difficulty has been experienced in obtaining forage so far, and the A. C. S. will be able to purchase plenty of fresh beef. The small rations and bread for the command will have to come from Washington or Georgetown.

  Very respectfully, I am, captain, your most obedient servant,

  CHAS. P. STONE, Colonel Fourteenth Infantry, Commanding Expedition.

  Capt. THEO. TALBOT, Assistant Adjutant-General.

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  ROCKVILLE, MD., June 13, 1861.

  COLONEL: I have the honor to acknowledge receipt at 5 p. m. yesterday of your letter of the day previous, the contents of which are duly noted, and my movements will be governed thereby. Yesterday afternoon at 4.10 o’clock Lieutenant-Colonel Everett, moving along the canal in boats with his battalion, occupied the aqueduct at Seneca Creek, placed guards, and established patrols. At 4 p. m. Major Jewell, with {p.107} his battalion, moving by the river road; occupied Seneca Mills, one-half mile north of Lieutenant-Colonel Everett. At the same time Colonel Stiles, moving with his regiment along the upper road, occupied the village, of Darnestown, three miles from Jewell. There was but ten minutes’ time difference in the occupation of the points designated, the three corps moving on different lines-one a distance of twenty-five miles; another twenty-two miles the third nine miles; an exactitude unusual in volunteer troops. The arrival of the troops here was most opportune. The loyal citizens were under most uncomfortable pressure, and doubtless would have had difficulty in casting unbiased votes at the election to-day. The conduct of the men in Rockville has been admirable. Not a complaint has been made to me of depredation on private property, and the soldiers are most kindly received and are very popular with the people.

  Yesterday I sent forward Lieutenant Piper, of the artillery, to reconnoiter beyond our positions. He reports the roads good; beef and forage plenty. He reports also that the enemy crossed the river in small force yesterday morning near Edwards Ferry, and attempted to break the canal, but the lock-keeper drew off the water at that point, which satisfied them, and at the same time makes the destruction of the embankments more difficult. Sufficient water can at any time be let in to float out canal-boats in case of our desiring it. We have now secured the canal to within six miles of Edwards Ferry, thus securing water transportation that far at least.

  The impression has been produced (by my making reconnaissance and minute inquiries) that I move immediately on Frederick.

  The troops of the expedition are now posted as follows: The Eighth Battalion District of Columbia Volunteers, Captain Gerhard, at Tennallytown, keeping open communication at Washington and the rear of the three lines of advance. The Fifth Battalion District of Columbia Volunteers, Lieutenant-Colonel Everett, at the aqueduct, on canal, seven or eight miles from Edwards Ferry, one company of eighty-five of this battalion having been left at Great Falls to watch the ferries. The Second Battalion District of Columbia Volunteers, Major Jewell, at Seneca Mills, three hundred and three strong, one-half mile north of Lieutenant-Colonel Everett. The Ninth Regiment New York troops at Darnestown, three miles north of Major Jewell, a good road connecting the last three-named positions. The First Pennsylvania and First New Hampshire Regiments, Third Battalion (Smead’s) District of Columbia Volunteers, are encamped here. The section of Griffin’s battery and the cavalry are encamped one mile from this, in the direction of Darnestown.

  A fine spirit seems to be general in the command, and it is well supplied with everything, except medical attendance in the District of Columbia Volunteers. Only one assistant surgeon is present with all the battalions, and he comes simply as a volunteer. No provision has been made for them, although I have long since and repeatedly made the proper representations on the subject. I fear there will be suffering from this deficiency whenever the battalions are separated from the regiments, and in case of action there would be unnecessary loss of life. At present the health of the whole command is good.

  Very respectfully, I am, colonel, your most obedient servant,

  CHAS. P. STONE, Colonel Fourteenth Infantry, Commanding Expedition.

  Lieut. Col. E. D. TOWNSEND, Assistant Adjutant-General, Headquarters of the Army.

  {p.108}

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  ROCKVILLE, June 14, 1861-8 o’clock a. m.

  COLONEL: The First Regiment Pennsylvania was pushed forward early this morning two miles beyond the position of the New York Ninth Regiment, on the road to the two ferries. The section of Griffin’s battery has gone to the same point. The First New Hampshire will leave this evening, bivouac nine miles from this, and, in the cool of the morning, proceed to Poolesville. I leave within the hour, taking the cavalry force to make a reconnaissance beyond Poolesville, towards the ferries, where there are said to be 300 to 400 of the enemy. I do not credit the report, but, if true, it will not be difficult to capture them.

  From Poolesville it will be easy to march either on the ferries or to the Point of Rocks, as may be deemed most advisable.

  The command is in good health and fine spirits.

  I inclose returns of elections in this region, showing a large majority for the Union candidate for Congress.

  Very respectfully, I am, colonel, your most obedient servant,

  CHAS. P. STONE, Colonel Fourteenth Infantry, Commanding Expedition.

  Lieut. Col. E. D. TOWNSEND, Assistant Adjutant-General, Headquarters of the Army.

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  POOLESVILLE, June 15, 1861.

  COLONEL: I have the honor to report that the troops of the expedition have to-night occupied Edwards Ferry and Conrad’s Ferry, the two approaches to Leesburg. The former is held by a portion of the Pennsylvania regiment, a piece of artillery under Lieutenant Hasbrouck, and twenty cavalry. The latter is held by a portion of the First New Hampshire Regiment.

  It is believed here that Harper’s Ferry has been evacuated, and that the garrison has retired, by way of Winchester, towards Manassas Junction. I shall send scouts out to-morrow. Ascertain, if practicable, the truth or falsity of the story.

  Lieutenant-Colonel Everett reports that he thinks the enemy are erecting works nearly opposite his position, on the canal, at the mouth of the Seneca Creek. The enemy at Leesburg were frightened, it is said, on Thursday evening, and burned the Goose Creek Bridge (railroad), tore up track, burned cars, &c. They have not, however, yet evacuated the place. The command is well and doing well.

  Very respectfully, colonel, your most obedient servant,

  CHAS. P. STONE, Colonel, Commanding Expedition.

  Lieut. Col. E. D. TOWNSEND, Assistant Adjutant-General, Headquarters of the Army.

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  POOLESVILLE, June 16, 1861.

  COLONEL: I reported last night the occupation of the two nearest ferries across the Potomac. One hour after that report was written there was a very large fire some miles to the westward of our position here on the Virginia side. Those who know the country well state that it must have been the destruction of the turnpike bridge over Goose Creek.

  The enemy occupy with small (visible) force the Virginia landing of Edwards Perry, and it is my impression that they have four pieces of {p.109} artillery on the south side of Goose Creek, about two hundred yards south of the ferry landing.

  If I become satisfied that Harper’s Ferry has been evacuated, and that a general retreat has been made, via Winchester, I shall cross the river by the upper ferry and ford, capture the force, whatever it may be, at the lower ferry, occupy Leesburg, and open means of communication, as rapidly as possible, with General Patterson on the one hand and General McDowell on the other, taking especial care to restore, as rapidly as practicable, the transportation routes on both sides of the river down. The canal on this side will require but a handful of men, and should General Patterson be in possession of Harper’s Ferry, the whole canal from that point to Washington can be put in working order in one day.

  I am just sending out an officer to inspect the canal above, and I think that water can be thrown into it a few miles north of this, which would relieve all this part of the State from the great inconvenience which now exists in getting supplies to and from Washington or other markets. Great convenience would also result to the Government in forwarding supplies along the river. Should such work interfere with the main objects of the expedition, it will not, of course, be attempted.

  Very respectfully, I am, colonel, your most obedient servant,

  CHAS. P. STONE, Colonel Fourteenth Infantry, Commanding Expedition.

  Lieut. Col. E. D. TOWNSEND, Assistant Adjutant-General, Headquarters of the Army.

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  POOLESVILLE, June 16, 1861-2 1/2 p. m.

  COLONEL: The enemy have appeared opposite the two ferries in force, probably part of the late Harper’s Ferry force, and dispute our passage towards Leesburg. They are throwing up a battery on the road between Edwards Ferry and Leesburg. Lieutenant Abert is reconnoitering along the river above their upper position. Captain Magruder is doing the same up the Monocacy road. My weakness for attack is want of artillery. Had I a full battery the approaches might be guarded by part to advantage, while another portion could be used in turning them. My impression is that these are Harper’s Ferry troops, but that their main body has taken the road to Manassas Junction.

  Very respectfully, colonel, your most obedient servant,

  CHAS. P. STONE, Colonel, Commanding.

  Lieut. Col. E. D. TOWNSEND, Assistant Adjutant-General.

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  POOLESVILLE, June 17, 1861-4 1/2 p. m.

  COLONEL: I have the honor to report that the enemy opened fire on the guard at Conrad’s Ferry (five miles above Edwards Ferry) this morning about 10 o’clock. The point was and is occupied on our side by five companies of the New Hampshire First Infantry. The enemy were reported to have three cannon, but in a careful examination I was unable to discover more than one 6-pounder field piece. They amused themselves by firing some twenty shots, apparently at the staff on which the New Hampshire troops had raised the national colors. No damage whatever was done to our men by the firing, and it appeared so objectless, {p.110} that I conjectured it must have been intended to cover an advance at some other point. I therefore made dispositions for watching the fords above and below, and threw out scouting parties to intercept any possible movement from the mouth of the Monocacy River.

  It is very necessary to hold these ferries and protect the canal, for the enemy seem disposed to destroy everything they do not control, and the canal is absolutely necessary to the well-being of this neighborhood-one of the best small-grain districts in the State. It is now suffering for want of means of transportation, and the appearance of troops here has had an excellent effect.

  I shall for the present hold the main body of troops here, keeping a strong guard at each of the ferries and pickets up and down the river at the fords. I have this evening strengthened the posts at Seneca Mills and the aqueduct net by two companies of the Ninth New York, and have moved the remainder of that regiment to a point near Dawsonville, to watch the roads leading toward Washington from the upper fords and ferries near the Point of Rocks.

  It seems to be universally conceded here by the people along the river that Harper’s Ferry has been abandoned, but it appears to me strange that no communication has come, from General Patterson, who, if at Harper’s Ferry, could communicate with me in four hours. I do not feel at liberty to detach a force so directly off my necessary line of operations.

  From the above rough sketch [diagram on the original copy] you will perceive that I cannot with safety trust my command immediately at the ferries, without exposing the route to Washington to any force which might have crossed above, near the Monocacy, and at the same time getting my troops into a horseshoe, with the rear exposed to the same force and a river in front. As at present arranged, they can all maintain their positions until relieved, and if attacked by an overwhelming force, all can withdraw towards Georgetown through defiles easily defended.

  On the other hand, if all, or nearly all, the force’s lately at Harper’s Ferry have retired toward Manassas, so that there remain none in sufficient numbers to make a demonstration by this route toward Washington, we are in a position here to be assembled and thrown into Leesburg at any moment.

  I feel greatly the want of artillery, and should be glad if more pieces could be spared to me.

  Very respectfully, I am, colonel, your most obedient servant,

  CHAS. P. STONE.

  Lieut. Col. E. D. TOWNSEND, Asst. Adjt. Gen. U. S. Army, Headquarters of the Army.

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  POOLESVILLE, June 17, 1861.

  My DEAR GENERAL: Your two notes of yesterday were both received by me this afternoon at Conrad’s Ferry, where I had gone to make an examination of the position of the enemy, who opened fire on our guards there this morning with one or more 6-pounder guns. The force on the opposite side of the river does not appear to be large, probably in the immediate vicinity of the Ferry not more, than 800 men; I could not see 100. We have there five companies of the New Hampshire regiment, with pickets thrown out above and below the Ferry to watch the fords. I could see no other object for the firing {p.111} than an attempt to amuse us, to allow a large force to cross somewhere above and attack our flank and rear, for the purpose of cutting us off from Washington and marching in that direction. My dispositions were made accordingly.

  The New York Ninth was ordered to the entrance of the Darnestown road, the Pennsylvania regiment and half of the New Hampshire, with one piece of artillery, disposed here for approach of the enemy from the north, and I strengthened Conrad’s Ferry only by twenty marksmen from the Pennsylvania First Regiment. The New Hampshire troops have the old musket, which has not power enough to do mischief across the river. A chance ball from one of the Pennsylvania muskets is said to have disabled a man at the enemy’s gun this morning.

  While writing this I hear the firing recommenced by the enemy.

  I have no reliable news from General Patterson’s command. Rumor here says Harper’s Ferry is occupied by U. S. troops.

  Two companies are detached from the Ninth Regiment to strengthen the force on the river near the mouth of the Seneca, where Colonel Everett and Major Jewell are stationed.

  As your messengers do not seem to understand the roads near this point, and have letters from you to deliver at Seneca Falls, I send this to Captain Mead, at Rockville, with orders to send it forward immediately. I write also to Colonel Townsend by same route. All your kind hints will be carefully remembered.

  I remain, dear general, very respectfully and truly, yours,

  CHAS. P. STONE, Colonel, Commanding.

  Brigadier-General MANSFIELD, Commanding Department of Washington.

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  HEADQUARTERS EAST POTOMAC, ABOVE GEORGETOWN, June 17-6.40 p. m.

  GENERAL: Your letter of this date has just been handed me.* As I have conflicting reports about the strength of the enemy now firing on the front of my position, and no positive assurance that there is not a force above, I do not feel authorized to weaken the force here by a withdrawal of a regiment, as I might thereby expose Washington to an attack from this direction, and at the same time put my command in a desperate condition.

  I hope to have reliable information by morning, and, if favorable, will send down the nearest regiment-the Ninth New York or the First Pennsylvania.

  Very respectfully, general, your most obedient servant,

  CHAS. F. STONE, Colonel Fourteenth Infantry, Commanding.

  Brigadier-General MANSFIELD, Commanding Department of Washington.

  * Not found.

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  POOLESVILLE, June 18, 1861-9 p. m.

  COLONEL: The enemy attempted to make a crossing of the Goose Creek this afternoon, having arrived opposite Edwards Ferry in force, {p.112} estimated by the officer in command of the guard there at from 800 to 900 men. They made use of the ferryboat, which they had withdrawn from the Potomac. I had given orders that on any attempt to move the boat fire should be opened on it, and in compliance with these orders Lieutenant Hasbrouck fired from his 12-pounder field howitzer a spherical case shot, which burst directly in range, and covered the boat with a shower of bullets and fragments. The effect was excellent. The horse of a mounted officer leaped overboard, and the boat was rapidly drawn back to the shore. The enemy then formed line along the crest of the bank and commenced firing, but a few well-directed spherical case shot dispersed them, and sent them flying towards Leesburg. I deemed it important to prevent communication along the river between these forces and those opposite Lieutenant-Colonel Everett’s position.

  To-night I shall order up Captain Smead’s battalion to within supporting distance of both Colonel Everett and Colonel Stiles, an(] to-morrow row morning shall be able to open communication with General Patterson by a trusty hired messenger.

  I respectfully request that orders may issue to the proper departments to send to-morrow by canal, in boats of light draught, 18,000 complete rations, excepting the meat ration, of which only 9,000 will be necessary; also, 15,000 ball cartridges, elongated bullet, cal. .58; 15,000 ditto, elongated bullet, cal. .69, and 15,000 ditto, round ball, cal. .697 all consigned to Capt. John R. Smead, acting assistant quartermaster of this expedition. These stores can come by canal as far as the aqueduct, occupied by Lieutenant-Colonel Everett, and can be thence transported in wagons.

  In addition to the before-mentioned ordnance stores, I request that there may be forwarded 140 6-pounder spherical case shot, fixed, and 144 12-pounder spherical case shot, fixed.

  I can now at any time, with very small loss, occupy Leesburg, but can see no advantage which would justify even the small loss which would be sustained, and the slight risk to my line which would necessarily result.

  Very respectfully, I am, colonel, your most obedient servant,

  CHAS. P. STONE, Colonel Fourteenth, Infantry, Commanding Expedition.

  Lieut. Col. E. D. TOWNSEND, Assistant Adjutant-General, Headquarters of the Army.

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  POOLESVILLE, June 19, 1861-noon.

  COLONEL: I have the honor to report that a gentleman has just arrived in my camp from Martinsburg, Berkeley County, Virginia, where he was a major of militia. He fled from Martinsburg on the 9th instant, because three companies of Confederate troops arrived there for the purpose of impressing into service all the militia. These three companies were commanded by Captain Letcher, he believes a brother of the governor. This gentleman concealed himself, and escaped with some two hundred others, and made their way through the mountains, away from the roads, out of the State. He states that two regiments have been impressed in Berkeley County, most of them strong Union men, who are determined to shoot their officers and go over to the Government troops the first opportunity; that these men carry, many of them, little United States flags concealed about their persons, and intend to {p.113} stick them in their musket boxes and join the United States forces whenever they can; that some of the impressed men are so obstinate that arms were not given to them, but they were carried away and made to do police, duty in the camps. The troops at Harper’s Ferry were badly fed and badly clothed; had very poor shoes, and few of them.

  There is nothing new to be communicated from this command.

  Very respectfully, colonel, your most obedient servant,

  CHAS. P. STONE, Colonel Fourteenth Infantry, Commanding Expedition.

  Lieut. Col. E. D. TOWNSEND, Assistant Adjutant-General, Headquarters of the Army.

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  POOLESVILLE, June 20, 1861.

  COLONEL: I sent a trusty messenger up the river yesterday as far as opposite Harper’s Ferry. He reports that there were no troops of the United States at or near that place. Harper’s Ferry was completely deserted, except by a few poor families.

  An action between our forces and those of the enemy at Martinsburg was vaguely reported as a complete defeat of the enemy.

  I find it necessary to occupy the ferry and fords at Monocacy, and for this purpose order up the Ninth New York this evening. I go myself in a few minutes to take possession, hoping to capture the ferry boat, which the enemy were trying to raise last night. More artillery is needed, and I hope may be furnished me.

  It is difficult to restrain the New Hampshire troops from crossing the river, but the officers seem disposed to do their duty in carrying out orders.

  The people in the neighborhood seem to gain confidence in the Government day by day, and the troops, especially the Pennsylvania First, are very popular with them. I find that the women and children had been taught by the Virginians and active secessionists here to expect every species of outrage and horror on the arrival of the United States troops. The reaction is very strong, and the troops are now looked to for protection.

  I am informed that repairs will be immediately commenced on the canal, and that the line will be in order in nine or ten days’ time. It will require careful guarding at present.

  Very respectfully, I am, colonel, your most obedient servant,

  CHAS. P. STONE, Colonel Fourteenth Infantry, Commanding Expedition.

  Lieut. Col. E. D. TOWNSEND, Assistant A Adjutant-General, Headquarters of the Army.

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  POOLESVILLE, June 21, 1861.

  COLONEL: I have the honor to report that the Ninth Now York Regiment takes post this evening at the Monocacy Ferry, to watch the river above and below.

  The Eighth Battalion District of Columbia Volunteers has been ordered up from Tennallytown to Great Falls. The officers of the Second Battalion District of Columbia Volunteers, having forgotten themselves so far as to request that the battalion might be relieved from duty and {p.114} sent back to Washington, and having permitted the battalion evidently to become demoralized, I have issued an order directing its return to Washington, where I recommend that it be mustered out of service.

  If practicable, a small regiment should be ordered to the post (Seneca Mills) lately occupied by that battalion.

  I yesterday reconnoitered the river up to Noland’s Ferry, and found no signs of the enemy. I passed within three miles of the Point of Rocks.

  Very respectfully, colonel, your most obedient servant,

  CHAS. P. STONE, Colonel Fourteenth Infantry, Commanding.

  Lieut. Col. E. D. TOWNSEND, Assistant Adjutant-General.

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  POOLESVILLE, June 22, 1861.

  COLONEL: I had the honor to report yesterday some dissatisfaction in the Second Battalion District of Columbia Volunteers, in my zeal, and that I had ordered that corps to Washington. Later in the day such urgent appeals were made to me by all the officers of the battalion, that I consented to suspend the order directing its return, and it will hold the same position as before-Seneca Mills. I consider that part of the line of the Potomac so important, that I recommend its being strengthened by a small regiment or a strong battalion, which I cannot spare from this region.

  The Ninth New York now occupies the mouth of the Monocacy and the line of the river Potomac as far as Noland’s Ferry.

  The wheat crops of this region are now within a few days of harvest, and are very abundant. Loudoun County, Virginia, is exceedingly productive, and next week will commence one of the richest harvests ever made there. I deem it very important that that county should be occupied so as to save the crops of the many loyal citizens there, and prevent the enemy seizing them and gaining advantage of the supplies.

  I was this morning applied to for security for a crop immediately opposite belonging to a Union man, but do not feel at liberty to cross until some communication comes from General Patterson, showing his dispositions and those of the enemy. I have sent messengers as far as eight miles above the Point of Rocks, but they were unable to learn anything concerning the position of troops of either force.

  I respectfully renew my application for more field pieces or mountain howitzers; and if a small portion of the force now with General Patterson can be caused to join me Loudoun County can be secured and the enemy made very uneasy on his left flank while he faces General McDowell.

  I have the honor to be, colonel, your most obedient servant,

  CHAS. P. STONE, Colonel Fourteenth Infantry, Commanding Expedition.

  Lieut. Col. E. D. TOWNSEND, Assistant Adjutant-General, Headquarters of the Army.

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  POOLESVILLE, June 23, 1861.

  COLONEL: I have received Lieutenant-Colonel Hamilton’s letter of the 22d instant, informing me of the proposition of the General in-Chief to General Patterson to make a movement South, &c.

  {p.115}

  As stated in my letter of yesterday, I deem it important that Loudoun County should be occupied immediately; but much, very much, has been already lost by a failure of some troops to occupy Harper’s Ferry and Point of rocks.

  My pickets extend to within three miles of the Point of Rocks, but with my present force I cannot advance them a mile with safety, and can only justify my present position by constant activity and watchfulness, and by keeping these troops under my command worked as constantly as troops can bear.

  Half a regiment at Point of Rocks, and the same force at a point opposite Harper’s Ferry (if it be not deemed advisable by the general in command at Williamsport to occupy the Ferry itself), would relieve me from great anxiety, and would have saved much uncertainty among the citizens of Virginia and Maryland.

  When I pushed forward my posts to Monocacy and Noland’s Ferry I supposed that United States troops in some force had certainly occupied the abandoned important points within twenty-five miles of them. We cannot control the Potomac without holding all the points I do, and not with safety and certainty without occupying those of Harpers Ferry or Knoxville and Point of Rocks.

  The inclosed appeal of a Virginian I believe to be genuine, and I have no doubt many have been forced into the ranks of the enemy since my arrival here.

  Yesterday the opposing pickets at Conrad’s Ferry met in the middle of the river, shook hands, and drank each other’s health. The Virginia picket men said they did not wish to fight, but “wanted to go home.”

  With a little more force, and a slight co-operation on the part of General Cadwalader or General Patterson, I could move forward with safety and success. I cannot do so however until Harper’s Ferry is occupied by somebody and its position understood.

  The health of the command remains excellent and the spirits good. An order to cross the river would be received with enthusiasm.

  Very respectfully, I am, colonel, your most obedient servant,

  CHAS. P. STONE, Colonel Fourteenth Infantry, Commanding Expedition.

  Lieut. Col. E. D. TOWNSEND, Assistant Adjutant-General, Headquarters of the Army.

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  POOLESVILLE, June 24, 1861-8 p. m.

  COLONEL: I left camp at midnight, last night on a reconnaissance up the river Potomac, accompanied by Capt. Wm. S. Abert, A. A. A. G., and Captain Stewart, A. D. C., with an escort of a dozen cavalry, having communicated all my plans of operations up to that time to Col. F. E. Patterson, First Pennsylvania Regiment, and leaving him in command; passed the extreme pickets of my command at 3 a. m. to-day, and arrived about daybreak at the village-Point Of Rocks, Md.

  As you are already aware, the bridge across the Potomac has been burned by the enemy. I found that the enemy had a picket of five men watching at the Virginia end of the burned bridge. At Point of Rocks I learned that there were no troops on this side of the river above, and dispatched Captain Abert, with two men on a hand-car, to a point opposite, Harper’s Ferry. Captain Abert returned at 1.45 p. m., and reported that he had visited Sandy Hook, opposite Harper’s Ferry, where he was {p.116} received by the inhabitants with the greatest enthusiasm, and questioned with much earnestness and anxiety as to when they would be relieved from their present painful position by the presence of United States troops. He made a careful personal examination of the ground in the neighborhood, which he found had been occupied in the most absurd manner by the enemy during their recent presence there. He met Captain Newton, Engineer Corps, reconnoitering the position, and gave him, for the information of General Patterson, an account of the numbers and positions of the troops composing this expedition. Captain Abert learned from good authority that General Johnston was this morning at Winchester with about 10,000 to 12,000 troops, and that he had broken up his camp, and was preparing for a hasty march today in some direction, supposed to be Cumberland.

  I had an interview at Point of Rocks with a man just from Leesburg, who informed me that he saw about 950 South Carolina troops arrive at Leesburg last night. This would make the force there about 1,600, with supporting troops nine miles off.

  The enemy destroyed to-day a large number of locomotives belonging to the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Company, together with a train of cars, said to be more than half a mile long. General Johnston might reach Leesburg by to-morrow afternoon, and either attempt the passage of the river or move towards Arlington. Should he come to Leesburg, my impression is that it will be with a view to make a demonstration on General McDowell’s right. In my opinion the Point of Rocks and Sandy Hook should be immediately occupied; the first, because it is now used as a crossing lace to and from Virginia; the second, because of the justly-founded alarm pervading the community, and the right of those loyal citizens who have faithfully stood by the flag under circumstances of difficulty and danger to protection at, the first moment possible.

  Had I one regiment more, and more artillery, I should occupy Sandy Hook to-morrow, and should I find that the enemy neglect my positions, I shall certainly occupy the Point of Rocks, for the purposes above indicated, and also for securing my right flank.

  Very respectfully, I am, colonel, your most obedient servant,

  CHAS. P. STONE, Colonel Fourteenth Infantry, Commanding.

  Col. E. D. TOWNSEND, Assistant Adjutant-General, Headquarters of the Army.

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  POOLESVILLE, June 25, 1861.

  COLONEL: From informers, and what can be seen from our positions, I feel assured that there has been a considerable increase of force in Leesburg and its vicinity. Yesterday morning General Johnston was at Winchester, as reported by me last night, and some of his forces may be those which have been seen this morning opposite us. I believe some have passed south of Goose Creek in the direction of Arlington, but there were undoubtedly nearly one thousand South Carolina troops opposite us yesterday.

  The destruction of locomotives and railroad cars noticed in my letter of last night took place at Martinsburg. The number of locomotives is said to be thirty-five, and the line of cars was said to be more, than half a mile long.

  An eye-witness reported General Johnston’s force at Winchester to {p.117} have been yesterday morning at least ten thousand, and this informer said that he saw all baggage packed and the force ready to move at a moment’s notice.

  I am not in a position to relieve the loyal people up the Potomac, but am impressed with the absolute necessity of relief being promptly afforded.

  I respectfully request again, with the risk of being deemed importunate, an additional force of artillery of some class be sent me, and that the cavalry force may be increased by the remainder of Company H, Second Cavalry, now in Washington, if it can be possibly afforded. I am much cramped for pickets of mounted men and escorts for reconnoitering purposes.

  The health of the command continues good.

  Very respectfully, colonel, your most obedient servant.,

  CHAS. P. STONE, Colonel Fourteenth Infantry, Commanding Expedition.

  Lieut. Col. E. D. TOWNSEND, Assistant Adjutant-General, Headquarters of the Army.

  –––

  CAMP NEAR POOLESVILLE, June 27, 1861.

  COLONEL: I have the honor to acknowledge receipt of copy of letter to General Patterson of 25th instant. Nothing of importance has occurred since my last report. The Virginia guards at the ferries seem to have been replaced by South Carolina troops, who recommenced the unsoldierlike practice of firing at pickets across the river. The fire was carefully returned, and nothing of the kind has taken place for twenty-four hours past.

  Colonel Patterson reports that the South Carolina troops, who passed Goose Creek the day before yesterday, are said to have encamped about two to two and one-half miles south of that creek, a mile or two back from the Potomac. I respectfully repeat my application for more cavalry for reconnoitering purposes, and additional field pieces. This command can properly man four more pieces if they can be furnished, as one of the companies of the Pennsylvania regiment has been well drilled at a battery in Philadelphia (Cadwalader’s old battery), and I have with me three officers of the regular artillery. Guns in position would enable me to dispose of a more considerable portion of the infantry force for the watching of the fords, always numerous, and daily becoming more so as the dry weather continues. The health of the command remains excellent, the sick report not averaging three per centum of the force.

  Considering the circumstances of the District of Columbia Volunteers, respectfully recommend that said infantry force be replaced by a regiment of State troops, and if an additional regiment can be spared, it Would greatly facilitate my operations.

  Very respectfully, I am, colonel, your most obedient servant,

  CHAS. P. STONE, Colonel Fourteenth Infantry, Commanding.

  Lieut. Col. E., D. TOWNSEND, Asst. Adjt. Gen. U. S. Army, Headquarters of the Army.

  {p.118}

  –––

  CAMP NEAR POOLESVILLE, June 28, 1861.

  COLONEL: The following reports of the force and position of the enemy opposite my positions are from negro scouts, and from appearances are nearly accurate. There is a gradual strengthening of force near Edwards Ferry-two regiments (not Virginians) at Leesburg, about 1,200; 400 having been detached from the 1.600 previously reported as a guard at Conrad’s Ferry.

  Four pieces of artillery are to-day reported opposite Edwards. One thousand additional troops were to arrive at Leesburg overnight.

  Considering the ease with which their forces can be suddenly increased from the direction of Winchester, and the extended line of posts which I am obliged to occupy, I deem it only prudent that this command should be re-enforced, so that I may be enabled to complete my line of posts to above the Point of Rocks, and have a disposable force to move to any position which may be attacked, and be able to take advantage of any indiscretion on the part of the enemy. I deem it highly important to occupy the Point of Rocks, and guard the ferries and fords there, and a little above and below. Communication is constantly going on there, and the enemy can at any time cross and, destroy the canal and railway track.

  No communication has yet come to me from Major-General Patterson or any of his command. The only intercourse between us has been the meeting of our reconnoitering parties opposite Harper’s Ferry. I do not dare to weaken my force by further detachments, and there seems to be great delay in occupying the space between us by General Patterson.

  All letters which pass from Maryland into Virginia now go between the Point of Rocks and Harper’s Ferry, a communication which could be entirely cut off by one regiment, which would at the same time give great impetus to the Union feeling in Frederick County, Maryland, and Loudoun and Berkeley, Virginia.

  The disposition shown by the enemy to burn and destroy private property makes me solicitous about that strong Union district. Hundreds of thousands of dollars worth of property could be destroyed in a few hours there by a small force, the telegraph wires cut, and the canal made useless to us for months.

  Very respectfully, I am, colonel, your most obedient servant,

  CHAS. P. STONE, Colonel Fourteenth Infantry, Commanding Expedition.

  Lieut. Col. E. D. TOWNSEND, Assistant Adjutant-General, Headquarters of the Army.

  –––

  CAMP NEAR POOLESVILLE, June 29, 1861.

  GENERAL : I have this afternoon received your letter of yesterday’s date,* and have sent orders to Colonel Cake to bring his battalion to this point as rapidly as the well-being of his troops will permit.

  I yesterday reported an increase of the enemy’s force opposite my position, and am very desirous of showing them a strong front, and at the same time to occupy more ground on my right.

  At present, with Harper’s Ferry unoccupied, the disaffected in Maryland have free communication with Virginia, across the Potomac above the Point of Rocks, and information and supplies go daily to the enemy. {p.119} The railroad and canal are not safe for a single night, and yet I cannot with anything like prudence detach a force for guarding the line unless strengthened for the purpose.

  I suppose Major-General Patterson must have weighty reasons for leaving the point opposite Harpers Ferry without guard, for I feel that each night risks an immense amount of private property and wearies the loyal people, while it encourages the sympathizers of the enemy.

  With two regiments more I can occupy the entire line from Georgetown to Harper’s Ferry, and with three more do not only that, but operate between General Johnston and General McDowell.

  Very respectfully, I am, general, your most obedient servant,

  CHAS. P. STONE, Colonel Fourteenth Infantry, Commanding Expedition.

  Brigadier-General MANSFIELD, Commanding Department of Washington.

  * Not found.

  –––

  CAMP NEAR POOLESVILLE, July 1, 1861.

  COLONEL: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of Special Orders, No. 109, which came to hand this morning.

  The advance towards General Patterson’s supposed position will commence this afternoon. I propose to occupy Point of Rocks to-night with six companies of the Ninth Regiment New York, to send forward the First Pennsylvania to-night as far as the Monocacy, which will enable the last-named regiment to join the Ninth New York fresh to-morrow forenoon. The rear will be covered by the First New Hampshire Regiment which will, until the last moment possible, guard the fords and ferries near this place. To-morrow evening I shall hope to occupy the Maryland Heights, opposite Harper’s Ferry, with the First Pennsylvania and six companies of the Ninth New York, having four companies of the Ninth New York at Point of Rocks, and the New Hampshire First and battalion of Pennsylvania Twenty-fifth at the Monocacy.

  It will be with serious misgivings that, I leave this is horseshoe of the river unguarded, for I shall expect to learn that the enemy have crossed immediately on my leaving, and doubtless the canal will be destroyed, as well as large amounts of grain of the old and new crop. To guard as far as possible against such a result, I shall post 100 of the returning District of Columbia Volunteers at Edwards Ferry, with two days’ rations, and shall send their baggage to the canal at Seneca, giving them orders to hold the ferry while their supplies last, and then fall back on the river road, or the tow-path, to their baggage, with which they will return by canal to Washington. The force at Seneca, being composed entirely of District of Columbia Volunteers, will hold their Position until the arrival of the former, and return to Washington with them.

  I regret greatly the necessity which exists for leaving this village and Vicinity without troops, as I have said before, and hope that these troops may be replaced before any evil results. The position and crops deserve occupation, if it be in any way practicable.

  The time required to retire the volunteers carefully will give opportunity to send other troops, if it be deemed advisable.

  Very respectfully, I am, colonel, your most obedient servant,

  CHAS. P. STONE, Colonel Fourteenth Infantry, Commanding Expedition.

  Lieut. Col. E. D. TOWNSEND, Assistant Adjutant-General, Headquarters of the Army.

  {p.120}

  –––

  CAMP NEAR POOLESVILLE, July 2, 1861.

  COLONEL: The six companies of the Ninth New York advanced yesterday afternoon to Point of Rocks; First Pennsylvania Artillery (Colonel Patterson) started for Licksville, but the heavy rain which came on rendered the roads impassable, and he was obliged to halt this side the Monocacy. The battalion Twenty-fifth Pennsylvania Regiment arrived last night. The provision train with much difficulty reached here from Seneca this morning.

  Captain Magruder has started on his march to Washington with Company H, Second Cavalry. The President’s Mounted Guard is at Edwards Ferry, and will march for Washington, via Seneca, to-morrow morning, with the Third Battalion District of Columbia Volunteers. Piper’s section of artillery will await the assembling of the District of Columbia Volunteer battalions at Seneca, and then proceed to Washington, accompanied by the President’s Mounted Guard.

  The movement of the First New Hampshire Regiment from this place will necessarily depend on the progress of the trains. I hope to see Harper’s Ferry to-night.

  Very respectfully, colonel, your most obedient servant,

  CHAS. P. STONE, Colonel Fourteenth Infantry, Commanding.

  Lieut. Col. E. D. TOWNSEND, Assistant Adjutant-General.

  –––

  POINT OF ROCKS, July 3, 1861.

  I have just returned from Sandy Hook, opposite Harper’s Ferry, to which point a division of the New York Ninth and the First Pennsylvania Artillery have been advanced. A messenger came in to me there from Sharpsburg, bringing intelligence that there was an affair at Falling Waters yesterday, in which the Government troops captured five hundred prisoners and six pieces of artillery. Our loss three killed and some wounded.

  The messenger states that there is a battle going on to-day on the road between Falling Waters and Winchester. Harper’s Ferry appears to be deserted. I could see but half a dozen people in the town without my glass. Shall I have any further instructions?

  CHAS. P. STONE, Colonel, Commanding.

  Lieut. Col. E. D. TOWNSEND.

  –––

  POINT OF ROCKS, July 4, 1861.

  COLONEL: I reported night before last and yesterday by telegraph. I visited the river opposite Harper’s Ferry yesterday and to-day. There are now at that point the Pennsylvania First Regiment, part of the New York Ninth, and Colonel Cake’s command. The train of provisions and ammunition has been detained on the road, but will be up tonight.

  I have no news from General Patterson since my telegram of last night. Had I only a little artillery and cavalry a good advance could be made, co-operating with General Patterson. I hope to occupy the town of Harper’s Ferry to-night or tomorrow morning, in spite of the want of artillery.

  The people received the troops at Berlin, Knoxville, and Sandy Hook {p.121} with the greatest demonstration of joy, and relief. I think it important to send a Government operator for the telegraph here and at Harper’s Ferry.

  Very respectfully, I am, sir, your most obedient servant,

  CHAS. P. STONE, Colonel Fourteenth Infantry, Commanding Expedition.

  Lieut. Col. E. D. TOWNSEND, Assistant Adjutant-General, Headquarters of the Army.

  –––

  POINT OF ROCKS, July 5, 1861.

  COLONEL: I have come down this far to hasten the movements of the troops. The New Hampshire First, the rear regiment, has come up. The men are hardly in moving condition this afternoon. The last companies of the Ninth New York go up to the Ferry this afternoon, and will be followed by part of the New Hampshire.

  It will be necessary to leave two or more companies at this place to keep up our communications for supplies. Captain Abert is engaged now in reconnoitering the fords above Harper’s Ferry and securing boats in which part of the passage can be effected.

  Very respectfully, colonel, your most obedient servant,

  CHAS. P. STONE, Colonel Fourteenth Infantry, Commanding Expedition.

  Lieut. Col. E. D. TOWNSEND, Assistant Adjutant-General, Headquarters of the Army.

  –––

  OPPOSITE HARPER’S FERRY, July 5, 1861.

  COLONEL: Yesterday afternoon, while I was engaged in bringing up more troops from the Point of Rocks, Harper’s Ferry was suddenly occupied by a few of the enemy, who opened fire on our pickets. The latter were re-enforced by a company of the Ninth New York Regiment, and firing was kept up for about half an hour, resulting in a slight loss on both sides; on ours one private killed and three wounded. As far as now known the loss of the enemy was two killed and two severely wounded, but there are reports that his loss was greater. The enemy retired to the rear of the town.

  I have this morning received a letter from Major Porter, assistant adjutant-general, Department of Pennsylvania, of which a copy is inclosed herewith.

  The movement directed to be made by infantry alone, in a country occupied by hostile cavalry, will be somewhat hazardous.

  Very respectfully, colonel, your most obedient servant,

  CHAS. P. STONE, Colonel Fourteenth Infantry, Commanding Expedition.

  Lieut. Col. E. D. TOWNSEND, Assistant Adjutant-General, Headquarters of the Army.

  [Inclosure.]

  HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF PENNSYLVANIA, Martinsburg, Va., July 4, 1861.

  SIR: The commanding general wishes you to join this column, now temporarily halted for provisions to be brought up. Under the impression you have crossed the river near Harper’s Ferry, he directs you to {p.122} move up towards Charlestown and effect a junction in that direction. As soon as provisions arrive he will advance to Winchester, if the foe have not evacuated that place. At present, only small parties are known to be in our vicinity, hovering about to pick up stragglers and careless pickets.

  If you have information which, in your judgment, renders the movement directed above injudicious or hazardous, you are desired to communicate your information and act upon it till you hear from him again. When the force in front is scattered he designs moving east towards Leesburg. He wishes you to be cautious in all your movements, that no check to the execution of your plans may result.

  I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

  F. J. PORTER, A. A. G.

  Col. CHARLES P. STONE, Commanding Rockville Expedition, en route to Martinsburg, Va.

  I am informed the enemy, 15,000 strong, are in front, this side of Winchester, Joe Johnston commanding.

  –––

  POINT OF ROCKS, July 6, 1861.

  COLONEL: I have written by mail, but do not altogether trust the post-office here. New York Ninth, Pennsylvania Twenty-fifth, and Pennsylvania First are on their way to General Patterson. New Hampshire First will move from Sandy Hook this afternoon, when the wagon train reaches there. I expect to be in Williamsport to-night or to-morrow morning. Have left much of the baggage, &c., to march light; have to leave one company to guard at Sandy Hook and two companies here. I respectfully urge a re-enforcement to these companies before it is known generally on the other side that they are so few in numbers here.

  Very respectfully, colonel, your most obedient servant,

  CHAS. P. STONE, Colonel Fourteenth Infantry, Commanding.

  Lieut. Col. E. D. TOWNSEND, Assistant Adjutant-General.

  –––

  POINT OF ROCKS, July 6, 1861.

  COLONEL: I have come down here on the locomotive to take a look at the rear before, moving on myself. I started off this morning toward General Patterson the Pennsylvania Twenty-fifth, the New York Ninth, and Pennsylvania First Artillery, less one company, left to guard baggage. I have to leave two companies here to guard baggage and look out for the railroad, so that the communication may not be cut off with the baggage and provisions above. It was necessary to lighten the wagons much to make a quick march.

  I regard it of great importance to re-enforce those small guards, and would respectfully recommend that a regiment be sent to Sandy Hook. Two wounded and a few sick men have to be left there.

  The New Hampshire regiment’s train will overtake it this evening, and it (now opposite Harper’s Ferry) will push on to be at Williamsport to-morrow morning. I shall get there (Williamsport) to-night or early in the morning.

  Very respectfully, I am, colonel, your most obedient servant,

  CHAS. P. STONE, Colonel Fourteenth Infantry, Commanding Expedition.

  Lieutenant-Colonel TOWNSEND, Assistant Adjutant-General.

  {p.123}

  –––

  No. 3.

  Report of Lieutenant Becker, Eighth Battalion D. C. Militia, of skirmish at Great Falls, Md.

  HEADQUARTERS 8TH BATTALION D. C. VOLS. (Received July 7, 1861, from Chain Bridge.)

  Have been fighting all day; fighting when I left at 7 o’clock this p. m. One man killed on our side. We want re-enforcements. Are not strong enough to hold our position. We want a surgeon. Please answer.

  BECKER, Adjutant Eighth Battalion.

  General MANSFIELD.

  –––

  JUNE 13, 1861.– Descent of Union Troops on Romney, W. Va.

  Report of Col. Lew. Wallace, Eleventh Indiana Infantry.

  HEADQUARTERS ELEVENTH REGIMENT INDIANA, Camp McGinnis, June 14, 1861.

  DEAR SIR: Having been notified that several hundred rebel troops were quartered at Romney, Hampshire County, Virginia, drilling there, impressing Union men, and in other ways oppressing loyal citizens, I determined to disperse them, if possible. For that purpose I left Cumberland at 10 o’clock on the night of the 12th instant, with eight companies, in all about five hundred men, and by railway went to New Creek station, twenty-one miles distant.

  A little after 4 o’clock I started my men across the mountains, twenty-three miles off, intending to reach the town by 6 o’clock in the morning. The road was very fatiguing and rough, leading along high bluffs and narrow passes, which required great caution in passing; so much so, indeed, that with the utmost industry I did not get near Romney until about 8 o’clock. In a pass a mile and a half this side the town my advance guard was fired upon by a mounted picket of the enemy, who dashed ahead and alarmed the rebels. In fact, I afterwards learned that they had notice of my coming full an hour before my arrival.

  In approaching the place it was necessary for me to cross a bridge over the South Branch of the Potomac. A reconnaissance satisfied me that the passage of the bridge would be the chief obstacle in my way, although I could distinctly see the enemy drawn up on the bluff, which is the town site, supporting a battery of two guns, planted so as to sweep the road completely. I directed my advance guard to cross the bridge on the run, leap down an embankment at the farther entrance, and observe the windows of a large brick house not farther off than seventy-five yards. Their appearance was the signal for an assault. A warm fire opened from the house, which the guard returned, with no other loss than the wounding of a sergeant. The firing continued several minutes. I led a second company across the bridge, and by following up a ravine got them into a position that soon drove the enemy from the house and into a mountain to its rear.

  My attention was then turned to the battery on the hill. Instead of following the road, as the rebels expected, I pushed five companies in skirmishing order, and at double-quick time, up a hill to the right, intending to get around the left flank of the enemy, and cut off their retreat. Hardly had my companies deployed and started forward, and got within rifle range, before the rebels limbered up and put off over {p.124} the bluff in hottest haste. Between their position and that of my men was a deep, precipitous gorge, the crossing of which occupied about ten minutes. When the opposite ridge was gained we discovered the rebels indiscriminately blent, with a mass of women and children, flying as for life from the town. Having no horse, pursuit of the cannoneers was impossible. They went off under whip and spur. After that I quietly marched into the place, and took possession of the empty houses and a legion of negroes, who alone seemed unscared by our presence. After searching the town for arms, camp equipage, &c., I returned to Cumberland by the same road, reaching camp at 11 o’clock at night. My return was forced, owing to the fact that there was not a mile on the road that did not offer half a dozen positions for the ruin or rout of my regiment by a much smaller force.

  The loss of the rebels we have not been able to accurately ascertain. A citizen of Romney admitted two killed. My own surgeon dressed the wound of one man. A number of tents were taken. Quite a number of rifles were destroyed, and, among others, I have a Maj. Isaac Vandever prisoner, a gentleman who, from accounts, has been very active in exciting rebellion, organizing troops, and impressing loyal citizens. I have also an excellent assortment of surgical stores, which, with the tents, I have taken the liberty to convert.

  My regiment behaved admirably, attacking coolly and in excellent order. Where all behaved gallantly, I cannot single out officers for praise. Sufficient, to say they conducted themselves like veterans, and in such a manner as to entitle them to your confidence in any field.

  I beg to call your attention to the length of our march-eighty-seven miles in all, forty-six of which was on foot, over a continuous succession of mountains, made in twenty-four hours, without rest, and varied by a brisk engagement-made, too, without leaving a man behind, and, what is more, my men are ready to repeat it to-morrow.

  I have already received your approval of my enterprise, for which I am very much obliged. One, good result has come of it: the loyal men in that region have taken heart. Very shortly I think you will hear of another Union company from that district. Moreover, it has brought home to the insolent “chivalry” a wholesome respect for Northern prowess.

  Very truly, sir, your obedient servant,

  LEW. WALLACE, Commanding Regiment.

  Major-General PATTERSON, Chambersburg, Pa.

  –––

  JUNE 17, 1861.-Action near Vienna. Va.

  REPORTS.

  No. 1.–	Brig. Gen. Irvin McDowell, U. S. Army.
  No. 2.–	Brig. Gen. Robert C. Schenck, U. S. Army.
  No. 3.–	Col. Maxcy Gregg, First South Carolina Infantry.

  No. 1.

  Report of Brig. Gen. Irvin McDowell, U. S. Army.

  HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT NORTHEASTERN VIRGINIA, Arlington, June 18, 1861.

  I have the honor to inclose a copy of my written instructions to General Schenck, under which his movement was made yesterday afternoon. {p.125} The point to which it was intended the regiment should go by train, and establish itself for the twenty-four hours, had been occupied, for the day before, by the Sixty-Ninth New York Regiment, under Colonel Hunter, commanding the brigade. The latter regiment had been sent there, on the return of General Tyler from his reconnaissance up the road, as an advance guard and a protection to the road, which had been repaired in anticipation of the demonstration I was to make on the notification of the General-in-Chief in favor of the attack on Harper’s Ferry. It is said the attack on the Ohio regiment was made by the South Carolinians. If so, they must have been moved forward from Centreville, where they have been stationed for some time past. This would seem to indicate that the reports of an advance of troops to their posts in front of this position are well founded. I have asked if it would accord with the plans of the General-in-Chief that a movement be made in force in the direction of Vienna, near which the attack was made. I learn from a reliable source that the force at Fairfax Court-House has been increased. Had the attack not been in made, I would not suggest this advance at this time; but now that it has, I think it would not be well for us to seem even to withdraw. General Schenck applies for permission to send a flag of truce to Vienna to bury his dead and care for his wounded. I do not think this necessary for either-purpose, but think the morale of the troops would be increased if they went over the ground again with arms in their hands. The distance by turnpike from Falls Church to Vienna is about six miles.

  General Tyler, who is in advance, sends me word that he sees the country as far as Falls Church. No signs of any movement. He wants no more troops than he has, unless it is intended to hold permanently the position he occupies.

  I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

  IRVIN McDOWELL, Brigadier General, Commanding.

  Lieut. Col. E. D. TOWNSEND, Assistant Adjutant-General, Headquarters Army, Washington.

  [Inclosure.]

  HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT NORTHEASTERN VIRGINIA, Arlington, June 17, 1861.

  Brigadier-General SCHENCK, Commanding Ohio Brigade:

  SIR: The general commanding directs that you send one of the regiments of your command, on a train of cars, up the Loudoun and Hampshire Railroad to the point where it crosses the wagon-road running from Fort Corcoran, opposite Georgetown, southerly into Virginia.

  The regiment, being established at that point, will, by suitable patrols, feel the way along the road towards Falls Church and Vienna, moving, however, with caution, and making it a special duty to guard effectually the railroad bridges and to look to the track. The regiment will go supplied for a tour of duty of twenty-four hours, and will move on the arrival at your camp of a train of cars ordered for that purpose, and will relieve all the troops of Colonel Hunter’s brigade now guarding the line.

  I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

  JAMES B. FRY, Assistant Adjutant-General.

  {p.126}

  –––

  No. 2.

  Reports of Brig. Gen. Robert C. Schenck, U. S. Army.

  Left camp with 668 rank and file, 29 field and company officers, in pursuance of General McDowell’s orders, to go upon this expedition with the available force of one of my regiments, the regiment selected being the First Ohio Volunteers. Left two companies-Company I and Company K, aggregate 135 men-at the crossing of the roads. Sent Lieutenant-Colonel Parrott, with two companies, 117 men, to Falls Church, and to patrol roads in that direction. Stationed two companies-D and F, 135 men-to guard railroad and bridge between the crossing and Vienna. Proceeded slowly to Vienna with four companies-Company E, Captain Paddock; Company C, Lieutenant Woodward, afterwards joined by Captain Pease; Company G, Captain Bailey; Company H, Hazlett; total, 271 men.

  On turning the curve slowly, within one-quarter of a mile of Vienna, were fired upon by raking masked batteries of I think, three guns, with shells, round-shot, and grape, killing and wounding the men on the platform and in the cars before the train could be stopped. When the train stopped, the engineer could not, on account of damage to some part of the running machinery, draw the train out of the fire, the engine being in the rear. We left the cars, and retired to right and left of train through the woods. Finding that the enemy’s batteries were sustained by what appeared about a regiment of infantry and by cavalry, which force we have since understood to have been some fifteen hundred South Carolinians, we fell back along the railroad, throwing out skirmishers on both flanks; and this was about 7 p. m. Thus we retired slowly, bearing off our wounded, five miles, to this point, which we reached at 10 o’clock.

  Casualties.-Captain Hazlett’s company, H, 2 known to be killed, 3 wounded, 5 missing: Captain Bailey’s company, G, 3 killed, 2 wounded, 2 missing; Captain Paddock’s company, E, 1 officer slightly wounded; Captain Pease’s, 2 missing.

  The engineer, when the men left the cars, instead of retiring slowly, as I ordered, detached his engine with one passenger car from the rest of the disabled train and abandoned us, running to Alexandria, and we have heard nothing from him since. Thus we were deprived of a rallying point, and of all means of conveying the wounded, who had to be carried on litters and in blankets. We wait here, holding the roads for re-enforcements. The enemy did not pursue.

  I have ascertained that the enemy’s force at Fairfax Court-House, four miles from Vienna, is now about four thousand.

  When the batteries opened upon us, Major Hughes was at his station on the foremost platform car. Colonel McCook was with me in one of the passenger cars. Both these officers, with others of the commissioned officers and many of the men, behaved most coolly under this galling fire, which we could not return, and from batteries which we could not flank or turn from the nature of the ground, if my force had been sufficient. The approach to Vienna is through a deep, long cut in the railway. In leaving the cars, and before they could rally, many of my men lost haversacks or blankets, but brought off all their muskets, except it may be, a few that were destroyed by the enemy’s first fire or lost with the killed.

  ROBT. C. SCHENCK, Brigadier-General.

  {p.127}

  –––

  [Received at the WAR DEPARTMENT June 18, 1861.]

  I am enabled now to give you additional and exact details of the affair near Vienna last evening. A perfectly reliable Union man, residing in Vienna, [and who] was there during the attack, has arrived, bringing with him, in patriotic and Christian kindness, the six bodies of our killed who were left behind. I have sent them to Camp Lincoln by the train which has just left for burial. He reports also one wounded man remaining at Vienna, John Volmer, of Company G, for whom I have just sent an assistant surgeon and two men with the same gentleman who brought the killed in his wagon, carrying a flag of truce, to be displayed if necessary. When the wounded man arrives I will send him forward by a train to my camp, to be conveyed from there to Georgetown Hospital by ambulance.

  The casualties, as I now am able accurately to state them, are as follows:

  Dead, 8.-Captain Hazlett’s: 1st, George Morrison, of Company H, brought in to-day. 2d, David Mercer, of same company, brought off the field to this place, and died here. 3d, Daniel Sullivan, of Captain Bailey’s company, G. 4th, Joseph Smith, Company G, brought in to-day. 5th, Philip Strade, Company G. 6th, Thomas Finton, Company G. 7th, Eugene Burke, Company G. 8th, J. R. T. Barnes, Company G, shot in the passenger car that was carried away from us by the engineer and died on his way to this camp.

  Wounded and yet living, 4-1st, David Gates, Company G, dangerously. 2d, B. F. Lanman, Company G, severely, but not dangerously. 3d, Henry Pigman, Company H, dangerously. (Those three were sent to the hospital this morning.) 4th, John Volmer, Company G, supposed dangerously; yet at Vienna and sent for.

  Total killed and wounded, 12. None, I believe, are now missing.

  From the same reliable source I ascertain that the whole force attacking us was at least 2,000, as follows: South Carolina troops, 800; these had left Fairfax Court-House on Sunday and gone over to the railway; two [hundred] came down yesterday through Hunter’s Grove. They sent, anticipating our coming to Fairfax Court-House, for 2,000 additional infantry, of whom only from 600 to 1,000 arrived before the attack. The enemy had cavalry, numbering, it is believed, not less than 200, and, in addition to these, was a body of 150 armed picked negroes, who were posted nearest us in a grain field on our left flank, but not observed by us, as they lay flat in the grain and did not fire a gun. The enemy had three pieces of artillery, concealed by the curve, of the railway as we passed out of the cut, and more pieces of ordnance-six, our informant believes-arrived on the field, but not in time, for action. The three pieces thus placed were, tired very rapidly; must have been managed by skillful artillerists; but I cannot learn who was in command of the enemy. Our men picked up and brought a-way several round and grape shot, besides two or three shells, which did not explode because the Borman fuse had not been cut. This raking fire was kept up against the cars and upon us as we retired through the woods and along each side of the railway. Its deadliest effect was on Company G, on the third platform car from the front, and on Company H, on the Second platform car. Company E, on the foremost car, was not touched. The first firing raked the train diagonally with round shot; the other, before the train came to a full stop, was cross-firing with canister and shells through the hind cars. The pieces were at a distance of about 150 yards, and no muskets or rifles were brought into action.

  The rebels must have believed that our number far exceeded the little {p.128} force of 271, or else I cannot understand why they made no pursuit nor came out, as we could discover, from the rise of ground behind which they were posted with their overwhelming numbers.

  The enemy’s whole force left Vienna last night between 10 and 12 o’clock; supposed to have gone to Fairfax Court-House. It is understood that there is a considerable force assembled at that point, but cannot ascertain how many. None of the bridges have been burned, nor the railway interfered with, between this point and Vienna since we came down the road.

  I send this, as we remain at this point without other facilities for correspondence or writing except to communicate by the Army telegraph, and 11 trust you will accept it in place of a formal written report.

  I am, just now ordered by Brigadier-General Tyler to move forward with my brigade in the direction of Falls Church, for which I am now getting in readiness. I have already spoken of the skill and coolness with which Colonel McCook and Major Hughes, with other officers, helped to conduct our retirement to this place. It was a very slow and painful march, carrying in the arms of the men and in blankets and on rude litters made by the way their wounded comrades. But I must not omit to mention others.

  Adjt. J. S. Parrott, my aide, Lieutenant Raynor, and Surgeon McMallen gave effective assistance. The company officers who were under fire generally behaved with coolness and gallantry. Captain Pease, of Company C, especially distinguished himself in protecting our rear and flanks, and I warmly recommend him to favorable consideration. The non-commissioned officers and men generally also behaved extremely well on the march, as we retired along the road. Captain Crowe, with Company D, which was among those I had left as patrol guards on the railway as we passed up, came up handsomely at double-quick step to our support, and Lieut. Col. E. A. Parrott., with his detachment of two companies, which had been thrown out to Falls Church and on the roads in that neighborhood, hearing of the attack on our advance, hastened by a crossroad to the line of the railroad to join and give us any support required.

  I have, in my former dispatch, mentioned the disregard of my instructions and cowardly desertion of us by the engineer of the train. His name, I understand, is Gregg. One of the brakemen, Dormin, joined us, and carried a musket and gave good help. The enemy, I learn, burned that part of the train which was abandoned by the engineer.

  ROBT. C. SCHENCK, Brigadier-General.

  –––

  No. 3.

  Report of Col. Maxcy Gregg, First South Carolina Infantry.

  CAMP NEAR FAIRFAX COURT-HOUSE, June 18, 1861-1.30 a. m.

  COLONEL: In pursuance of orders received at 1 o’clock a. m. on the 16th of June, I proceeded in the forenoon of that day to make a reconnaissance across the country towards the Potomac. Marching from this place with my regiment (about five hundred and seventy-five strong), after leaving a large camp guard and Captain Ball’s troop of horse, numbering about seventy, including a detachment from Captain Wickham’s troop, I met at the Frying-pan Church Captain Terry’s troop of horse, {p.129} about seventy strong (including a detachment of Captain Langhornes Company), and two guns of Captain Kemper’s battery, commanded by him in person, and with thirty-four men. With this force I went on to Dranesville, learning on the way that some four hundred of the enemy came up the Alexandria and Leesburg turnpike the same day, about 1 O’clock p. m., to within a mile or two of Hunter’s Mill, and then returned.

  Early in the morning of the 17th I rode with a troop of horse to the heights on this side of the Potomac, opposite to Seneca Creek, and went in person to the bank of the river to reconnoiter. I could see but few troops of the enemy, and no boats prepared for crossing the river. We marched down afterwards, under the guidance of Capt. John Powell, a high-spirited and highly intelligent and most zealous friend of our cause, to Hunter’s Mill, where, if the enemy had been engaged in repairing the railroad bridge, a plan of attack devised by Captain Powell would have offered the best chances of success. We found, however, no sign of the enemy, and only some railroad cars still smoking, which had been destroyed by our friends in the neighborhood.

  We then marched to Vienna, and drew up our forces in readiness to receive, the enemy if they should repeat the visit made for the last two days. Nothing being seen of them, however, and the water-tank having been demolished to increase the obstacle already caused by the removal of the lead-pipe for conveying water, I put the command in march for Fairfax Court-House.

  Toward 6 o’clock p. m., just as we were moving off, a distant railroad whistle was heard. I marched the troops back, placing the two 6-pounder guns on the hill commanding the bend of the railroad, immediately supported by Company B, First South Carolina Volunteers, Lieutenant McIntosh. The rest of the regiment, under Lieutenant-Colonel Hamilton, was formed on the crest of the hill to the right of the guns. The cavalry were drawn up still farther to the right.

  The train of cars came round the curve of the railroad into sight at the distance perhaps of four hundred yards. Captain Kemper and Lieutenant Stuart opened a rapid and well-aimed fire with the two guns, which would have been very destructive if the troops had not made a most rapid movement from the cars into the woods. Supposing that they might form and advance, I sent Companies A, Captain Miller, and E, Captain Gadberry, to deploy as skirmishers against them. Afterwards, finding that they were flying, I sent Captain Terry with his troop, guided by Mr. G. W. Hunter, a zealous friend of the cause, in pursuit. From the lateness of the hour, however, the nature of the ground, and the start which the enemy had, they could not be overtaken. Six of the enemy were found dead and one desperately wounded. Blood was also found in the bushes through which they had fled, but the darkness prevented any serious search. One passenger car and five platform cars were taken and burned. It seems from information which we gathered that five or six more cars belonging to the same train, and perhaps a number of cars in a second train, escaped by a precipitate retreat.

  The wounded prisoner represented the number of the enemy’s force as eight hundred and fifty men, and said that it was the Fifth [First] Regiment of Ohio Volunteers, commanded by Colonel McCook. Various arms, accouterments, and tools were taken, and one officer’s sword without a scabbard.

  My orders requiring me to avoid any unnecessary engagement, and not to remain absent from my camp more than one night, I marched back to this place, where I arrived about 1 o’clock this morning. I {p.130} have every reason to be satisfied with the conduct of all our troops. Captain Kemper’s command showed great ardor, combined with discipline. Captain Kemper’s and Lieutenant Stuart’s skill in the management of guns left nothing to desire. Lieutenant-Colonel Hamilton led the First Regiment with his usual gallantry of bearing, duly seconded by Major Smith, Lieutenant Ready (acting adjutant), and Captain McGowan, regimental quartermaster. Dr. Powell, surgeon, and Dr. Bull, assistant surgeon, had little to do, as the fire of musketry with which the enemy in scrambling out of the cars replied to our cannonade was straggling and ineffective. Major Kennedy, commissary, and Captain Tyler, volunteer on my staff, were prompt to carry orders and to give valuable counsel. The companies of Captains Miller and Gadberry, though greatly fatigued with two days’ rough march in hot sun and dust, appeared revived at once when thrown forward as skirmishers against the enemy. The same spirit was shown by all the other companies of the regiment. Lieutenant Bragg, of Company M, proved himself ready and skillful in deranging the railroad track. Captains Terry and, Ball and the cavalry which they led commanded my entire confidence by their bearing, and only needed opportunity for more effective action. We arrived here about 1 o’clock this morning.

  I have the honor to be, colonel, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

  MAXCY GREGG, Colonel First Regiment S. C. Vols., Comdg. at Fairfax Court-House.

  Col. W. C. MORAGNE, Assistant Adjutant-General, Centreville.

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  JUNE 19, 1861.-Skirmish at New Creek, W. Va.

  REPORTS, ETC.

  No. 1.–	Brig. Gen. J. E. Johnston’s letter transmitting reports.
  No. 2.–	Col. A. P. Hill, Thirteenth Virginia Infantry.
  No. 3.–	Col. John C. Vaughn, Third Tennessee Infantry.

  No. 1.

  Brig. Gen. T. E. Johnston’s letter transmitting reports.

  HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE SHENANDOAH, Winchester, Va., June 20, 1861.

  GENERAL: I respectfully inclose herewith copies of reports by Cols. A. P. Hill and Vaughn. The latter is interesting from the difference it exhibits between the spirit of our troops and those of the United States.

  Most respectfully, your obedient servant,

  J. E. JOHNSTON, Brigadier-General, C. S. Army.

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  No. 2.

  Report of Col. 4. P. Rill, Thirteenth Virginia Infantry.

  BRIGADE HEADQUARTERS, Camp David, Va., June 19, 1861.

  COLONEL: I have the honor to report that on yesterday I directed Col. J. C. Vaughn, of the Third Tennessee Regiment, to take two companies {p.131} from his own and two companies from the Thirteenth Virginia Regiment, and at 8 p. m. to proceed to New Creek Depot, eighteen miles west of Cumberland, on the line of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, and disperse the force there collected, bring away the two pieces of artillery, and burn the railroad bridges. The directions, I am happy to assure you, were carried out to the letter, and the march of thirty-six miles accomplished between 8 p. m. and 12 the next day. Some 250 of the Federal troops, after a slight stand, retired in disorder, with a loss of a few men. The bridge was then burned and Colonel Vaughn retired, bringing with him the two pieces of artillery and a stand of colors.

  To Colonel Vaughn and his officers and men I am much indebted for the handsome manner in which my orders were carried out.

  Inclosed you will find the report of Colonel Vaughn.

  I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

  A. P. HILL, Colonel Thirteenth Regiment, Commanding Brigade.

  Col. E. K. SMITH, Assistant Adjutant-General.

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  No. 3.

  Report of Col. John C. Vaughn, Third Tennessee Infantry.

  HEADQUARTERS THIRD TENNESSEE REGIMENT, COLONEL HILL’S BRIGADE, C. S. ARMY, June 19, 1861.

  SIR: I have the honor to report that on yesterday, at 8 p. m., in pursuance to your orders, I took two companies of the Thirteenth Virginia Volunteers, C. S. Army, commanded by Captains Crittenden and White; also two companies of Third Tennessee Volunteers, C. S. Army, commanded by Captains Lillard and Mathes, and advanced eighteen miles west to the line of the enemy, upon the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, and found them posted in some strength, with two pieces of artillery, on the north bank of the Potomac, at the twenty-first bridge on said road. The enemy had no pickets posted.

  At 5 a. m., after reconnoitering, I gave the order to charge the enemy, which command, I beg leave to say, was gallantly executed and in good order, but with great enthusiasm. As we appeared in sight, at a distance of 400 yards, the enemy broke and fled in all directions, firing as they ran only a few random shots, one of which, however, I regret to say, entered the arm of Private Smith, of Captain Lillard’s company, which was in advance, wounding him slightly. The enemy did not wait to fire their artillery, which we captured, consisting of two loaded guns, both of which, however, were spiked by the enemy before they fled.

  From the best information, their number was between 200 and 300. I do not know the loss of the enemy, but several were seen to fall. We did not take any prisoners, owing to the start the enemy got and to our having left in the rear all the horses belonging to my command.

  I then ordered the twenty-first railroad bridge to be fired, which was done, and in 9 few minutes only the piers remained. In further pursuance of your order I then retired, bringing with me the two guns.

  The enemy’s flag, which I forgot to mention, was captured, and other articles of little value.

  {p.132}

  I cannot close this report without bringing to your notice the gallant conduct of both officers and men, who were each at their post and burning to engage the enemy, and when the order to charge was given, rushed forward with enthusiasm and waded the river to their waists.

  I arrived here this evening, the spirits of my command in nowise flagged.

  Respectfully, your obedient servant,

  JOHN C. VAUGHN, Colonel, Commanding Third Tennessee Volunteers, C. S. Army.

  Col. A. P. HILL, Commanding Brigade, C. S. Army, Romney, Va.

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  JUNE 24, 1861.– Affair on the Rappahannock River, Va.

  Statement of Mr. Joseph Christian, forwarded by Brig. Gen. John B. Magruder, C. S. Army.

  HEADQUARTERS, Yorktown, Va., June 27, 1861.

  SIR: I have the honor to send a report, made to Colonel Crump, of an abortive attempt to land soldiers from an armed steamer in the Rappahannock River, where the enemy was driven back by our citizens. This morning at sunrise I sent a force of fifteen hundred men to support the cavalry and artillery under Major Hood, operating near and on the Poquosin, to meet any party sent from the enemy’s works and cut it off. I shall join this force to-day. The Rev. Mr. Adams will hand this to the colonel commanding the Virginia forces. I have been extremely indebted to this good and patriotic minister of the Gospel for much assistance. He has lost everything in the cause, and I would like to see him appointed as chaplain to one of the regiments in this department.

  I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

  J. B. MAGRUDER.

  Col. GEORGE DEAS, Assistant Adjutant-General, C. S. Army.

  [Inclosure.]

  URBANNA, VA., June 26, 1861.

  MY DEAR SIR: I have just received a note, by special messenger, from C. W. Montague, esq., requesting me to furnish to you an accurate account of all the doings of the enemy on the Rappahannock, on Monday evening last. I have taken much pains to gather, from persons who have visited the scene of action and conversed with those who were engaged in it, the following particulars, which you may regard as reliable:

  About 4 p. m. on Monday, the 24th, a war steamer (the Star of New York, of one thousand tons burden [the Monticello]), came to opposite the house of Mr. James W. Gresham, of Lancaster, situated immediately on the river, about twelve miles below Urbanna, on the Lancaster side. She dispatched to the shore three barges, one a very large one, with a swivel in the bow, and two smaller ones, all filled with armed troops. The large barge grounded on the flats. The other two came ashore with a number of armed men, variously estimated at between thirty and sixty. After reaching the shore some six or eight proceeded up to Mr. Gresham’s house. One of the party accosted Mr. Gresham, and introduced another {p.133} of the party. The first named, it seems, was the pilot, who was a captain of a wood vessel, and acquainted with Gresham. He inquired if he had any chickens or lambs for sale. Mr. Gresham replied that “He had a plenty, but not a d-d one for that party.” He then took the pilot aside and told him they had better be getting away, as there were troops in the neighborhood, and that he did not wish his premises to be the scene of a battle, as his mother was very ill in the house. While they were talking a small company of Lancaster troops, about thirty in number, were seen coming down the road in double-quick time. The alarm was given, and the enemy fled precipitately to their boats, our men firing into them as they shoved off. In their flight they left one of the barges, the men, in great confusion, crowded into the other, and others wading out to the large barge on the flats. In their flight they left, besides the barge, two breech-loading rifles, a revolver, and several swords, with coats, hats, and shoes, thrown away in their hasty retreat. It is confidently asserted that four of the enemy were killed in the boat. Nobody hurt on our side. As soon as our men fired on the enemy the ship opened her guns on Mr. Gresham’s house. She fired fifty-three shot and shell, seventeen of which took effect, damaging the house to the amount of at least $1,000. As in all of our engagements, the preservation of life was most remarkable. One of the balls struck the bed on which Mrs. Gresham was lying ill. She was then removed to an out-house, and a bomb-shell came in and exploded in the room without injury to any one.

  I have given you, in a very hurried manner, these particulars, which I gather from most reliable sources of information. You will unite, with us in contemptuous indignation at the cowardly conduct of these dastardly scoundrels, who, refusing to meet half their number face to face, at a safe distance, in their ship, destroy the property of our citizens.

  I hope to be able to visit your camp soon and renew the acquaintance I had the pleasure of having with you last winter.

  Hastily and truly, yours,

  JOS. CHRISTIAN.

  Col. CHARLES A. CRUMP, Gloucester Point, Va.

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  JUNE 25, 1861.–Descent on Mathias Point, Va.

  Report of Brig. Gen. T. H. Holmes, C. S. Army.

  HEADQUARTERS, BROOKE’S STATION, VA., June 27, 1861.

  SIR: I have to report that a small party of the enemy lauded at Mathias Point on the 25th and burned the house of Dr. Howe. The landing was effected under the guns of the enemy, and doubtless was with a view to discover whether we were erecting a battery there. If it be the wish of the commanding general that a battery should be erected to prevent the free navigation of the river, I respectfully recommend that the neighborhood of Evansport should be preferred to Mathias Point. There is very little difference in the distance of the channel from the shore, and large guns will command either. From Evansport there is a good road to Fredericksburg, which would turn this position, and a good road to Manassas, turning that position; whereas from Mathias Point it would require a long land travel to any vulnerable point. If you can send me two 32-pounders (rifled), or two 8-inch columbiads, I believe I {p.134} could stop the navigation of the river, if the general commanding thinks it a matter of sufficient importance to justify the expense. I could use the rifled 6-pounders that I now have in Walker’s battery to annoy the enemy’s commerce; but we have not the ammunition to spare.

  I am, colonel, very respectfully,

  T. H. HOLMES, Brigadier-General, Commanding.

  Col. GEORGE DEAS, Assistant Adjutant-General, C. S. Army.

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  JUNE 26, 1861.–Skirmishes at Frankfort and on Patterson’s Creek, W. Va.

  Reports of Col. Lew. Wallace, Eleventh Indiana Infantry.

  GRAFTON, VA., June 28, 1861.

  The following dispatch from Colonel Wallace is so gratifying, that I send it to you entire:

  CUMBERLAND, June 27.

  General MCCLELLAN: I have been accustomed to sending my mounted pickets (thirteen men in all) to different posts along the several approaches to Cumberland. Finding it next to impossible to get reliable information of the enemy yesterday, I united the thirteen, and directed them, if possible, to get to Frankfort, a town midway between this place and Romney, and see if there were rebel troops there. They went within a quarter of a mile of the place, and found it full of cavalry. Returning, they overtook forty-one horsemen, and at, once charged them, routing and driving them back more than a mile, killing eight of them, and securing seventeen horses. Corporal Hayes, in command of my men, was desperately wounded with saber cuts and bullets. Taking him back, they halted about an hour, and were then attacked by the enemy, who were re-enforced to about seventy-five men. The attack was so sudden that they abandoned the horses, and crossed to a small island at the month of Patterson’s Creek. The charge of the rebels was bold and confident, yet twenty-three fell under the fire of my picket close about and on the island. My fellows were finally driven off, scattering, each man for himself, and they are all in camp now; one, Corporal Hayes, of Company A, wounded, but recovering; one, John C. Hollinbeck, of Company B, dead. The last was taken prisoner and brutally murdered.

  Three companies went to the ground this morning, and recovered everything belonging to my picket except a few of the horses. The enemy were engaged all night long in boxing up their dead. Two of their officers were killed. They laid out twenty-three on the porch of a neighboring farm house. I will bury my poor fellow to-morrow.

  I have positive information, gained to-day, that there are four regiments of rebels in and about Romney, under a Colonel McDonald. What their particular object is I cannot learn. The two Pennsylvania regiments are in encampment at the State line, about nine miles from here, waiting further orders. They have not yet reported to me. They hesitate about invading Maryland.

  The report of the skirmish sounds like fiction, but it is not exaggerated. The fight was really one of the most desperate on record, and abounds with instances of wonderful daring and coolness.

  LEW. WALLACE, Colonel Eleventh Regiment Indiana Volunteers.

  GEO. B. MCCLELLAN, Major-General.

  Lieut. Gen. WINFIELD SCOTT.

  –––

  HEADQUARTERS ELEVENTH REGIMENT, INDIANA, Camp McGinnis, June 27, 1861.

  SIR: Yesterday a mounted picket of mine of thirteen men, on the road to Frankfort, attacked a company of rebels, forty-one in number, {p.135} chased them a couple of miles, killed eight of them, and captured seventeen horses. Returning from the skirmish, they were in turn attacked by the enemy, re-enforced to seventy-five men, and driven to a kind of island in the neighborhood of the mouth of Patterson’s Creek, where they made a stand and fought till dusk, killing and wounding a large number, when they escaped with the loss of one man, John Hollinbeck, Company B, killed, and Corporal David Hayes, Company A, wounded. The bodies of twenty-three rebels were laid out on the porch of a farm house near the scene of the last engagement. Eight dead bodies (rebels) were left on the railroad track, where the first encounter took place. Hayes is doing well. His hurts are a saber cut on the head and two bullet wounds on the body.

  I would simply say of this skirmish, that it was one of the boldest, most desperate, and fortunate on record, abounding with instances on the part of my scouts of rarest coolness, skill, and courage. What makes it most singular is that, for a considerable portion of the time, it was a hand-to-hand fight, carried on with pistol, saber, bayonet, and fist. One man, Louis Farley, killed six rebels; another (Grover) killed three; David Hayes, the wounded corporal, killed two, and received all his wounds While in hot pursuit at the very tails of the rebels’ horses. Among the dead of the enemy are a Captain Blue and two lieutenants.

  Hollinbeck, the only man of mine killed, was severely wounded, then taken prisoner, and then brutally murdered by his captors.

  All my men bear marks of the contest; some in bruises and cuts, others in bullet-holes through their clothes and equipments.

  Very respectfully,

  LEW. WALLACE, Colonel Eleventh Regiment Indiana.

  Maj. Gen. PATTERSON.

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  JUNE 27, 1861.-Attack on Mathias Point, Va.

  REPORTS.

  No. 1.–	Brig. Gen. T. H. Holmes, C. S. Army.
  No. 2.–	Col. Daniel Ruggles, C. S. Army.
  No. 3.–	Maj. Ro. M. Mayo, C. S. Army.

  No. 1.

  Report of Brig. Gen. T. H. Holmes, C. S. Army.

  HEADQUARTERS, BROOKE’S STATION, VA., June 28, 1861.

  GENERAL: Herewith you will please find the report of Colonel Ruggles of an affair at Mathias Point. There are now there fifteen companies of volunteers, and I have ordered a section of Walker’s battery to re-enforce them. This force I think sufficient to prevent a landing for the purpose of holding the point. If it be your design to erect a battery there to command the river, I think instructions to that effect should be given immediately, and another regiment ordered to report to me for its defense after construction.

  I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

  T. H. HOLMES, Brigadier-General, Commanding.

  General R. E. LEE, Commanding.

  {p.136}

  –––

  No. 2.

  Report of Col. Daniel Ruggles, C. S. Army.

  HEADQUARTERS, CAMP RUGGLES, VA., June 27, 1861-9.30 p. m.

  SIR: I have the honor to state, for the information of the general commanding, that, in conformity to his orders, received last evening at 7 o’clock, I ordered Major Mayo, with his battalion, composed as indicated, to proceed without delay to Brooke’s Station, for which ample preparation has been made, to commence the movement tomorrow morning,

  I have also the honor to state that, at an early hour this morning, a steamer, supposed to be the Freeborn, and two tugs, having in tow a large open boat or raft, with several small boats, suitable for landing men, took position nearly in front of this camp, and was represented to have effected that purpose. The employment of the principal part of the command for some hours was thus rendered necessary to ascertain the fact, with a view of repelling the enemy, which fortunately proved groundless. At about 1 p. m. our pickets reported that the enemy, whose steamers had returned to the immediate vicinity of Mathias Point, had already effected a landing of a strong detachment of men at the point, from which the pickets were mainly driven by the raking fire of shell and shot from the enemy’s steamers. The condition of things rendered vigorous measures on our part indispensable, and which has resulted, I am happy to inform you, in complete success. The enemy, who had landed, as before reported, with a detachment of at least fifty men, was driven, after a short conflict, on board of his steamers, in a state of undoubted discomfiture, and immediately withdrew from our shores. Night having closed in about the time this success was obtained, full particulars as to any loss of the enemy have not yet been obtained. I shall embrace an early moment to forward detailed reports of subordinate commanders.

  I deem it of the utmost importance for your information that we discovered, immediately after the enemy was driven off, the foundation of a regular sand-bag battery, in the erection of which considerable progress had been made during the brief period the enemy had occupied the position, which would have completely commanded Mathias Point, where it has been in contemplation that a permanent battery may be established, commanding the Potomac River channel. In addition to the sand bags, we captured a considerable number of axes and spades, a very large, coil of heavy rope, (evidently to draw heavy guns on shore), left by the enemy in his precipitate flight. I have been thus particular in stating the arduous service in which this entire command has been engaged to-day, and from which we have this moment returned, at 9.30 p. m., to apprise you as to how completely paralyzed we are for the want of a battery of heavy guns to command the channel and one field battery of effective rifled guns to enable us to drive the enemy’s steamers from almost every portion of the extended range of coast constantly threatened by them. During the entire period of our operations this afternoon one or more of the enemy’s steamers has thrown shot and shell in rapid succession, sweeping almost the whole space in which the successive positions of our troops were taken, and at times greatly endangering them. Under the circumstances, I am constrained to request that you will send me Captain Walker’s light battery of rifled guns, or, in the event that it cannot be spared, Captain Braxton’s field battery, for a brief period of service, which I consider of vital importance to the {p.137} interests of the State. I am also constrained to delay the movement of Major Mayo’s command, owing to the very critical condition of affairs in this district, rendering it necessary to employ strong pickets to-night, and to commence the erection of breastworks at Mathias Point and near Grimes’ house without a moment’s delay, and for which purpose detachments are now moving to the ground, until I may be enabled to receive further orders of the general in the case. I have reason to apprehend that the enemy may return, strongly re-enforced, before morning.

  I have the gratification of being able to bear testimony as to the excellent tone which has been exhibited by this command to-day and the zeal with which officers and men have participated in the stirring scenes through which we have passed.

  In conclusion, I feel constrained to express the opinion, in which all the field officers concur, that without artillery this command cannot hold this important position, and prevent the enemy from effecting a substantial lodgment, and strike an irretrievable blow against the interest and material defenses of the State.

  I have to request that this communication may be forwarded to the War Department of the Confederate Government as my report of the events of the day.

  I am happy to state that no casualties have occurred to our forces. Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

  DANIEL RUGGLES, Colonel, Provisional Army.

  Lieut. H. H. WALKER, Acting Assistant Adjutant-General, Hdqrs. Dept. of Fredericksburg, Brooke’s Station, Va..

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  No. 3.

  Report of Maj. Ro. H. Mayo, C. S. Forces.

  MATHIAS POINT, VA., June 28, 1861.

  SIR: I have the honor of communicating to you the action of my command yesterday. About 3 o’clock I received a communication from Colonel Brockenbrough that the enemy were landing at the Point, and that he wished my cooperation. The distance from my camp to the Point is about three miles. I immediately put my command, consisting of one cavalry and three infantry companies, in motion. On arriving near the Point I found Colonel Claybrook with several companies in re-serve. Being confident that I was better acquainted with the topography of this Point than almost any officer in this district, I determined, without waiting farther orders, to take my command through the woods in an entirely different direction from that followed by Colonel Brockenbrough and yourself. Having heard from Colonel Brockenbrough’s Pickets that they thought the enemy were erecting a battery in the Pines on the end of the Point, I took ten men from Captain Gouldin’s company, and, halting the rest of my forces, went into the bushes with them to ascertain the correctness of the report. Having progressed some distance into the pines, and on the immediate brink of the river, where we could see a steamer and a sail vessel about three or four hundred yards from the shore, I found that my skirmishing party was too small to examine properly the ravines and bushes, and, returning to my command, deployed Captain Gouldin’s company and Lee’s Legion (under {p.138} command of Lieutenant Beale, Captain Garnett being sick and absent) dismounted as skirmishers, leaving the rest of my command in reserve. We swept entirely through the bushes on the Point, and did not get in view of the enemy until we reached a marsh that separated us from them, and was entirely commanded by the steamer and the vessel. On arriving in this position we, discovered the enemy getting into their boats about two hundred and fifty or three hundred yards distant, and we immediately commenced a fire both upon the boats and the steamer. The boats returned our fire two or three times, and then all of their men, except two or three who had fallen overboard, lay down in their boats, and it was some time before they could get their oarsmen to pull the boats from the shore.

  We feel confident, from the number of men who never rose from the bottom of the boats and the blood upon the shore, that there were eight or ten killed and several more wounded.

  After we had fired five or six rounds the steamer opened fire upon us with shot and shell, but by making my men lie down nobody was hurt. After firing several times the steamer went high up the river in order to meet their boats, which could not come to them, as they would have to approach nearer to our skirmishers. Having accomplished my purpose I would not allow my men to cross the marsh, as it would have exposed them to a raking fire from the steamer, but returned in the same direction we had come.

  I have never realized until yesterday how absolutely necessary artillery is at this point. With a single smooth-bored 12-pounder I could have sunk the steamer and vessel without exposing my men more than they were. I am happy to say that my men acted very gallantly throughout the action.

  Very respectfully submitted.

  RO. M. MAYO, Major, Commanding.

  Col. D. RUGGLES.

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  JULY 1, 1861.-Arrest of the Police Commissioners of Baltimore, Md.

  REPORTS, ETC.

  No. 1.–	Order from General Scott for the arrest of the Commissioners.
  No. 2.–	Reports of Maj. Gen. Nathaniel P. Banks, U. S. Army.
  No. 3.–	Instructions to Col. John R. Kenly, First Maryland Infantry.
  No. 4.–	Report of the Board of Police Commissioners.
  No. 5.–	Memorial of the Board of Police Commissioners.
  No. 6.–	Memorial of the Mayor and City Council of Baltimore.
  No. 7.–	Resolution of the House of Representatives and reply of the President.

  No. 1.

  Order from General Scott for the arrest of the Commissioners.

  HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, Washington, June 24, 1861.

  SIR: Mr. Snethen, of Baltimore, a gentleman of standing, will deliver to you this communication. He has just given to the Secretary of War and myself many important facts touching the subject of [the] Union in that city. It is confirmed by him that, among the citizens, the secessionists, {p.139} if not the most numerous, are by far more active and effective than the supporters of the Federal Government.

  It is the opinion of the Secretary of War, and I need not add my own, that the blow should be early struck, to carry consternation into the ranks of our numerous enemies about you. Accordingly, it seems desirable that you should take measures quietly to seize at once and securely hold the four members of the Baltimore police board, viz: Charles Howard, Wm. H. Gatchell, J. W. Davis, and C. D. Hinks, esqrs., together with the chief of the police, G. P. Kane. It is further suggested that you appoint a provost-marshal to superintend and cause to be executed the police law provided by the legislature of Maryland for Baltimore.

  Your discretion and firmness are equally relied upon for the due execution of the foregoing views.

  I remain, sir, with great respect, yours, truly,

  WINFIELD SCOTT.

  Maj. Gen. N. P. BANKS, U. S. A.

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  No. 2.

  Reports of General N. P. Banks, commanding Department of Annapolis.

  BALTIMORE, July 1, 1861.

  The board of police was arrested this morning at 4 o’clock. Troops have been stationed at the principal squares of the city. All is perfectly quiet. We greatly need cavalry for patrol duty.

  N. P. BANKS.

  Lieutenant-General SCOTT.

  –––

  HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF ANNAPOLIS, Fort McHenry, July 1, 1861.

  GENERAL: In pursuance of orders of the 24th ultimo, received from your department, I arrested, and now detain in custody of the United States, Mr. George P. Kane, chief of police of the city of Baltimore. Mr. Kane was arrested on the morning of the 27th ultimo. The strong position he held as the head of a large body of armed men, posted in different parts of the city, who might be summoned together without loss of time, and the necessity of succeeding in the arrest, if attempted, made it impracticable, in my judgment, in view of all facts, to undertake at the same time the execution of other parts of this order.

  The arrest of the chief of police, and the suspension of the powers of the board of police, were announced to the people of Baltimore in a proclamation, dated the 27th June, a copy of which is herewith inclosed [A]. Upon the arrest of the chief of police, Col. John R. Kenly, of the First Maryland Regiment, was appointed provost-marshal within and for the city of Baltimore, who entered at once upon his duties. Subsequent to a recognition and protest against the suspension of their functions by the board of police, they declared, in resolutions formally adopted and published, that the police law itself had been suspended, and the officers and men discharged from duty for the present, holding them at the same time to be subject to their orders, both now and hereafter. Colonel Kenly was obliged immediately to organize a force {p.140} of four hundred men to serve as police officers, in order that the city should not be entirely divested of all police protection, which, with the aid of many loyal citizens, was effected, and the men sworn to the just performance of their duty, in the course of a few hours.

  The city has remained in perfect order and quiet since the organization of the new police. The headquarters of the police, when vacated by the officers appointed by the board, resembled a concealed arsenal. Large quantities of arms and ammunition were found secreted in such places and with such skill as to forbid the thought of their being held for just or lawful purposes. An inventory of the arms and ammunition will be forwarded. Colonel Kenly has performed his duties as provost-marshal in the most prompt, faithful, and discreet manner.

  This morning at 4 o’clock the members of the board of police were arrested by my order, and, together with the chief of police, are now securely held in custody by Major Morris, Commanding officer at Fort McHenry, in behalf of the Government of the United States. The persons arrested are Messrs. Charles Howard, president of the board; William H. Gatchell, Charles D. Hinks, and John W. Davis, being all its members, except the mayor of the city, who is connected ex officio with this department.

  In view of possible occurrences, and the better to meet contingent action of disloyal persons, rumors of which have reached me from quarters entitled to respect, I have placed a large part of the force under my command within the city, and in possession of the principal public squares. No building of importance will be occupied, and no obstruction to the business of the city will occur, unless it be upon the strongest public necessity. The troops will be withdrawn from the city as soon as the question of the conflicting forces of police can be arranged. This I believe will be done at once. The arrests of this morning and the reasons for the occupation of the city have been announced by proclamation, a copy of which is herewith inclosed [B].

  I have the gratification to inform you that all the arrests have been made without disturbance, and that the city is now and has been since the arrest of the chief of police more quiet and orderly than for any time for many months previous.

  I have the honor to be, with great respect, your obedient servant,

  NATH. P. BANKS, Major-General, Commanding.

  Lieutenant-General SCOTT, Commander-in-Chief of the Army.

  [Inclosure A.]

  PROCLAMATION.

  HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF ANNAPOLIS, June 27, 1861.

  To the People of the City of Baltimore:

  By virtue of authority vested in me, and in obedience to orders, as Commanding general of the Military Department of Annapolis, I have arrested and do now detain in custody Mr. George P. Kane, chief of police of the city of Baltimore. I deem it proper at this the moment of arrest to make formal and public declaration of the motive by which I have been governed in this proceeding. It is not my purpose, neither is it in consonance with my instructions, to interfere ill any manner whatever with the legitimate government of the people of Baltimore or {p.141} Maryland. I desire to support the public authorities in all appropriate duties, in preserving peace, protecting property and the rights of persons in obeying and upholding every municipal regulation and public statute consistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States and of Maryland. But unlawful combinations of men, organized for resistance to such laws, that provide hidden deposits of arms and ammunition, encourage contraband traffic with men at war with the Government, and, while enjoying its protection and privileges, stealthily wait opportunity to combine their means and forces with those in rebellion against its authority, are not among the recognized or legal rights of any class of men, and can-not be permitted under any form of government whatever. Such combinations are well known to exist in this department. The mass of citizens of Baltimore and of Maryland, loyal to the Constitution and the Union, are neither parties to nor responsible for them. The chief of police, however, is not only believed to be cognizant of these facts, but, in contravention of his duty and in violation of law, he is by direction and indirection both witness and protector to the transactions and the parties engaged therein. Under such circumstances the Government cannot regard him otherwise than as the head of an armed force hostile to its authority and acting in concert with its avowed enemies. For this reason, superseding his official authority and that of commissioner of police, I have arrested and do now detain him in custody of the United States; and in further pursuance of my instructions I have appointed for the time being Colonel Kenly, of the First Regiment of Maryland Volunteers, provost-marshal in and for the city of Baltimore, to superintend and cause to be executed the police laws provided by the legislature of Maryland, with the aid and assistance of the subordinate officers of the police department, and he will be respected accordingly.

  Whenever a loyal citizen shall be otherwise named for the performance of this duty, who will execute these laws impartially and in good faith to the Government of the United States, the military force of this department will render to him that instant and willing obedience which is due from every good citizen to his government.

  NATH. P. BANKS, Major-General, Commanding Department of Annapolis.

  [Inclosure B.]

  PROCLAMATION.

  HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF ANNAPOLIS, Fort McHenry, July 1, 1861. To the People of the City of Baltimore :

  In pursuance of orders issued from the headquarters of the Army at Washington, for the preservation of the public peace in this department, I have arrested and do now detain in custody of the United States the members of the late board of police, Messrs. Charles Howard, William H. Gatchell, Charles D. Hinks, and John W. Davis, the incidents of the late week furnishing full justification for this order. The police headquarters, under charge of the board, when abandoned by their officers, resembled in some respects a concealed arsenal. After public recognition and protest against the “suspension of their functions,” they continue in daily secret session. Upon a forced and unwarrantable construction of my proclamation of the 27th ultimo, they declared the police law itself suspended, and the officers and men off duty for the present, intending to leave the city without any police protection whatever. They {p.142} refused to recognize the force necessarily appointed for its protection, and hold subject to their orders now and hereafter the old police, a large body of armed men, for some purpose unknown to the Government, and inconsistent with its security. To anticipate their intentions and orders, I have temporarily placed a portion of my command within the city. I disclaim for the Government I represent all desire, intention, and purpose to interfere, in any of the ordinary municipal affairs of Baltimore. Whenever a loyal citizen can be nominated to the office of marshal who will execute the police laws impartially and in good faith to the United States, the military force will be withdrawn at once from the central parts of the municipality. No soldier will be permitted in the city except under regulations satisfactory to the marshal, or by order of the general in command, and whenever the municipal laws and regulations shall be by them violated, they shall be punished according to the municipal laws and upon the judgment of the civil tribunals.

  NATH. P. BANKS, Major-General, Commanding.

  Memorandum of ordnance, &c., captured by the provost-marshal at the time of arresting the Police Commissioners of Baltimore, July 1, 1861.

  Six 6-pounder iron cannon; two 4-pounder iron cannon; three hundred and thirty-two muskets, rifles, and pistols, and a large quantity of ammunition, &C.

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  No. 3.

  Instructions to Col. John R. Kenly, First Maryland Infantry

  HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF ANNAPOLIS, June 27, 1861.

  SIR: My attention has been called to a resolution purporting to have been this day passed by the late board of police Commissioners, expressing the opinion that “the suspension of their functions suspended at the same time the operations of the police law, and puts the officers and men off duty for the present.”

  You will take special notice, sir, that by my proclamation of this day neither the law, nor the officers appointed to execute the laws, are affected in any manner whatever, except as it operates upon the members of the board of commissioners and chief of police, whose functions were and are suspended. Every part of the police law is to be enforced by you, except that which refers to the authority of the commissioners and chief of police; and every officer and man, with the exception of those persons above named, will be continued in service by you, and in the positions they now occupy, and with the advantages they now receive unless one or more shall refuse to discharge their duties.

  If any police, officer declines to perform his duty, in order to avoid the anarchy which it was the purpose of the commissioners to bring upon the city by incorrectly stating that it had been by my act deprived of its police protection, you will select, in conference with such of the public authorities as will aid you, good men and true to fill their places and discharge their duties.

  You will also take especial notice that no opinion, resolution, or other act of the late board of commissioners can operate to limit the effective {p.143} force of the police law, or to discharge any officer engaged in its execution. If any provision of the law fails to be executed, it will be from the choice of the city; and if any officer, except such as are herein named, leave the service, it will be upon his own decision.

  You will cause these views to be made known as the rule of your conduct.

  I repeat my declaration and my purpose: No intervention with the laws or government of the city whatever is intended, except to prevent secret, violent, and treasonable combinations of disloyal men against the Government of the United States.

  I am, sir, truly, yours, &c.,

  NATH. P. BANKS.

  Colonel KENLY, Provost-Marshal.

  [Inclosure.]

  MEETING OF THE POLICE BOARD.

  Matters being thus arranged, the board of police commissioners went into secret session. The result of their deliberation was embodied in the following preamble and resolutions:

  Whereas the laws of the State of Maryland give the whole and exclusive control of the police force of the city to the board of police, organized and appointed by the general assembly, and not only are said board bound to exercise the powers in and to discharge the duties imposed upon them, but all other persons are positively prohibited, under heavy penalties, from interfering with them in so doing; and

  Whereas there is no power given to the board to transfer the control of any portion of the police force to any person or persons whomsoever other than the officers of police appointed by them, in pursuance of the express provisions of the law, and under their orders; and

  Whereas, by order of Major-General Banks, an officer of the U. S. Army, commanding in this city, the marshal of police has been arrested, the board of police superseded, and an officer of the Army has been appointed provost-marshal, and directed to assume the command and control of the police force of this city: Therefore, be it

  Resolved, That this board do solemnly protest against the orders and proceedings above referred to of Major-General Banks as an arbitrary exercise of military power, not warranted by any provision of the Constitution or laws of the United States or of the State of Maryland, but in derogation of all of them.

  Resolved, That whilst the board, yielding to the force of circumstances, will do nothing to increase the present excitement or obstruct the execution of such measures as Major-General Banks may deem proper to take on his own responsibility for the preservation of the peace of the city and of public order, they cannot consistently with their views of official duty and of obligation to their oaths of office recognize the right of any of the officers and men of the police force as such to receive orders or directions from any other authority than from this board.

  Resolved, That, in the opinion of the board, the forcible suspension of their functions suspends at the same time the active operation of the police law, and puts the officers and men off duty for the present; leaving them subject, however, to the rules and

  regulations of the service as to their personal conduct and deportment, and to the orders which this board may see fit hereafter to issue when the present illegal suspension of their functions shall be removed.

  [Signed by all the board.]

  In conformity with these resolves, the board summoned the different Police captains, and informed them that they had concluded to disband the police force, and through the captains the men were informed of this intention. They accordingly vacated the station-houses, and divested themselves of the insignia of office.

  {p.144}

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  No. 4.

  Report of the Board of Police Commissioners.

  FORT MCHENRY, July 29, 1861.

  To the honorable the General Assembly of Maryland:

  The undersigned, commissioners of police of the city of Baltimore, have the honor respectfully to report: That from the date of their report made to your honorable body in May last they continued faithfully to discharge the duties imposed on them by the laws of the State until Thursday morning, the 27th of June. At an early hour on that day Col. George P. Kane, the marshal of police, was arrested at his residence by a body of military, acting under the orders of Major-General Banks, in the service of the United States, and was taken to Fort McHenry, where he is still confided. A few hours afterwards the board were called upon by Colonel Kenly, who read to them an order of General Banks, appointing him provost-marshal, and a proclamation by the same officer, announcing to the citizens of Baltimore that the marshal of police had been arrested and that the official authority of the board Of police was “superseded.”

  The commissioners of police, having maturely considered their duties and obligations under the law by which they held their appointments, could not avoid the conclusion that such action on the part of an officer of the General Government, who, in point of fact, held at the time military possession of the city of Baltimore, at once suspended the active operation of the police law, and put for the time off duty all the officers and men who could not, without directly violating both the letter and spirit of the law, recognize the authority or be subject to the control of any other head than the board of police.

  Accordingly the board unanimously adopted a resolution to that effect.

  On the following Monday morning, the 1st of July, about the hour of 3 o’clock, all the members of the board, with the exception of the mayor, were arrested in like manner by order of General Banks, at their respective residences, and taken to Fort McHenry. One of them, Mr. C. D. Rinks, was, after a few days’ confinement, allowed to return to his own house on parole, upon the representations of his physicians that owing to his state of ill health his life would be seriously endangered by a continuance of his imprisonment. The other commissioners, Messrs. Howard, Gatchell, and Davis, constituting a majority of the whole board, have ever since been confined in Fort McHenry; but they have this morning been officially notified that they are to be removed on the steamer Adelaide to some other place at 6 o’clock this evening.

  The undersigned, Charles Howard, William H. Gatchell, and John W. Davis, further respectfully report that, being deprived of their liberty without legal process, and the courts of justice, as well of the United States as of the State of Maryland, being prevented by the military power of the former from affording them any relief, they addressed to the Congress of the United States a memorial asking that any charges made against them might be speedily investigated, and that the grievances of which they complain might be properly redressed.

  To that memorial were appended copies of the two proclamations issued by General Banks in reference to the board of police, and of the preamble and resolutions adopted by the board in reference to the first of said proclamations.

  The undersigned respectfully ask leave to submit herewith, as a part of this report, copies of the above-mentioned memorial to Congress {p.145} [No. 5], and to refer to the same and to the documents appended thereto for more full information in reference to their proceedings and to the views by which they have been governed.

  All of which is respectfully submitted.

  CHARLES HOWARD. WM. H. GATCHELL. JOHN W. DAVIS. GEO. WM. BROWN, Mayor and Ex-officio, Member of the Board of Police.

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  No. 5.

  Memorial of the Board of Police Commissioners.

  To the honorable the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States:

  The memorial of Chas. Howard, Wm. H. Gatchell, and Jno. W. Davis, citizens of Baltimore, in the State of Maryland, respectfully represents:

  That between 2 and 3 o’clock on the morning of the 1st of July instant, they were severally aroused from sleep at their respective dwellings by large bodies of soldiers of the Army of the United States, quartered in or about this city, and were removed by force and against their will from their homes and families to Fort McHenry, where they have ever since been confined as prisoners, and now are.

  Your memorialists at the time received no information as to the cause of their arrest than that the same was made by order of Major-General Banks, commanding this military department, nor have they since been informed of any charges whatever against them further than those contained in a proclamation of General Banks issued later in the same day, a copy of which, taken from one of the newspapers of the city, they append hereto.*

  By reference to the said proclamation your honorable bodies will perceive that the arrest of your memorialists is alleged to have been made “in pursuance of orders issued from the headquarters of the Army at Washington, for the preservation of the public peace in this department,” and is attempted to be justified by the refusal of your memorialists, as members of the board of police of Baltimore, to acquiesce in the legality and effect of a previous proclamation of General Banks declaring their official authority superseded. The proclamation in question goes on to charge that your memorialists, after such attempted suspension of their functions, had continued to hold sessions daily; “that upon a forced and unwarrantable construction” of the previous proclamation referred to they had declared the police law to be suspended, and their police force to be off of duty, “intending to leave the city without any police protection whatever”; and that they had moreover refused to recognize as policemen certain persons selected by a provost-marshal, under General Banks, to act in that capacity. There is a further allegation that the “headquarters under the charge of the board, when abandoned by the officers, resembled in some respects a concealed arsenal.”

  Your memorialists respectfully represent that together with their colleague, Charles D. Hinks, esq., who was arrested with them (but has since been discharged upon his parole because of ill health), and the {p.146} mayor of the city, who has not been arrested, they constitute the board of police, a quasi corporation created by the legislature of Maryland, and having exclusive police jurisdiction in the city of Baltimore. The nature and extent of their functions and duties will be made known to your honorable bodies by an examination of the code of Public Local Laws of the State of Maryland (art. iv, sees. 806 to 822, and sees. 199 to 228 inclusive). It will there be seen that their powers are of the amplest character, and that they not only have control of the whole police department of the State within the city limits, but are likewise charged with the appointment of all judges of election, and the conduct of all elections, whether Federal, State, or municipal, to be held in the city; so that every such election is, by special enactment, declared invalid and of no effect unless held by the board and under its control and supervision.

  It will further appear by the explicit terms of the law that no police force can lawfully exist in Baltimore unless appointed and governed by the police board, and that neither officers nor men, when appointed, have any official authority or jurisdiction independently of or apart from the board; but that all of them are merely employed, in pursuance of the express provisions of the law, “to enable the board to discharge the duties imposed upon them.” By section 819 of the article of the code already referred to, heavy pecuniary penalties are imposed upon any person who shall forcibly resist or obstruct the execution or enforcement of any of the provisions of the law, in the premises, or disburse any money in violation thereof; and it is made the duty of the board to enforce such penalties by civil action, leaving the parties who may have violated the law still subject to indictment for any criminal offense committed by them in the course of such violation.

  Your memorialists, with their colleague, Mr. Hinks, were duly appointed by the legislature of Maryland, at its January session, 1860, to carry out the provisions of the police system of which they have thus indicated the leading features, and they duly took the oath to do so which is prescribed by the law. The term of office of Messrs. Howard and Davis does not expire until the 10th of March, 1862, and that [of] Messrs. Gatchell and Hinks extends for still two years longer. None of them are subject to removal except by the legislature of Maryland, from which they derive their authority and functions. All the provisions of the police law were fully tested by legal proceedings instituted in the superior court of Baltimore City shortly after its enactment, and carried on appeal to the court of last resort in the State. The result was an unqualified recognition by all the judges of the conformity of the law in all particulars with the constitution of Maryland and that of the United States.

  Such being the official tenure and lawful and constitutional powers and duties of your memorialists, they were astonished, on the 27th of June last, to be visited, without previous notice, by Colonel Kenly, of the Maryland Volunteers, then encamped near Baltimore, and to be informed by that officer that he was instructed by Major-General Banks to read them a proclamation declaring their official authority superseded, and **appointing Colonel Kenly provost-marshal to administer the police law of the State in their stead. Of that proclamation a copy is appended to this memorial,** by which it will be seen that although various causes are alleged for the arrest of Col. George P. Kane, marshal of police, and for superseding his official authority likewise, no ground of complaint whatever is pretended to exist against the board of police, and no excuse {p.147} is vouchsafed for the overthrow of the constitutional authority of the State of Maryland vested in your memorialists, and, of course, incapable of being constitutionally or lawfully divested by any Federal authority, civil of military.

  The city of Baltimore being entirely commanded by large bodies of Federal troops stationed around it, and it being wholly impossible for your memorialists to offer any effective resistance to the illegal proceedings of General Banks, they had no alternative but to submit to force, and to vindicate, as far as practicable, the authority of the State of Maryland, and their own personal and official rights and self-respect, by protesting against such proceeding as an arbitrary and unconstitutional exercise of military power. They accordingly adopted the preamble and resolutions likewise hereto appended.*** It is in this act, and in their continuing their sessions under and in pursuance, that General Banks, in his proclamation issued on the day of their arrest, professes to find justification for his unwarrantable and unlawful violation of their personal liberty. It is no part of the intention of your memorialists to enter into any discussion of the allegations of that proclamation further than to say that it is wholly untrue, as therein alleged, that they continued to hold the police force of the State of Maryland, in the city of Baltimore, subject to their orders, for any purpose inconsistent with the peace or security of the Government. They declared the active operation of the police law to be suspended for the obvious and unanswerable reason that the forcible suspension of the functions of the board which alone had authority to administer the law necessarily paralyzed the law also. They declared the police force appointed by them to be still an existent body, because the law creating the force forbids the dismissal of the men, except for cause., and then by the board of police alone, after trial had. They declared it to be still subject to their orders, for so long as the force exists it cannot be subject under the law to any other. They refused, as a matter of obvious duty, to recognize as policemen the parties named by Colonel Kenly to act as such, for they assumed it, as they still consider it to be beyond dispute, that Colonel Kenly could have no lawful right to appoint policemen, under the laws of Maryland, whatever his authority may have been as a military officer (which they do not propose to consider) to appoint military subordinates in the stead of policemen outside of those laws or in derogation of them.

  The attempt by Colonel Kenly to enforce such police appointments, and all efforts of his nominees to act thereunder were moreover punishable offenses under the police law, the penalties of which it was the sworn duty of your memorialists to enforce, And in the violation of which it was impossible they could acquiesce. But your memorialists distinctly and emphatically deny that they had any other purpose in their Official protest and action than to fulfill their manifest and sworn obligations, and to maintain the dignity and assert the authority of the laws Of Maryland which were intrusted to their hands for execution, but which they were precluded by force from executing. They solemnly declare that if they had been permitted to continue in the exercise of their functions, after the arrest and imprisonment of the marshal of Police on the 27th of June, they would have continued to discharge their duties, as they had discharged them theretofore, in all respects faithfully, impartially, and that to the best of their ability, in obedience to the and the constitution, and they asseverate, and will maintain, that the imputation of any other intention or purpose on their part is wholly destitute of foundation in fact. The statement in regard to the {p.148} concealed arsenal” at the marshal’s office, they do not deem it necessary to allude to, further than to say that it is perfectly notorious, and has been fully shown by the message of the mayor to the city council of Baltimore,**** that the arms in question were the lawful property of the city; that they were insignificant in quantity, constituting but little more than the customary armament of the force for its public duties, and were lawfully concealed to prevent unlawful seizure. Your memorialists therefore respectfully represent that the grounds set up by General Banks, in his proclamation, give to their arrest and imprisonment no color of justification or necessity.

  And as to the proclamation of General Banks issued on the 27th of June, announcing the arrest of the marshal of police, and declaring his official authority to have been superseded, these memorialists respectfully say that the charges against that officer contained therein are equally without foundation, so far as they believe or have any reason to suspect. They have personal knowledge of the fact, which is equally well known to all impartial citizens of Baltimore, that the official duties of Colonel Kane have been discharged throughout with singular ability, integrity, and courage, and never more conspicuously, or in better faith, or at more imminent risk of his own life, than in the protection of the troops of the Federal Government on the 19th of April. Of the police force placed under his command by these memorialists, and selected wholly without reference to their political opinions (as the law and the official oath of your memorialists require), your memorialists can say without exaggeration that they do not believe a body of men can be found anywhere more entirely devoted to the conscientious discharge of official duty, or less justly liable to the accusation of entering into unlawful combinations themselves, or encouraging such combinations in others. Down to the moment of the suspension of the active duties of the force by General Banks, these memorialists have pride in asserting that no community ever acknowledged more universally than the citizens of Baltimore, and none ever had better reason to acknowledge, the successful operation of a police system, in securing the strictest enforcement of the laws, the amplest protection of private rights, and the most rigid maintenance of public order.

  Your memorialists further say that with every opportunity afforded by their official position, and every energy stimulated by their sense of duty to ascertain the existence of all unlawful combinations or associations within their jurisdiction, they have no reason whatever to suspect that any such combinations did, in fact, exist, as alleged by General Banks in his proclamation of June 27, and they confidently assert their conviction that his allegation to the contrary, was founded upon false information, communicated to him by designing persons, and cannot be sustained or countenanced by credible evidence of any sort. But even if your memorialists were and are altogether mistaken in these particulars; if the marshal of police had been faithless to his obligations, as charged, and had been willing or able to seduce the men under his command from theirs also, it was still only necessary for General Banks to furnish the board of police with the slightest evidence to that effect, and your memorialists would have given to his suggestions the most prompt

  in and respectful consideration. They would have suspended or removed the marshal, if such action had been proper, and would have placed beyond question their own disposition and ability to discharge the whole of their duty in the premises. If General Banks, even without advising them, had seen fit to arrest the marshal of police, upon any charge {p.149} which might have been deemed sufficient to justify such a step, your memorialists would have taken care to govern the police force efficiently and properly during his confinement. The legality of such arrest would have been a question for Colonel Kane, and not your memorialists, to consider; but either of the courses suggested would have fulfilled the purposes, and have met the exigency announced in the proclamation. General Banks, acting doubtless in conformity with his orders, adopted neither the one course nor the other, but assuming jurisdiction not only over the person of an alleged offender, but over his official functions, likewise saw fit not only to arrest and imprison him, but to dismiss him from his place as a public officer of this State (which only your memorialists could lawfully do), and to supersede the lawful authority of your memorialists besides. Knowing that such a proceeding could not by possibility be justified by anything in the laws or constitution of Maryland or the United States, your memorialists were compelled by every consideration of sworn duty to treat the same as an arbitrary act of force and usurpation, no matter by whose orders it might have been committed, or under what pretexts it was sought to be excused. No construction which it was possible for them to give to the proclamation of the 27th of June could have brought them to any other conclusion than that it was their bounden duty to enter their protest against it.

  They therefore deny that the construction which they adopted was either “forced” or “unwarrantable,” as charged in the proclamation of July 1; and they emphatically protest against the truth of the further allegation contained in the latter document to the effect that their official course upon the occasion was dictated by a purpose to “leave the city without any police protection whatever.” If, indeed, they had entertained such a purpose, they respectfully suggest that it was not a matter with which any officer of the Federal Government had any rightful concern, howmuchsoever it would have furnished their fellow-citizens with just cause of complaint. But they entertained no such purpose On the contrary, they aver and are prepared to show that when General Banks, by his proclamation of June 27, interrupted the exercise of their lawful authority, the city was thoroughly protected, in all particulars, by your memorialists and the force under their command; that its tranquillity was perfect; its peace neither disturbed nor threatened; the rights of person and property of all men were inviolate; the civil authorities of the State and city were in the beneficial and effective exercise of all their functions, and the laws were supreme, except in so far as interfered with by the military power. If, therefore, the city was left without protection on the 27th of June, it was the fault and upon the responsibility not of your memorialists but altogether of that department of the General Government by which the constituted authorities of the State were superseded and the protective provisions of its laws deprived of their vitality.

  If General Banks himself were unlawfully superseded by force, he Surely would not regard it as just in his captors to accuse him of leaving his department without protection, because he refused, as a man of Courage and honor, to acquiesce in their violent suspension and assumption of his functions.

  Your memorialists claim to be judged, officially and personally, by no lower standard of dignity, responsibility, or honor. As public officers and men of ordinary integrity, it must be obvious to your honorable bodies that they could not lend themselves in any way to what they know to be a palpable violation of the law they had sworn to support.

  They could not transfer or acquiesce in the transfer to General Banks {p.150} or Colonel Kenly of an authority which the law commanded them to exercise exclusively themselves. They could not authorize their police force to serve under any command or control but their own in the face of the express provisions of the law to the contrary. They could not expose their officers and men to civil and criminal responsibility by leaving them on duty under unlawful orders which could afford them no protection before the tribunals of justice. Your memorialists had no choice therefore but to protest as they did; to declare their force off duty, and to leave the military authority to deal, on its own responsibility, with the exigency it had seen fit to create.

  In entering thus at large into a discussion of the grounds set up by General Banks in justification of their arrest, your memorialists have been governed altogether by a desire to vindicate their personal and official character and conduct from unfounded and disparaging imputations, and to demonstrate the gratuitous character of the injustice against which they appeal to Congress for relief. They are in no wise to be considered as thereby recognizing for an instant the right of the War Department, or of any officer acting thereunder, to proceed against them in the mode adopted, even if the accusations which they have repelled were perfectly well founded. The State of Maryland is one of the State’s of the Union. She is at peace, with the Government. Her people are disarmed, and her territory is occupied by an overwhelming military force. Martial law has not been proclaimed among her people, but, on the contrary, all intention to set it up or enforce it is disavowed in the most explicit way in the proclamation of June 27. The Federal courts and those of the State are in full and undisturbed, operation so far as citizens not belonging to the military force are concerned, and process is served without obstruction, and is obeyed without resistance by all except those in military authority. If, therefore, your memorialists were charged with any offense known to the law there was and is nothing to prevent their arrest and detention by the civil arm, in due course, and upon proper and lawful warrant supported by oath, as prescribed and required by the Constitution.

  But they respectfully submit that in the proclamation by which their arrest is sought to be justified, there is no allegation of any matter or thing which, if sworn to in proper form of law, would authorize the issuing of process against them by any judicial tribunal.

  If they were so unfortunate as to place an erroneous construction upon the first proclamation of General Banks, as he alleges, they are not aware of any statute of the United States which renders such a mistake a penal offense.

  If it be a crime on their part to regard as illegal and wholly null the attempted suspension by a Federal officer of their functions as constituted authorities of the State of Maryland, they have been unable to learn by what provisions of the Constitution and laws such an offense is created or defined.

  If they are lawfully punishable for holding subject to their orders a police force which the laws of Maryland made it their duty so to hold, and for refusing to recognize as public officers of Maryland the appointees of General Banks, whom they are bound under the laws of Maryland to prosecute as offenders for attempting to exercise police functions, they are at a loss to conceive under what head of the penal law such criminality on their part exists. They mean no improper reflection when they assert their belief that no law officer of the Government would venture to ask for a warrant upon an affidavit of the facts recited in the proclamation of July 1, and that no competent tribunal {p.151} would hesitate to quash such a warrant if issued. They know no principle of criminal jurisprudence, under free institutions, which would authorize even the courts of recognized jurisdiction to sanction the arrest and confinement of a citizen upon the indefinite allegation of his entertaining “some purpose, not known to the Government,” but still alleged to be “inconsistent with its peace or security.”

  But be this as it may, these memorialists, respectfully insist that if they are charged with any offense which is known to the laws, it is their constitutional right, as citizens of the United States, to be dealt with according to law. If they are charged with no offense, it is equally their constitutional right to have the fact recognized, and to enjoy their personal liberty.

  They have, through their counsel, respectfully asked of General Banks a statement of the grounds of their imprisonment, and have challenged an investigation of any and all charges affecting either their personal or official integrity or their fidelity to the laws and the Constitution.

  No such statement has been made to them, no such investigation has been granted, and no hope has been held out to them of any speedy relief from the unjust and unlawful imprisonment under which they are suffering. In the mean time they are withdrawn from their homes and separated from their families; their public duties are unlawfully committed to other hands; their private interests are exposed to detriment and perhaps ruin, and they themselves held as malefactors before the country, and are compelled by force to endure mortification and obloquy. The arbitrary suspension of the writ of habeas corpus has of course deprived them of the means provided by law for their deliverance, and unless your honorable bodies should see fit to relieve them, they are wholly without means of present redress. They therefore most respectfully and earnestly invoke the immediate interposition of Congress in their behalf.

  They repeat that they have administered their public trust faithfully, impartially, and to the best of their ability, and have not used the police force under their control, nor have they permitted it, nor contemplated permitting it, to be used for any other purpose than the legitimate and faithful discharge of its duties as prescribed by law. As private citizens they invite scrutiny likewise into their conduct in every respect in which it may be lawfully impugned, and they assert their readiness meet, without a moment’s delay, any charge which may be responsibly laid against their individual or official proceedings.

  As citizens of the United States they therefore appeal to your honorable bodies for relief from oppression and unconstitutional wrong. As public officers of the State of Maryland they protest against the usurpation of their official authority by an officer of the United States Army, and they protest the more strongly because the usurpation against which they remonstrate is not an irresponsible proceeding of the officer in question, but the advised and deliberate act of the War Department itself. They are aware that the President of the United States ha’s called upon Congress to sanction the suspension of the habeas corpus and other acts which have been done by the Executive Department, upon its responsibility, without previous sanction of law. But the President has not asserted in his message any right on the part of the Federal Government to depose and appoint State officers, or annul laws of the States constitutionally enacted, nor has he suggested any power ill Congress to clothe him with any such authority. He has asserted no right to do wrong to individuals, nor has he asked the interposition of Congress to any such end. But whatever may be the claims of the {p.152} Executive, your memorialists respectfully insist that the demands of the Constitution and of individual right and public liberty are very far above them, and they throw themselves therefore for redress and deliverance upon the justice and authority of the representatives of the people. They have no other recourse against arbitrary power and military force, and they demand as matter of right that their case be investigated by Congress or remitted to the tribunals of justice to be lawfully heard and determined.

  CHARLES HOWARD. WILLIAM H. GATCHELL. JOHN W. DAVIS.

  FORT MCHENRY.

  * See p. 141.

  ** See p. 140.

  *** See p. 143.

  **** See pp. 15-20.

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  No. 6.

  Memorial of the Mayor and City Council of Baltimore.

  To the honorable the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States:

  The mayor* and city council of Baltimore respectfully present this their memorial:

  The recent suspension of the functions of the board of police of this city makes it the duty of your memorialists to call your attention to certain consequences of that action which affect every citizen in this community. The memorial of the board of police already presented to your honorable bodies has given you full information of the nature and extent of their powers. A brief reference to certain leading features of the law of Maryland under which they hold office, and with whose execution they are charged, will enable you to appreciate the embarrassments which now affect the due administration of the government of Baltimore.

  The board of police is, under the laws of Maryland, the sole police authority of the city. It alone is competent to provide for the preservation of peace and order within our limits; to appoint subordinate police officers, to appoint judges of elections, and provide for the execution of the laws regulating elections; to enforce all ordinances of the mayor and city council of Baltimore for the preservation of health and the maintenance of peace and order.

  By other provisions of the laws for the police government of this city, the organization of any permanent police force other than that organized by and acting under the orders of the board of police is distinctly prohibited.

  To the due execution of the laws of their State for their local government, by legally-constituted officers, the free citizens of Baltimore have an unquestioned constitutional right. The manner in which that right has been respected will appear from the facts which we now recite:

  The major-general commanding in the military department of which this city forms a part issued a proclamation, dated June 27, announcing the arrest of the marshal of police. With professions of respect for every municipal regulation and public statute, the proclamation further announces to the public that the official authority of the marshal of police and the board of police is superseded, and a “provost-marshal,” an officer unknown to the civil law of Maryland, is appointed. No charge is preferred against the members of the board of police, nor is {p.153} any reason assigned for superseding them and depriving the citizens of Baltimore of their only legal police authority.

  The board of police, yielding to the force which prevented their execution of the laws of this State, submitted to the practical suspension of their functions, and neither offered nor permitted any resistance to such action as the general in command saw fit to adopt.

  The provost-marshal, appointed by the general in command to execute the police laws of Maryland for the government of the city of Baltimore, took possession of the offices belonging to the city, and removed certain officials not appointed by the board, but by the mayor and city council of Baltimore, appointing others in their place.

  The memorial of the board of police has presented at length the considerations of official duty which made it impossible for them, either themselves to aid, or to permit the officers under their command to aid, in violations of the law under which they hold office. A comparison or the reasons assigned by them, with the provisions of the police law, to which they direct your attention, will prove the correctness of their conclusions. Under date of July 1 appeared a third proclamation of the general in command, announcing the arrest of the members of the board of police. Again disclaiming for those under whose authority he acts any intention to interfere with the municipal affairs of Baltimore, he assigns certain reasons for the summary arrest of these gentlemen whom without complaint on oath or civil process he arrested and now holds in custody. Examined in connection with the law under which they were appointed, the pretended offenses charged against them amount together to the simple performance of their official duty. Had they aided or acquiesced in the establishment of any police authority other than their own, they would have plainly violated the law under which they hold office.

  By a fourth proclamation, dated July 10, the major-general in command informs the public that he has removed the “provost-marshal,” and has appointed a “marshal of police,” in all respects to administer every department of the police law in full freedom for the peace and prosperity of the city and the honor and perpetuity of the United States. This officer now affects to administer the law for the police government of Baltimore by means of a force organized under and acting by his direction.

  Whatever professions of regard for our laws accompany these transactions the facts are too plain to be concealed. The local laws of the State of Maryland for the police government of the city of Baltimore, to which all officers of the Federal Government are bound to yield obedience within our limits I have been set aside. The only officers competent to administer those laws have been superseded and then imprisoned. The general in command, professing to act under instructions from the Federal Government, has marched large bodies of armed men into the city, planted cannon in the principal, streets and public squares, and, by the law and authority of superior force, has established the present acting police force, has enabled its officers to take possession of the Offices, and buildings belonging to the city of Baltimore, to eject officers appointed by the mayor and city council, and to assume the function of executing laws whose fundamental provisions they daily violate by the exercise of police authority. Your memorialists need not dwell on the embarrassments which must certainly result from thus disorganizing the civil government of a city, nor on the sense of insecurity which affects citizens who reflect that the present police acts without legal warrant or authority. A community thus deprived of its lawful government is en {p.154} titled to demand that those who assume so grave a responsibility shall furnish some sufficient reason for their action. It is impossible to believe that the Federal authority have wantonly disturbed the peace and good government of the city. No doubt statements have been made to which credit has been given, and on the faith of which the Government has acted. The proclamation of the general in command, issued immediately after the arrest of the members of the board of police, vaguely charges that the board “hold, subject to their orders, now and hereafter, the old police force, a large body of armed men for some purpose unknown to the Government and inconsistent with its peace and security.” Your memorialists are left in doubt as to the precise nature of the purpose referred to, but the suspension of their authority, and the subsequent imprisonment of the board of police, seems to have been the result of a belief that their authority would be used to the injury of the Government of the United States.

  That this opinion has any foundation in facts your memorialists deny, and appeal to the history of the official acts of the police authority of this city.

  For a detailed account of the unhappy occurrences of the 19th April you are referred to the statement of the mayor of the city, which is herewith submitted.** No evidence of failure of duty on the part of the police authority on that day can be produced. The mayor, ex officio a member of the board, shared the dangers to which the troops were exposed, and both he and the Marshal of police risked their lives for their protection. The great excitement which ensued, and which was intensified by the wanton killing of a citizen at a distance from the scene of the riot, and who was shot from the window of the cars as the train passed out of the city, was represented to the President by the mayor of the city. The President and his Cabinet recognized the necessity of temporarily avoiding a passage through Baltimore, and gave repeated assurances that the troops should not be brought through the city.

  Unauthorized persons declaring openly their intention to cut their way through Baltimore with or without the orders of the Government, the authorities of Baltimore, as well the police board as your memorialists, called their people to arras, procured such weapons as could be hastily gathered, and did all in their power to provide for the defense of their city from the threatened danger. This they did, and this they justify. In the then excited condition of the people a portion of our population may have entertained designs of active hostility to the Government.

  If such designs existed they were frustrated by the precautions of the board of police. Fort McHenry, believed to be without either a sufficient garrison or armament, was nightly guarded by the military of the city, acting under the orders of the board of police. Other Government property received especial protection. Arms, supposed to belong to the United States and found in the hands of individuals, were taken possession of and preserved by the board of police, who gave notice to the Government agents of their action. The persons and property of all citizens received equal and sufficient protection. Whatever charges malice may suggest, the preservation of peace in the city, the prevention of conflict between citizens divided in opinion, the protection of life, limb, and property during a period of great popular excitement, is a monument to the zeal and good faith of our police authorities. When there no longer seemed any necessity for a military array, the arms placed in the hands of the people were, recalled, and the city resumed {p.155} its ordinary condition of quiet. So Baltimore remained until May 14, when, it being ascertained that the people were disarmed, and that the movement could be made without serious danger, the general then in command in this department occupied a portion of the city with certain troops under his command. His arrival was announced by proclamation; and in the afternoon of May 14 be sent a detachment of troops into the city, who seized and carried off arms belonging to and in the custody of the authorities of the city of Baltimore. No resistance was offered or permitted by the authorities of the city. Two of our citizens, one of them a member of the legislature of Maryland, were by the orders of the same military officer summarily arrested, and after an imprisonment of a few days were released because there existed no sufficient cause for either arrest or detention.

  Since the middle of May many thousand United States soldiers have passed through this city. There has been no single instance of opposition to their progress, nor any failure on the part of the city authorities to take proper precautions for their protection as well as preserving the peace of the city. The courts of the United States are and have been unimpeded in the performance of their duties, save when in a memorable instance the marshal of the United States was not permitted to enter Fort McHenry or to serve process issued by the highest judicial officer of the United States. The order of the city has been preserved; no resistance of any kind has been made, even to illegal and unconstitutional acts of military officers. No arrest that has been made by mere military authority but that could have been made by civil officers. Thus, without the existence of a single fact to justify an appeal to a supposed authority growing out of military necessity, citizens have been seized and imprisoned, their homes invaded and searched without warrant or complaint on oath, as required by law.

  The protection afforded by constitutional guarantees of the liberty of the citizen and constitutional restraints imposed on the power of the Executive has been denied. Obedience to the courts is refused when they interfere for the protection of the citizen. Arms belonging to the city of Baltimore and rightfully in the custody of its authorities have been taken. The buildings of the city have been given into the custody Of officers not known to its laws. Its court-house has been occupied by troops. Its civil authority has been disregarded, and a revolutionary government established by mere force of arms and against law.

  Against these manifold wrongs your memorialists, for themselves and the free community which they represent, do most solemnly protest.

  The State of Maryland has been and is subject to the Constitution and laws of the United States, and her citizens are of right entitled to the protection of that Constitution and of those laws. The civil authorities of this city have heretofore, and do now, render fitting obedience to the requirements of both. If disaffection is believed to exist, from which danger is apprehended, the guns of Fort McHenry turned on the homes of the women and children of an unarmed city, the Federal troops encamped around its limits, would seem an adequate protection to the Government. Whether that disaffection is weakened by depriving a whole community of the protection of its laws, whether the risk of disorder is diminished by establishing a police government which fails to command the respect accorded to undoubted lawful authority, you in Your wisdom will determine.

  But your memorialists respectfully, yet most earnestly, demand, as a matter of right, that their city may be governed according to the Constitution and laws of the United States and of the State of Maryland. {p.156} They demand as a matter of right that citizens may be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures, and that they be not deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. They demand as a matter of right that the military render obedience to the civil authority, that our municipal laws be respected, that officers be released from imprisonment and restored to the lawful exercise of their functions, that the police government established by law be no longer impeded by armed force to the injury of peace and order. These their rightful demands your memorialists submit for the consideration of your honorable bodies.

  * See also the mayor’s message, pp. 15-20.

  ** See pp. 15-20.

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  No. 7.

  Resolution of the House of Representatives and reply of the President.

  RESOLUTION.

  Resolved, That the President be requested immediately to communicate to this House, if in his judgment not incompatible with the public interest, the grounds, reason, and evidence upon which the police commissioners of Baltimore were arrested, and are now detained as prisoners at Fort McHenry.

  Adopted, July 24, 1861.

  REPLY.

  WASHINGTON, July 27, 1861.

  To the House of Representatives:

  In answer to the resolution of the House of Representatives of the 24th instant, asking the grounds, reason, and evidence upon which the police commissioners of Baltimore were arrested and are now detained as prisoners at Fort McHenry, I have to state that it is judged to be incompatible with the public interest at this time to furnish the information called for by the resolution.

  ABRAHAM LINCOLN.

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  JULY 2-25, 1861.-Operations in the Shenandoah Valley.

  SUMMARY OF THE PRINCIPAL EVENTS.

  July	2, 1861.–	General Patterson’s command crosses the Potomac River. Engagement at Falling Waters, or Hoke’s Run.
  	3, 1861.–	Martinsburg occupied by Union forces.
  	15, 1861.–	Skirmish near Bunker Hill.
  	18, 1861.–	Main body of Confederate forces withdrawn.
  	21, 1861.–	Skirmish at Charlestown.
  	25, 1861.–	General Patterson superseded by Major-General Banks.

  REPORTS, ETC.

  No. 1.–	Maj. Gen. Robert Patterson, Pennsylvania Militia, with orders and correspondence, and including application for Court of Inquiry.
  No. 2.–	Capt. James H. Simpson, U. S. Topographical Engineers.
  No. 3.–	Col. George 11. Thomas, Second U. S. Cavalry. {p.157}
  No. 4.–	Lieut. D. D. Perkins, Fourth U. S. Artillery.
  No. 5.–	Maj. Gen. W. H. Keim, Pennsylvania Militia.
  No. 6.–	Col. J. J. Abercrombie, Seventh U. S. Infantry.
  No. 7.–	Col. John C. Starkweather, First Wisconsin Infantry.
  No. 8.–	Col. P. Jarrett, Eleventh Pennsylvania Infantry.
  No. 9.–	Capt. E. McK. Hudson, Fourteenth U. S. Infantry.
  No. 10.–	Brig. Gen. Joseph E. Johnston, Q. S. Army.
  No. 11.–	Col. T. J. Jackson, C. S. Army.
  No. 12.–	Strength of Johnston’s division (C. S. Army), June 30, 1861.
  No. 13.–	Strength of Patterson’s command (U. S. Army), June 28, 1861.

  No. 1.

  Reports of Maj. Gen. Robert Patterson, Pennsylvania Militia, of operations in the Shenandoah Valley, with orders and correspondence, and application for Court of Inquiry.

  HEADQUARTERS, July 12 1861.

  Major-General PATTERSON, Commanding Department of Pennsylvania:

  SIR: The General-in-Chief directs me to inform you, in confidence, that he hopes to move a column of about 35,000 men early next week, towards the enemy’s lines from Fairfax Court-House to Manassas Junction, for aggressive purposes.

  I am, &c.,

  E. D. TOWNSEND, Assistant Adjutant-General.

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  HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF PENNSYLVANIA, Martinsburg, Va., July 3, 1861.

  Lieut. Col. E. D. TOWNSEND, Assistant Adjutant-General:

  Entered and passed through this place to-day in hot pursuit of the enemy. The Army was welcomed with enthusiasm by the mass of the population, gratified by the protection promised and now given by the Government. The force we scattered yesterday was thirty-five hundred strong, and their loss about sixty killed. It rallied, and presented front to-day, but again retreated to a point seven miles from here, where they have been re-enforced by a party under Colonel Bee, claimed in all to be thirty thousand; in reality, thirteen thousand.

  I have ordered the Rhode Island Battery to come up from Williamsport with a provision train on the 5th. Rumor indicates Colonel Stone as approaching by way of Harper’s Ferry. My post-office is Hagerstown, unless the Government re-establishes the mail route.

  R. PATTERSON, Major-General, Commanding.

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  MARTINSBURG, VA., July 4, 1861.

  SIR: I avail myself of a favorable opportunity hastily to inform you Of my arrival at this place, with no opposition of any character since the 2d instant, but with a warm welcome from the populace. The rebel cavalry retired from the town as the command entered, and scattered in several directions. The infantry and artillery retired towards Winchester.

  I have halted temporarily to bring up supplies, which will be here to-morrow, having to-day returned all my wagons for the purpose. Provisions {p.158} in this part of the country are, limited, and consequently with my present transportation I can advance but a short distance before I am compelled to halt. As soon as provisions arrive I shall advance to Winchester to drive the enemy from that place, if any remain. I then design to move towards Charlestown, to which point I believe Colonel Stone is advancing, and, if I find it not hazardous, to continue to Leesburg. I must do this or abandon the country, by retiring the way I came, in consequence of the term of the three months’ volunteers being about to expire. They will not, in any number, renew their service, though I think the offer should be made.

  The Union sentiment here is apparently very strong, but many fear a reverse, and that this force will retire, either voluntarily or forcibly. The people cannot be made use of to raise a force for self-defense unless supported by a strong force of U. S. troops.

  I desire to be informed of the wish of the General-in-Chief in regard to the continued occupation of this region. I have ordered up all force in the rear, except the Connecticut regiment, five companies of which are stationed at each of the depots, Williamsport and Hagerstown. The Rhode Island Battery and the Thirteenth Pennsylvania Volunteers join me to-night.

  I am, sir, your obedient servant,

  R. PATTERSON, Major-General, Commanding.

  Col. E. D. TOWNSEND, Asst. Adjt. Gen., Hdqrs. Army, Washington City.

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  MARTINSBURG, July 4, 1861. Col. E. D. TOWNSEND, Assistant Adjutant-General:

  Received your confidential letter by Lieutenant Jones,* of the Rhode Island Battery, and will regulate accordingly, though may have to act earlier. Seven miles in advance is General Johnston with 15,000 to 18,000 foot, 22 guns, and 650 horse. See my letter of date, and private one from Major Porter. Please keep me advised.

  R. PATTERSON, Major-General, Commanding.

  * Probably Townsend to Patterson, July 1, p. 157.

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  WASHINGTON, July 5, 1861.

  General R. PATTERSON:

  If necessary, call up the regiment left at Frederick, and I will replace it. In an extreme case, order Colonel Wallace to join you.

  Colonel Stone was yesterday opposite Harper’s Ferry, with greater part of his force.

  Your telegrams of the 3d and 4th received with satisfaction.

  WINFIELD SCOTT.

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  WASHINGTON, July 5, 1861-10 p. m.

  Major-General PATTERSON, Martinsburg:

  Your letter of the 4th is received. Orders were sent this morning to Madison for the Third and Fourth Regiments from Wisconsin to repair {p.159} to Williamsport via Chambersburg and report to you. The Nineteenth and Twenty-eighth New York Regiments leave here for Hagerstown to-morrow at half past 2 p. m. You will have to provide transportation for them thence to the post you may order them to. If any three-months’ men will re-engage for the long term, designate a Regular officer of your command to muster them, provided a sufficient number to form a regiment can be obtained. Having defeated the enemy, if you can continue the pursuit without too great hazard, advance via Leesburg (or Strasburg) towards Alexandria; but consider the dangerous defiles, especially via Strasburg, and move with great caution, halting at Winchester and threatening a movement by Strasburg; or the passage of the Potomac twice, and coming down by Leesburg, may be the more advantageous movement.

  WINFIELD SCOTT.

  –––

  MARTINSBURG, VA., July 5, 1861.

  Col. E. D. TOWNSEND, Asst. Adjt. Gen., U. S. Army, Washington City:

  Have ordered up everything-Colonel Stone, Cumberland, and Frederick force. Large re-enforcements have come in from Manassas.

  R. PATTERSON, Major-General, Commanding.

  –––

  MARTINSBURG, VA., July 6, 1861.

  Lieut. Gen. WINFIELD SCOTT:

  Telegram of yesterday received. Many thanks for the Wisconsin and New York regiments. Can you give me the New York Sixty-ninth (Colonel Corcoran)? I know you will appreciate the motive which prompts me to urge this request, and pardon my importunity. The insurgents have unquestionably received large re-enforcements, and are said to have twenty-six thousand, with twenty-four guns, many rifled, and some of very large caliber. I hope in proper season to give you a good account of them. Colonel Stone is coming up on the Maryland side, and will probably reach Williamsport to-morrow. Wallace ordered on.

  R. PATTERSON, Major-General, Commanding.

  –––

  BUCKHANNON, VA., July 6, 1861.

  Lieut. Col. E. D. TOWNSEND:

  General Patterson informs me that he has ordered Wallace away from Cumberland. From what I know of the state of affairs there I ask the General-in-Chief to direct that Cumberland and Piedmont may be occupied by Pennsylvania State troops. Great difficulty is liable to ensue if this be not done.

  GEO. B. MCCLELLAN, Major-General, Commanding.

  –––

  WASHINGTON, July 6, 1861.

  General PATTERSON, Martinsburg, Va.:

  Governor Curtin has been requested to send two regiments of State troops (probably the two near Bedford) to Cumberland to hold that {p.160} place temporarily instead of Wallace’s regiment. They are instructed to obey your orders, or any other they may receive (in an extreme case) from General McClellan.

  E. D. TOWNSEND, Assistant Adjutant-General.

  (Similar dispatch to McClellan.)

  –––

  HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF PENNSYLVANIA, Martinsburg, Va., July 6, 1861.

  SIR: I telegraphed my intention to cross the Potomac on the 1st instant. I now have the honor to report my movements since that date.

  I left Hagerstown on the afternoon of the 30th ultimo, the earliest day my command could take the field in a proper condition for active service, intending the following morning to enter Virginia with two columns at Dam No. 4 and Williamsport, to be united the same day at Hainesville, the known location of the rebels. Owing to the danger and difficulty attending the fording at Dam No. 4, I placed all the force at Williamsport. My order of march for the 2d instant is given in the accompanying circular.

  The advance crossed the Potomac at 4 a. m., all taking the main road to Martinsburg, with the exception of Negley’s brigade, which, about one mile from the ford, diverged to the right, to meet the enemy should he come from Hedgesville, to guard our right, and to rejoin at Hainesville. About five miles from the ford the skirmishers in front and on the flank suddenly became engaged with the enemy, posted in a clump of trees. At the same time their main force appeared in front, sheltered by fences, timber and houses. Abercrombie immediately deployed his regiments (First Wisconsin and Eleventh Pennsylvania) on each side, of the road, placed Hudson’s section, supported by the First Troop, Philadelphia City Cavalry, in the road, and advanced to the attack against a warm fire before him. The enemy, being supported by artillery, resisted for twenty-five minutes with much determination. Lieutenant Hudson after getting into position soon silenced their guns.

  In the mean time Thomas’ brigade rapidly advanced, and deployed to the left to turn the right flank of the enemy. The enemy, seeing this movement, and being pressed by Abercrombie, retired, hotly pursued for four miles by artillery and infantry. The, cavalry could not be employed, on account of numerous fences and walls crossing the country.

  In the enemy’s camp were found camp equipage, provisions, grain, &c. This brush was highly creditable to our arms, winning as we did the day against a foe superior in number to those engaged on our side. They were well posted, sheltered by timber, and sustained by artillery and cavalry. Our men advanced over open ground against a warm fire, of artillery and infantry. I present the reports of Colonels Abercrombie and Thomas and Lieutenants Perkins and Hudson, and take much pleasure in bearing testimony as an eye-witness to the admirable manner in which their commands were handled and their commendations earned.

  I also bear testimony to efficient service in posting portions of the troops and conducting them to the front and into action rendered by the members of my staff present on the field of battle-Col. F. J. Porter, Capt. John Newton, and Lieutenant Babcock, and Majors Price and Biddle-who were employed conveying orders; also Surgeon Tripler in attention to the wounded.

  {p.161}

  The loss of the enemy was over sixty killed. The number of wounded cannot be ascertained, as a large number were carried off the field.

  I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

  R. PATTERSON, Major-General, Commanding.

  Col. E. D. TOWNSEND, Asst. Adjt. Gen., U. S. Army, Washington city.

  –––

  WASHINGTON, July 7, 1861.

  Maj. Gen. R. PATTERSON, U. S. Army, Martinsburg, Va.:

  SIR: Besides Colonel Wallace’s regiment, and Colonel Stone’s three regiments and a half, there are now en route, or under orders to join you as soon as practicable, two regiments from Madison, Wis., one regiment (to start to-morrow) from Boston, and four New York regiments from this city; two of the latter went by rail yesterday, and two go to-day. All these regiments are directed to Williamsport, that being the most convenient point in regard to transportation of supplies, &c. General Sandford (a major-general of twenty-five years’ standing), in the best possible spirit, volunteered to go, with two of his most efficient regiments, to assist you. The General-in-Chief desires you to make up for him a suitable command, and to employ him as he desires, for the good of the service. You will find him worthy of your best respect and attentions.

  As you were informed by telegraph this morning, Governor Curtin has been requested, with the sanction of the Secretary of War, to order two regiments of State troops to hold Cumberland for the present; which regiments are instructed to obey you or (in an extreme case) any orders they may receive from General McClellan.

  The General desires me to add that, waiting for horses, we cannot yet, say on what, day we shall be able to attack the enemy in the direction of Manassas Junction. We hope, however, to be ready before the end of this week.

  I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

  E. D. TOWNSEND.

  CIRCULAR.]

  HDQRS. DEPARTMENT OF PENNSYLVANIA, Martinsburg, Va., July 8, 1861.

  The troops will move to-morrow morning in the following order:

  The First (Thomas’) Brigade, with the Rhode Island Battery temporarily attached thereto, will advance by the Winchester turnpike, accompanied by one squadron of cavalry.

  The Seventh (Stone’s) Brigade, with Perkins’ battery attached thereto, will take the main street of the town (by the court-house), and will continue, on the road parallel and east of the Winchester turnpike. One company of cavalry will be attached to this command.

  The First (Cadwalader’s) Division will follow the march of Thomas’ brigade. Doubleday’s battery will advance with this division, one regiment of which will be detailed for its guard, to accompany it wherever it may be ordered.

  The Second (Keim’s) Division will pursue both routes; General Negley’s brigade following the march of Colonel Stone, and Colonel Abercrombie’s and General Wynkoop’s that of General Cadwalader. {p.162}

  The Twenty-eighth and Nineteenth New York Regiments will be temporarily attached to General Keim’s division.

  General Keim will detail a strong rear guard from his division for the wagon train. The rear guard will march on the flanks and rear of the train, and will be re-enforced by a squadron of cavalry.

  General Keim will detail a competent field officer to command the rear guard.

  The wagons will advance in one train in the rear of the troops, and will be required to keep closed.

  The troops of the several divisions and brigades will keep closed.

  By order of Major-General Patterson:

  F. J. PORTER, Assistant Adjutant-General.

  –––

  HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF PENNSYLVANIA, Martinsburg, Va., via Bedford, July 8, 1861.

  COMMANDING OFFICER, Cumberland, Md.:

  Your two Pennsylvania regiments have been ordered to Cumberland, and placed under the orders of General Patterson, who directs you to hold that place and protect the people of the country, but unless threatened, to make no aggressive movement into Virginia without strong inducements and certainty of success.

  If your judgment approves, occupy Piedmont, and be governed in your policy by instructions given Colonel Wallace, a copy of which will go to you.

  F. J. PORTER, Assistant Adjutant-General.

  –––

  MARTINSBURG, VA., July 9, 1861.

  COLONEL: I have received the telegrams of the General-in-Chief, notifying me of the additional regiments sent me. Colonel Stone and the Nineteenth and Twenty-eighth New York Regiments arrived yesterday. General Sandford, with the Fifth and Twelfth New York Regiments, will join to-morrow. Since I last addressed you I have, made no movements-in fact, have been prevented by the necessity of sending all my Wagons to the rear to obtain provisions for a few days in advance and to bring up troops. The commissary has supplies (with those in hands of troops) for about ten days. Though the quartermaster has spared no exertion, and his agents have been very active, he has not as yet been able to provide a supply train for the command. I am therefore “much restricted in my movements, being compelled, after three days’ advance, to send back for provisions. The difficulty will increase as I advance; indeed, I am now almost at a stand. Instead of receiving aid from the inhabitants, I find myself in an enemy’s country, where our opponents can procure supplies and we nothing, except by seizure. Even information is studiously kept from us. Supplies, especially provisions, are very scarce, and not even one day’s rations can be relied upon. The supply of grain also is very limited. Under these circumstances I respectfully present to the General-in-Chief the following plan, which, with my present views, I desire to carry into operation so soon as I can do so with safety and the necessity of following Johnston ceases:

  I Propose to move this force to Charlestown, from which point I can move easily, strike at Winchester, march to Leesburg when necessary, {p.163} and open communication to a depot to be established at Harper’s Ferry, and occupy the main avenue of supply to the enemy. My base Will then be some seven miles nearer, more easily reached by road, and my line of communication rendered more secure than at present. I can establish communication with the Maryland shore by a bridge of boats. In this way I can more easily approach you, and the movement, I think, will tend to relieve Leesburg and vicinity of some, of its oppressors. My present location is a very bad one in a military point of view, and from it I cannot move a portion of the force without exposing that of what remains to be out off.

  General Sandford informs me by letter that he has for me a letter from you. I hope it will inform me when you will put your column in motion against Manassas and when you wish me, to strike. The enemy retired in succession from Darkesville and Bunker Hill to Stephenson’s Station, a few miles from Winchester. There he has halted, and report says is in trenching. His design evidently is to draw this force on as far as possible from the base, and then to cut my line or to attack with large re-enforcements from Manassas.

  As I have already stated, I cannot advance far, and if I could I think the movement very imprudent. When you make your attack I expect to advance and offer battle. If the enemy retires I shall not pursue. I am very desirous to know when the General-in-Chief wishes me to approach Leesburg. If the notice does not come in any other way, I wish you would indicate the day by telegraph, thus: “Let me hear of you on -.”

  I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

  R. PATTERSON, Major-General, Commanding.

  Col. E. D. TOWNSEND, Asst. Adjt. Gen., U. S. Army, Washington City.

  –––

  HAGERSTOWN, MD., July 9, 1861.

  Lieutenant-General SCOTT:

  I arrived here at 11 last night with the Fifth and Twelfth, being thirty hours in the cars. The artillery, two rifled guns, and two howitzers will be here this afternoon. Have reported by special messenger to General Patterson. Stone arrived at Martinsburg yesterday afternoon.

  C. W. SANDFORD.

  –––

  Minutes of Council of War.

  MARTINSBURG, July 9, 1861.

  Colonel CROSMAN, quartermaster, thought 900 wagons would be sufficient to furnish subsistence and to transport ammunition to our present force. The calculation for the original column was 700 wagons, of which 500 were on hand and 200 expected. The great difficulty win be to obtain forage for the animals, the present consumption being twenty-six tons daily,

  Captain BECKWITH, commissary: The question of subsistence, is here a question of transportation. Thus far no reliance has been placed on the adjacent country. A day’s march ahead would compel a resort to it. As far as known, those supplies would be quite inadequate.

  {p.164}

  Captain SIMPSON, Topographical Engineers: The difficulty of our present position arises from the great facility the enemy has to concentrate troops at Winchester from Manassas Junction. By the railroad 112,000 men could be sent there in a day, and again sent back to Manassas. Our forces should combine with the forces at Washington.

  Captain NEWTON, Engineers: Our present position is a very exposed one. General Johnston can keep us where we are as long as he pleases, and at any time make a demonstration on our rear. Our whole line is a false one. We have no business here except for the purpose of making a demonstration. He threatens us now. We, should be in a position to threaten him. We should go to Charlestown, Harper’s Ferry, Shepherdstown, and flank him.

  Colonel STONE: It is mainly a question for the staff. Our enemy has great facility of movement, and to extend our line would be accompanied with great danger. Johnston should be threatened from some other point. We might leave two regiments here, two guns at Shepherdstown, and proceed to Charlestown, and threaten from that point.

  General NEGLEY: Ditto to Captain Newton.

  Colonel THOMAS: Approves of a flank movement to Charlestown.

  Colonel ABERCROMBIE: The same.

  General KEIM: The same.

  General CADWALADER: Opposed to a forward movement.

  –––

  WASHINGTON, July 11, 1861.

  Maj. Gen. PATTERSON, Martinsburg, Va.:

  The author of the following is known, and he believes it authentic:

  WASHINGTON, July 9, 1861.

  The plan of operations of the secession army in Virginia contemplates the reverse of the proceedings and movements announced in the Express of yesterday and Saturday. A schedule that has come to light meditates a stand and an engagement by Johnston when he shall have drawn Patterson sufficiently far back from the river to render impossible his retreat across it on being vanquished, and an advance then by Johnston and Wise conjointly upon McClellan, and after the conquest of him, a march in this direction, to unite in one attack upon the Federal forces across the Potomac with the army under Beauregard at Manassas Junction and the wing of that army, the South Carolina regiments chiefly, now nine miles from Alexandria. Success in each of these three several movements is anticipated, and thereby not only the possession of the capital is thought to be assured, but an advance of the Federal troops upon Richmond prevented.

  The plan supposes that this success will give the Confederate cause such prestige and inspire in it such faith as will insure the recognition of its Government abroad, and at the same time so impair confidence in the Federal Government as to render it impossible for it to procure loans abroad, and very difficult for it to raise means at home.

  Real retreats, which have been anticipated, it will be seen, are by this plan altogether ignored. According to it, fighting and conquest are the orders.

  W. SCOTT.

  –––

  MARTINSBURG, VA., July 12, 1861.

  Col. E. D. TOWNSEND, Assistant Adjutant-General :

  Dispatch of 11th received and confirms my impression expressed on 9th instant. To properly strengthen my position and secure, line, of communication, now insecure, and more so as we advance; to insure expedition and continued success, I ask permission and a little time to transfer my depot to Harper’s Ferry, and my forces on line of operations {p.165} through Charlestown, over a good road. My depot will be better secured, more convenient, Dearer, and line better protected. I cannot now bring from Hagerstown, with present means of transportation, an ample supply of provisions for active operations. I call from Harper’s Ferry. I send to Hagerstown an officer to commence to-day the transfer, if assent be given, and I wish an answer to-day. Defeat here is ruin everywhere. I consider a regiment of regulars, and more, if possible, essential to give steadiness to my column and to carry on active operations against a determined opposition, and I urge that my three-months’ volunteers be replaced by three-years’ men. Many of them are barefooted and cannot be employed for active service. They can be made useful until their term expires for this transfer of depot. Many three-months’ men refuse to renew their service. The enemy have retired beyond Winchester, and are said to be fortifying.

  R. PATTERSON, Major-General, Commanding.

  –––

  WASHINGTON, July 12, 1861-1.30 p. m.

  Major-General PATTERSON:

  Go where you propose in your letter of the 9th instant. Should that movement cause the enemy to retreat upon Manassas via Strasburg, to follow him would seem at this distance hazardous, whereas the route from Charlestown, via Key’s Ferry, Hillsborough, and Leesburg, towards Alexandria, with the use of the canal on the other side of the river for heavy transportation, may be practicable. Consider this suggestion well, and, except in an extreme case, do not recross the Potomac with more than a sufficient detachment for your supplies on the canal.

  Let me hear of you on Tuesday. Write often when en route.

  WINFIELD SCOTT.

  –––

  MARTINSBURG, July 13, 1861.

  Col. E. D. TOWNSEND, Assistant Adjutant-General:

  McClellan’s victory received here with great joy; received without comment from the General-in-Chief. I have given and now give mine. My column must be preserved to insure to the country the fruits of this and other victories, which we hope will follow. My determination is not changed by this news. I would rather lose the chance, of accomplishing something brilliant than, by hazarding this Column, to destroy the fruits of the campaign to the country by defeat. If wrong, let me be instructed.

  R. PATTERSON, Major-General, Commanding.

  –––

  MARTINSBURG, July 13, 1861.

  Col. E. D. TOWNSEND, Assistant Adjutant-General:

  Received the announcement of McClellan’s victory with great gratification. His success, however, makes no change in my plans. This force is the keystone of the combined movements, and injury to it would counteract the good effects of all victories elsewhere. Johnston is in Position beyond Winchester, to be re-enforced, and his strength doubled just as I would reach him. My position is a strong one, but I must act cautiously whilst preparing to strike.

  R. PATTERSON, Major-General.

  {p.166}

  –––

  WASHINGTON, July 13, 1861.

  Major-General PATTERSON, Commanding U. S. Forces at Martinsburg, Va.:

  GENERAL: I telegraphed to you yesterday, if not strong enough to beat the enemy early next week, make demonstrations so as to detain him in the valley of Winchester; but if he retreats in force towards Manassas, and it be too hazardous to follow him, then consider the route via Key’s Ferry, Leesburg, &c.

  WINFIELD SCOTT.

  –––

  WASHINGTON, July 13, 1861.

  His Excellency Governor CURTIN, Governor of Pennsylvania:

  SIR: I respectfully request your excellency to send five of the long-term regiments of Pennsylvania Volunteers, in addition to the two at Cumberland, to report to Major-General Patterson, say at Harper’s Ferry, and the remainder of the long-term regiments to report to Lieutenant-General Scott in this city.

  I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

  SIMON CAMERON Secretary of War.

  –––

  MARTINSBURG, VA., July 14, 1861.

  COLONEL: I have thus far succeeded in keeping in this vicinity the command under General Johnston, who is now pretending to be engaged in fortifying at Winchester, but prepared to retire beyond striking distance if I should advance far.

  To-morrow I advance to Bunker Hill, preparatory to the other movement. If an opportunity offers, I shall attack; but unless I can rout, shall be careful not to set him in full retreat upon Strasburg. I have arranged for the occupation of Harper’s Ferry, opposite which point I have directed provisions to be sent.

  Many of the three months’ volunteers are very restless at the prospect of being retained over their time. This fact will cause you to hear from me in the direction of Charlestown. Want of ample transportation for supplies and baggage has prevented my moving earlier in the direction I desired.

  I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

  R. PATTERSON, Major-General, Commanding.

  Col. E. D. TOWNSEND, Asst. Adjt. Gen., Hdqrs. of the Army, Washington City.

  –––

  BUNKER HILL, VA., July 16, 1861.

  COLONEL: I have the honor to report for the information of the General-in-Chief my advance and arrival at this place yesterday, opposed only by a body of six hundred cavalry, of which one was killed and five taken prisoners.

  To-morrow I move upon Charlestown. A reconnaissance shows the Winchester road blocked by fallen trees and fences placed across it, indicating no confidence in the large force now said to be at Winchester. {p.167} I send you a sketch,* prepared by Captain Simpson, of the works said to have been erected in the vicinity of Winchester.

  I shall (preparations already commenced) hold and occupy Harper’s Ferry with the three years’ troops. If the General-in-Chief desires to retain that place (and I advise it never to be evacuated), I desire to be informed at once by telegraph.

  I have to report that the term of service of a very large portion of this force will expire in a few days. From an undercurrent expression of feeling I am confident that many will be inclined to lay down their arms the day the term expires. With such a feeling existing any active operations towards Winchester cannot be thought of until they are replaced by three years’ men. Those whose terms will expire this week I shall arrange to send off by Harper’s Ferry-those for Philadelphia via Baltimore and those for Harrisburg via Hagerstown.

  If Harper’s Ferry is to be held, after securing that I shall, if the General-in-Chief desires, advance with the remainder of the troops via Leesburg, provided the force under Johnston does not remain at Winchester, after the success which I anticipate from General McDowell. I wish to be advised if these propositions meet with the approval of the General-in-Chief.

  The Wisconsin regiments are without arms and accouterments, which I have directed the commander of Frankford Arsenal to provide. Telegrams will reach me via Hagerstown and also via Point of Rocks.

  I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

  R. PATTERSON. Major-General, Commanding.

  Col. E. D. TOWNSEND, Asst. Adjt. Gen., Hdqrs. of the Army, Washington City.

  * Not found.

  –––

  CHARLESTOWN, VA., July 17, 1861.

  Col. E. D. TOWNSEND, U. S. Army:

  The term of service of the Pennsylvania troops (eighteen regiments) expires within seven days, commencing tomorrow. Can rely on none of them renewing service. I must be at once provided with efficient three years’ men or withdraw to Harper’s Ferry. Shall I reoccupy permanently Harper’s Ferry or withdraw entirely? I wrote, yesterday on this-subject, and now wish to be informed of the intention of the General-in-Chief. My march to-day was without opposition or incident of importance. The country has been drained of men. This place has been a depot of supplies for force at Winchester, and the presence of the army is not welcomed.

  I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

  R. PATTERSON, Major-General, Commanding.

  (Repeated July 18.)

  –––

  JULY 17, 1861-9.30 p. m.

  Major-General PATTERSON, U. S. Forces, Harper’s Ferry:

  I have nothing official from you since Sunday [14th], but am glad to learn, through Philadelphia papers, that you have advanced. Do not let the enemy amuse and delay you with a small force in front whilst {p.168} he re-enforces the Junction with his main body. McDowell’s first day’s work has driven the enemy beyond Fairfax Court-House. The Junction will probably be carried to-morrow.

  WINFIELD SCOTT.

  –––

  CHARLESTOWN, VA., July 18, 1861-1.30 a. m.

  Colonel TOWNSEND, Headquarters of the Army:

  Telegram of to-night [17th] received. Mine gives the condition of my command. Some regiments have given warning not to serve an hour over time. To attack under such circumstances against the greatly superior force at Winchester is most hazardous. My letter of 16th gives you further information. Shall I attack?

  R. PATTERSON, Major-General, Commanding.

  (Repeated same day.)

  –––

  WASHINGTON, July 18, 1861.

  Major-General PATTERSON, Commanding U. S. Forces, &c., Charlestown, Va.:

  I have certainly been expecting you to beat the enemy. If not, to hear that you had felt him strongly, or, at least, had occupied him by threats and demonstrations. You have been at least his equal, and, I suppose, superior, in numbers. Has he not stolen a march and sent re-enforcements toward Manassas Junction? A week is enough to win victories. The time of volunteers counts from the day of muster into the service of the United States. You must not retreat across the Potomac. If necessary, when abandoned by the short-term volunteers, intrench somewhere and wait for re-enforcements.

  WINFIELD SCOTT.

  –––

  CHARLESTOWN, VA., July 18, 1861.

  Col. E. D. TOWNSEND:

  Telegraph of to-day received. The enemy has stolen no march upon me. I have kept him actively employed, and by threats and reconnaissances in force caused him to be re-enforced. I have accomplished in this respect more than the General-in-Chief asked or could well be expected, in face of an enemy far superior in numbers, with no line of communication to protect. Our future post-office, Sandy Hook.

  R. PATTERSON, Major-General, Commanding.

  –––

  CHARLESTOWN, VA., July 18, 1861-1 p. m.

  Col. E. D. TOWNSEND, Asst. Adjt. Gen., U. S. Army, Washington, D. C.:

  I have succeeded, in accordance with the wishes of the General-in-Chief, in keeping General Johnston’s force at Winchester. A reconnaissance in force on Tuesday caused him to be largely re-enforced from Strasburg.

  With the existing feeling and determination of the three months’ men to return home, it would be ruinous to advance, or even to stay here, {p.169} without immediate increase of force to replace them. They will not remain.

  I have ordered the brigades to assemble this afternoon I and shall make a personal appeal to the troops to stay a few days until I can be re-enforced. Many of the regiments are without shoes; the Government refuses to furnish them; the men have received no pay, and neither officers nor soldiers have money to purchase with. Under these circumstances, I cannot ask or expect the three months’ volunteers to stay longer than one week. Two companies of Pennsylvania volunteers, were discharged to-day and ordered home. I to-day place additional force at Harper’s Ferry, and establish communication with Maryland.

  I send Captain Newton to prepare for its defense.

  R. PATTERSON, Major-General, Commanding.

  (Repeated same day.)

  –––

  CHARLESTOWN, VA., July 18, 1861.

  COLONEL: I arrived at this place on the 17th instant. Nothing of importance occurred on the march. The principal inhabitants left some ten days since, anticipating its occupation by the Federal troops. It was till our arrival the location of a band of secession militia, engaged in pressing into service the young men of the country.

  I have to acknowledge the receipt of two telegrams from the General-in-Chief of the 17th and 18th instants, both looking to a movement and attack upon Winchester. A state of affairs existed which the General-in-Chief is not aware of though in some respects anticipated by his instructions that if I found the enemy too strong to attack, to threaten and make demonstrations to retain him at Winchester. I more than carried out the wishes of the General-in-Chief in this respect.

  Before I left Martinsburg I was informed of a large increase to Johnston’s command, and the visit to Winchester of the leading members of the Confederate Army. Just before General McDowell was to strike I advanced to Bunker Hill, causing surprise, and, I have since learned, an additional increase of force.

  On Tuesday I sent out a reconnoitering party toward Winchester. It drove in the enemy’s pickets, and caused the army to be formed in line of battle, anticipating an attack from my main force. This party found the road barricaded and blocked by fallen trees. The following day I left for this place.

  Before marching from Martinsburg I heard of the mutterings of many of the volunteer regiments, and their expressed determination not to serve one hour after their term of service should expire. I anticipated a better expression of opinion as we approached the enemy, and hoped to hear of a willingness to remain a week or ten days. I was disappointed, and when I prepared for a movement to the front, by an order for the men to carry two days’ provisions in their haversacks, I was assailed by earnest remonstrances against being detained over their time-complaints from officers of want of shoes and other clothing-all throwing obstacles in the way of active operations. Indeed, I found I should, if I took Winchester, be without men, and be forced to retreat, and thus lose the fruits of victory. Under the circumstances neither I nor those on whom I could rely could advance with any confidence. I am, therefore, nowhere with a force which will be dwindling away very rapidly. I to-day appealed almost in vain to the regiments {p.170} to stand by the country for a week or ten days. The men are longing for their homes, and nothing can detain them.

  I sent Captain Newton to-day to Harper’s Ferry to arrange for defense and re-establish communication with Maryland; also, the Massachusetts regiment. The Third Wisconsin will soon be there. Lieutenant Babcock lifts been at Sandy Hook several days, trying to get the canal in operation, preparing the entrance to ford, putting in operation a ferry, and reconstructing the bridge. Depots for all supplies will soon be established, and then I shall cause to be turned in the camp equipage, &c., of the regiments, and to that place I shall withdraw if I find my force so small as to render my present position unsafe. I cannot intrench sufficiently to defend this place against a large force.

  I shall direct the regiments to be sent to Harrisburg and Philadelphia to be mustered out by Captain Hastings, Major Ruff, and Captain Wharton.

  I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

  R. PATTERSON, Major-General, Commanding.

  Col. E. D. TOWNSEND, Asst. Adjt. Gen., U. S. Army, Washington City.

  –––

  CHARLESTOWN, VA., July 19, 1861.

  ADJUTANT-GENERAL U. S. ARMY, Washington City:

  Almost all the three-months’ volunteers refuse to serve an hour over their term, and except three regiments which will stay ten days the most of them are without shoes and without pants. I am compelled to send them home, many of them at once. Some go to Harrisburg, some to. Philadelphia, one to Indiana, and if not otherwise directed by telegraph, I shall send them to the place of muster, to which I request rolls may be sent, and Captain Hastings, Major Ruff, and Captain Wharton ordered to muster them out. They cannot march, and unless a paymaster goes to them, they will be indecently clad and have just cause of complaint.

  R. PATTERSON, Major-General, Commanding.

  –––

  CHARLESTOWN, July 19, 1861.

  Lieut. Gen. WINFIELD SCOTT, Commanding:

  GENERAL: The delay incident even to telegraphic communication, and to the importance of retaining this line, induces me to dispatch my aide-de-camp, Major Russell, who will inform you fully as to my position, and take your directions.

  I have the honor to be, with great respect, your obedient servant,

  R. PATTERSON, Major-General, Commanding.

  –––

  CHARLESTOWN, July 19, 1861.

  Col. E. D. TOWNSEND:

  I sent Major Russell to you to-day as messenger. The Second and Third Pennsylvania Volunteers demand discharge, and I send them {p.171} home to-morrow; others follow immediately. The enemy, from last information, are still at Winchester, and being re-enforced every night. I have asked Postmaster-General to establish post-office at Harper’s Ferry. There is none at Sandy Hook.

  R. PATTERSON, Major-General.

  –––

  HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF PENNSYLVANIA, Charlestown, Va., July 19, 1861.

  COLONEL: In reply to your communication of yesterday* the commanding general directs me to say that there is no intention or desire to retain the regiment beyond their term of service against the will of the members. He, however, earnestly desires and appeals to the regiment to remain a short time over its term, to enable him to relieve it without the great injury to the service resulting from the loss of a large and valuable portion of this command. The sudden depletion of this force jeopardizes its safety and the interest of the country, which your regiment came out to defend, and have nobly sustained. In his appeal now to the brave, he feels that sacrifices will be made till this place can be safely held and this force not be compelled to retire. Re-enforcements are promised and daily expected, and as rapidly as he can relieve every regiment which desires to go he will do so. He knows, too, that as long as danger threatens the regiment will not leave. Can you give him assurances they will remain till he can safely relieve them, which he thinks cannot exceed ten days, and may be much less?

  I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

  F. J. PORTER, Assistant Adjutant-General.

  Col. LEWIS WALLACE, Comdg. Eleventh Indiana Regt., Camp near Charlestown, Va.

  * Not found.

  –––

  GENERAL ORDERS, No. 46.}

  WAR DEP’T, ADJ’T-GENERAL’s OFFICE, Washington, July 19, 1861.

  I. Major-General Robert Patterson, of the Pennsylvania Volunteers, will be honorably discharged from the service of the United States on the 27th instant, when his tour of duty will expire.

  Brevet Major-General Cadwalader, also of the Pennsylvania Volunteers, will be honorably discharged upon the receipt of this order, as his term of service expires to-day.

  II. Major-General Dix, of the United States forces, will relieve Major-General Banks, of the same service, in his present command, Which will in future be called the Department of Maryland, Headquarters at Baltimore.

  Upon being relieved by Major-General Dix, Major-General Banks will proceed to the valley of Virginia, and assume command of the army now under Major-General Patterson, when that department will be called the Department of the Shenandoah, headquarters in the field.

  ...

  By order:

  L. THOMAS, Adjutant-General.

  {p.172}

  –––

  SPECIAL ORDERS, No. 108.}

  HDQRS. DEPT. OF PENNSYLVANIA, Charlestown, Va., July 20, 1861.

  All troops at Martinsburg or on their way thither from Williamsport are directed to retrace their steps at once and to return to their former stations.

  By order of Major-General Patterson:

  F. J. PORTER, A. A. G.

  –––

  CHARLESTOWN, VA., July 20, 1861.

  Col. E. D. TOWNSEND:

  With a portion of his force Johnston left Winchester by the road to Millwood on the afternoon of the 18th. His whole force was about thirty-five thousand two hundred.

  R. PATTERSON.

  –––

  HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, Washington, July 20, 1861.

  Major-General PATTERSON, U. S. Army, Charlestown, Va.:

  Five Pennsylvania regiments, Colonel Paine’s Fourth Wisconsin, now at Harrisburg, and four regiments from this city, are ordered to join your army.

  E. D. TOWNSEND, Assistant Adjutant-General.

  –––

  HARPER’S FERRY, July 21, 1861.

  Col. E. D. TOWNSEND:

  I came here to-day. Yesterday Winchester and this county were abandoned by all armed parties. Johnston left for Millwood, to operate on McDowell’s right and to turn through Loudoun upon me. I could not follow. The only active troops I have are the Second Cavalry, Doubleday’s, Perkins’, Rhode Island Battery, Second Massachusetts, Third Wisconsin (not fully equipped), Fourth Connecticut at Hagerstown, &c., Twelfth, Nineteenth, and Twentieth New York. All others are barefooted. Their term expires in a few days, and I am required by General Orders, No. – to send them home. Five regiments have gone; four go to-morrow, and so on. The Third Wisconsin will be placed temporarily on the canal, which parties have lately attempted to destroy, and will remain till I am provided with troops for active service. I have ordered the hospital depot, &c., at Hagerstown to be transferred to this place, but if you order me to you, will countermand the order. A large force will be required to defend this place against an active foe. I hear nothing of the Pennsylvania Reserves. Shall I join you with all my effective force, abandoning this place, sending home the three months’ men, and my supplies to Washington?

  R. PATTERSON, Major-General, Commanding.

  –––

  HEADQUARTERS, July 22, 1861-1.30 a. m.

  General BANKS, Baltimore, Md.:

  Proceed to Harper’s Ferry and relieve General Patterson, turning over your present command to General Dix.

  WINFIELD SCOTT.

  {p.173}

  –––

  HARPER’S FERRY, July 23, 1861.

  Col. E. D. TOWNSEND, Assistant Adjutant-General, Headquarters Army:

  My train is crossing the river, and I will go to join with all my available force unless I hear from you by immediate return dispatch.

  R. PATTERSON, Major-General, Commanding.

  –––

  WASHINGTON, July 23, 1861-4.15 p. m.

  To General PATTERSON, Harper’s Ferry, Va.:

  Your force is not wanted here. It is expected you will hold Harper’s Ferry unless threatened by a force well ascertained to be competent to expel you.

  WINFIELD SCOTT.

  –––

  WASHINGTON, July 23, 1861-11.30 p. m.

  Major-General BANKS, U. S. Army, Commanding, &c., Harper’s Ferry:

  I deem it useful, perhaps highly important, to hold Harper’s Ferry. It will probably soon be attacked, but not, I hope, before I shall have sent you adequate re-enforcements. A Connecticut regiment may soon be expected by you. Others shall to-morrow be ordered to follow.

  WINFIELD SCOTT.

  –––

  WASHINGTON, July 23, 1861-11.30 p. m.

  Major-General BANKS, Harper’s Ferry:

  The following information has just been received from A. N. Rankin, editor of Rep. and Transcript:

  There are nine 32-pounders, four 44-pounders, and two 6-pounders, and 1,000 stand of arms at Winchester, with but 500 men, raw militia, to guard the same. There are also about 1,000 tents and a very large amount of powder, balls, and shell.

  WINFIELD SCOTT.

  –––

  HARPER’S FERRY, VA., July 23, 1861.

  Brevet Major-General CADWALADER, Hagerstown, Md. :

  My DEAR GENERAL: I inclose an army order cut from a newspaper, which contains the only information on the subject which has reached these headquarters.* It is doubtless genuine, and under these circumstances neither you nor I can make any movement towards Washington without being liable to the imputation of seeking service or thrusting ourselves upon the administration.

  I have therefore to request that you will consider the order which you sent to Hagerstown rescinded.

  Brigadier-General Williams will leave here to-morrow with the Tenth Regiment, and is ordered to take command of any troops he may find at Hagerstown and conduct them to Harrisburg.

  I will follow you as soon as relieved.

  With great regard, very sincerely, yours,

  R. PATTERSON, Major-General, Commanding.

  * Reference is probably to General Order, No. 46, of July 19, p. 171.

  {p.174}

  –––

  HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF PENNSYLVANIA, Harper’s Ferry, Va., July 24, 1861-3 p. m.

  Col. E. D. TOWNSEND:

  While awaiting the arrival of General Banks, who is addressed as commanding here, I have carefully considered the telegram of 11.30 p. m. of 23d from the General-in-Chief to him, and the course to be followed. Winchester is now occupied by about three thousand men. It is true they are militia; more in number than the effective men at my disposal. Three-years’ men only reliable. A proper force to take it now would strip the supplies here and at Sandy Hook of reliable protection. I consider the occupation of Harper’s Ferry with the small force here as hazardous, and as untenable against a formidable force with less than 20,000 men. The number now here is too small to hold Harper’s Ferry, and too large to retreat with if forced to evacuate. No re-enforcements heard of and regiments going off at the rate of two to four per day.

  R. PATTERSON, Major-General, Commanding.

  –––

  HAGERSTOWN, July 25, 1861.

  Col. F. J. PORTER, Asst. Adjt. Gen., Hdqrs. Department of Pennsylvania:

  SIR: I am possessed of reliable information that a messenger left this place for Baltimore with a dispatch from the Confederate Army to the rebels in Baltimore, to the effect that their generals were determined to make a dash at some point, and that Beauregard was for attacking Washington and General Lee was for Baltimore, going through this State at this point, and this plan was adopted. This messenger stated that there would be hell to pay in this place in less than six days, and that Baltimore would be in their hands without the slightest doubt.

  This messenger left here on the night of the 23d, and stated that his dispatch was from Governor Pratt, of this place.

  I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

  LEVI WOODHOUSE, Colonel Commanding Fourth Regiment Connecticut Volunteers.

  –––

  GENERAL ORDERS, No. 33.}

  HDQRS. DEP’T OF PENNSYLVANIA, Harper’s Perry, Va., July 25, 1861.

  The term for which the troops from Pennsylvania were called into service having expired, and nearly all of them having returned to their homes, the commanding general, by direction of the War Department, relinquishes the command of this department on the expiration of his term of service.

  The commanding general regrets to leave you. It is with satisfaction that he recalls to you that you have steadily advanced in the face of the enemy, greatly superior in numbers and artillery, and offered battle, which they refused until protected by their strong intrenchments at Winchester.

  You have done all that was possible and more than could have been expected or demanded, and if advantage has not been taken of your sacrifices and if the fruits of your campaign have been lost, the fault cannot be imputed to you.

  To the members of the department staff he tenders his thanks for their efficient aid and devotion to duty.

  R. PATTERSON, Major-General, Commanding.

  {p.175}

  –––

  GENERAL ORDERS, No. 34.}

  HDQRS. DEP’T OF THE SHENANDOAH, Harper’s Ferry, Va., July 25, 1861.

  By virtue of orders received from the War Department, Maj. Gen. N. P. Banks hereby assumes command of this department.

  By order of General Banks:

  ROBT. WILLIAMS, Assistant Adjutant-General.

  –––

  PHILADELPHIA, PA., November 1, 1861.

  Hon. SIMON CAMERON, Secretary of War, Washington:

  SIR: Believing to the present moment that, on account of other persons, a public examination into the manner in which the affairs of the Department of Pennsylvania while under my command were conducted, and that the publication of the correspondence with and orders to me of the General-in-Chief, especially connected with the late campaign in Maryland and Virginia, might be detrimental to the interests of the service, I have refrained from asking for an investigation or permission to publish the orders by which I was controlled. The same reason has caused me studiously to avoid verbal statements on the subject in reply to numerous inquiries.

  Charges have been publicly made through the press and the impression created that the design of the campaign was not carried out by me, but rather deranged by my neglect or violation of orders. Intimations against my loyalty have been insidiously circulated. From the silence of my immediate commander I infer he does not design to relieve me from the odium attached to these reports and rumors. While I am willing, if the general good demand it, to suffer personally, and am desirous that no course on my part shall prove injurious to public interest, yet I believe the time has arrived when the question as to the manner in which I executed the duties intrusted to me may be safely investigated, so that the failure to accomplish certain results never anticipated of my command by the General-in-Chief, until he saw his defeat, may be ascribed to the real cause. Further silence, therefore, on my part would confirm the impression that I plead guilty to the charges that have been made against my honor, my loyalty, and my military capacity. I have a right at least to be relieved from the position in which my long silence, caused solely by an earnest desire for the success of our cause, has left me.

  In presenting this my application for a court of inquiry, or permission to publish my correspondence with the General-in-Chief, I claim and am ready to substantiate

  1st. That if the General-in-Chief ever designed my command to enter upon the soil of Virginia with prospects of success, he destroyed my power when greatest, and when that of the enemy was weakest, by recalling to Washington, after they had crossed the Potomac, all my regular troops, with the Rhode Island regiment and battery, leaving me but a single company of cavalry, which had not then been one month in service, and entirely destitute of artillery.

  2d. That the General-in-Chief forbade my advance, and compelled me to recall to Maryland all the troops which, confident of success, had crossed the Potomac into Virginia in execution of a plan which had been submitted to him and had received his cordial approbation.

  3d. That for a long time the General-in-Chief kept my command in a crippled condition, and demanded my advance after he had withdrawn {p.176} from me all my available artillery, and only after the enemy had had time to become vastly my superior in artillery, infantry, and cavalry, and was intrenched. In answer to my earnest appeals he re-enforced me only after the occasion for employing re-enforcements had passed away.

  4th. That if the General-in-Chief designed me to do more than threaten the enemy at Winchester, he did not divulge his wish.

  5th. That if the General-in-Chief, expected me to follow to Manassas “close upon the heels of Johnston,” he expected a physical impossibility; the enemy moving part of the way by rail from an intermediate point, while our army was on foot, entering an enemy’s country, and guarding a heavy train and a depot retained by him in an improper place.

  6th. The General-in-Chief forbade pursuit of the enemy in the event that he should retire towards Manassas, fearing to press him on Washington.

  7th. That I was informed by the General-in-Chief the attack on Manassas would be made on Tuesday, the 16th of July, instead of Sunday, the 21st; at which time he directed me to make such a demonstration upon Winchester as to keep the enemy at that place. I claim that the demonstration was made on that day, and that he did not avail himself of the fruits of that movement, as he had expected to do all that was demanded of me, and more, was effected.

  8th. That if the army I had commanded had attacked Winchester on Tuesday, the 16th of July, as it has since been alleged I was ordered to do, two armies, instead of one, would have been demoralized, and the enemy would have turned with all the flush of victory to a triumph in front of Washington.

  9th. That I have suffered additional injustice at the hands of the General-in-Chief, who sanctioned and fixed the impression that the enemy at Winchester was inferior to me in force in every arm of service, and yet has not corrected that report, although he knew two days after the battle of Bull Run that siege artillery heavier than mine, and three times as numerous, had been left by the enemy at Winchester, while a greater number of guns had been carried away.

  I remain, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

  R. PATTERSON.

  –––

  PHILADELPHIA, November 26, 1861.

  Hon. SIMON CAMERON, Secretary of Mar:

  SIR: I respectfully request that you will do me the justice, to refer to my letter of the 1st instant, and give it your early attention. I cannot refrain from intimating a confident hope that my application for a court of inquiry will meet with your favorable consideration, and that an order for the detail will be made at the earliest moment consistent with the interests of the service.

  I have the honor to be, with great respect, your obedient servant,

  R. PATTERSON, Major-General.

  –––

  WAR DEPARTMENT, November 30, 1861.

  General R. PATTERSON, Philadelphia, Pa.:

  GENERAL: I have to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 26th instant, calling my attention to your communication of the 1st of {p.177} November, which contains a request for an inquiry into the late campaign in Virginia, in which you commanded a part of the United States forces. Your letter did not reach me until my return to this city, and subsequent to the departure of Lieutenant-General Scott to Europe.

  There appears to be no precedent in our service for an investigation or trial of an officer’s conduct after he has received an honorable discharge. The inquiry you desire to have instituted would equally concern the late General-in-Chief, and as it appears to me, in justice to him, should not be made in his absence. The respect I have, always entertained for you, as well as the friendly relations which have long existed between us, would claim for any personal request from you the most prompt and favorable attention; but in my public capacity, in the present of condition of affairs, I cannot convince myself that my duty to the Government and to the country would justify me in acceding to your request. I must, therefore, reluctantly decline the appointment of a court of inquiry at this time.

  With much respect, your obedient servant,

  SIMON CAMERON, Secretary of War.

  –––

  IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES, December 17, 1861.

  Resolved, That the Secretary of War be requested, if not incompatible with the public interest, to furnish the Senate with copies of the correspondence between Lieutenant-General Scott and Major-General Patterson, and with all orders from the former to the latter, from the 16th day of April, 1861, to the 25th day of July, inclusive.

  Attest:

  J. W. FORNEY, Secretary.

  –––

  WAR DEPARTMENT, Washington, December 24, 1861.

  Hon. H. HAMLIN, President of the Senate:

  SIR: In answer to the resolution of the Senate of the 17th instant, I have the honor to transmit herewith a report of the Adjutant-General, from which it will be perceived that it is not deemed compatible with the public interest at this time to furnish the correspondence between Generals Scott and Patterson, as called for.

  Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

  SIMON CAMERON, Secretary of War.

  [Inclosure.]

  HDQRS. OF THE ARMY, ADJT. GEN.’S OFFICE, Washington, December 23, 1861.

  Hon. SECRETARY OF WAR, Washington, D. C.:

  SIR: In compliance with your instructions, I have the honor to report that, after due consideration, the General-in-Chief is of opinion it would be “incompatible with the public interest to furnish the Senate with copies of the correspondence between Lieutenant-General Scott and Major-General Patterson, and with all orders from the former to the latter from the 16th day of April, 1861, to the 23d day of July, inclusive,” At this time, as called for in the resolution of December 17, 1861.

  Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

  L. THOMAS, Adjutant-General. {p.178}

  NEW YORK, March 31, 1862.

  To the Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War:

  On the statement of Major-General Patterson, submitted by him as evidence to the honorable the Committee of the House of Representatives on the Conduct of the War, I beg leave to remark-

  1. That his statement, 148 long pages, closely and indistinctly written, has been before me about forty-eight hours, including a Sunday when I was too much indisposed to work or to go to church; that I cannot write, or read at night, nor at any time except by short efforts, and that I have been entirely without help.

  2. That, consequently, I have read but little of the statement and voluminous documents appended, and have but about two hours left for comments on that little.

  3. The documents (mainly correspondence between General Patterson and myself) are badly copied, being hardly intelligible in some places from the omission and change of words.

  4. General Patterson was never ordered by me, as he seems to allege, to attack the enemy without a probability of success, but on several occasions he wrote as if he were assured of victory. For example, June 12 he says he is “resolved to conquer, and will risk nothing;” and July 4, expecting supplies the next day, he adds, as soon as they “arrive I shall advance to Winchester, to drive the enemy from that place.” Accordingly, he issued orders for the movement on the 8th; next called a council of war, and stood fast at Martinsburg.

  5. But although General Patterson was never specifically ordered to attack the enemy, he was certainly told and expected, even if with inferior numbers, to hold the rebel army in his front on the alert, and to prevent it from re-enforcing Manassas Junction by means of threatening maneuvers and demonstrations-results often obtained in war with half numbers.

  6. After a time General P. moved upon Bunker Hill, and then fell off upon Charlestown, whence he seems to have made no other demonstration that did not look like a retreat out of Virginia. From that movement Johnston was at liberty to join Beauregard with any part of the army of Winchester.

  7. General P. alludes with feeling to my recall from him back to Washington, after the enemy had evacuated Harper’s Ferry, of certain troops sent to enable him to take that place; but the recall was necessary to prevent the Government and capital from falling into the enemy’s hands. His inactivity, however, from that cause need not have been more than temporary, for he was soon re-enforced up to at least the enemy’s maximum number in the Winchester Valley, without leading to a battle or even a reconnaissance in force.

  8. He also often called for batteries and rifled cannon beyond our capacity to supply at the moment, and so in respect to regular troops, one or more regiments. He might as well have asked for a brigade of elephants. Till some time later we had for the defense of the Government in its capital but a few companies of regular foot and horse, and not half the number of troops, including all descriptions, if the enemy had chosen to attack us.

  9. As connected with this subject, I hope I may be permitted to notice the charge made against me on the floors of Congress, that I did not stop Brigadier-General McDowell’s movement upon Manassas Junction after I had been informed of the re-enforcement sent thither from Winchester, though urged to do so by one or more members of the Cabinet. {p.179} Now, it was at the reception of that news too late to call off the troops from the attack, and, besides, though opposed to the movement at first, we had all become animated and Sanguine of success, and it is not true that I was urged by anybody in authority to stop the attack, which was commenced as early, I think, as the 18th of July.

  10. I have but time to say that among the disadvantages under which I have been writing are these: I have not had within reach one of my own papers and not an officer who was with me at the period in question.

  Respectfully submitted to the committee.

  WINFIELD SCOTT.

  –––

  No. 2.

  Report of Capt. James H. Simpson, U. S. Topographical Engineers.

  HDQRS. DEPARTMENT OF PENNSYLVANIA, Martinsburg, Va., July 4, 1861.

  MAJOR: I have to report that the column under General Patterson crossed the Potomac from Williamsport into Virginia on the morning of the 2d, and encamped the same night at Hainesville, on Hoke’s Run, twelve miles distant. The main column, under General Patterson, consisting of probably three fourths of the command, took the most direct route. The balance of the command, under the command of General Negley, and which I accompanied, took a more circuitous route, the object being to sweep the whole country. We met the enemy on both routes, but they could not withstand the force of our array, and, after exchanging some shots, fled precipitately. The next morning we started for this city, which we reached yesterday before noon, our entry being of the most gallant character, and the citizens generally receiving us with cheers of gratulations and sweet smiles of approbation. The enemy in a small body is posted, or were yesterday, about two and one-half miles from us on the Winchester road, but they will not be permitted to remain there long. To-day our train has gone to Williamsport to obtain supplies. The main body of the enemy is represented as being intrenched about seven miles from us on the Winchester road. They are variously estimated by the citizens of the country from 7,000 to 20,000 strong. We probably are about 10,000 strong.

  I have the honor to be, major, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

  J. H. SIMPSON, Captain, Topographical Engineers.

  Maj. HARTMAN BACHE, Comdg. Corps Topographical Engineers, Washington, D. C.

  –––

  No. 3.

  Report of Col. George H. Thomas, Second U. S. Cavalry.

  HDQRS. 1ST BRIG., 1ST Div., PATTERSON’S COLUMN, Camp near Martinsburg, Va., July 3, 1861.

  SIR: I have the honor to submit the following report of the operations of the First Brigade, under my command, in the encounter with the enemy on the 2d instant. About one mile in advance of Falling Waters, on the road from Williamsport, Md., to Martinsburg, Va., Colonel {p.180} Abercrombie, in command of the leading brigade, was met by the enemy, who had taken a position in a body of timber, and opposed his advance with much determination, using both artillery and infantry. My brigade being the next, I brought it into line on the left of the road, one section of Perkins’ Battery being thrown forward, supported by the Twenty-third Regiment Pennsylvania Volunteers (Colonel Dare), completely outflanking the enemy’s right. After a few discharges from the artillery the enemy retreated, hotly pursued both by Abercrombie’s Brigade, on the right of the road, and mine on the left, for more than three miles. The Twenty-first Regiment Pennsylvania Volunteers (Colonel Ballier) deployed as skirmishers, supported by the Sixth, Colonel Nagle, passed over their camp, which had been abandoned in much disorder and haste.

  The artillery, supported by the Twenty-third Pennsylvania Volunteers, advanced along the road, until halted by the general’s orders, and my brigade went into camp upon part of the ground previously occupied by the enemy on Hoke’s Run. Two companies of the Second Cavalry, Captains Whiting and Royall, were held in reserve, as I hoped that I might have an opportunity of charging the enemy after the retreat commenced; but no such opportunity was offered, on account of the broken and wooded nature of the country over which we had to operate.

  There were no casualties in my brigade. One hundred and fifty tents were found in the enemy’s camps and destroyed; also a large quantity of forage, as we had no means of transporting either. It gives me much pleasure to say that the troops behaved with the utmost coolness and precision during the engagement. I herewith submit reports of Captains Perkins and Hudson, in command of separate sections of artillery.

  Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

  GEO. H. THOMAS, Colonel Second Cavalry, Commanding First Brigade.

  Maj. F. J. PORTER, Asst. Adjt. Gen., Hdqrs. Department of Pennsylvania.

  –––

  No. 4.

  Report of Lieut. D. D. Perkins, Fourth U. S. Artillery.

  CAMP NEAR MARTINSBURG, VA., July 4, 1861.

  SIR: I have the honor to submit the following report of my operations in the affair of the 2d instant. My battery of light artillery, Company F, of the Fourth Regiment, U. S. Army, having been assigned by sections to the different columns, I remained with the center section (Lieutenant Martin’s), composed of two 6-pounder guns. A few miles after crossing the Potomac firing commenced on the right, with Colonel Abercrombie’s brigade, and by direction of Col. George H. Thomas, commanding brigade to which I had been assigned, I proceeded as rapidly as possible to the front, and took position in a wheat field on the left of the main road. Here, not finding any occasion to place my guns in battery, I passed on, inclining to the right through several fields, up to a thick wood, which afforded cover for a body of the enemy’s skirmishers. With the assistance of Colonel Dare and Colonel Ballier, commanding regiments, in support, this place was soon cleared, and I moved along the edge of the wood, when, by direction of Colonel Thomas, who visited {p.181} my section at that time, I struck into the main road, and continued in it thereafter.

  A quarter of a mile beyond the point where I entered the road, I was informed at a farm-house that a considerable force of the rebels had passed about ten minutes before. Striking into a gallop, I took my section as far ahead of its support as I dared, and halted until I could get sight of its approach. Immediately I was visited by two officers of the enemy. I went out to meet them. We brought our horses together, and shook hands quite cordially, when they asked me what company I belonged to and how far “the boys” were behind. I answered so as to allay any suspicion they might have that I was not one of their own party, and endeavored to detain them, for neither I nor my section were provided with small-arms. At first they appeared satisfied that my pieces formed a part of their own flying artillery. Suddenly they somehow discovered their error, and, bending over their horses’ necks, ran away at the utmost speed. As soon as could be done in a narrow road, I put my pieces in battery and discharged some canister then some spherical case-shot, at them and their retreating friends, with what effect I do not know. I then returned to camp.

  I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

  D. D. PERKINS, First Lieut. Fourth Artillery, Comdg. Co. F, Fourth Artillery.

  Col. G. H. THOMAS, Commanding First Brigade.

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  No. 5.

  Report of Maj. Gen. W. 17. Keim, Pennsylvania Militia.

  SECOND DIVISION HEADQUARTERS, Camp Brown, Martinsburg, Va., July 8, 1861.

  SIR: I have the honor to transmit to you the reports of the First Regiment Wisconsin Volunteers, Col. John C. Starkweather, and the Eleventh Regiment Pennsylvania Volunteers, Col. P. Jarrett, received through Col. J. J. Abercrombie, officer commanding Sixth Brigade, Second Division, U. S. Army. The details are given so clearly, it is not necessary to dilate upon that subject.

  The enemy had the advantage of position and local information. Posted so as to command the approach of the brigade under Colonel Abercrombie, they opened fire near Hoke’s Run, beyond Falling Waters, six miles from Williamsport, Md. The Wisconsin regiment, in the advance, promptly responded to the attack, supported by the Eleventh Regiment Pennsylvania Volunteers, until Captain Perkins’ battery was placed in position. When united, a galling fire, was opened upon them. Captain McMullin’s Rangers, the First City Troop, Captain James, and Colonel Thomas’ command maintained a position under fire with great firmness.

  Col. J. J. Abercrombie, commanding the brigade, deserves great credit for the skill and the masterly manner in which he handled the troops. I beg you will report him favorably to the War Department. The presence of the commanding general, Maj. Gen. Robert Patterson, and staff, was of essential service. It infused life and spirit into the different commands. With the eye of the commander upon them, they acted bravely and with great steadiness, considering the short time of Service and with inexperienced volunteers.

  {p.182}

  The loss on the part of the enemy was large, estimated from 60 to 80 killed and a large number wounded. Our loss, 2 killed; 13 wounded; 1 missing.

  I have the honor to remain, your obedient servant,

  W. H. KEIM, Major-General, Comdg. Second Div. Pennsylvania Vols.

  Col. F. J. PORTER, Department of Pennsylvania.

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  No. 6.

  Report of Col. J. J. Abercrombie, Seventh U. S. Infantry.

  HEADQUARTERS SIXTH BRIGADE, July 8, 1861.

  GENERAL: I have the honor to inclose the reports of Colonels Starkweather and Jarrett, of the First Wisconsin and Eleventh Pennsylvania Regiments, relative to the combat of the 2d of this month. The troops composing the Sixth Brigade, including Captain McMullin’s Rangers, acquitted themselves with much credit, both to officers and men. Captain Hudson’s section of the Light Battery, and the City Troop, under Captain James, aided materially in driving the enemy from the field.

  With trifling exceptions, much praise is due the Pennsylvania Eleventh, Colonel Jarrett, and Wisconsin First, Colonel Starkweather. The Colonels of these regiments displayed great coolness and activity in getting and maintaining their positions in line to the close of the conflict.

  I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

  J. J. ABERCROMBIE, Col. Seventh Infantry, Comdg. Sixth Brig. Volunteer Militia.

  Maj. FITZ-JOHN PORTER, Asst. Adjt. Gen., Headquarters Department Pennsylvania.

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  No. 7.

  Report of Col. John C. Stark-weather, First Wisconsin Infantry.

  HDQRS. 1ST REGT. WIS. VOLS., 2D Div., 6TH BRIG., Martinsburg, Va., July 4, 1861.

  DEAR SIR: I have the honor of reporting for your information and that of the War Department, that on the 2d day of July, 1861, when en route for Martinsburg, within a short distance of Hoke’s Run, at about 10 o’clock a. m. of that day, First Regiment Wisconsin Volunteers being in advance of the column’s main body, I detailed Company B, Capt. H. A. Mitchell, to deploy to the right and left of the road as skirmishers in advance of the column, being sustained on the road by the cavalry. After such deployment had been made and an advance forward of about a quarter of a mile, firing was heard in continued long volleys from a large body of the enemy’s troops, which was well replied to by Company B and McMullin’s Rangers. The strength of the enemy being too great, however, for the skirmishers engaged, I deployed Company A, Capt. George B. Bingham, to their assistance, and kept them all in position, doing great execution, until ordered to fall back slowly, so as to allow the artillery to work more effectually, who {p.183} had in the mean time been placed in position on the right. The companies rallied upon the center, and fell back slowly and in perfect order keeping up their firing upon the enemy, and after reaching the head of column I deployed the whole right wing, Companies A, B, C, D, and E, assisted by Company F, of left wing, upon the enemy’s left front as skirmishers, sending at the same time the balance of the regiment by companies to the front by the road. The skirmishers, sustained by the left four companies, turned the right flank of the enemy, and with the assistance of the artillery, drove the enemy’s right flank in, and routed them from the woods. The whole regiment was then rallied on the color company, and deployed immediately to the front and in advance of the column as skirmishers, sustaining such position until a halt was made by the whole column. My regiment was most handsomely sustained in the outset by the artillery and Eleventh Pennsylvania Regiment Volunteers, Colonel Jarrett, and afterwards by them and other troops in the column.

  The field officers, Lieutenant-Colonel Harris, Major Lane, and Adjutant Poole, are entitled from me to great praise for their promptness and great efficiency in the skirmish. Officers and men all behaved with the utmost bravery, and are entitled to great credit as raw troops.

  The casualties consist in the death of Private George Drake, of Company A; Sergeant W. M. Graham, Company B, dangerously wounded, being shot in three separate places; Color Sergeant Fred. Hutching, wounded in the leg, belongs to Company E, color company; Privates William Matthews, P. O. Pummer, and Henry Young, of Company G, wounded; first two in the legs, other in the head; and Sol. Wyse, of Company K, taken prisoner by the enemy’s cavalry on the extreme right of skirmishers, when deployed to the front, just as a halt was ordered and a rally being made on the center.

  I have the honor to be, yours, to command,

  JOHN C. STARKWEATHER, Colonel, Comdg. First Regiment Wisconsin Volunteers.

  Colonel ABERCROMBIE, Commanding Brigade.

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  No. 8.

  Report of Col. P. Jarrett, Eleventh Pennsylvania Infantry.

  HDQRS. ELEVENTH PENNSYLVANIA VOLUNTEERS, Camp near Martinsburg, July 3, 1861.

  SIR: I have the honor to report to you the part taken by my command in the engagement of yesterday morning. The regiment being formed in the woods to the right of the turnpike, I detached Companies A, B, and C as skirmishers, with a view of outflanking the enemy, whose cavalry were making a demonstration in that direction, and moved forward, maintaining a fire against the enemy, who retired as I advanced until I reached the point where I rejoined the left of the regiment. The loss in this part of the command was one wounded.

  At the same time the remainder of the regiment, under command of Lieutenant-Colonel Coulter, was advanced by him in line (Companies D and E being extended upon the right as skirmishers) with a view of turning the enemy’s guns upon the road. In this manner he moved forward upon the open ground for about one mile, keeping up a very brisk fire with the enemy until the woods to the right of their guns were {p.184} reached, from which, however, their guns had by that time been removed. The loss in this part of the command was one killed and eight wounded. Then, closing in my line, I reunited the regiment, and there being no occasion for further operations in that direction, rejoined the remainder of the brigade upon the road.

  The officers and men behaved well, and it affords me pleasure to say that each one performed his duty to my entire satisfaction. I am also happy to state that Lieutenant-Colonel Coulter and Major Earnest deserve much credit for the able manner in which they brought their command into action.

  Respectfully submitted.

  P. JARRETT, Colonel, Comdg. Eleventh Regiment Pennsylvania Volunteers.

  Col. J. J. ABERCROMBIE, Commanding Sixth Brigade Volunteers.

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  No. 9.

  Report of Capt. Edward McK. Hudson, Fourteenth U. S. Infantry.

  CAMP NEAR MARTINSBURG, VIRGINIA, July 4, 1861.

  SIR: I have the honor to report the operations of the first section, one 12-pounder howitzer and one 6-pounder gun, of Light Company F, Fourth Artillery, under my command on the 2d instant.

  The section was attached to Colonel Abercrombie’s brigade, and crossed the Potomac in rear of the advanced infantry about 4.15 a. m. After proceeding some four miles along the road, the infantry being deployed to the right and left, a sharp fire opened upon our right wing from a thick wood. I brought my pieces into battery on high ground to the right of the road, and threw a few rounds of shell and shrapnel into the edge of the wood and at a house near by, from the garden of which some of the rebel fire seemed to proceed. The infantry were at the same time pouring a well-sustained fire into the wood, from which the enemy soon retreated. My section then advanced with the brigade, and was placed in position at several commanding points on either side of the road. Nothing, however, occurred until in the immediate, neighborhood of Hainesville. I was advancing on a narrow part of the road in column of pieces, when a company of some seventy-five of the rebels, whom I, from their gray uniform, at first took for Wisconsin troops, opened a very hot fire at the distance of some three hundred yards. I brought my howitzer into battery, and dispersed them with a single canister. At that moment two guns opened fire upon me from a point beyond and some distance to the left.

  By this time my 6-pounder was ready for action, and two or three rounds from each piece silenced the fire of the rebel battery. After advancing a short distance beyond the village I was directed to halt, as already the place selected for camp was passed.

  During the whole day, the First City Troop, Captain James, accompanied, supported, and protected my section.

  I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient, servant,

  EDW. McK. HUDSON, Captain, Commanding Section.

  Capt. D. D. PERKINS, Captain, Commanding Battery.

  {p.185}

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  No. 10.

  Report of Brig. Gen. Joseph E. Johnston, C. S. Army.*

  * See also Johnston’s report (No. 81) of the Bull Run campaign.

  HEADQUARTERS, DARKESVILLE, July 4, 1861.

  GENERAL: I respectfully transmit herewith Colonel Jackson’s report of his operations, including those of Lieutenant-Colonel Stuart’s Cavalry, on the 2d and 3d instants. This report gives most satisfactory evidence of the skill of these two officers and the efficiency of the troops under their command. Each of these two officers has, since the commencement of hostilities I been exercising the command corresponding to the next grade above the commission he holds, and proved himself fully competent to such command. I therefore respectfully recommend that Colonel Jackson be promoted without delay to the grade of brigadier-general, and Lieutenant-Colonel Stuart to that of colonel.

  Most respectfully, your obedient servant,

  J. E. JOHNSTON, Brigadier General, C. S. Army.

  General COOPER, Adjutant and Inspector General.

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  No. 11.

  Report of Col. T. J. Jackson, C. S. Army, Commanding First Brigade.

  HEADQUARTERS FIRST BRIGADE, Darkesville, July 3, 1861.

  COLONEL: About 7 1/2 a. m. yesterday I received a note at Camp Stephens from Lieut. Col. J. E. B. Stuart, of the Virginia Cavalry, to the effect that the Federal troops were four and one-half miles in advance. Having received instructions from you not to fall back unless the enemy were in force, but having assured myself of his being in force to retire under cover of our cavalry, I immediately ordered forward Colonel Harper’s regiment and Captain Pendleton’s battery, and gave the necessary instructions for moving the baggage to the rear should it be necessary, and for advancing other regiments should it be desirable; Colonel Gordon being instructed to guard the baggage. After advancing a short distance I left three pieces of the battery. On reaching the vicinity of Failing Waters I found Federal troops in the position indicated by Colonel Stuart. I directed Colonel Harper to deploy two of his companies, under command of Major Baylor, to the right. The enemy soon advanced, also deployed, and opened their fire, which war, returned by our skirmishers with such effect as to force those of the enemy back on their reserve. From a house and barn which we took possession of an apparently deadly fire was poured on the advancing foe until our position was being turned, when, in obedience to my instructions, Colonel Harper gradually fell back. Soon the enemy opened with his artillery, which Captain Pendleton, after occupying a good position in rear and waiting until the advance sufficiently crowded the road in front, replied to with a solid Shot, which entirely cleared the road in front.

  Having ordered the quartermaster, Maj. John A. Harman, to move the baggage to the rear, as I had satisfied myself that the enemy were in force, and that my orders required me to retire, I continued to fall {p.186} back, checking the Federal forces, who were advancing through the fields in line and through the woods as skirmishers, endeavoring to outflank me, by means of our deployed troops and an occasional fire from the gun. Colonel Allen’s regiment, and also Colonel Preston’s, in obedience to orders from me, advanced to support Colonel Harper, if necessary, and once Colonel Allen’s took a position for the purpose of checking the advance, but it was not brought into action, as my purposes were accomplished without it.

  Previous to my arrival at the position where the skirmishing commenced, Colonel Stuart, leaving Captain White with his company to watch the enemy, had with the rest of his command moved forward for the purpose of turning the right flank of the enemy, and if practicable capturing his advance. Fearing lest Colonel Stuart should be cut off, I sent a message to him that I would make a stand about one and a half miles in advance of Martinsburg, where I requested him to join me. Soon after I had posted my infantry and artillery Colonel Stuart joined me. The enemy halted at Camp Stephens for the night. Leaving Colonel Stuart in advance of Martinsburg, I encamped two and a half miles this side, at Big Spring, where I remained until I received your order this morning to join you at this place. Only one regiment and one piece of artillery of my command were brought into action.

  Colonel Harper reports:

  “I carried but three hundred and eighty men of my regiment into the fight, of whom eleven are wounded and nine are missing; several are believed to have been left dead upon the ground. The enemy’s loss was much greater. One of my skirmishing companies, in its advance upon the orchard upon the left of the road, found eight dead bodies of the enemy. The fire upon the advancing line of the enemy in our front was also quite effective. A field officer was seen to fall from his horse, and one of my field officers, Lieutenant-Colonel Harman, in charge of the companies at the house and barn, reports that he saw as many as fourteen men carried to the rear in blankets.”

  Colonel Stuart reports his capture of an entire company (the Fifteenth Pennsylvania Volunteers), with the exception of the captain. Three, resisting, were killed. He farther reports that “one of the enemy was killed by a negro of Captain Carter’s and one of Captain Patrick’s company.” The following is his list of prisoners: Forty-three privates, Fifteenth Pennsylvania Volunteers; one second lieutenant, one surgeon, one (position not known), but all of the Fifteenth Pennsylvania Volunteers; one private First Wisconsin Volunteers; two privates Second U. S. Cavalry, mounted and equipped; making a total of forty-nine. He reports one wounded and two missing. The enemy, he states, entered Martinsburg at 12 m. to-day.

  Colonel Stuart and his command merit high praise, and I may here remark that he has exhibited those qualities which are calculated to make him eminent in his arm of the service. He speaks of Messrs. Swan and Brien, citizens of Maryland, deserving, as usual, great credit.

  Among the reasons which induced me to advance on the enemy may be mentioned a desire to capture him should his strength not exceed a few hundred, and should he appear in force, to bold him in check until the baggage wagons should be loaded and move in column to the rear. Great credit is due to the officers and men for the admirable manner in which they discharged their respective duties.

  I am, colonel, your obedient servant,

  T. J. JACKSON, Colonel, Virginia Volunteers, Commanding.

  Lieut. Col. E. K. SMITH, Assistant Adjutant-General, C. S. Army.

  {p.187}

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  No. 12.

  Abstract from monthly report of Brig. Gen. Joseph E. Johnston’s division, or Army of the Shenandoah (C. S. A.), for June 30, 1861.

  Commanding officer.	Troops.	PRESENT FOR DUTY.
  		Infantry.		Cavalry.		Artillery.
  		Officers.	Men.	Officers.	Men.	Officers.	Men.
  Colonel Jackson	First brigade	128	2,043			4	81
  Col. F. S. Bartow	Second brigade	155	2,391			3	59
  Brigadier-General Bee	Third brigade	161	2,629			4	78
  Col. A. Elzey	Fourth brigade	156	2,106			4	45
  Col. J. E. B. Stuart	First Virginia Cavalry			21	313
  Col. A. C. Cummings	Virginia Volunteers	14	227
  	Total	614	9,396	21	313	15	263

  Aggregate present for duty.

  General staff	32
  Infantry	10,010
  Cavalry	334
  Artillery	278
  	10,654

  No. 13.

  Abstract from return of the Department of Pennsylvania, commanded by Major-General Patterson, June 28, 1861.

  Commanding officer.	Troops.	PRESENT FOR DUTY.
  		Infantry.		Cavalry.		Artillery.
  		Officers.	Men.	Officers.	Men.	Officers.	Men.
  Bvt. Maj. Gen. Geo. Cadwalader	First division	322	6,637	11	307	7	251
  Maj. Gen. W. H. Keim	Second division	322	6,410	3	74
  	Total	644	13,0471	14	381	7	251

  Aggregate present for duty.*

  Infantry	13,691
  Cavalry	395
  Artillery	258
  	14,344

  * With the exception of the Fourth Connecticut Infantry, four companies of United States cavalry, and three companies of United States artillery, this force was composed entirely of three months’ troops.

  {p.188}

  JULY 5, 1861.-Skirmish near Newport News, Va.

  REPORTS.

  No. 1.–	Capt. S. W. Fisk, Crescent Rifles, Louisiana Infantry.
  No. 2.–	Capt. Robert C. Standard, Howitzer Company, C., S. Army.
  No. 3.–	Capt. William Collins, Halifax Catawba Troop.

  No. 1.

  Report of Capt. S. W. Fisk, Crescent Rifles, transmitted by Major Rightor and Brigadier-General Magruder, C. S. Army.

  YOUNG’S MILLS, VA., July 5, 1861.

  SIR: A detachment of men, consisting of one hundred infantry, one howitzer, and about fifteen or twenty cavalry, left last night, about midnight, under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Dreux. We advanced in the direction of Newport News, and took post in the woods, near Curtis’ farm, near the road, as shown in diagram annexed.* We were ordered to lie in ambush. The vedettes soon after came in and announced the approach of a body of cavalry one hundred strong. Colonel Dreux’s orders were that they should closely conceal their persons and weapons, and permit the enemy to cross the road on our left and somewhat beyond the left of our line, and that no one should fire before he himself should give the order, after they had advanced, as above. A few of our infantry scouts had previously been sent into the woods, on our left, to observe the approach of the enemy and ascertain if they were enemies. In a few moments after sending out the scouts, Colonel D. said, “They are coming!” addressing me. Whereupon I took my post a few paces from him, on his right, but not a word was said by him to intimate that he expected the approach of any but cavalry. Notwithstanding Colonel Dreux’s and my own positive order to the men not to fire, one or two shots having been exchanged between the scouts and the enemy, several of the men on the left began also to fire. Very soon after I was informed that Colonel Dreux was wounded. This was about half an hour after daybreak. Being obliged to direct my attention to our line of infantry, and still, according to the information I had received from Colonel D., of expecting cavalry, I pursued or carried out his original intention, and, in obedience to his order, not to give the command to fire until their column had passed in front of us. This was, however, but for a moment, and their column not passing our front, as expected, and the enemy being scarcely recognizable, except by the occasional flash of their arms when discharged, finding that they still remained on our left, in order to face towards them and enable us to charge, I gave the order, “Left into line, wheel,” which, as far as I could observe, was well and promptly executed. When we wheeled into the road the enemy had disappeared or fled. A-bout the time that this movement was executed the horses attached to the howitzer, being said to have taken fright, ran off with the gun with great violence down the road, creating considerable confusion on our right, which was soon, however, remedied. Having remained near the scene of action long enough to bring off our wounded, we retired in good order, no possibility of carrying out the surprise originally intended by Colonel Dreux longer {p.189} existing, and being in the neighborhood of the large forces of the enemy, from whom they could readily be re-enforced.

  I regret deeply to report the death of our gallant and able commander, Lieutenant-Colonel Dreux, and of Private Stephen Hackett, of the Shreveport Grays. In addition, I report Private Buford, of the Crescent Rifles, slightly wounded in the head. Oar position in ambush, and the sudden disappearance of the enemy, made it impossible for me to estimate the numbers of the latter with any approach to accuracy.

  Both officers and men of the infantry, upon whom my attention was almost entirely bestowed for the two or three moments during which the command devolved on me, behaved with coolness. Three of the enemy are believed to be killed or wounded. .

  S. W. FISK, Captain, Commanding Crescent Rifles.

  Major RIGHTOR, Louisiana Battalion.

  * Not found.

  [Indorsements.]

  YOUNG’S MILLS, VA., July 5, 1861.

  Brig. Gen. J. B. MAGRUDER:

  SIR: I have received your dispatch and in conformity with your instructions I send you the above detailed account of the affair drawn up by Captain Fisk, of the Crescent Rifles. The bodies of the deceased are laid out in a little church near this place. Lieutenant-Colonel Dreux fell last evening about 10 o’clock, leaving me in command of the battalion. Please send me full instructions, and let me know whether the cavalry force, stationed here is under, my command. I have not the remotest idea of their whereabouts at this moment, and, in case of necessity, I have no means of dispatching you a courier.

  I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

  N. H. RIGHTOR, Major, Commanding Louisiana Battalion.

  Respectfully referred to Major-General Lee, commanding, with the following remarks:

  SIR: I had left Lieutenant-Colonel Dreux in command at Lowery’s Mill on the morning before the skirmish, and had myself gone with a larger force to the York road, as the enemy had crossed Hampton Creek. Late that night I learned, for the first time, at Bartlett’s, of the expedition, and the next morning of the death of its gallant leader. I since ascertained that the whole of the enemy’s force, was about four hundred. The enemy fled. Our men occupied the field, and very deliberately took off their killed and wounded. A war steamer, in the afternoon, came up the river and threw shells into the wood where the affair happened.*

  J. B. MAGRUDER, Brigadier-General, Commanding.

  * See also in “Correspondence, etc.,” post, Magruder to Deas, July 7, 1861.

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  No. 2.

  Report of Capt. Robert C. Stanard, C. S. Army.

  YORKTOWN, VA., July 7, 1861.

  DEAR SIR: In accordance with your instructions, I hereby submit my account of the skirmish which occurred on the morning of July 5, {p.190} on the Warwick road, below Smiths, and the occasion of the running off of the howitzer gun.

  On the evening of July 4, I rode down from Young’s house (where you had stationed me to superintend the erection of breastworks) to Young’s Mills, and proposed to Colonel Dreux that we should make a trip with one howitzer and one hundred of his men and twenty horse-men to the point where the skirmish took place. We (the whole force detailed) arrived there about daybreak, or a little before, and were placed on the left of the road, in ambush, my howitzer on the left of the line. Soon after we arrived our guide (a Mr. Fitchett), who had ridden some distance down the road, returned and reported the approach of the enemy. He could not correctly state how strong they were, but told me that he thought they numbered from two hundred to three hundred and fifty men. Colonel Dreux had given instructions that the enemy should be allowed to advance till his rear passed my howitzer, and that he would give the command when the firing on our side should commence. After waiting more than long enough for the enemy to have gotten up to us, and not understanding why they did not come, Colonel Dreux sent out five men as scouts, to ascertain, if possible, where the enemy was. During the absence of these scouts, Lieutenant Moseley (my first lieutenant) and myself walked into the Toad, and had not been there five minutes before we saw one of the enemy in advance, coming down the road at a charge bayonet. He had gotten up very close to us when we saw him. We at once jumped into the bushes, and ran to our gun, which was some thirty or forty steps from us. Just as we entered the bushes the man fired, and my impression is that he killed Colonel Dreux, as immediately afterwards I called for Colonel Dreux to know whether I should take the howitzer into the road. The enemy having stopped advancing, and having commenced an oblique fire into the bushes where we were, I could hear nothing from Colonel Dreux, and my howitzer being where it could not be brought into action unless the enemy came in our front, and being anxious to protect my men as much as possible, I gave the order to have the piece limbered up and taken into the road, so that if we were to receive the fire of the enemy, we might at least be where we could see them, and fire on them, if necessary. My command was obeyed, but just as the howitzer entered the road the horses took fright and started off at full speed up the road. The driver of the horse’s to the howitzer (who was a volunteer and not accustomed to the team) informs me that he attempted to halt just as he got into the road, and that the dashing by of the troop which accompanied us caused his horses to become unmanageable, and to runoff. Soon as I found that the howitzer had run off, I ran through the bushes, to the right of where we were stationed, and jumped into the road to try and stop it. It had gotten ahead of me, and, notwithstanding my running some distance after it, I could not stop it. I then sent my first lieutenant (Moseley) and my sergeant (Gretter) in pursuit of the piece. They soon returned with it. The fight (which lasted only five to ten minutes) was then all over. I then, for the first time, heard that Colonel Dreux was killed. I kept the howitzer in the road, for the purpose (if we could get no other conveyance) of putting on it any dead or wounded we might have. A cart was afterwards brought up, and three or four of my men assisted in putting into it the dead body of Private Hackett, of the Louisiana battalion. I afterwards put Colonel Dreux’s body in the same cart, and we moved off. I would state that the enemy, I am satisfied, did not know of the running off of the howitzer, as there was {p.191} no more firing that I heard of after it got into the road. The detachment of the battery which was with the gun stood at their posts, and, had the gun not run off, they would have had it ready for action as soon as it entered the road. This, sir, is my recollection of the affair, and I respectfully submit it to your consideration.

  RO. C. STANARD, Captain Third Company of Howitzers.

  General J. B. MAGRUDER.

  –––

  No. 3.

  Report of Capt. William Collins, C. S. Army.

  CAMP HOOD, VA., July 7, 1861.

  SIR: In obedience to an order received from you, I have the honor to report the skirmish of the 5th instant, in which I was engaged, and the circumstances of the retreat of the cavalry under my command.

  On the evening of the 4th instant I, in company with Captain Stanard, visited the quarters of Colonel Dreux, and informed him that we had received information that a squad or foraging party of the enemy had advanced up as far as Captain Smith’s that day, and that they were in the habit of visiting that point daily, and Colonel Dreux then informed us that he had received the same information, and intended to go out that night and try and capture a party of them, and that he desired that I should accompany him with a detachment of twenty of my command, and that he would also take along Captain Stanard and one of his howitzers, and also a detachment of twenty from four companies of infantry.

  About 12 o’clock at night the above force marched from Young’s Mills, under the command Colonel Dreux. We marched down below the farm of Pembroke Jones, and turned in at the house of a man named Curtis, at which place we had expected, from information received, that we would, perhaps, find the squad above spoken of quartered. Finding no one, we, marched back to the main road, from which Point Colonel Dreux sent down, in the direction of Newport News, three of my command, in company with a man named Fitchett as guide, to ascertain if there were any troops approaching, at which time Colonel Dreux marched his men up the road, towards Lee’s store, and, after having traveled about a half a mile, we arrived opposite a small woods road, running at right angles into the main road, at which point, we were halted. The cavalry was then ordered down this woods road seventy-five yards, and directed to form in column of fours, facing the main road, in readiness to charge. The howitzer was then placed in the same road, about ten paces in front of the cavalry. The infantry was then stationed on the right and left of this road, along the side of the main road. At this time the vedettes, that had been sent down the road towards Newport News, returned and reported that the enemy was approaching, about a mile off, and that they covered a distance of two hundred yards of the road, of which he could see, and how much farther their column extended he did not know. Colonel Dreux then sent a detachment of five or six of the infantry down the road to act as scouts, and to Conceal themselves in the bushes, and to report the approach of the enemy, and they were ordered to keep themselves concealed, and not to fire until the command was given, at which time the infantry and howitzer would fire simultaneously, immediately after which time the cavalry {p.192} was to charge upon them. The first information I received of the approach of the enemy, a gun was fired to our left, on the main road, and was immediately followed by another, and, with a short pause, the firing was again commenced about the same point, which was kept up regularly, the balls cutting around very near myself and men. My men were ordered to stand firm and hold their position. At this time some of the men of Captain Stanard’s command, who were standing firmly at their piece, called out to their captain for orders, to know what they should do. Captain Stanard was at that time just to my right, standing behind a large tree. I then called out to him to go and man his piece, or order his men what to do. I then remarked to the men of my command that I would ride up near the road and know why it was that they did not return the fire of the enemy, as they were then firing upon us on our flank and rear, and, about the time that I arrived near the line of the infantry the command was given by Captain Stanard to limber up the howitzer, at which time it was moved rapidly off, and just at this time three of the enemy presented themselves in the rear of the cavalry, and were fired upon by them, killing two and wounding the third. The cavalry then dashed out in the direction that the howitzer had gone, thinking that it was a signal for a retreat. This was all done in a moment. As soon as I saw they had retreated I rushed into the road, and went in the direction the howitzer and cavalry had gone, calling to the driver of the howitzer to halt his piece. He made no stop. I passed him, and threw myself in front of his horses and halted him. I will here state that the sergeant of the howitzer came rapidly up the road in pursuit of the piece, ordering the driver to carry it back. I accompanied it back down near the scene of action, when I learned that the enemy had fled, and had gotten a considerable, distance. As I suppose, they retreated about the time the howitzer was run out. Then, for the first time, I learned that Colonel Dreux had been shot, and that his body was in charge of his men, together with the body of Private Hackett, belonging to the Shreveport Grays. There came up at the same time a private, wounded, whose name I did not know, and he was taken to his camp on the horse of one of the cavalry. I halted my men above Lee’s store, and awaited the bodies of the dead. I then accompanied them to the camp at Young’s Mills, in company with a portion of the howitzers and some of the infantry, where they were put in charge of the commandant of the post.

  I dispatched, soon after the engagement, a dragoon to you, to report what had taken place. During the whole of the firing none of the enemy were seen by the cavalry except the three that were shot, and there was not a gun fired after the cavalry left. We were surrounded by a dense thicket, that rendered it impossible for a man mounted to see one on foot until he had approached within a few yards. And, notwithstanding the critical situation in which they were placed, I have the utmost confidence in believing that the cavalry would have held their position until the last, if they had not believed that the moving of the howitzer was a signal for their retreat. The whole fire of the enemy seemed to be directed at the cavalry, as no shots, so far as I could ascertain, went in the direction of the infantry. I suppose the enemy learned the position of the cavalry from the noise made by their horses. No, command was given during the engagement that I heard at all. In going thus into detail I have given, I think, a full and explicit account. All of which is most respectfully submitted.

  WILLIAM COLLINS, Captain Halifax Catawba Troop.

  Brigadier-General MAGRUDER.

  {p.193}

  JULY 6-17, 1861.–Campaign in West Virginia.

  SUMMARY OF THE PRINCIPAL EVENTS

  July	6-7, 1861.–	Skirmishes at Middle Fork Bridge.
  	7, 1861.–	Skirmish at Glenville.
  	7-12, 1861.–	Skirmishes at Belington and Laurel Hill.
  	10, 1861.–	Skirmish at Rich Mountain.
  	11, 1861.–	Engagement at Rich Mountain.
  	12, 1861.–	Beverly occupied by U. S. troops.
  	13, 1861.–	Surrender of Pegram’s command (C. S. forces). Action at Carrick’s (or Corrick’s) Ford. Skirmish at Red House, near Barboursville.
  	14, 1861.–	Brig. Gen. H. R. Jackson ordered to command of Confederate forces
  	16, 1861.–	Skirmish at Barboursville.
  	17, 1861.–	Action at Scarey Creek.

  REPORTS, ETC.

  No. 1.–	Maj. Gen. George B. McClellan, U. S. Army, of preliminary operations, with orders and proclamations, from June 22 to July 5.
  No. 2.–	Major-General McClellan, of operations from July 6 to 15.
  No. 3.–	Col. John M. Connell, Seventeenth Ohio Infantry, of skirmish at Glenville.
  No. 4.–	Brig. Gen. William S. Rosecrans, U. S. Army, of preliminary operations from June 27 to July 3.
  No. 5.–	Brigadier-General Rosecrans, of engagement at Rich Mountain.
  No. 6.–	Brig. Gen. T. A. Morris, Indiana Militia, of skirmishes at Belington and Laurel Hill, pursuit of Garnett’s forces, and action at Carrick’s Ford.
  No. 7.–	Capt. H. W. Benham, U. S. Corps of Engineers, of the pursuit of Garnett and action at Carrick’s Ford.
  No. 8.–	Brig. Gen. C. W. Hill, Ohio Militia, of operations from July 4 to 19.
  No. 9.–	Col. J. Irvine, Sixteenth Ohio Infantry, of operations from July 11 to 15.
  No. 10.–	Col. H. G. Depuy, Eighth Ohio Infantry, of operations July 13 and 14.
  No. 11.–	Col. Thomas Morton, Twentieth Ohio Infantry, of operations from July 13 to 15.
  No. 12.–	Maj. Charles N. Lamison, Twentieth Ohio Infantry, of operations July 13 and 14.
  No. 13.–	Col. G. W. Andrews, Fifteenth Ohio Infantry, of operations from July 13 to 15
  No. 14.–	Lieut. H. A. Myers, Ringgold Cavalry, of operations-from July 7 to 15.
  No. 15.–	Congratulatory address from General McClellan.
  No. 16.–	Brig. Gen. R. S. Garnett, C. S. Army, of preliminary operations, with correspondence, from June 25 to July 6.
  No. 17.–	Maj. M. G. Harman, C. S. Army, of engagement at Rich Mountain and action at Carrick’s Ford, with communications to him.
  No. 18.–	Brig. Gen. H. R. Jackson, C. S. Army, of events from July 11 to 16, with correspondence.
  No. 19.–	Instructions from General Lee to General Jackson.
  No. 20.–	Lieut. Col. J. M. Heck, Twenty-fifth Virginia infantry, of operations from May 24 to July 13, including skirmishes July 7 to 9, and engagement at Rich Mountain.
  No. 21.–	Maj. Nat. Tyler, Twentieth Virginia. Infantry, of operations from July 1 to 14, including skirmish July 7, and the engagement at Rich Mountain.
  No. 22.–	Mr. Jed. Hotchkiss, topographical engineer, Confederate service, of events from July 2 to 14.
  No. 23.–	Lieut. Col. John Pegram, C. S. Army, of the engagement at Rich Mountain and the surrender of his forces. {p.194}
  No. 24.–	Capt. Pierce B. Anderson, Lee Battery, C. S. Army, of the engagement at Rich Mountain.
  No. 25.–	Lieut. Charles W. Statham, Lee Battery, same as above.
  No. 26.–	Lieut. John R. Massey, Lee Battery, same as above.
  No. 27.–	Lieut. Charles I. Raine, Lee Battery, same as above.
  No. 28.–	Col. William C. Scott, Forty-fourth Virginia Infantry, of operations on the day of the engagement at Rich Mountain.
  No. 29.–	Col. W. B. Taliaferro, Twenty-third Virginia Infantry, of the action at Carrick’s Ford.
  No. 30.–	Maj. Gen. George B. McClellan, U. S. Army, of the skirmish at Barboursville.
  No. 31.–	Major-General McClellan, of the action at Scarey Creek.
  No. 32.–	Brig. Gen. Henry A. Wise, C. S. Army, of skirmish July 16 and action at Scarey Creek.
  No. 33.–	Strength of General Wise’s command (C. S. Army) July 8, 1861.
  No. 34.–	Strength of General Garnett’s command (C. S. Army) July 8, 1861.

  No. 1.

  Reports of Maj. Gen. George B. McClellan, U. S. Army, of preliminary operations, with orders and proclamations, from June 22 to July 5.

  HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE OHIO, Parkersburg, Va., June 22, 1861.

  COLONEL: I reached here yesterday morning, hoping to move forward during the day, but was delayed by want of wagons and the disorganization to be expected on the part of new troops moving for the first time into the field. In a few minutes (near 7 a. m.) I shall move with the advance to Clarksburg, taking one regiment of infantry, two detached companies (one of regulars), one battery, and a company of cavalry. Two Indiana regiments will follow during the morning, two Ohio regiments to-morrow. No other Ohio regiments will reach Grafton, via Bellaire, today. Reports from the front are somewhat contradictory, but agree in representing the enemy in strong force near Piedmont and Beverly. Notwithstanding that General Morris and others seem sure that we have a large force to contend with, I now am inclined to doubt it. I will, without delay, beat them up in their quarters and endeavor to put an end to their attempts in this direction. I have, I think, force enough to fight them wherever I find them.

  General McCall telegraphs that Cumberland will be re-enforced on Monday. If that is accomplished, we should be able to cut off the force near Piedmont. As I cannot learn yet the quality of their troops (there are reports that there are some regiments of the regular Confederate troops) I shall be cautious in my movements. I feel very much the absolute necessity of more commissary and quartermaster officers, also of cavalry. I hope the Lieutenant-General will find it in his power to let me have the companies of First Cavalry, now at Leavenworth.

  I received on the 18th instant the order adding Missouri to my department. My arrangements for coming here to take command are so far advanced that it was not possible for me to go to Missouri. I shall go there immediately on my return from this State.

  I move hence on Clarksburg, and will act there according to the information I receive-either move in force on the rear of the enemy at Beverly or go on to Piedmont.

  Excuse, colonel, the hurried nature of this.

  Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

  GEO. B. McCLELLAN, Major-General, U. S. Army,

  Col. E. D. TOWNSEND, Assistant Adjutant-General.

  {p.195}

  –––

  HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE OHIO, Grafton, Va., June 23, 1861.

  COLONEL: Having completed as far as possible the necessary arrangements for transportation, &c., I left Parkersburg yesterday about 1 p. m. with the Ninth Ohio Regiment; Company I, Fourth Artillery, and the company of Chicago Rifles. I reached here about 2 a. m., having left the Ninth Regiment at Webster. The Eighth and Tenth Indiana, Loomis’ Michigan Battery, and Captain Barker’s company of Illinois cavalry reached Clarksburg to-day. The Third and Fourth Ohio also reached Fetterman to-day. The Seventeenth and Nineteenth Ohio and Howe’s battery will be up to-morrow.

  From information I have received I think it more than probable that there are from fifteen hundred to three thousand rebels at Romney, intrenched with a few guns. I think their object is to cover the approaches to Winchester from an apprehended attack in this direction, as well as to cover the operations of guerrilla parties now acting towards Piedmont. It will probably be necessary to break up their establishment when I get through with other more important matters. If General Patterson could furnish the force to do it in the mean time, I think it would be advantageous. Their presence tends to alarm Union men even this far away. I did not find my orders intelligently carried out for the defense of Cheat River, and will go there myself to-morrow to see it property attended to. It is very important to secure that line.

  There is certainly a force of some kind near Huttonsville, with a strong advanced party intrenched near the Laurel Mountain, between Philippi and Beverly. I think that the chief object of this party is to protect and furnish guerrilla parties, which are doing much damage in this region. I am of the opinion that the apprehensions of an attack in force, so constantly and so seriously reported to me that I felt it impossible to disregard them, are not well founded. It is confidently asserted that Georgia and Tennessee troops are among those At the Laurel Hill, but I do not feel certain of it. It seems to be a peculiar characteristic of the information obtained here that it is exceedingly vague and unreliable. I hope to inaugurate a better system.

  My presence here was very necessary to reassure the Union men, and even if I find no force able to oppose us, I shall still be certain that it was very necessary for me to be here. As soon as I can get my command well in hand and obtain more reliable information-and I hope this will not occupy more than one or at most two days-I propose moving with all my available force from Clarksburg on Buckhannon, then on Beverly, to turn entirely the detachment at the Laurel Mountain. The troops at Philippi will advance in time to follow up the retreat of the rebels in their front. After occupying Beverly I shall move on Huttonsville, and endeavor to drive them into the mountains, whither I do not propose to follow them, unless under such circumstances as to make success certain. Having driven out the mass of their troops, and having occupied the pass by which they might return, I propose moving small columns through the country to reassure the Union men and breakup any scattered parties of armed rebels. As soon as practicable, I intend to clean out the valley of the Kanawha.

  Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

  GEO. B. McCLELLAN. Major-General.

  Lieut. Col. E. D. TOWNSEND, Assistant Adjutant, General.

  {p.196}

  –––

  HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE OHIO, Grafton, Va., June 23, 1861.

  To the Inhabitants of Western Virginia:

  The army of this department, headed by Virginia troops, is rapidly occupying all Western Virginia. This is done in co-operation with, and in support of such civil authorities of the State as are faithful to the Constitution and laws of the United States. The proclamation issued by me under date of May 26, 1861, will be strictly maintained. Your houses, families, property, and all your rights will be religiously respected; we are enemies to none but armed rebels and those voluntarily giving them aid. All officers of this army will be held responsible for the most prompt and vigorous action in repressing disorder and punishing aggression by those under their command.

  To my great regret I find that enemies of the United States continue to carry on a system of hostilities prohibited by the laws of war among belligerent nations, and of course far more wicked and intolerable when directed against loyal citizens engaged in the defense of the common Government of all. Individuals and marauding parties are pursuing a guerrilla warfare, firing upon sentinels and pickets, burning bridges, insulting, injuring, and even killing citizens because of their Union sentiments, and committing many kindred acts.

  I do now, therefore, make proclamation, and warn all persons that individuals or parties engaged in this species of warfare-irregular in every view which can be taken of it-thus attacking sentries, pickets, or other soldiers, destroying public or private property, or committing injuries against any of the inhabitants because of Union sentiments or conduct, will be dealt with in their persons and property according to the severest rules of military law.

  All persons giving information or aid to the public enemies will be arrested and kept in close custody, and all persons found bearing arms, unless of known loyalty, will be arrested and held for examination.

  GEO. B. McCLELLAN, Major-General, U. S. Army, Commanding Department.

  –––

  HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE OHIO, Grafton, Va. 7 June 25, 1861.

  To the Soldiers of the Army of the West:

  You are here to support the Government of your country, and to protect the lives and liberties of your brethren, threatened by a rebellious and traitorous foe. No higher and nobler duty could devolve upon you, and I expect you to bring to its performance the highest and noblest qualities of soldiers-discipline, courage, and mercy. I call upon the officers of every grade to enforce the discipline, and I know that those of all grades, privates and officers, will display in battle cool, heroic courage, and will know how to show mercy to a disarmed enemy.

  Bear in mind that you are in the country of friends, not of enemies; that you are here to protect, not to destroy. Take nothing, destroy nothing, unless you are ordered to do so by your general officers. Remember that I have pledged my word to the people of Western Virginia that their rights in person and property shall be respected. I ask every one of you to make good this promise in its broadest sense. We come here to save, not to upturn. I do not appeal to the fear of punishment, but to your appreciation of the sacredness of the cause in which we are engaged. Carry with you into battle the conviction that you are right, and that God is on your side.

  {p.197}

  Your enemies have violated every moral law; neither God nor man can sustain them. They have, without cause, rebelled against a mild and paternal Government; they have seized upon public and private property; they have outraged the persons of Northern men merely because they came from the North, and of Southern Union men merely because they loved the Union; they have placed themselves beneath contempt, unless they can retrieve some honor on the field of battle. You will pursue a different course. You will be honest, brave, and merciful; you will respect the right of private opinion; you will punish no man for opinion’s sake. Show to the world that you differ from our enemies in the points of honor, honesty, and respect for private opinion, and that we inaugurate no reign of terror where we go.

  Soldiers! I have heard that there was danger here. I have come to place myself at your head and to share it with you. I fear now but one thing-that you will not find foemen worthy of your steel. I know that I can rely upon you.

  GEO. B. McCLELLAN, Major-General, Commanding.

  –––

  HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE OHIO, Buckhannon, Va., July 2, 1861.

  Brig. Gen. J. D. Cox, Camp Dennison, Ohio:

  GENERAL: On receipt of this you will at once assume command of the First and Second Kentucky Regiments and the Twelfth Ohio. Call upon Governor Dennison to supply you with one company of cavalry and six guns. Captain Kingsbury probably has State guns enough to give you.

  You will expedite the equipment of those regiments, and move them at once to Gallipolis, via Hamden and Portland, hiring teams for the supplies of the troops between Portland and Gallipolis, sending to the quartermaster in advance to have teams ready. With the regiment first ready to move proceed to Gallipolis and assume command of the Twenty-first. Cross the river and occupy Point Pleasant. With the regiment that next arrives occupy Letart’s Falls, and then move the other two regiments to the mouth of Ten-mile Creek, or the point near there where the road from Letart’s Falls intersects the Kanawha River. Place the last regiment in reserve at Point Pleasant, or any proper point in rear of your line of defense. Intrench two guns at Letart’s and four at your advanced position on the Kanawha. Remain on the defensive, and endeavor to keep the rebels near Charleston until I can cut off their retreat by movement from Beverly. Should you receive certain intelligence that. I am hard pressed, seek to relieve me by a rapid advance on Charleston, but place no credit in rumors, for I shall be successful. Use your cavalry as pickets, not exposing them. Punish Ripley, if you earl. Repress any outbreaks that may occur at Guyandotte or Barboursville.

  Remember, my plan is to cut them off, and do all you can to assist that object. Always keep two or three boats on hand. Call on Capt. W. J. Kountz, at Marietta or Ripley, to supply boats from his fleet. If the two companies of Seventeenth Ohio are still at Ravenswood when you reach Gallipolis, order them to rejoin their regiment, via Parkersburg or Webster. Communicate frequently. A telegraph line follows me out.

  Very respectfully, yours,

  GEO. B. McCLELLAN, Major-General, Commanding.

  {p.198}

  –––

  HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE OHIO, Buckhannon, Va., July 5, 1861.

  Col. E. D. TOWNSEND, Assistant Adjutant-General:

  COLONEL: You will probably feel as much regret as. I do in finding that I am still here. The cause is the difficulty of getting up supplies and arranging transportation. I hope that to-day’s arrivals will enable me to move in the-morning. While waiting here I have endeavored to employ our time to advantage.

  You will observe that this is the important strategical position in this region. From it I can cover our base of operations and supplies, and move readily by good roads in any desired direction. I have directed the positions on Cheat River at Grafton, Webster, Clarksburg, and Parkersburg to be intrenched, that the necessary garrisons may be reduced as much as possible. The bridges, tunnels, &c., on the two branches of the railroad are now well guarded. The Cheat River, covering the left of our base, is guarded by eleven companies; Grafton, by a regiment 5 Clarksburg, some eight companies, besides Virginia recruits; Parkersburg, six companies, two regiments of Indiana troops to arrive there to-day, and to be disposable as a reserve where needed. Two other Indiana three-years’ regiments are en route to Bellaire, to be sent wherever needed. Six companies occupy Wirt County Court-House, where Union men have suffered much. Four companies at Ravenswood repulsed O. J. Wise night before last. I hope that he determined to renew the attempt, as in that case he will have been cut off by a column of twelve hundred men under Colonel Norton, that were to reach Ripley from Letart’s at 2 p. m. yesterday. I shall not be surprised to learn before this letter is closed that he is captured. In consequence of the threatening aspect of affairs in the Great Kanawha Valley I have, ordered four regiments there, as explained in my instructions to General J. D. Cox, a copy of which has been forwarded to you.

  Of the troops composing the active, army fifty-one companies and one battery are at Philippi, amusing the enemy, who is strongly intrenched with artillery on the Laurel Mountain between that place and Beverly. I have with me here six entire regiments of infantry, six detached companies, two batteries, two companies of cavalry; two more regiments, and some five or six detached companies of infantry will reach here by to-morrow night. The Seventh Ohio occupied Weston some three days since, and four companies of the Seventeenth reached Glenville from Parkersburg yesterday. I ordered strong detachments from these commands to move last night on Bulltown, and break up a large force of armed rebels congregating there. I can, if necessary, have them all back with me by to-morrow night.

  I have sent out frequent small parties to break, up the collections of rebels. We have them pretty well under now. One of our parties of forty last night broke up two hundred. The morale of our men is excellent-could not be better. It is difficult to get perfectly accurate information, but we are improving in that respect everyday. The feeling of the people here is most excellent. We are welcomed wherever our men go. It is wonderful to see how rapidly the minds of many of these people become enlightened when they find we can protect them.

  Fear and ignorance combined have made most of the converts to secession; the reverse process is now going on with great rapidity.

  I expect to find the enemy in position on Rich Mountain, just this side of Beverly. I shall, if possible, turn the position to the south, and thus occupy the Beverly road in his rear. If possible I will repeat the maneuver of Cerro Gordo.

  {p.199}

  Assure the General that no prospect of a brilliant victory shall induce me to depart from my intention of gaining success by maneuvering rather than by fighting. I will not throw these raw men of mine into the teeth of artillery and intrenchments if it is possible to avoid it. Say to the General, too, that I am trying to follow a lesson long ago learned from him; i. e., not to move until I know that everything is ready, and then to move with the utmost rapidity and energy. The delays that I have met with have been irksome to me in the extreme, but I felt that it would be exceedingly foolish to give way to impatience, and advance before everything was prepared. I think the troops are, improving decidedly in their performance of guard and outpost duty, and that we are losing nothing in efficiency by the halt at this place.

  From all that I learn the enemy is still uncertain as to where the main attack is to be made, and is committing the error of dividing his army in the face of superior forces. If he abandons the position on Laurel Mountain, the troops at Philippi will press him closely. I shall know to-night with certainty what he has in the pass at Huttonsville. I am told that he has moved all his troops thence towards Beverly. By our present positions we have cut off all his supplies of provisions from this region, so that he must depend almost entirely upon Staunton-a long haul, over a rough mountain road.

  Very respectfully, your obedient servant.

  GEO. B. McCLELLAN, Major-General, U. S. Army, Commanding Department.

  –––

  BUCKHANNON, VA., July 6, 1861.

  Col. E. D. TOWNSEND:

  A well-concerted movement to catch O. J. Wise, with his eight hundred men, at Ripley, on the 4th, failed in consequence of the rapidity with which the rebels fled at the first notice of the approach of danger.

  GEO. B. McCLELLAN, Major-General.

  –––

  No. 2.

  Reports of Maj. Gen. Geo. B. McClellan, U. S. A., of operations from July 6 to 15.

  BUCKHANNON, July [6], 1861.

  Lieut. Col. E. D. TOWNSEND:

  Have directed movement in force up the Great Kanawha, and other movements of troops covering nearly the whole of Western Virginia. My advance guard goes at 4 in the morning to occupy the Middle Fork Bridge. By the 8th or 9th at latest I expect to occupy Beverly, fighting a battle in the mean while. I propose to drive the enemy over the mountains towards Staunton, and expect your further orders by telegraph Whether to move on Staunton on the south or towards Wytheville.

  GEO. B. McCLELLAN, Major-General.

  {p.200}

  –––

  HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE OHIO, Buckhannon, Va., July 6, 1861.

  Col. E. D. TOWNSEND , Assistant Adjutant-General, Washington, D. C.:

  COLONEL: My advance guard, consisting of the Fourth and Ninth Ohio, Loomis’ Michigan battery, and Burdsal’s Ohio dragoons, under the command of Col. R. L. McCook, moves at 4 a. m. to-morrow to seize the Middle Fork Bridge, twelve miles from here. The headquarters will follow as soon as the transportation arrangements can be completed-say by 9 a. m. Two regiments of Rosecrans’ brigade will move in the morning. Another regiment of Schleich’s brigade would have moved in support of the advance guard but for an unfortunate blunder in sending out a scouting party without my knowledge. This party is in trouble, and I have been obliged to send out a large portion of the Third Ohio to cover its retreat.

  I expect to attack the enemy on the 8th or 9th. He is intrenched on Rich Mountain. I have to-day ordered General Morris to advance in the morning from Philippi with his command-(sixty-two companies and one battery) to within one and a half miles of the Laurel Mountain, where the enemy is strongly intrenched. His instructions are to observe them closely and to follow rapidly any movement in retreat, but not to attack until he hears that I have carried Beverly.

  I have instructed General Cox to occupy Ripley with one regiment, and to move with four on Charleston and the Gauley Bridge, the Ripley regiment supporting the movement. He is to reopen the navigation of the Kanawha, and when Gauley is occupied will open a communication with me via Summersville and Bulltown. Six companies are to occupy California, the county seat of Roane; four to hold Wirt County Court-House; six companies, Glenville; two, Weston; eight, Bulltown; four, Frenchtown; two, French Creek. At least four will hold this place after we advance.

  I hope the General-in-Chief will regard these orders as prudent and efficacious. I hope in a few days to occupy all that portion of Western Virginia that is in my department; to restore order; establish the authority of the provisional government, and to quell the secession feeling. I have taken the liberty of going somewhat beyond my department, and have instructed General Cox to occupy Barboursville and Guyandotte. If circumstances permit, and the General does not object, I would be glad, after securing all the country north of the Great Kanawha, to move on Wytheville and cut off the railroad communication. I shall soon be prepared to do that or move on Staunton, as the General may direct.

  Hoping that my movements may meet his approval, I am, very truly, yours,

  GEO. B. McCLELLAN, Major-General, U. S. Army, Commanding Department.

  –––

  HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE OHIO Buckhannon, Va., July 7, 1861.

  Col. E. D. TOWNSEND:

  An unauthorized scout last night got into trouble, but extricated itself with great gallantry, losing one man killed and five wounded. {p.201} Brought off all the wounded and the musket of the man killed. They killed a large number of the enemy, who were probably Georgia troops. The enemy did not pursue.

  GEO. B. McCLELLAN, Major-General.

  –––

  BUCKHANNON, July 7,1861.

  Col. E. D. TOWNSEND:

  My advance guard, under Col. R. L. McCook, consisting of Fourth and Ninth, and one battery and one company of cavalry, has occupied Middle Fork Bridge, twelve miles east. Tenth Indiana has moved up in support. Headquarters and four regiments, with one battery and one company of cavalry, move east to-morrow. Supply train now arriving. Three Indiana regiments march to-morrow. Enemy said to be intrenched in force in my front. Cannot rely on reports. Will not learn what I have met until the advance guard comes in contact. I will be prepared to fight whatever is in front of me. One of my parties surprised a party near Weston last night and took prisoners six armed men with their horses. Another party of fifty killed at least seven of the enemy, and lost one man killed and five wounded. Brought off all the wounded and the arms of the killed. Advance guard received the body to-day. The men are in magnificent spirits for a battle. The only trouble will be to restrain them.

  GEO. B. McCLELLAN, Major-General.

  –––

  BUCKHANNON, July 7, 1861.

  Col. E. D. TOWNSEND, Assistant Adjutant-General:

  Newspaper reports say that my department is to be broken up. I hope the General will leave under my control both the operations on the Mississippi and in Western Virginia. If he cannot do so, the Indiana and Ohio troops are necessary to my success. With these means at my disposal, and such resources as I command in Virginia, if the Government will give me ten thousand arms for distribution in Eastern Tennessee I think I can break the backbone of secession. Please instruct whether to move on Staunton or on to Wytheville.* I thank the General for his commendation, and hope to deserve rather in the future than in the past. Please enforce the occupation of Cumberland and Piedmont. The condition of things in that vicinity renders it absolutely necessary to occupy both these points, and you will remember that my command does not extend that far. I cannot too strongly impress upon you the necessity of holding these points. The Pennsylvania State troops now in the vicinity of Cumberland will answer the purpose perfectly well.

  GEO. B. MCCLELLAN, Major-General, Commanding.

  * General Scott’s answer follows.

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  JULY 9, 1861.

  General MCCLELLAN, U. S. Army, Buckhannon:

  Your telegrams of 7th received. The General concedes that you are the best judge of your means and the importance of the objects to be {p.202} gained; but when you speak of extending your operations to Staunton, and even to Wytheville, he fears your line will be, too long without intermediate supports. He wishes you to weigh well these points before deciding.

  E. D. TOWNSEND.

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  HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE OHIO, Middle Fork Bridge, Va., July 10, 1861.

  To Lieut. Col. E. D. TOWNSEND:

  In sight of the enemy, who is strongly intrenched and holds firm. A strong armed reconnaissance is now starting out. I think I can turn his position; feel sure of success in any event. This country exceedingly difficult to operate in. My other column from Philippi is also within a mile of the intrenchments on Laurel Hill; advanced guards within two hundred yards of the enemy on each line; all my men eager for the fight. The companies at Glenville are safe, and favorable chance of cutting off O. J. Wise. I shall make no further extended movement without laying the whole case before the General and obtaining his orders in advance. Wish to clear my department fully of the enemy, and then be ready to carry out the views of the General-in-Chief Can shorten distance from base by adopting a new base in event of extended operations.

  Please send me more regular officers; some old regiments, if possible. I want those mountain guns at once. I have great difficulties to meet, but, have gone into them knowing that the General will give me support as I need it, and that he will appreciate my position.

  GEO. B. MCCLELLAN, Major-General, Commanding.

  –––

  HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE OHIO, Rich Mountain, Va.-9 a.m., 12th. [July, 1861.]

  Col. E. D. TOWNSEND:

  We are in possession of all the enemy’s works up to a point in sight of Beverly. Have taken all his guns, a very large, amount of wagons, tents, &c.-everything he had. A large number of prisoners, many of whom wounded. Several officers prisoners. They lost many killed. We have lost in all perhaps twenty killed and forty wounded, of whom all but two or three in the column under Rosecrans, which turned the position. Mass of enemy escaped through the woods entirely disorganized. Among prisoners, Dr. Taylor, formerly of the Army. Colonel Pegram was in command.

  Rosecrans’ column left camp yesterday morning and marched some eight miles through the mountains, reaching turnpike some two or three miles in rear of the enemy. Defeated an advance force, taking a couple of guns. I had position ready for twelve guns near main camp, and as guns were moving up ascertained that enemy had retreated. I am now pushing on to Beverly, as part of Rosecrans’ troops being now within three miles of it. Our success complete and almost bloodless. Doubt whether Wise and Johnston will unite and overpower me. Behavior of troops in action and towards prisoners admirable.

  GEO. B. McCLELLAN, Major-General, Commanding.

  {p.203}

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  HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE OHIO, Camp at Beverly, Va., July 12-8 p. m.

  COLONEL: I have the honor to inform you that the army under my command has gained a decisive victory, which seems to have accomplished the objects of my march. I tamed the enemy’s very strong intrenchments on Rich Mountain yesterday with General Rosecrans, brigade of four regiments and one company of cavalry. He had a spirited action with a large party of the enemy (who had two guns) on the Summit of the mountain, captured both guns, and killed a large number of the enemy.

  This morning, as we were in the act of moving twelve guns into a position commanding the enemy’s intrenchments by a road cut last evening, it was ascertained that he had left in the utmost confusion. We have all his guns (six in number), all his wagons, tents, &c. The number of killed, wounded, and prisoners is large. Our loss very small-about 11 killed and 35 wounded.

  I advanced at once on Beverly, and occupied it with the least possible delay, thus cutting off Garnett’s retreat on Huttonsville, and forcing him to take the Leedsville and Saint George road. I have ordered General Morris to press him closely, and have also given instructions by telegraph which will throw from 5,000 to 6,000 men and four guns in his front, so that there is good reason to hope that we may yet capture him. I shall move on Huttonsville to-morrow morning, and endeavor to seize the Cheat Mountain pass before the enemy can occupy it in strength. With that pass seized, the position on Cheat River (near Rowlesburg) strongly occupied, and the Gauley Bridge held, as it probably is by this time, by General Cox, I think we shall have placed the occupation of Western Virginia on a safe basis. After reaching Huttonsville I can determine better than I now can whether it will be advisable to occupy the Greenbrier Valley at present.

  I hope to be, able to give you to-morrow full details of the transactions of the last few days. I advanced so rapidly to this place that it is not now in my power. We occupy here a very strong defensive position. We are constantly picking up more prisoners.

  I am, colonel, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

  GEO. B. McCLELLAN, Major-General, U. S. Army.

  Col. E. D. TOWNSEND Assistant Adjutant-General, Washington.

  Captured official papers show Garnett’s force to have been 10,000 men. Please give instructions as to the disposition to be made of the prisoners of war. I shall for the present order them to Columbus, Ohio. We have several officers, among them Dr. Taylor, formerly of the Medical Corps, U. S. Army.

  G. B. McC.

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  BEVERLY, VA., July 13, 1861.

  Col. E. D. TOWNSEND:

  Success of to-day is all that, I could desire. We captured six brass cannon, of which one is rifled, all their camp equipage and transportation, even, to his tents. The number of tents will probably reach two hundred, and more than sixty wagons. Their killed and wounded will amount to fully one hundred and fifty; at least one hundred prisoners and more coming in constantly. I know already of ten officers killed {p.204} and prisoners. Their retreat complete. Occupied Beverly by a rapid march.

  Garnett abandoned his camp early this morning, leaving much of his equipage. He came within a few miles of Beverly, but our rapid march turned him back in great confusion, and he is now retreating on the road to Saint George. I have, ordered General Morris to follow him up closely. I have telegraphed for the two Pennsylvania regiments at Cumberland to join General Hill at Rowlesburg. The general is concentrating all his troops at Rowlesburg to cut off Garnett’s retreat near West Union, or, if possible, Saint George. I may say that we have driven out some ten thousand troops strongly intrenched, with the loss of eleven killed and thirty-five wounded.

  Provision returns found here show Garnett’s force to have been ten thousand men. They were Eastern Virginians, Georgians, Tennesseeans, and, I think, Carolinians. To-morrow I can give full details as to prisoners, &c. Will move on Huttonsville to-morrow, and endeavor to seize the Cheat Mountain pass, where there are now but few troops. I hope that General Cox has by this time driven Wise out of the Kanawha Valley. In that case I should have accomplished the object of liberating Western Virginia. I hope the general will approve my operations.

  GEO. B. MCCLELLAN, Major-General, Commanding.

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  HEADQUARTERS, July 13, 1861.

  Gen. MCCLELLAN, Beverly, Va:

  The General-in-Chief, and what is more, the Cabinet, including the President, are charmed with your activity, valor, and consequent successes of Rich Mountain the 11th, and of Beverly this morning. We do not doubt that you will in due time sweep the rebels from Western Virginia, but we do not mean to precipitate you, as you are fast enough.

  WINFIELD SCOTT.

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  HUTTONSVILLE, VA., July 14, 1861.

  Colonel TOWNSEND:

  Garnett and forces routed; his baggage and one gun taken; his army demoralized; Garnett killed. We have annihilated the enemy in Western Virginia, and have lost thirteen killed, and not more than forty wounded. We have in all killed at least, two hundred of the enemy, and their prisoners will amount to at least one thousand. Have taken seven guns in all. I still look for the capture of the remnant of Garnett’s army by General Hill. The troops defeated are the crack regiments of Eastern Virginia, aided by Georgians, Tennesseeans, and Carolinians. Our success is complete, and secession is killed in this country.

  GEO. B. MCCLELLAN, Major-General, Commanding.

  –––

  CAMP NEAR HUTTONSVILLE, July 14, 1861.

  Col. E. A TOWNSEND:

  I have, just returned from Cheat River, having crossed the mountain with a strong advanced guard. The enemy have no doubt retreated {p.205} to Staunton, and I have the pleasure to announce that, with the exception of the Kanawha, the part of Western Virginia included in my department is now free from the presence of the enemy. I expect every day to hear that the measures taken to drive Wise out of the Kanawha have proved successful. I shall now proceed to scour the country with small columns, unless the moral effect of our successes has sufficed to disperse the guerrilla bands. The three-months’ regiments are to be reorganized, and some time will be required to prepare this hastily organized army for further operations.

  The general’s kind telegraph is received. Offer him my thanks for it.

  GEO. B. MCCLELLAN.

  –––

  HDQRS. ARMY OF OCCUPATION WESTERN VIRGINIA, Camp near Huttonsville, July 14, 1861.

  COLONEL: I have the honor to submit, for the information of the Commanding General, the following report of the operations of the forces under my command from the time of my leaving Grafton. Previous to my departure from Grafton I became satisfied that a large body of the rebel array, supposed to consist of six or seven thousand men, under Brig. Gen. Robert S. Garnett formerly of the U. S. Army, occupied an intrenched position at Laurel Hill, about thirteen miles south of Philippi, on the turnpike leading to Beverly, with the apparent intention of making a determined stand at that point; whereupon I at once resolved to push on with all the available force at my disposal, and endeavor, by making a rapid detour through Buckhannon, to reach Beverly, and strike their rear, cutting off their supply communication from Staunton.

  As soon as I had concentrated my forces at Buckhannon I moved forward, and at the same time ordered General Morris to advance from Philippi, and take a commanding position about a mile and a half distant, and directly opposite the enemy’s works, thereby enabling him to divert their attention from me, also to watch their movements, and be in position to act promptly after I had reached their rear, at Beverly. General Morris promptly responded to my order, and secured the proper position with but slight resistance, and I pushed forward with my column as rapidly as my means of transportation would permit.

  On the evening of the 9th instant I arrived at Roaring Creek, near the base of Rich Mountain, where I found the enemy in considerable force had destroyed a bridge, and were strongly intrenched at a point where the road enters a defile leading up the mountain, about two miles distant from my camp.

  On the morning of the 10th I ordered a reconnaissance in force, consisting of the Ninth and Fourth Ohio Volunteers, and Loomis’ battery, under the supervision of Lieutenant Poe, Topographical Engineers. This was pushed within two hundred yards of the enemy’s guns, and resulted in the loss of one man killed and one wounded, but the dense thickets with which their works were surrounded prevented the attainment of much positive or satisfactory information. It served, however, to confirm my previous supposition, that the intrenchments were held by a large force, with several guns in position to command the front approaches, and that a direct assault would result in a heavy and unnecessary loss of life.

  These considerations at once determined me to make an effort to turn their flank and commence the attack from the rear. Accordingly I ordered General Rosecrans to move at 4 o’clock in the morning with the Nineteenth Ohio, the Eighth, Tenth, and Thirteenth Indiana Regiments, and {p.206} Burdsal’s dragoons, to cut his way through the almost impenetrable thickets of brush to the lofty summit of Rich Mountain, at Hart’s farm, about five miles distant, and to move thence at once down the turnpike road and attack the intrenchments in rear, and during the progress of his march to communicate with me every hour. The remainder of the force under my command to be held in readiness to assault in front as soon as Rosecrans’ musketry should indicate that be was immediately in their rear.

  The order to General Rosecrans to advance to attack the rear of the enemy’s lower intrenchments was not carried out, but his brigade remained at Hart’s farm during the remainder of the day and the night, and I received no communication from him after about 11 o’clock a. m., when he was still distant about a mile and a half from Hart’s farm.

  About the time I expected the general to reach the rear of their intrenchments I moved up all my available force to the front, and remained in person just in rear of the advance pickets, ready to assault when the indicated moment should arrive.

  In the mean time I sent Lieutenant Poe to find such a position for our artillery as would enable us to command the works. Late in the afternoon I received his report that he had found such a place. I immediately detailed a party to cut a road to it for our guns, but it Was too late to get them into position before dark, and as I had received no intelligence whatever of General Rosecrans’ movements, I finally determined to return to camp, leaving merely sufficient force to cover the working party. Orders were then given to move up the guns with the entire available infantry at daybreak the following morning. As the troops were much fatigued, some delay occurred in moving from camp, and just as the guns were starting intelligence was received that the enemy had evacuated their works and fled over the mountains, leaving all their guns, means of transportation, ammunition, tents, and baggage behind.

  Then, for the first time since 11 o’clock the previous day, I received a communication from General Rosecrans, giving me the first intimation that he had taken the enemy’s position at Hart’s farm, from which it appeared that he, with great difficulty and almost superhuman efforts on the part of his men, had forced his way up the precipitous side of the mountain, and at about 1 p. m. reached the summit, where he encountered a portion of the enemy’s force, with two guns in position behind earth and log works-affording protection to their men.

  The attack was commenced by the enemy with heroic spirit and determination. They opened upon the advance of our column with volleys of musketry and rapid discharges of canister, killing several of our men, and at first throwing them into some confusion. They, however, soon rallied, and returned a brisk and accurate fire, which told with terrible effect in the enemy’s ranks-killing and wounding nearly every man at their guns. The troops then advanced, continuing their well-directed fire, until they drove the enemy from their position, and caused them to take flight down the turnpike towards their intrenchments at the base of the mountain.

  The troops then encamped on the battle-field at about 2 o’clock p. m., and remained there until the following morning, when I made a rapid march and occupied Beverly. I here learned that General Garnett, as soon as he discovered we were approaching his rear and had cut off his retreat in this direction, abandoned his intrenchments at Laurel Hill, leaving his tents and other property, and had made a hasty retreat in the night over a rough country road leading towards Saint {p.207} George. General Morris had been repeatedly instructed by me to keep a close watch upon Garnett’s movements, and to be ready the moment he retreated to follow him up vigorously with all his available force, and crush him if possible; but, much to my surprise, when he discovered that Garnett had escaped, he only sent a portion of his force about eight miles, and then halted it for several hours, to communicate with me and bring up re-enforcements. This detention gave Garnett the opportunity to get far in advance, and had it not been for the rapid and well-directed march of the advance, conducted by Captain Benham, it is believed that the rebel general would have escaped unharmed. Captain Benham is entitled to great praise for his prompt and energetic movement upon Garnett’s rear, the result of which will be seen from his report inclosed. This shows that General Garnett and about twenty others of the enemy were killed, and fifty prisoners and two stands of colors and one rifle cannon taken, besides the baggage train and a large amount of other property. I take very great pleasure in recommending Captain Benham to the especial notice of the General-in-Chief. Immediately after learning that Garnett had retreated, I ordered Brigadier-General Hill, commanding at Grafton, to assemble all his disposable force, and endeavor, by a rapid march upon Saint George or West Union, to out off the retreat of the rebels, but I have not yet heard the result of his movement. My last advices this evening report General Hill’s advance within four miles of the retreating rebels.

  I have not time now to notice individual acts of merit and bravery displayed in the recent conflicts, but shall take an early opportunity of presenting them to you in detail. I cannot, however, let the present occasion pass without making mention of the services of Brigadier-General Rosecrans in conducting his command up the very precipitous sides of the mountains and overcoming the formidable obstacles which impeded his progress; also for the very handsome manner in which he planned and directed his attack upon the rebels at Hart’s farm, carrying them after a stout and determined resistance.

  I also conceive it to be due to my volunteer aide-de-camp, Col. F. W. Lander, to speak of his services in this connection. He, by the request of General Rosecrans, accompanied his column, and by his experience assisted materially in conducting the troops over a most difficult country, and displayed extraordinary activity and courage in the battle. He escaped unhurt, having the horse under him disabled by a canister shot.

  I pursued the retreating rebels yesterday as far as Cheat River, and became satisfied that they would not stop short of Staunton. I therefore returned to this camp, which commands the communication between Eastern and Western Virginia, over the Staunton and Parkersburg turnpike.

  General Garnett’s command when last heard from were retreating in great confusion near the North Branch of the Potomac, on the road leading from West Union to Williamsport.

  I trust I will not be regarded as merely conforming to a formula when I express the great obligations due to my personal and general staff, who by their good judgment, untiring energy, and cool conduct have enabled me to overcome the inevitable difficulties of an imperfect and hasty organization, and to accomplish whatever good results have been achieved. As far as I have myself observed and learned from their officers, the conduct of the volunteers who participated in the actions at Rich Mountain and at Carrick’s Ford was unexceptionable. They invariably displayed an ardent desire to meet the enemy, and {p.208} great gallantry in action, and in my judgment all they require to make good and reliable soldiers is a little more drill and discipline.

  The results of the action at Rich Mountain, as nearly as can be ascertained, were as follows:

  Our loss in killed, 12; wounded, 59; no prisoners. The loss of the enemy in killed, 135; wounded and prisoners not yet reported, as near as can be determined between 800 and 900. Two brass 6-pounder cannon, a large number of muskets, two stands of colors, and other property were taken. Two 6-pounder brass cannon were captured at the lower intrenchments with a large wagon train, with horses and a large number of tents.

  But the really important results of these operations are the complete rout and annihilation of the rebel forces; the capture of one and the death of the other of their leaders; that this portion of Western Virginia is entirely freed from their presence, and that there is now not one single organized band of the rebels on this side of the mountain north of the Kanawha Valley.

  After my arrival at Beverly I received a note from Colonel Pegram, containing a proposition to surrender his command as prisoners of war. This note with my reply are inclosed. His command, consisting of 33 commissioned officers and 560 men, are now prisoners.

  I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

  GEO. B. McCLELLAN, Major-General, U. S. Army, Commanding.

  Col. E. D. TOWNSEND, Asst. Adjt. Gen., Hdqrs. of the Army, Washington, D. C.

  [Inclosure No. 1.]

  Instructions to General T. A. Morris.

  HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE OHIO, Buckhannon, Va., July 3, 1861.

  General T. A. MORRIS, Philippi:

  GENERAL : Yours of the 2d has reached me. After questioning your messenger and hearing his full story, I confess that I do not share your apprehensions, and that I am not a little surprised that you feel the defense of Philippi so hazardous and dangerous an operation. If four thousand (nearly) of our men, in a position selected and fortified in advance, with ample time to examine the ground carefully and provide against any possible plan of attack, are not enough to hold the place against any force these people can bring against it, I think we had better all go home at once. If we cannot fight in position, I am much mistaken as to our men.

  I have, however, in deference to your views, ordered the Sixth Ohio on temporary duty with you until the crisis has passed, although I believe they can be employed to more advantage at other points. This is all the re-enforcement I can now spare. As to the one or two squadrons of efficient cavalry asked for by Captain Benham, it seems hardly necessary for me to repeat that I have only one and a half companies, such as they are, and that more important duty is for them here.

  You have only to defend a strong position, or, at most, to follow a retreating enemy. I fear you do not share the confidence I feel in our men, and that you regard their cavalry as more dangerous than I do. I feel that these men of ours can be worked up to any deed of daring, that their leaders can make them cool under fire, and that a couple of {p.209} good companies of infantry can drive off all their cavalry in this mountainous country.

  I propose taking the really difficult and dangerous part of this work on my own hands. I will not ask you to do anything that I would not be willing to do myself. But let us understand each other. I can give you no more re-enforcements. I cannot consent to weaken any further the really active and important column which is to decide the fate of the campaign. If you cannot undertake the defense of Philippi with the force now under your control, I must find some one who will. I have ordered up Latham’s company, all of Keys’ cavalry that are fit to take the field, and the Sixth Ohio.

  Do not ask for further re-enforcements. If you do, I shall take it as a request to be relieved from your command and to return to Indiana.

  I have spoken plainly. I speak officially. The crisis is a grave one, and I must have generals under me who are willing to risk as much as I am, and to be content to risk their lives and reputation, with such means as I can give them. Let this be the last of it. Give me full details as to the information you obtained-not mere rumors, but facts-and leave it to my judgment to determine what force You need. I wish action now and determination.

  I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

  GEO. B. McCLELLAN, Major-General, Commanding.

  [Inclosure No. 2.]

  HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE OHIO, Buckhannon, Va., July 6, 1861.

  Brig. Gen. T. A. MORRIS, Commanding at Philippi :

  GENERAL: The major-general commanding directs that you advance from your present position to-morrow morning, and take up a position within two miles of the enemy-near Elliott’s farm-in preference on the south side of Barker’s Mill Run, on the heights in rear of William Yeager’s house. It is deemed preferable to avoid the defile north of the Elliott house by crossing the river somewhere near the nineteen-mile post from Beverly, and recrossing at the ford where the Middle Fork road crosses just at the position to be occupied by you.

  Your train may remain at Philippi, under a sufficient escort, until you have occupied your new position. You will move prepared to force any opposition offered, and will at all hazards accomplish the object proposed. Occupy Belington by a strong advanced guard, and place a strong detachment to cover the paths leading from the rebel camp to the left flank of your position. From this position push out strong infantry reconnaissances, to ascertain the exact position, condition, and movements of the enemy. Watch them closely day and night. Have everything ready to pursue them should they retreat, and follow them up closely in that event. Make extended reconnaissances, calculated to give the impression that the main attack is to be made by you, and use all efforts to retain them in their present position. Arrange your hour of starting from Philippi so that you will by an easy march reach the vicinity of Elliott’s within an hour or two after sunrise.

  Let your advanced guard be of infantry, strong, and near the main column. Do not push out any advanced cavalry patrols. A strong advanced guard will move from here to-morrow morning to occupy the Middle Fork Bridge. By the next day the Roaring Creek Bridge will be taken, and perhaps on the same day the town of Beverly will be {p.210} occupied. The general is delayed by the non-arrival of supplies, but hopes to occupy Beverly on Tuesday, at latest-probably on Monday.

  He asks you to do all in your power to hold the enemy in check in their present position, and to induce them to believe that you will make the main attack; the object being to cut them off at Beverly.

  I have the honor to be, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

  S. WILLIAMS, Assistant Adjutant-General.

  [Inclosure No. 3.]

  Letter from Lieut. Col. John Pegram, C. S. Army.

  HEADQUARTERS AT MR. KITTLE’S HOUSE, Near Tygart’s Valley River, 6 Miles from Beverly, July 12, 1861.

  COMMANDING OFFICER OF NORTHERN FORCES, Beverly, Va.:

  SIR: I write to state to you that I have, in consequence of the retreat of General Garnett, and the jaded and reduced condition of my command, most of them having been without food for two days, concluded, with the concurrence of a majority of my captains and field officers, to surrender my command to you to-morrow as prisoners of war. I have only to add, I trust they will only receive at your hands such treatment as has been invariably shown to the Northern prisoners by the South.

  I am, sir, your obedient servant,

  JOHN PEGRAM, Lieutenant-Colonel, P. A. C. S., Commanding.

  [Inclosure No. 4.]

  Letter from General McClellan to John Pegram, C. S. Army.

  HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE OHIO, Beverly, Va., July 13, 1861.

  JOHN PEGRAM, Esq., Styling himself Lieutenant-Colonel, P. A. C. S.:

  SIR: Your communication, dated yesterday, proposing to surrender as prisoners of war the force assembled under your command, has been delivered to me. I will receive you, your officers and men, as prisoners, and I will treat you and them with the kindness due to prisoners of war, but it is not in my power to relieve you or them from any liabilities incurred by taking arms against the United States.

  I am, sir, respectfully, your obedient servant,

  GEO. B. McCLELLAN, Major-General, U. S. Army, Commanding Department.

  –––

  HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE OHIO, Camp near Huttonsville, Va., July 15, 1861.

  COLONEL: I have sent by Major Marcy a brief account of the operations which have resulted in the dispersion of the rebels in this portion of Western Virginia and in driving them completely beyond the mountains. I am in constant expectation of hearing from General Cox that his efforts to drive the Wises out of the Kanawha Valley and occupy the Gauley Bridge have been crowned with success. Should there be any delay in that quarter, I will take a few regiments and move by {p.211} Weston, Bulltown, Sutton, &c., on the Gauley Bridge, in order to bring the matter to a speedy conclusion.

  As far as I can now learn the effect of our operations against the larger forces has been to cause the small guerrilla bands to disappear, and I think we shall have no great difficulty in securing the entire pacification of this region. I propose moving back to Beverly to-morrow with headquarters, the advance-guard brigade, Howe’s battery, and Barker’s cavalry. I will leave here for the present Schleich’s brigade, consisting of the Third Ohio, Fourteenth and Fifteenth Indiana, Loomis’ battery, and Burdsal’s cavalry, with instructions to place an advance guard in the mountain, and to patrol the road in advance frequently. At Beverly I will be in a position to move promptly to any quarter required. The rather annoying business of reorganizing the three-months’ regiments is now to be gone through with. I have some fourteen of that character in my command. While this is being done, I will endeavor so to locate the three-years’ troops as to have good camps of instruction, while the necessary defensive purposes are at the same time subserved.

  To effect this, I would ask the attention of the General-in-Chief to the great necessity for the appointment of more general officers for the three-years’ service. But one brigadier-general has yet been appointed for Ohio, and none for Indiana. The appointment of J. J. Reynolds (formerly of the artillery, now brigadier-general in the Indiana State service) is much desired by the troops from that State, and I hope that he may receive the first appointment. I would be glad to have him here now to place him in command at this post. With the raw material which composes this army it would seem absolutely necessary that we should have general officers of military education.

  I would beg leave to express the hope that a brigade of the old regular infantry and some companies of regular cavalry may be assigned to my command, if it is intended that I shall be engaged in further active operations. While engaged in reorganizing the three months’ regiments there is a great deal to be done in completing the organization of the trains and various staff departments.

  Maj. R. B. Marcy, who has been acting during this brief campaign as inspector-general of this army, is in full possession of my views, and can communicate them better orally than I can on paper. May I ask that the General-in-Chief will communicate to the major for my benefit so much of his intentions as may be necessary to enable me to conform my preparations and movements to his views, it being my desire to act in strict accordance with the General’s wishes.

  I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

  GEO. B. McCLELLAN, Major-General, U. S. Army.

  Col. E. D. TOWNSEND, Assistant Adjutant-General, Washington, D. C.

  –––

  No. 3.

  Report of Col. John M. Connell, Seventeenth Ohio Infantry, of skirmish at Glenville.

  BUCKHANNON, VA., July 8, 1861-3 p. m.

  GENERAL: My scout Edwards, just in, effected his escape through the enemy’s lines at Glenville about two hours after the fight began {p.212} yesterday. Thirty-five men first attacked and fired upon our pickets without injuring them. They returned the fire effectually, and got safely into camp. All of our pickets got safely in during the night. The advance of the enemy was composed of about 160 well-armed and disciplined men, and by dark last night our little force was surrounded, the enemy covering the three roads leading past the Court House.

  He brings no definite information as to number of enemy, thinks at least 2,500, 1,000 of whom are an Eastern Virginia regiment, well armed and equipped and disciplined, the rest militia.

  Irregular firing was kept up during the night. At daybreak, in the language of the scout, “Both sides were firing like hell,” our men holding good their position. Tyler’s two companies stopped last night ten miles this side of Glenville, for what reason God only knows. But the delay has probably occasioned the cutting off of my brave boys.

  Colonel Tyler himself at 10 o’clock this morning was not a mile and a half from Weston. If our men at Glenville cannot hold out till to-morrow morning Tyler and Lytle will not reach Wise at all.

  The scout reports that our men are behaving nobly, determined to hold their position.

  Respectfully,

  J. M. CONNELL, Seventeenth Ohio Volunteers.

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  No. 4.

  Reports of Brig. Gen. William S. Rosecrans, U. S. Army, of preliminary operations from June 27 to July 3.

  JUNE 29, 1861.

  [GENERAL:] On the receipt of your instructions by telegraph to proceed to Elk Camp, after midnight of the 27th I took my staff and sixty-five Chicago dragoons, under Captain Barker, and arrived at 6 a. m. I found it about ten miles below Clarksburg, in the woods, in a bend of the Elk, and about one mile and a half above the bridge. They were sent to cover in the position marked A on the sketch herewith.* Spending two or three hours in reducing things to order and reconnoitering the locality, I found there was no room for any one of the regiments, and some had not even room for a company roll-call. Meanwhile I received your dispatch by messenger, announcing the departure of General Schleich and of Colonel McCook for the same spot. I had the long-roll beat, and the troops assembled from the woods, fields, and ravines, where they were roaming. Those were arrested who did not obey the call, and experienced its meaning. Having given them this lesson I dismissed them for dinner, and gave orders that after they should prepare for a march. I then went forward to examine the country for a suitable camp. The valley in which is the Buckhannon turnpike is narrow, winding along through high hills, covered with timothy and clover, and offers no sufficient space for an encampment until you reach Duncan’s Bottom. Arriving there, the citizens of the vicinity told me I could find a good camping ground in a valley beyond Natty Mountain; it proved a mistake, and I returned to this place, where I met the head of the column, and ordered them to encamp for the night.

  It was then 8 o’clock, and I proceeded to Schleich’s camp and wrote you the dispatch sent last evening. On my way I found McCook’s regiment {p.213} on the only ground fit for the camp at the bridge, which the Eighth and Tenth were sent to cover at the point marked C. Schleich had gone into camp at the Elk Camp at A on the sketch. I returned home at 12.30 o’clock last night, and this morning read your letter of the 27th. Yesterday intelligence of the non-occupation of Buckhannon was confirmed this morning by a scout of the Nineteenth, who slept there last night, and found no secession forces. As telegraphed you last night, I am more and more afraid we shall be compelled to hunt rather than fight.

  After these details of my movements and position I have only to add that, according to the tenor of your instructions to occupy Buckhannon with one regiment when I deemed it safe, I have sent the Ninth Ohio, under Colonel McCook, who will probably reach there by 6 o’clock this evening.

  No one, my dear general, among your general friends, has more disinterested and earnest wishes for the success of your efforts than the writer of this letter. None under your command are more loyally, cheerfully ready to conform to the duties of a subordinate position, and I even flatter myself I understand the position as well as most of your brigadiers. Review, if you please, that letter which you have put on record, and say whether, after you receive this, both private feelings and public interest are likely to be the better for it.

  Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

  W. S. ROSECRANS, Brigadier-General, U. S. Army.

  Major-General MCCLELLAN.

  * Not found.

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  HDQRS. OHIO AND INDIANA PROV. BRIG., UNITED STATES VOLUNTEER MILITIA, Camp Buckhannon, June 30, 1861.

  SIR: I send this by special messenger to open communication with You. By order of Major-General McClellan, after a night’s march I occupied this place with my brigade-the Eighth and Tenth Indiana and Nineteenth Ohio-this morning at 7 o’clock amid the cheers and congratulations of the citizens. The Beverly and Weston roads are occupied in peace, and patrols will be established to scour the country in all directions. Let me know how you are situated, and advise me of anything relating to the movements of the secessionists in our region and elsewhere.

  Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

  W. A. ROSECRANS, Brigadier-General.

  Col. E. B. TYLER, Seventh Ohio U. S. Volunteer Infantry, Weston.

  –––

  HDQRS. OHIO AND INDIANA PROV. BRIG., UNITED STATES VOLUNTEER MILITIA, Buckhannon, Va., July 3, 1861.

  GENERAL: Of the matters on which I wished to consult was the order to be given to the detached portion of the Seventeenth Ohio Regiment. Colonel Connell, with Lieutenant-Colonel Pond and four companies of the regiment, was detached and landed at Petroleum on the 26th ultimo, with orders to proceed to Hughes’ River, and take position to command the Staunton road and the road from Glenville through Burning Springs {p.214} to Parkersburg, and await orders. Subsequently he received an additional supply of provisions, and directions to proceed to Glenville, and thence to Weston, unless unforeseen circumstances should require other action. Since then Colonel Tyler informed me that he was thirty-seven miles west of Glenwood. I wrote Colonel Tyler to communicate with him, and gave no further orders, until I knew your views of the forces in that direction.

  One company, under Captain Stinchcomb, of Colonel Sill’s [Connell’s] regiment, was detailed as a train guard during the 24th to 28th ultimo, when I was removed from the opportunity of communicating with them. Three companies, under Major Steele, a very enterprising officer of that regiment, was detached at Clarksburg on the 27th to proceed to Parkersburg, and there take boats for Ripley, Ravenswood, and Belleville.

  The major arrived in Parkersburg on Friday, the 28th. On the same evening he embarked on two steamboats, commanded by Captain Kountz, and reached a landing two miles below Ravenswood with two companies, leaving the other steamboat to land above Belleville, and march down and take it while the two landed at Ravenswood.

  The major proceeded to Ripley, which he reached at 4 a. m. of the 29th. He placed his advance guard hidden from sight, and having surrounded the place, completely surprised it, capturing the postmaster and some eighty other secessionists. He administered the oath-of allegiance to the captives; installed the postmaster newly appointed by the Government; took the captive postmaster with him to Ravenswood, where they captured all they could, and swore them in as at Ripley. The other company landed and cleared Belleville. Major Steele deemed it prudent to leave two companies (D and I) at Ravenswood, and brought the other One to Clarksburg, which he reached on the morning of the -. One company remains in Parkersburg. This being the position of the detachment of the Seventeenth, the question arises, what shall be done with them?

  Will you send down all the companies of the Twenty-second to Parkersburg, to enable Gilmore to test the three years’ question, and return the three companies of the Seventeenth, that they may rejoin this brigade? What orders will you give for Colonel Connell? An answer to these questions seems necessary before I can give orders to Major Steele. I send this with him to expedite the matter.

  Respectfully, your obedient servant,

  W. S. ROSECRANS.

  Maj. Gen. G. B. MCCLELLAN, U. S. Army, Comdg. Dep’t of the Ohio, Buckhannon, Va.

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  No. 5.

  Report of Brig. Gen. W. S. Rosecrans, U. S. A., of engagement at Rich Mountain

  HEADQUARTERS FIRST BRIGADE, U. S. V. M., Beverly, Va., July 19, 1861.

  MAJOR: In obedience to the order of the major-general commanding, I have the honor to submit the following report of the operations of the First Brigade, consisting of the Eighth and Tenth Indiana Volunteer Militia, the Thirteenth Indiana U. S. Volunteer Infantry, and the Nineteenth Ohio U. S. Volunteer Militia which resulted in dislodging {p.215} the rebel forces from their intrenched position at Camp Garnett, on Rich Mountain.

  After the armed reconnaissance, was over, by direction of the major-general I ordered the Eighth Indiana to bivouac in advance of the camp at Roaring Creek, and the Tenth and Thirteenth into camp. About 10 p. m. I came to the headquarters with a plan for turning the enemy’s position. The general having considered it, and heard the information on which it was based, was pleased to direct me to carry it out, and for that purpose ordered Colonel Sullivan, of the Thirteenth Indiana, and Burdsal’s cavalry, temporarily attached to the brigade, and that the movement should begin at daylight of the next morning. The troops were ordered to parade in silence, under arms, without knapsacks, with one day’s rations in their haversacks, and their canteens filled with water. By inadvertence, the assembly was sounded in the Nineteenth Ohio Regiment, and lights put in several tents. When I discovered it, they were promptly extinguished. The pickets relieved, the regimental, camps and guards, with the sick and a few men of each company remaining, orders were given that the reveille should be beaten at the usual hour, and the column formed and moved forward in the following order* and strength:

  1. Eighth Indiana, under Benton	242	strong.
  2. Tenth Indiana, under Manson	425	“
  3. Thirteenth Indiana, under Sullivan	650	“
  4. Nineteenth Ohio, under Beatty	525	“
  Total infantry	1,842
  5. Burdsal’s cavalry	75
  Aggregate	1,917

  Colonel Lander, accompanied by the guide, led the way through a Pathless forest, over rocks and ravines, keeping far down on the Southeastern declivities of the mountain spurs, and using no ax, to avoid discovery by the enemy, whom we supposed would be on the alert, by reason of the appearance of unusual stir in our camp, and the lateness of the hour. A rain set in about 6 a. m. and lasted until about 11 o’clock a. m. with intermissions, during which the column pushed cautiously and steadily forward, and arrived at last and halted in rear of the crest on the top of Rich Mountain. Hungry, and weary with an eight hours’ march over a most unkindly road, they laid down to rest, while Colonel Lander and the general examined the country. It was found that the guide was too much scared to be with us longer, and we had another valley to cross, another hill to climb, another descent beyond that to make, before we could reach the Beverly road at the top of the mountain. On this road we started at 2 o’clock, and reached the top of the mountain after the loss of an hour’s time by mistake in the direction Of the head of the column, in rectifying which the Tenth Indiana took the advance.

  Shortly after passing over the crest of the hill, the head of the column, ordered to be covered by a company deployed as skirmishers, was fired on by the enemy’s pickets, killing Sergeant James A. Taggart and dangerously wounding Capt. Christopher Miller, of the Tenth.

  The column then advanced through dense brush wood, emerging into rather more open brush-wood and trees, when the rebels opened a fire of both musketry and 6-pounders, firing some case shot and a few shells. The Tenth advanced and took position at A, Plan No. 1,* with one {p.216} company deployed as skirmishers covering its front. The Eighth advanced, and halted in column of fours at B. The Thirteenth advanced to C, in an old road, where it was ordered to occupy the heights with three companies at d d d, and skirmish down the hill, keeping strong reserves on the top. Three companies were ordered back to E, to cover the debouche up the valley on the left. The companies of the remainder were to fill the space In the line marked III, the remaining two companies standing in column at t. The Nineteenth Ohio came down the road and halted in column at H.

  Owing to misunderstanding orders, Colonel Sullivan occupied the hill with his whole regiment, and it took forty minutes to correct the error and get into the proper position, as indicated. The command “Forward” was then given, and another company from the right of the Tenth deployed as skirmishers, leaving an interval through which the Eighth could pass in column and charge the rebel battery on the left of their position at Z as soon as our fire had told properly. At the same time Colonel Sullivan was to take his four companies and charge around the road on the left.

  After in advance of fifty yards and some heavy firing from our line, the enemy showed signs of yielding, and I gave orders to the Eighth, and sent them to the colonel of the Thirteenth, to charge in column. The Eighth made a mistake and got into line at B, where, in consideration of their abundant supplies of ammunition, I left them. The Thirteenth went into column at D, Plan 2. Seven companies of the Nineteenth Ohio deployed into line at H, and delivered two splendid volleys, when the enemy broke. Meanwhile I rode round to the Thirteenth, and drove them into charge up across the road, as shown at I. The Tenth charged by fours at J. The Eighth came down and charged upon the rebel front at K.

  The battle was over, the enemy dispersed; one piece of cannon taken at A, another at B, and their dead and wounded scattered over the hillside.

  Learning from a captive, that the Forty-fourth Virginia and some Georgia troops and cavalry were below, and finding it too late to continue the operations against the rebels’ position that evening with troops as much exhausted as were ours, and threatened, too, by succors, the troops were bivouacked in the position shown on Plan No. 2, Lieutenant-Colonel Hollingsworth going down on the ridge with six companies to the position mentioned within half a mile of the rebel pickets.

  The two brass 6-pounders captured were put in order, and, under command of Captain Koukle, Nineteenth Ohio, placed, one looking down the Beverly road at C, the other at D, looking towards Camp Garnett. During that rainy night our men bivouacked cheerfully, and turned out with great promptitude whenever the rebels by their movements alarmed our pickets.

  About 3 o’clock in the morning of the 12th our pickets brought in a prisoner from the rebel camp, from whom I learned their forces were disorganized and probably dispersing. This determined the disposition for the attack on the camp. I ordered Colonel Beatty, with all the Nineteenth, to proceed along the ridge and take their position on the south side of the road, and directed Burdsal’s cavalry, accompanied by one company of the Tenth Indiana, to reconnoiter down the road. Colonel Sullivan, with the Thirteenth, was to follow the movement promptly, and by his skirmishers to clear the hillside north of the road.

  These orders were obeyed, and, finding the position abandoned, Burdsal’s cavalry and Company C, Tenth Indiana Regiment, entered the camp about 6 o’clock a. m., where they found and took prisoners {p.217} 10 officers, 5 non-commissioned officers, and 54 privates; the descriptive list of which is hereto attached, and marked A .

  Colonel Beatty entered the upper camp about the same time, and occupied it, taking charge of the property, among which were two brass 6-pounders and some eighty tents, four caissons, and one hundred rounds of ammunition. Colonel Sullivan, of the Thirteenth Indiana, came in and occupied the camp on the north side of the road, and took charge of the horses, wagons, tents, tools, and implements of the rebels there. The Eighth and Tenth Indiana were left in position on the battlefield, and were charged with the duty of burying the dead. They remained until next morning, the 13th, when the whole force moved forward to their present encampment at Beverly.

  Having given the details, I close my report by the following summary of the movement:

  With strong detachment from the Nineteenth Ohio, the Eighth, Tenth, and Thirteenth Indiana and Burdsal’s cavalry, amounting to 1,912 rank and file, I set out at 5 a. m. of the 11th, and by a circuitous route, through a trackless mountain forest, reached the Beverly road at the top of Rich Mountain, where I found the enemy advised of my approach and in force, with two 6-pounder field-pieces, and infantry, from various circumstances, judged to have been from 800 to 1,200 strong, though probably not all of them in action. We formed at about 3 o’clock under cover of our skirmishers, guarding well against a flank attack from the direction of the rebels’ position, and after a brisk fire, which threw the rebels into confusion, carried their position by a charge, driving them from behind some log breastworks, and pursued them into the thickets on the mountain. We captured twenty-one prisoners, two brass 6-pounders, fifty stand of arms, and some corn and provisions. Our loss was 1-2 killed and 49 wounded.

  The rebels had some 20 wounded on the field. The number of the killed we could not ascertain, but subsequently the number of burials reported to this date is 135-many found scattered over the mountain. Our troops, informed that there were one or two regiments of rebels towards Beverly, and finding the hour late, bivouacked on their arms amid a cold, drenching rain, to await daylight, when they moved forward On the enemy’s intrenched position, which was found abandoned by all except 63 men, who were taken prisoners. We took possession of two brass 6-pounders, four caissons, and one hundred rounds ammunition, two kegs and one barrel powder, 19,000 buck and ball cartridge, two stands of colors, and a large lot of equipments and clothing, consisting of 204 tents, 427 pairs pants, 124 axes, 98 picks, 134 spades and shovels, all their train, consisting of 29 wagons’, 75 horses, 4 mules, and 60 pairs harness.

  The enemy, finding their position turned, abandoned intrenchments, which, taken by the front, would have cost us a thousand lives, and dispersed through the mountains, some attempting to escape by the way Of Laurel Hill and others aiming for Huttonsville. Among the former were the command of Colonel Pegram, which, unable to join the rebels at Laurel Hill, surrendered to the major-general on the 13th.

  Our loss in the engagement killed and wounded is shown in the statement hereto appended, marked B. The list of prisoners taken is shown in the paper hereto appended, marked D. The invoice of property captured and turned over to the post quartermaster is hereto annexed, marked E.

  In closing this report, I deem it proper to observe that, considering the rawness and inexperience of both officers and men, the fact that one {p.218} fourth were on picket guard the previous evening, and had made a most fatiguing march through the rain and with only inadequate supplies of food, their conduct was admirable.

  Among those who are entitled to special mention are Colonel Lauder, who with the guide led the way into the very midst of the action; Colonel Manson, of the Tenth Indiana, who was everywhere along his lines, inspiring the men by his voice and presence, and who bravely led the charge of his regiment. Colonel Benton was ready to obey orders, and moved among his men with alacrity. Colonel Sullivan charged with his command as the rebels were dispersing, and captured several of the prisoners. Major Wilson, of the Eighth, was conspicuous for coolness and promptitude of action. Lieutenant-Colonel Colgrove, of the Eighth, deserves especial mention for his coolness while forming his lines of the regiment under fire. Major Foster, of the Thirteenth, showed coolness and self-possession in forming a port-ion of his men under the fire of the cannons.

  My thanks are due Captain Kingsbury, my assistant adjutant-general, and to Capt. A. Irwin Harrison, for their valuable and efficient aid in carrying orders under fire.

  The Tenth Indiana was under fire for an hour and a half. The Nineteenth Ohio distinguished itself for the cool and handsome manner in which they held their post against a flank attack, and for the manner in which they came into line and delivered their fire near the close of the action. I consider Colonel Beatty to have managed his men well, and to have been ably seconded by Colonel Hollingsworth and Major Buckley.

  For the individuals who distinguished themselves under the eyes of their regimental commanders I respectfully refer to the reports of colonels of regiments, herewith submitted.

  Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

  W. S. ROSECRANS, Brigadier-General, U. S. Army.

  Maj. S. WILLIAMS, Asst. Adjt. Gen., U. S. Army, Hdqrs. Army West Virginia.

  * The “plans” referred to in this report are not found.

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  No. 6.

  Reports of Brig. Gen. T. A. Morris, Indiana Militia, of skirmishes at Belington and Laurel Hill pursuit of Garnett’s forces, and action at Carrick’s Ford.

  HDQRS. NEAR BELINGTON, VA., July 9, 1861.

  SIR. Since my report of the 7th instant, I have the honor to inform the commanding general that we now occupy the Elliott farm. Our advanced position is behind Belington, some two hundred yards. The cleared grounds extend some two hundred yards beyond Belington. A heavy body of timber then commences, which is now occupied by the enemy in large force. Skirmishing has been going on since the occupation of our position. Yesterday they appeared in such force that we threw several shells into the wood, and attempted to occupy it with our pickets; but we were driven in, with the loss of two killed and three wounded. Our total loss up to this time, in killed, is 4; wounded, 6; missing, 1.

  I feel sure we could hold this side of the wood, did it not extend our lines too much beyond the point we are instructed to retain. Captain {p.219} Hines, my aide-de-camp, was on a hill in view of part of their camp the entire day yesterday. He saw forty to sixty large tents, capable of accommodating twenty to twenty-five men each, and saw the ends of rows of tents extending back, and which to him appeared as a large camp. The enemy were in motion several times during yesterday, and their columns were seen marching in our direction. We are sure they were last night in the rear of a round hill in front of Belington, and within three-fourths of a mile, and in numbers at least two or three thousand. Scouts on the hill this morning report their tents in the same position as yesterday.

  The instructions of the commanding general will be carried out, although it is difficult to restrain our men from advancing. I hardly know in what terms to convey to you their enthusiasm. Their coolness under such fire as we have been subjected to (incessant since our arrival) is very creditable to them, and establishes beyond all question, if proof were needed, that they can be relied upon in any emergency.

  The regiments in advance are Milroy’s Ninth Indiana, Barnett’s artillery, Steedman’s Fourteenth Ohio, and Dumont’s Seventh Indiana, which regiments deserve special mention.

  Rumors from several sources reached us yesterday of re-enforcements to the enemy from the direction of Beverly, but they are not of a character to be, reported to the commanding general under the instructions I have received.

  Owing to the rapid march from Philippi, made necessary by the instructions of the commanding general of July -, it was impossible to bring much baggage or provisions. Our men are very short of the latter, and we have only seven wagons to the regiment and such scanty assistance as we hire to keep us supplied.

  I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

  T. A. MORRIS, Brigadier-General.

  Maj. S. WILLIAMS, Assistant Adjutant-General.

  P. S.-Information just in reports the enemy as having retired from the wood in front of Belington. Reconnoitering parties are out in several directions, and the movements of the enemy will be closely watched.

  –––

  JULY 13, 1861.

  SIR: After resting two hours near Leadsville our advanced column, Steedman, Dumont, and Milroy, moved on this morning at 3 o’clock in pursuit of the enemy. I am now advancing, at 5 o’clock, with the balance of my force to support them. We left Belington in pursuit yesterday with four wagons of hard bread and pork, which were all the available wagons, the balance having been sent to Philippi to bring up supplies from there. As I have before reported, we have but seven wagons to the regiment. Our men have necessarily been restricted in their rations, and must be more so as we advance. I shall pursue just as long as it is possible with the means of transportation at my command. If you could send us provisions, it would greatly assist us in the advance.

  Inclosed I send you a dispatch, this moment received from Captain Benham, who is with the advance.

  I am, very respectfully, your Obedient servant,

  T. A. MORRIS, Brigadier-General.

  Maj. S. WILLIAMS, Assistant Adjutant-General. {p.220} [Inclosure.]

  1 1/2 MILES EAST OF NEW INTEREST-6.10 a. M.

  GENERAL: I have just started, after having halted the column for half an hour. There is no doubt they have passed up on Pleasant Run, opposite me, and I follow them, though with much doubt. It is said they are now about six miles ahead, having traveled on last night.

  H. W. BENHAM, Captain.

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  BRIGADE HEADQUARTERS, Carrick’s Ford, Va., July 14, 1861.

  SIR: I reported yesterday, at about 6 a. m., the progress of the forces of my command in pursuit of the enemy retreating from Laurel Hill. The pursuit was continued through the day in the same order as stated in my report of yesterday morning, viz: Steedman’s Fourteenth Ohio in advance, with two sections of Barnett’s artillery, next Dumont’s Seventh Indiana and Milroy’s Ninth Indiana. These regiments, as I reported, started in pursuit from our resting place near Leadsville at about 4 o’clock in the morning, under the immediate command of Captain Benham. The remainder of the column were on the march by 5 o’clock a. m. A drizzling rain commenced about 6 o’clock, which by 9 became quite heavy. The enemy left the main turnpike and turned towards Cheat River, crossing two branches of the Laurel Mountain over a narrow and difficult road. Owing to the heavy rain, the roads were rendered very difficult for the men and the few wagons of ammunition and provisions. By 11 o’clock the rain became a drenching storm, and continued for several hours, the roads in the mountains becoming nearly impassable. At 2 o’clock the whole command were up to the position which we now occupy.

  For details of the operations of the advance column I refer you to the report of Captain Benham.

  The attention of the commanding general is particularly called to the gallant bearing of the regiments which led the advance. I would also call attention to the fact that the entire command commenced the pursuit on a few minutes’ notice, without time to prepare even a day’s rations for the haversacks. I ordered four wagons to be loaded with hard bread and pork to follow the command. These four wagons, with the little additional rations put in with the ammunition, are all the provisions the command has had since leaving Belington, except some beeves procured in this vicinity.

  The march of yesterday was from eighteen to twenty miles. When it is considered that we have put to flight a force equal to our own, and have pursued him night and day for thirty hours, almost without provisions, over a mountainous and difficult road, and part of the time through a drenching storm, we may feel sure that our cause must be successfully maintained by men who show such gallant bearing and soldierly endurance.

  Justice to a gallant soldier compels me to say that, from the commencement of our march from Philippi to the routing of the enemy at this place, too much praise cannot be bestowed on Captain Benham, and I take this occasion to thank him for the invaluable service he has rendered me. I must also call attention to the services of Maj. J. W. Gordon, now of the Eleventh Regiment of Infantry, U. S. Army. Major Gordon volunteered a private in the Ninth Indiana Regiment, was promoted sergeant-major in the same regiment, and two weeks since received {p.221} the appointment of major in the Regular Army. Owing to the position of the enemy in front of the brigade in which he, was serving as sergeant-major, he requested to be retained until the issue should be settled. Acting yesterday as my volunteer aide with the advance column, Captain Benham testifies to his gallantry and invaluable services during the entire day, and more especially in the face of the enemy.

  I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

  T. A. MORRIS, Brigadier-General, Commanding.

  Maj. SETH WILLIAMS, Assistant Adjutant-General, Department of the Ohio.

  –––

  BRIGADE HEADQUARTERS, ELLIOTT’S FARM, Near Belington, Va., July 16, 1861.

  SIR: On the morning of the 14th I instant I reported to you the operations of the brigade up to the routing of the Confederate forces at Carrick’s Ford at about 2 p. m. of the previous day, and I have to state that while our troops were halting for rest our scouts followed close upon the route of the enemy for from four to six miles farther, and on the morning of the 14th we learned that they were fully fifteen miles in advance of us. At about noon of the same day we started for Saint George, in pursuance of orders, which place we reached at night. Without provisions, other than the beeves, sent by General McClellan, and in the exhausted state of the command, it was impossible to pursue farther. At Saint George we heard the report that General Hill, agreeably to an order sent by General McClellan, had met the flying enemy, and captured or dispersed the remnant. Twelve wagons, most of them loaded with new clothing, were discovered four miles to the right of our route by our scouts, and were taken possession of. Yesterday morning we left Saint George to return to this place, in order to get proper provisions and shelter for the troops.

  After a fatiguing march of twenty-three miles, we reached here at about 9 o’clock last night. The command were getting sick from the use of fresh beef only, and many of them preferred doing without beef rather than increase the disease (diarrhea) brought on by its use without bread or salt.

  When the reports of the different colonels engaged at Carrick’s Ford shall be handed me I will complete my report of that engagement, in order that individual cases (if such there should be) of special service may be made. I am now gathering up all the captured and gallantry property and having it properly cared for. The limited transportation with this column (which has been before reported) will take three or four clays to gather up the property strewed from here towards Saint George. A large number of tents have been taken. An inventory of all property will be made as soon as it can possibly be done.

  Your letter of the 15th did not reach me till this morning. I shall, therefore, gather the captured property, recruit my command, and, as soon as it is accomplished, proceed to Philippi. I would respectfully state that I have reported to the commanding general as often as it was possible under the circumstances which have surrounded me.

  I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant

  T. A. MORRIS, Brigadier-General, Commanding.

  Maj. S. WILLIAMS, Assistant Adjutant-General, Huttonsville Va.

  {p.222}

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  No. 7.

  Report of Capt. H. W. Benham, U. S. Corps of Engineers, of the pursuit of Garnett and action at Carrick’s Ford.

  CHEAT RIVER CAMP, CARRICK’S FORD, Eight Miles South of Saint George, Va., July 13, 1861.

  SIR: In accordance with your directions, this morning I took command of the advance, guard of your column, consisting of the Fourteenth Ohio, Colonel Steedman, with one section of Colonel Barnett’s artillery, the Seventh Indiana, under Colonel Dumont, and the Ninth Indiana, Colonel Milroy, in all about 1,800 men, and with this force, as instructed, I started from near Leadsville, at about 4 a. m., to pursue the army of General Garnett, which, consisting, as we learned, of 4,000 to 5,000 men and four to six cannon, had retreated from the north side of Laurel Mountain, near Belington, the day before yesterday. It being ascertained that the enemy had retired towards the village of New Interest, and thence, as was supposed, over a mountain road leading to the Shafer Fork, or main branch, of the Cheat River, to Saint George, the troops were brought rapidly forward on their route, so as to reach the entrance of the mountain road-about seven miles’ march-at about 6 o’clock. A short distance after entering this path the passage was found to be obstructed by large trees, recently felled, in about twelve to fifteen places, and in nearly every defile for three or four miles, but the information that was from time to time received that this force, which had some fifteen hours the start of us from Belington, were now only four to five miles in advance, encouraged our efforts, and though for nearly the whole time the rain was pouring in torrents and the clayey roads almost impassable in many places, the spirit of the troops, without exception, as it came under my eye, was such as to bear them most rapidly onward under all these trials, superadded to that of hunger-with the greater part of them for the previous fifteen or twenty hours.

  At about noon we reached Kaler’s, or the first ford of the Shaver Branch or main Cheat River, having, within the previous two or three Miles, fired at and driven in several pickets of the enemy protecting those who were forming the barricades, and at one place we broke up a camp where the meals were being cooked. At the ford near Kaler’s, and at about one-half of the distance to another ford, which we afterwards met with about one mile farther on, we saw the baggage train of the enemy, apparently at rest. This I proposed to attack as soon as strengthened by the arrival of Steedman’s second battalion, with Dumont’s regiment, when the thoughtless firing of a musket at our ford set the train rapidly in motion, and long lines of infantry were formed in order of battle to protect it. In a few minutes, however, the arrival of Barnett’s artillery, with Dumont close upon it, enabled the command to push forward in its original order, but the train and its guard had retired, leaving only a few skirmishers to meet us at the second ford, where, however, quite a rapid firing was kept up by the advance regiment, and the artillery opened for some minutes to clear the adjacent woods the more completely of the enemy.

  We then continued our march rapidly to the ford, and as we approached it we came upon their train, the last half of it just crossing in the river. The enemy was found to have taken a strong position, with his infantry and artillery upon a precipitous bank of some fifty to eighty feet in height upon the opposite side of the river, while our own ground was upon the low land, nearly level with the river. Steedman’s regiment, {p.223} in the advance, opened its fire most gallantly upon them, which was immediately returned by their strong force of infantry and by their cannon, upon which Barnett’s artillery was ordered up and opened upon them with excellent effect.

  As I soon perceived a position by which their left could be turned, six companies of Colonel Dumont’s regiment were ordered to cross the river about three hundred yards above them, to pass up the hill obliquely from our right to their left, and take them in rear. By some mistake, possibly in the transmission of the order, this command crossed at about double this distance and turned at first to their right, which delayed the effect of this movement. After some fifteen minutes, however, this error was rectified, and, the hill being reported as impracticable, this command, now increased to the whole regiment, were ordered down to the ford, under close cover of this hill on their side, and there to take them directly in front at the road.

  The firing of Steedman’s regiment and of Milroy’s, now well up and in action, with repeated and rapid discharges of the artillery during this movement, decided the action at once. As Dumont reached the road, having passed along and under their whole front, the firing ceased, and the enemy fled in great confusion, Dumont’s regiment pursuing them for about one mile farther, having a brisk skirmishing with their rear for the first half of that distance, during which General Garnett was killed. The enemy would still have been followed up most closely, and probably to the capture of a large portion of their scattered army, but this was absolutely impossible with our fatigued and exhausted troops, who had already marched some eighteen miles or more, in an almost incessant, violent rain, and the greater part of them without food since the evening, and a portion of them even from the noon of the yesterday, so warm had been the pursuit on their hasty retreat from Laurel Mountain, twenty-six miles distant. The troops were, therefore, halted for food and rest at about 2 p. m.

  The result of the action proves to be the capture of about forty loaded Wagons and teams, being nearly all their baggage train, as we learn, and including a large portion of new clothing, camp equipage, and other stores; their headquarter papers and military chest; also two stands of colors and one fine rifled piece of artillery; while the commanding general, Robert S. Garnett, is killed, his body being now cared for by us, and fifteen or twenty more of the enemy are killed and nearly fifty prisoners are taken. Our own loss is two killed and six or seven wounded; one dangerously.

  In concluding this report, I feel it my duty to state that just as the action was closing, the head regiment of the body of the troops under Yourself, though starting as I learn three hours later, the Sixth Indiana, under Colonel Crittenden, came up to the field in excellent order, but, unfortunately, too late to aid us in the battle.

  The conduct of those gallant officers, Colonels Barnett, Steedman, Dumont, and Milroy, with the steady perseverance of their officers and men in their long and arduous march, suffering from hunger, rain, and Cold, with their gallantry in action, was most heroic, and beyond all Praise of mine. Their country only can fully appreciate and reward their services.

  I have the honor to be, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

  H. W. BENHAM, Captain of Engineers, Chief Eng. Dep’t of the Ohio, and Comdg. advance Column.

  General T. A. MORRIS, Commanding U. S. Forces.

  {p.224}

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  No. 8.

  Report of Brig. Gen. C. W. Hill, Ohio Militia, of operations from July 4 to 19.

  HEADQUARTERS U. S. VOLUNTEERS, Grafton, Va., July 22, 1861.

  SIR: I have the honor to submit the following statement of facts, showing the operations of my command in attempting to intercept the retreat and to capture a portion of General Garnett’s army from Laurel Hill.

  When I was first assigned to duty here, the Cheat River line was in the hands of Col. J. Irvine’s command (Sixteenth Ohio Regiment), and he continued in charge of the line until the night of the 15th instant. On the 1st instant I went over the line with Colonel Irvine from Rowlesburg to the Cheat River Bridge, five miles above, and there gave him in writing all of the instructions which I had received from the department headquarters touching that line. The instructions as given to me and thus imparted contemplated Rowlesburg as the point of support on the railroad, and West Union, distant thirteen miles, as the place for the advance guard to the eastward, with scouts farther east, and as soon as practicable an advance guard towards or at Saint George. Intermediate points were to be held, and for the whole, including the protection of the three bridges on the railroad, the garrison was to be increased early to 1,000 men. From the 4th to the 6th instant a minute reconnaissance of the line was carried on by my order by Col. Charles Whittlesey and Maj. J. B. Frothingham, engineers, and the conclusions arrived at reported on the 6th to department headquarters.

  On the 7th instant twenty-five cavalry, to serve as vedettes, couriers, and pickets, were added to Colonel Irvine’s command, as had also been a 6-pounder field piece.

  On the 12th instant six companies Of the Eighth Ohio, under Colonel Depuy, had joined Colonel Irvine, moving in by way of Oakland and Chisholm’s mill; and the garrison at Rowlesburg and thence five miles up Cheat River was held by six companies of the Fifteenth Ohio, under Col. G. W. Andrews and two companies of the First Virginia.

  On the 9th Colonel Irvine telegraphed as follows: “Our increased knowledge clearly indicates the occupancy of the junction (Red House) as the proper position for our troops.” Referring him to the instructions already given, and the views of Colonel Whittlesey and Major Frothingham, Colonel Irvine was informed on the same day that he “must act on his best judgment.”

  On the 12th instant Colonel Irvine telegraphed me that he intended to move eastward along the northwest pike. He says: “My main force will be at the mill mentioned (Chisholm’s), eight miles from Oakland, with strong advance guard at the Red House, say two hundred or three hundred men.” Our telegraphic correspondence was frequent each day, and conducted with a view to keep each other fully advised of all material facts.

  On the 13th of July I was called in from Webster at about 11 a. m., and then I received a telegram from Maj. S. Williams, dated the 12th, at Beverly, and at Roaring Run the 13th, saying:

  General McClellan, having just learned that the rebel forces abandoned their positions at Laurel Hill last night, and are now making for Eastern Virginia, via the Louisville and Saint, George pike, directs that you take the field at once, with all the force you can make available, to cut off their retreat. Two Pennsylvania regiments {p.225} at Cumberland have been directed to proceed forthwith to Rowlesburg by a special train and report to you. You can for the time being withdraw several companies from points on the railroad between Wheeling and Parkersburg, and concentrate them by special train. No time is to be lost. It is supposed you will be able to take the field with, say, six thousand men, including Colonel Irvine’s command, and at least four guns. The rebel forces under Garnett are said to be to-night about six miles from Leadsville. Morris is following them up.

  I immediately telegraphed Colonel Irvine:

  The rebels are driven out of Laurel Hill, and in full retreat eastward on Saint George pike. Hold your position with firmness to the last man. I will re-enforce you in person and with all available forces as soon as possible.

  It was not deemed safe to depend upon any of the Pennsylvania troops. (None came at any time or reported.)

  The suggestion of six thousand troops and four guns was supposed to be an approximate rule. To comply with it near four thousand troops, in detachments scattered along the line of the two railroads to Parkersburg and Wheeling, would have to be gathered up, supplied with a reasonable amount of baggage, teams, forage, and six days’ rations, and horses and harnesses must be obtained for the three guns in battery at Grafton. Requisitions were therefore, made, and by reaching to Parkersburg the figures were brought up to about 5,400 men, including detachments from the Fifth, Eighth, Thirteenth, Fifteenth, Sixteenth, Eighteenth, Twentieth, and Twenty-second Ohio, with a few artillerists and cavalry, and detachments from the First and Second Virginia Regiments. These troops were almost entirely destitute of baggage, wagons, and nearly all of those subsequently obtained, being otherwise appropriated, were to be got by force only.

  The orders were all given and answers obtained, except as to baggage teams, by 3 p. m. of the 13th. The troops and three guns to be moved from Grafton were much delayed for the want of horses, harnesses, and wagons, and the first train, with four companies of infantry, was not able to leave for Oakland until after 4 p. m. I went in that train, and arrived in Oakland about 10 o’clock p. m. The second train from Grafton, with a few more infantry of the Twentieth, three guns, and twenty-five cavalry, came up soon after. For all on these two trains there was but one baggage wagon, and that belonged to Colonel Morton, of the Twentieth. As soon as the horses of myself and staff could be got off from the cars and a guide obtained, all of the infantry (three companies), not required for guard duty, were ordered forward to Chisholm’s Mill, with Major Walcutt and Captain Bond, of my staff, to report to Colonel Irvine. They arrived there at about 4 a. m. of the 14th. Found no troops there; and, leaving the three companies to rest, went on and reported in person to Colonel Irvine at West Union, at about 6 o’clock a. m., a few minutes before he received news that the rebels had already passed the Red House, at 5 a. m., eight miles farther east. Colonels Irvine and Depuy immediately called to arms and went in pursuit, Major Walcutt with them. Captain Bond returned to Oakland to notify me, but, owing to the fatigue of his horse, did not arrive until 9 a. m.

  Anticipating the arrival during the night of several other trains, including that having the horses, wagons, and harnesses ordered to be taken and brought on, I had given orders for such as should come up to March at daylight, by way of Chisholm’s Mill, not then knowing any other way to reach the Red House Junction. Several trains were known to have been on the way in time to arrive at Oakland long before daylight. The train with the horses, wagons, and harnesses was reported to be at Rowlesburg before 12 the preceding night, and this property was separated, and portions of it were said to be at Cranberry Summit {p.226} the next morning at 9 o’clock. All the trains but the two first were equally and unaccountably delayed. From daylight till 9 o’clock my utmost efforts with the telegraph seemed to avail little or nothing. The regimental commanders, Colonels Dunning, Stanley, Morton, Smith, and Turley, were equally balked by railroad detentions. Without waiting further, the twenty-five cavalry and the few of Colonel Morton’s Twentieth Infantry had formed to move on, when Captain Bond arrived at 9 a. m. with news of the escape, as before stated.

  Before this I had relied with entire confidence that the line was occupied as stated in Colonel Irvine’s telegraph of the 12th instant, instead of which it now appears that his troops were at West Union, eight miles west of the Red House, where the Horseshoe Run road, traveled by the rebels, intersects the Northwest pike; and it also appears by the statement of Lieut. H. A. Myers and Angier Dobbs, of the cavalry attached to Colonel Irvine’s command, that all scouts and pickets had been withdrawn, by Colonel Irvine’s order, from that road early on the 13th, and the road left entirely free all night long. On this subject see Colonel Irvine’s report, herewith presented.

  As soon as possible after Captain Bond’s arrival at Oakland, the horses were taken from Colonel Morton’s baggage wagon and hitched to one of the guns, and, with the few of Colonel Morton’s infantry then arrived, started in the pursuit, while I moved on with as much dispatch as possible with my aid, Captain Bond, a guide, and twenty-five cavalry. At Red House I found the gun sent to Colonel Irvine some days before, one company of his infantry, and a few prisoners captured that morning. Ordering forward all but eight of the cavalry, I stopped a few moments to gather information and make dispositions rendered necessary in consequence of the (since found to be erroneous) reports that there was a body of rebel troops yet to come, up. I moved forward again with five of the cavalry, and soon overtook Colonels Irvine, Depuy, and their commands, which were halted about six miles east of the Red House. A council was immediately called, including the field officers and captains Of all the companies, in order to learn the actual condition of the men and all other facts that should govern the action of the command. A free interchange, of facts and opinions occurred, when the facts found and opinions arrived at were, that the enemy had passed the Red House, about three thousand strong, including from three to five guns and several hundred cavalry, before 5 o’clock in the morning, the artillery covering the rear.

  That the very sparse settlements along the line of the march had been and were being so stripped of provisions by the enemy that no reliance could be placed upon getting any kind of supplies in their track.

  That none of the companies that marched over the night before from Oakland had any supper, and that very few, if any, in the whole command had any breakfast, and the haversacks were almost entirely empty, and wholly so with the most of the men.

  There did not appear to be on an average one day’s rations for the men then on the march drawn and unconsumed. For the whole but one wagon; and all there was in the way of means of transportation, provisions, camp equipage, and cooking utensils had been left in the rear an in camp.

  The whole force then in the column, I think, did not exceed 1,300 men.

  If the pursuit continued, the march for many miles must be over the ranges of the Alleghany Mountains, with no known possibility of cutting the enemy off or attacking him in flank, even though the pursuers could overtake the pursued. The mounted scouts, reconnoitering {p.227} to the front, were sent out before my arrival, and did not report to, me. I cannot, therefore, state from them the distance between the two, armies before our return; but Colonels Irvine and Depuy, in their reports, state the least distance to have been eight miles, and that while our command was halted the enemy had reached Stony River.

  Captain Keys, who, after overtaking Colonel Irvine, led the small detachment of cavalry, and serving as an advance guard, told me since our return that he saw none of the enemy, except a few stragglers a long distance off.

  The fatigued condition of our men, and all of the matters above being considered in council (except the distance between forces, which was subject to speculation), a distinct vote was taken upon the question whether the command should then continue the pursuit or return, and every officer but three, in the whole numbering about twenty, was emphatic in opposition to further pursuit in the then condition of the command, and every officer voted against going forward except one-a major, who declined voting-and in that vote I fully concurred. What any one might have done under different circumstances and in the light of different facts it is idle now to speculate.

  It is proper here to say, that on the march east from the Red House no prisoners were, taken, nor were abandoned arms or articles of any importance found, so far as I have been able to learn.

  To be in more convenient communication with the railroad at Oakland, and nearer to their camp equipage and supplies, the troops were marched back to Red House. On the way Colonel Morton’s infantry and one gun were met about two miles from the Red House. On arriving at Red House it was found that there were not provisions enough to give all of our troops there, assembled one full meal without drawing from Oakland, and there being as yet no means of transportation, Colonel Morton’s companies and two companies of the Virginia troops marched back to Oakland to their dinners, suppers, and camp equipage, arriving there about 9 o’clock in the evening

  Late in the afternoon of the 14th, Col. T. R. Stanley and Lieutenant-Colonel Turley, of the Eighteenth and Twenty-second Ohio, from Clarksburg, had arrived at Oakland, and during that night Colonel Dunning, of the Fifth, also from Clarksburg, arrived at Oakland, as did Col. W. S. Smith, of the Thirteenth Regiment, at Grafton, from Parkersburg each with his command, endeavoring to respond to my orders. In anticipation of a movement forward the next day, if means of transportation and horses and harnesses for the guns should be obtained, and information should come in indicating probable success in following the retreating enemy, orders were given that all of the troops at Red House and Oakland should be immediately provided with two days’ cooked rations, and be put in readiness to march. Such information did come about 2 p. m. of the 15th, and while it was being considered, and a plan of operations discussed with the commandants of regiments at Oakland, a dispatch from department headquarters at Huttonsville was received, dated the 14th, addressed to me, saying:

  Garnett’s army completely routed yesterday, 13th, at 2 p. m., at Cheat River, on the Saint George road. Baggage captured; one gun taken; Garnett killed; his forces demoralized.

  “I charge you to complete your operations by the capture of the remainder of his force. If you have but one regiment, attack and check them until others arrive. You may never have such another opportunity again. Do not throw it away. Conduct this movement in person, and follow them a l’outrance (to the utmost).

  (Telegram literatim as follows, “a lon-Trance.” Is this the sense?)

  {p.228}

  Couriers by two different routes had brought me intelligence that the enemy having burned the bridge at Stony River, on the Northwest pike, early in the afternoon of Sunday, had gone into camp a little east of Greenland, with intention to remain for several days, and had burned the bridge at the gap there, to protect them from a rear attack. Learning also that Stony River could be passed without serious delay; that the camp a little east of Greenland could be turned by a march from New Creek Station and also by a detour to the right in proceeding from the west by way of Greenland, and believing that a strong expedition moving with celerity might expect to reach the enemy at or before he would reach Petersburg and return in safety, I considered that such a movement would be within my discretion, and also within my instructions.

  Accordingly, Colonel Stanley, with nearly 600 men of the Eighteenth Regiment, and Colonel Dunning, with 700 men of the Fifth Regiment, were ordered to move by the diagonal road from Oakland over the mountains to the bridge on the pike over the North Branch of the Potomac, there to be joined by eight companies of the Eighth Regiment, under Colonel Depuy; seven companies of the Sixteenth, under Colonel Irvine; six companies of the Fifteenth, under Col. G. W. Andrews, and two companies of the First Virginia Regiment, which were to move from Red House with the Ringgold Cavalry, Captain Keys, and two guns of Captain Daum’s battery; Colonel Morton, with six companies of the Twentieth Ohio and two Virginia companies, and Lieutenant-Colonel Turley, with five companies of the Twenty-second Ohio and two guns of Captain Daum’s battery, were ordered to proceed by railroad to New Creek Station, to attack the enemy from the north. The column to form its junction on the Northwest pike, at the North Branch of the Potomac, was to move towards Greenland, and leaving that on its left, press on to the intersection of roads leading to Petersburg and Moorefield, and to be followed by Col. W. S. Smith, with the Thirteenth Regiment and a battery of two guns-he having been ordered up from Grafton, where he was waiting on the cars. The different columns were to, and did, keep up communication by couriers, and were to co-operate whenever the case required.

  The column of Colonels Dunning and Stanley left Oakland with me at 5 p. m. on the 15th; was joined by Colonel Irvine’s column, as intended, and marched inside of the first twenty-four hours to Groves’, five miles beyond Greenland, the distance being estimated at thirty-five and a half miles from Oakland. The enemy broke up his camp near Greenland and retired as we approached that place, and reached Petersburg in the afternoon or evening of the 16th. That night we were but fourteen miles from the enemy, and scouts were sent towards Petersburg, as also towards Moorefield and Romney, to keep watch of the enemy’s movements in all directions. The column from the west, with the first division of one-third of the whole, made up of picked men, got off early the next morning, and after a four-mile march was stopped by a courier with a dispatch from Major-General McClellan, ordering the pursuit to be abandoned.

  It was subsequently ascertained that the enemy had resumed his march in the direction of Staunton. The column would have abandoned the pursuit at any rate if the enemy could not have been reached at or in the immediate vicinity of Petersburg. The column marched back to Greenland, and there all the troops of the expedition were united, and remained for the night. The next day the entire body marched by the Northwest pike to the North Branch of the Potomac and encamped.

  {p.229}

  Sending the Eighth Regiment, Colonel Depuy, to the Red House, and the baggage around by the same route, the other troops marched to Oakland, arriving there, about 10 a. m. Friday, the 19th instant. The march was certainly a very trying one, and brought out the good qualities of the officers and men to a remarkable degree. Too much could not be said in praise of the cheerful spirit and persevering fortitude of the command.

  With the most active and thorough use of scouts, mounted men, and on foot, the country was ascertained to be so clear of the enemy in any force as to give no indications of his interrupting our movements during the period intended to be covered by the expedition.

  Appended is a map, showing the topography of the country and the line of march. Copies of all the reports received from those constituting parts of the command are forwarded herewith. I regret the length of this report, but the unjust imputations cast upon me rendered it due to the service and to myself that the material facts should be stated.

  They are respectfully submitted.

  CHAS. W. HILL, Brigadier-General, Commanding.

  Maj. Gen. G. B. MCCLELLAN, Commanding Department of the Ohio.

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  No. 9.

  Report of Col. J. Irvine, Sixteenth Ohio Infantry, of operations from July 11 to 15.

  HEADQUARTERS SIXTEENTH REGIMENT O. V. M., Oakland, Md., July 20, 1861.

  GENERAL: In reply to your order of the 19th instant, requiring me to report the steps taken by me to intercept the retreat of the rebels from Laurel Hill, I have the honor to report that in obedience to your order I occupied and fortified the junction of the Buffalo turnpike with the Northwest road, together with the Cheat Bridge. Subsequent reconnaissances indicated the occupation of a point farther to the eastward on the Northwestern road, and upon the suggestion of Colonel Whittlesey, and your approval, I occupied the junction of the Saint George turnpike with the Northwestern with two companies, which by the reconnaissances, then made was supposed to be the extreme eastern point of access to the Northwestern road from the vicinity of Laurel Hill.

  On the information received from you I advanced with the remainder of my regiment (in all seven companies) and one gun to West Union on Friday night, the 11th of July, arriving shortly after midnight, where I was joined by Colonel Depuy, of the Eighth Ohio, with his six companies. On Saturday, the 12th, Colonel Depuy and myself made reconnaissances of the roads in the vicinity, but failed to get the correct information sought. It was not until near midnight of the 12th that I learned that the road entering the Northwest pike at Red House was not a branch of the Saint George pike. I immediately dispatched mounted scouts to Horseshoe Run road (the one entering at Red House), and they brought me information of the passage of the enemy at about 6 1/2 o’clock of the 15th. I immediately put my command in motion, and marched eastward on the Northwest pike to Red House, where I learned the enemy had left at 5 o’clock a. m. I followed, crossing {p.230} Backbone Mountain, and halted to rest my men two miles west of North Branch Bridge, where I was overtaken by you. My command had already marched fourteen miles, most of them without breakfast. I had but few rations to send forward, if I had transportation, but I had not a single wagon to carry anything. At the consultation then held, a full statement being made by the respective commanding officers of their condition and of yours, in regard to want of transportation, it was determined to abandon the pursuit, in which opinion there was a unanimous concurrence, with, I believe, a single exception amongst over twenty officers.

  At that time the enemy were at Stony River Bridge, which they subsequently destroyed before even fresh troops could have reached them from where we then were. Subsequent operations being conducted under your own eye, I suppose are not called for in this hasty report, made under circumstances forbidding accuracy of date and detail.

  I remain, your obedient servant,

  J. IRVINE, Colonel, Commanding Sixteenth Regiment O. V. M.

  P. S.-On Saturday, the 12th, I had mounted scouts at a fork of the roads where a road branched east from Saint George’s pike, supposing it to be the road leading to Red House.

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  No. 10.

  Report of Col. H. G. Depuy, Eighth Ohio Infantry, of operations July 13 and 14.

  RED HOUSE CAMP, Hdqrs. Eighth Regiment O. V. M. July 22, 1861.

  SIR: In compliance with your order, dated July 19, 1861, requiring me to transmit you a full account of my proceedings with my command to pursue and intercept the rebel forces retreating from Laurel Hill, by way of Saint George and Red House Corners, on Sunday, July 14, 1861, with the number of my forces, the amount of provisions on hand, and means of transportation, herewith I present the following report:

  I arrived at West Union from Oakland with four companies of my command on Saturday morning, July 13, at 1 a. m., in a violent rain storm, having been compelled to leave two companies at Chisholm’s Mill to guard all of my teams which had given out. They arrived at West Union at 9 a. m., making my force six companies, of 578 men. At 9 a. m. July 13, I waited on Colonel Irvine, of the Sixteenth Ohio Regiment, and we proceeded to examine the country for five miles in the different directions which we supposed the enemy would take. On our return Colonel Irvine received a dispatch from you, informing him that the enemy were retreating by way of Saint George. As yet not knowing but that West Union would be the route they would be compelled to take, owing to the impassable state of the other roads leading from Saint George across the country and intercepting the western turnpike, I, with Colonel Irvine, and Major Bailey, immediately selected two positions, one south of West Union one-half mile, and the other one mile west, either of them strong enough to have defended us from any numbers. I ordered my men to lay upon their arms in readiness to take position at a moment’s warning.

  {p.231}

  At 5 1/2 a. m. Sunday morning Colonel Irvine’s scouts came in, and informed me that the enemy were retreating by way of Red House Corners. We immediately got under way and gave chase, arriving at the Corners at 7 a. m., a distance of seven miles. Here we learned they had passed at 5 a. m., with the exception of a regiment or two still back. We immediately selected two companies of rifles-one from the Eighth, Captain Daggett, and one from the Sixteenth-and ordered them to proceed southward toward Texas Corners, and meet them if possible upon advantageous grounds, the main body, supposed to be, from what we learned from prisoners, about 5,000 strong, having got two and a half [hours] the start. We continued the chase until we were within eight miles of them, having traveled six miles. We halted to make reconnaissance, when we were overtaken by General Hill. The balance of our march was made under the supervision of the commanding general.

  When I started on Sunday morning in pursuit many of my command had taken no breakfast, and made the entire march of that day with but half a biscuit. We had not one day’s provisions on hand, and our means of transportation were so limited as to cut off the hope of an immediate supply. My command had at that time received no horses or wagons from the Government, and my only means of transportation were teams pressed into service from farmers in and about Oakland.

  H. G. DEPUY, Colonel Eighth Regiment, O. V. M.

  Brigadier-General HILL.

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  No. 11.

  Reports of Col. Thomas Morton, Twentieth Ohio Infantry, of operations from July 13 to 15.

  HEADQUARTERS TWENTIETH REGIMENT O. V. M.; Oakland, Md., July 20, 1861.

  SIR: On Saturday, July 13, at 11 o’clock a. m., I received your order directing me to withdraw such of the forces under my command as I might deem prudent from the line of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad between Benwood and Grafton, and join you at Oakland, Md. Accordingly I dispatched Major Lamison over the line of said road, with instructions to withdraw from said line Companies A, F, I, and K, and proceed with them to such point as he might learn I would occupy, unless otherwise instructed. On the afternoon of same day I proceeded, with a detachment of one company of the Virginia First, Captain Britt; One company of the Virginia Second; two pieces of artillery, under Captain Daum; and Companies B and E, of the Twentieth Regiment O. V. M., to Oakland, at which place I arrived at 10 o’clock p. m. of said day. Owing to a want of the means of transportation, I was delayed at Oakland until 10 o’clock on Sunday morning, when I marched forward to the Red House, at which point I arrived at 2 o’clock p. m., and thence Proceeded in pursuit of the rebel forces over the Northwestern turnpike, until I met you with your forces returning. While at the Red House, Major Lamison arrived with the forces under his command, having made a most orderly and rapid march, for the particulars of which I refer you to his report, a copy of which I herewith transmit. The officers and men under my command conducted themselves in the most soldierlike manner, and to their hearty co-operation and energy I am {p.232} indebted for the promptness with which they appeared it the points intended to be occupied.

  All of which is respectfully submitted.

  THOMAS MORTON, Colonel, Commanding Twentieth Regiment O. V. M.

  Brig. Gen. C. W. HILL, Commanding First Brigade, First Division., U. S. Troops.

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  HEADQUARTERS TWENTIETH REGIMENT O. V. M., Grafton, Va., July 21, 1861.

  SIR: On Monday, July 15, I received your order to proceed with Companies A, Captain Nichols; B, Captain Dodds; E, Captain Mott; F, Lieutenant Taylor; I, Captain Cable; K, Lieutenant Adams, quartermaster (detailed to this special duty), of the Twentieth Regiment Ohio Volunteer Militia, and Companies – – of the Twenty second Regiment Ohio Volunteer Militia, under Lieutenant-Colonel Turley; one detachment of a company of the Virginia First, Captain Britt; one company of the Virginia Second, Captain Ewing, and two pieces of artillery, under the command of Captain Daum, numbering in all about 900 men, to New Creek, on the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, and thence strike the Northwestern Virginia turnpike for the purpose of cutting off the retreat of the rebel forces passing over that road from Laurel Hill. The advanced guard, with the artillery, left Oakland at 4 o’clock p. m., under command of Major Lamison, but on account of the want of telegraphic communication was delayed by the conductor of the train until 8 o’clock p. m. within one mile of Oakland.

  At 2 o’clock a. m., July 16, I arrived at New Creek, and at 3 a. m. put my command in motion, and for the want of means of transportation, and that my movements might not be delayed, I took no baggage, except one-third of the cooking utensils and one day’s rations. We breakfasted after a march of six miles, and proceeded to Ridgeville, having learned that the enemy were in force at that place. Finding no force at that point, I proceeded, over a most rugged and difficult road, almost impassable for the artillery, to Martin’s Gap, after a march of fifteen hours, making thirty-three miles, at which place your courier reached us, ordering us to join you at Greenland, two and a half miles distant, at which place we arrived at 11 o’clock a. m. on Wednesday, July 17. Joining your forces at Martins Gap, I learned that the advance of the enemy, about 1,000, had encamped at that place on Sunday, July 14, about 10 o’clock a. m., and that, learning of the approach of our forces, had hastily retreated on Saturday, at 6 o’clock p. m. for Petersburg. In their retreat they destroyed the bridge, over Patterson’s Creek, making the road impassable for wagons, and was therefore compelled to send my artillery around over the Northwestern turnpike, a distance of seven miles farther than pursued by my command. Being without a baggage train and ambulance, with short rations, the march was a most trying one, and to the endurance of men and officers and their cheerfulness and hearty co-operation I am indebted for the celerity of my movements, and for which all deserve much praise.

  All of which is respectfully submitted.

  THOMAS MORTON, Colonel, Commanding Twentieth, Regiment O. V. M.

  C. W. HILL, Brigadier-General, Comdg. U. S. Troops in Western Va.

  {p.233}

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  No. 12.

  Report of Maj. Charles N. Lamison, Twentieth Ohio Infantry, of operations July 13 and 14.

  HEADQUARTERS TWENTIETH REGIMENT O. V. M., Oakland, Md., July 20, 1861.

  SIR: At 1 1/2 a. m., Saturday, July 13, I received your order directing me to proceed over the line of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, and with Companies A, F, I, and K, then stationed at different points on said line, with them to join you at Oakland, Md., or at such other point as I might learn you might then occupy. Accordingly, I at once ordered transportation from Wheeling, and dispatched Adjutant Evans over the line from Fairmont, who brought the several detachments to Grafton, at which place we arrived at 2 a. m. Sunday. Owing to delays on the road, occasioned by trains on the road and the unwillingness of conductors to proceed, I did not arrive at Oakland until 12 O’clock m. Sunday. On my arrival, learning that you had proceeded to Chisholm’s Mill, I at once, without taking any baggage, put my detachment in motion, and at 3 o’clock reached the Red House, on the Northwestern turnpike, at which place I met you returning with the forces under General Hill. The conduct of the men and officers under my command is deserving of much credit, and to their energy and hearty co-operation I am indebted for rapidity of my movements.

  Respectfully, I am, yours,

  CHARLES N. LAMISON, Major Twentieth Regiment O. V. M.

  THOMAS MORTON, Colonel, Commanding Twentieth Regiment O. V. M.

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  No. 13.

  Report of Col. G. W. Andrews, Fifteenth Ohio Infantry, of operations from July 13 to 15.

  HEADQUARTERS FIFTEENTH REGIMENT O. V. M., Oakland, Md., July 19, 1861.

  In answer to your order, directing me to report to you the steps taken by me to intercept the rebels in their late flight from Laurel Hill, the force I had to march against them, &c., I have to say: On Saturday, 13th instant, at about 4 o’clock p. m., immediately after receiving your orders to move all my available forces up Cheat River from Rowlesburg, so as to take position near the bridge of the river, some four miles South of Rowlesburg, I moved what forces I could spare, making, with what I already had at that camp (Cheat River), about four hundred and fifty.

  Before going to the bridge I sent for the late sheriff of Preston County, Virginia, knowing him to be a loyal man, and very intelligent and useful in describing the geography of the country. I directed him to summon to his aid four other citizens in whom we could fully confide, and report them to me at Cheat River forthwith. He did all I required with great Promptitude. After this preparation I marched to Cheat River Bridge, and arrived there about 8 1/2 o’clock p. m. same day. Mr. Shaffer sat down with me in my tent, and made a rough and hasty draught of the {p.234} country between Laurel Hill and Oakland and the Red House, showing a main road running front a northward point from Laurel Hill to the Northwestern turnpike, intersecting the same at the Red House; also showing many roads approaching the same; also a road leading to Saint George northward to my camp, with various approaches. In the opinion of Mr. Shaffer, and those who were in attendance with him, awaiting orders to act as scouts, the rebels must pass along the first-mentioned road, leading to the Northwestern turnpike, so as to strike the turnpike at the Red House. With the light I had before me I concurred in this opinion, and was about to take the available force of my command with the two companies of the First Virginia Regiment, and immediately march to the road described as running from Laurel Hill to the Northwestern turnpike, so as to take position on the said road southwestward from West Union about seven miles-about the same distance, from the Red House and some fifteen miles from my camp. But, reflecting on my instructions, I thought you had scarcely authorized me so to do. I abandoned the contemplated march, and concluded to send out mounted scouts, well-armed, in the direction last mentioned, as well as in and around Saint George. Accordingly, at about 10 o’clock p. m., I dispatched four scouts, well armed and mounted, with directions to reach the Laurel Hill and Northwestern turnpike road as soon as possible westward from West Union, and to reconnoiter then the approaches thereto. This duty would take them over a very rough road (most of the way) some sixteen or eighteen miles. I directed them to first report to Colonel Irvine’s command, then at West Union, if they should make important discoveries nearer to him than to me, then hasten on to me. I also sent a scout in disguise to take observations about Saint George and the road leading from that point to my camp; also many scouts not mounted in various directions.

  The first-named mounted scouts reached the road they desired at about 1 o’clock a. m. Sunday morning, and soon discovered the enemy in large numbers, and to get out of his reach they were obliged to secrete themselves for a short time. This was southwestward from West Union about seven or eight miles, of course much nearer Colonel Irvine’s than to my own command, and so, in obedience to my orders, he was notified before the messengers came to me. This notice, I am informed, was given between 3 and 4 o’clock a. m. same day. The horses of these scouts gave out, by which means I did not receive the report until 10 o’clock a. m. little before 11 o’clock a. m. I started with all the force I could spare, with one day’s cooked rations, together with parts of the two Virginia companies, making altogether about 450, and, arrived at the Red House, passing through West Union, at 3 1/2 o’clock p. m., a distance of eighteen or nineteen miles. When I arrived I found Colonel Irvine’s force, part of Colonel Depuy’s (Eighth Ohio), and a few of the Twentieth Ohio, under your own personal command, with two pieces of ordnance, that had been in hot pursuit several hours before me. Not gaining on the enemy, and our forces being considerably out of strength, and without any provision, and it plainly appearing that further immediate pursuit would be futile, under your order all our forces turned back and encamped at Red House. Leaving my force, I returned to Cheat River to order provisions and transportation forward.

  On the next day (Monday) I received from you an order to join a forward movement from the Red House, with all the forces of my command I could spare from the duties already assigned me.

  At about 8 o’clock p. m. on Monday, 15th instant, I joined the column {p.235} under your command with about same force I took to the Red House (450), and moved eastwardly on the Northwestern turnpike in pursuit of the enemy. I left with two days’ rations, and ordered more to be sent. I had no transportation facilities, and could take little baggage of any kind. With some difficulty my quartermaster impressed two teams, which served to transport a few cooking utensils and the scanty provisions I took along. We pursued the enemy under your personal command little over two days, and seemed to gradually near him, when on Wednesday, the 17th, the column was turned back. The whole command marched back to this point in two days, somewhat fatigued, but in the best of order, and in very good spirits. My own I know to be particularly so.

  All of which is respectfully submitted.

  G. W. ANDREWS, Colonel, Commanding Fifteenth Regiment O. V. M.

  Brigadier-General HILL, Commanding U. S. Troops, N. W. Virginia.

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  No. 14.

  Report of Lieut. H. A. Myers, Ringgold Cavalry, of operations from July 7 to 15.

  HEADQUARTERS RINGGOLD CAVALRY, Grafton, Va., July 21, 1861.

  I was ordered by General Hill on the 7th of July to take twenty-five men of the Ringgold Cavalry to serve as mounted scouts under command of Colonel Irvine, of the Sixteenth Ohio, and reported my command to him on the same night. Colonel Irvine was then posted near Cheat River Bridge. I remained attached to his command until Monday, the 15th of July. On the morning of the 8th six men of my command were sent by order of Colonel Irvine out on the Saint George road, sometimes called the Horseshoe Run road, that intersects the Northwestern turnpike at Red House, to Rinehart’s School-House. They remained there until Saturday, the 13th, when they were ordered by Colonel Irvine to come into his camp at West Union, which they did the same afternoon. I had ascertained from persons living on the Saint George road before mentioned that the rebels were retreating, and would be through on that road from Saint George to Red House on Saturday night or Sunday, and reported the same to Colonel Irvine. I told him I thought it important that scouts should be sent out in that direction, and gave him the information I had received. He replied that there were other points of more importance.

  About sundown on Saturday, the 13th, a man came up from the neighborhood of Rinehart’s School-House, and told me that he had heard that they were coming through on that road. I again went to Colonel Irvine and gave him this information) and told him that some of my boys were anxious to go out on that road. He said he would see about it, and walked away. I returned to my quarters, and remained there pursuant to his orders.

  H. A. MYERS, Second Lieutenant, Ringgold Cavalry.

  {p.288}

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  No. 15.

  Congratulatory address from General McClellan.

  ARMY OF OCCUPATION, WESTERN VIRGINIA, Beverly, Va., July 16, 1861.

  Soldiers of the Army of the West!

  I am more than satisfied with you.

  You have annihilated two armies, commanded by educated and experienced soldiers, intrenched in mountain fastnesses fortified at their leisure. You have taken five guns, twelve colors, fifteen hundred stand of arms, one thousand prisoners, including more, than forty officers-one of the two commanders of the rebels is a prisoner, the other lost his life on the field of battle. You have killed more, than two hundred and fifty of the enemy, who has lost all his baggage and camp equipage. All this has been accomplished with the loss of twenty brave men killed and sixty wounded on your part.

  You have proved that Union men, fighting for the preservation of our Government, are more than a match for our misguided and erring brethren; more than this, you have shown mercy to the vanquished. You have made long and arduous marches, often with insufficient food, frequently exposed to the inclemency of the weather. I have not hesitated to demand this of you, feeling that I could rely on your endurance, patriotism, and courage.

  In the future I may have still greater demands to make upon you, still greater sacrifices for you to offer. It shall be my care to provide for you to the extent of my ability; but I know now that by your valor and endurance you will accomplish all that is asked.

  Soldiers! I have confidence in you, and I trust you have learned to confide in me. Remember that discipline and subordination are qualities of equal value with courage.

  I am proud to say that you have gained the highest reward that American troops can receive-the thanks of Congress and the applause of your fellow-citizens.

  GEO. B. MCCLELLAN, Major-General, U. S. Army, Commanding.

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  No. 16.

  Reports of Brig. Gen. R. S. Garnett, C. S. Army, of preliminary operations, with correspondence, from June 25 to July 6.

  HDQRS. DEPARTMENT OF NORTHWESTERN VIRGINIA, Camp at Laurel Bill, Va., June 25, 1861.

  SIR: I reached Huttonsville on the 14th instant. I found there twenty-three companies of infantry, mostly mustered into service, but in a miserable condition as to arms, clothing, equipments, instruction, and discipline. Twenty of these companies were organized into two regiments, the one under Lieutenant-Colonel Jackson and the other under Lieutenant-Colonel Heck. Though wholly incapable, in my judgement of rendering anything like efficient service, I deemed it of such importance to possess myself of the two turnpike passes over the Rich and Laurel Mountains, before they should be seized by the enemy, that I left Huttonsville on the evening of the 15th with these two regiments {p.237} and Captain Rice’s battery, and, by marching them a greater portion of the night, reached the two passes early in the afternoon of the following day, Colonel Heck’s regiment and a section of artillery occupying the Buckhannon Pass, and Colonel Jackson, with the remaining section, taking up their position here.

  I regard these two passes as the gates to the northwestern country, and, had they been occupied by the enemy, my command would have been effectually paralyzed or shut up in the Cheat River Valley. I think it was a great mistake on the part of the enemy not to have remained here after driving Colonel Porterfield’s command over it. I have caused all the country roads leading from the northwestern country, which cross this range of mountains between the foot of Cheat Mountain and Saint George, the county seat of Tacker County, to be blocked up by cutting large trees across them. I have done this to prevent the enemy from getting into my rear and cutting off my supplies, which, so far, I have been obliged to obtain chiefly from Staunton.

  By sending out heavy escorts I am now endeavoring to collect grain and cattle, both from the direction of Philippi and Buckhannon. I have made Beverly for the present my principal depot. I propose in a few days to send the three small companies left at Huttonsville, six miles farther south, to the foot of Cheat Mountain, where, in a strong position which I shall improve, I shall establish them, and deposit two days’ supplies for my entire command.

  The road from Saint George to Cheat River Bridge, on the railroad, is a country road, and scarcely practicable for wheels. My last information, which is, of course, not very reliable, is that the enemy have blocked up this road from the Cheat Bridge to where it is crossed by the Northwestern turnpike, which leads by Evansville to Grafton. If this proves to be true, it will increase my difficulties in getting on this railroad very much. Should they have done the same thing on all the roads crossing the railroad from the south, they will have put the railroad, I fear, beyond the reach of my present force. This force I consider more than sufficient to hold these two passes, but not sufficient to hold the railroad, if I should get an opportunity of seizing it at any particular point; for I must have an adequate force in each of the passes to secure them for our use. My best chance of getting at the railroad seems at present to be by the Morgantown road, a road which leads from Yeager’s (see map) to Evansville. When once at Evansville, which is on the Northwestern turnpike, I should threaten equally Grafton (twelve miles distant) and Cheat Bridge (fourteen miles distant), at both of which points they now have a force which they would be compelled to keep in this position, and thus enable me to get at the road at Independence, five miles from Evansville, destroy it there, and then fall upon the force at Cheat Bridge (by marching on the railroad) before it could be re-enforced from Grafton. The objection to this operation is that it enables the enemy at Philippi to throw himself upon my rear. If, however, I had sufficient force to hold this post securely, my remaining force could regain it from Cheat Bridge, by way of Saint George, with a little work on, that road; the roads from Philippi leading over the Laurel Mountain into that road, four in number, having, as I have already stated, been blocked up by me. My moving force (say three thousand), however, will not be sufficient, I fear, for this operation.

  The various accounts which I get of the enemy’s strength (none, positive or even reliable) represent him as having from four to seven thousand at Philippi, with from six to ten pieces of artillery, and that he is intrenched on the hill behind the town, about three thousand at Grafton, {p.238} three or four thousand at Clarksburg, and about two thousand at Cheat Bridge. I have been, so far, wholly unable to get anything like accurate or reliable information as to the numbers, movements, or intentions of the enemy, and be-in to believe it almost an impossible thing. The Union men are greatly in the ascendency here, and are, much more zealous and active in their cause than the secessionists. The enemy are kept fully advised of our movements, even to the strength of our scouts and pickets, by the country people, while we are compelled to grope in the dark as much as if we were invading a foreign and hostile country.

  The Georgia regiment reached me yesterday. I hear nothing definite about the two remaining companies of the Twentieth Regiment, and the four remaining companies of Colonel Fulkerson’s. There has elapsed scarcely time for me to hear of the result of my application for two additional companies of cavalry. They are greatly needed here. The maps give very incorrect impressions as to the number of roads in this region of country.

  I have heard nothing of the medical stores for my command, nor of other requisitions made on the Ordnance and Quartermaster’s Departments. I hope that they may be urged to fill them as speedily as possible. Many of my men are without blankets or tents. The nights are frequently cold and we have frequent rains.

  I shall have the defenses of this place complete in a week. The Buckhannon Pass is naturally much stronger, and the regiment there will be able to hold five times their number in check for a sufficient time to admit of being re-enforced, if they will stand to their work.

  At Philippi the enemy occupy the heights beyond the town, in the direction of Grafton. They have mined the bridge and thrown abatis in the ford. It is further said that they have blocked up the road on this side of Philippi. Until I can get some additional cavalry I shall not have adequate means of determining to what extent these reports are true.

  This communication is rather lengthy, I fear, for the general to read, but, as I do not propose to trouble him often, I have deemed it best to report fully the condition of things under my command.

  Two companies of infantry are being organized in Beverly, under Colonel Porterfield, whom I have assigned temporarily to the command of that place. Captain Rice’s company is also ordered to form part of his command, after turning over his battery to Captain Anderson. Accessions to my command come in very slowly.

  No periodical muster rolls for June 30 have yet arrived, nor any other blank forms. The general’s order, in relation to the court of inquiry, had already been anticipated. The proceedings will be forwarded in a day or two. I was aware of the road by Stribling Springs, but it is impossible to cut off all communication with the enemy. The mass of the country people is against us.

  I have already addressed several communications to General Cooper, and asked for instructions as to the proper person to address. Be pleased to inform me on this point.

  At the end of this month I shall send a return of my force. I am pushing the instruction of the men with all possible activity.

  I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

  R. S. GARNETT, Brigadier-General, Provisional Army, Commanding.

  Lieut. Col. GEORGE DEAS, Asst. Adjt. and Insp. Gen., C. S. Army, Richmond, Va.

  {p.239}

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  HEADQUARTERS, Richmond, Va., July 1, 1861.

  Gen. R. S. GARNETT, Commanding Northwestern Army:

  GENERAL: I have received your letter of the 25th instant [ult.], re, porting the condition and distribution of your force and your projected plan of operations. I have taken great pleasure in submitting it to the President, and trust you will be able to accomplish your purposes. The rapture of the railroad at Cheat River would be worth to us an army. The companies of the Twentieth and Thirty-seventh Regiments have been forwarded to you; also two companies of cavalry. Another squadron will be furnished if desired. I have ordered Capt. G. Jackson to report to you for duty with the cavalry. His commission will entitle him to precedence over officers of the same grade in the volunteer service. He is a cavalry officer of some experience. Everything that you have required has been sent as far as practicable. The remainder will be forwarded as fast as available. Muster rolls were sent some time since. Your correspondence can be addressed to this office as usual.

  Very respectfully,

  R. E. LEE, General, Commanding.

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  HDQRS. DEP’T OF NORTHWESTERN VIRGINIA, Camp at Laurel Hill, Va., July 1, 1861.

  Lieut. Col. GEORGE DEAS, Assistant Adjutant and Inspector General, Richmond, Va.:

  SIR: It is with great reluctance that I feel constrained to call for an addition to my present force, for I know that these calls are coming in upon the Government from all quarters of the State, and from some, perhaps, more immediately threatened than I am, as far as I know; but, with the railroad running across my entire front, I have become satisfied that I cannot operate, beyond my present position with any reasonable expectation of substantial success, with the present force under my command, and I deem it my duty to state the fact. My hope of increasing my force in this region has, so far, been sadly disappointed. Only eight men have, joined me here, and fifteen at Colonel Heck’s camp, not sufficient to make up my losses by discharges, &c. These people are thoroughly imbued with an ignorant and bigoted Union sentiment. Unless success was reduced to a certainty, it would be, imprudent to abandon the passes I now hold, yet they cannot be held securely with less than two thousand men, which would reduce my movable force to twenty-five hundred. If the necessities of the Government could afford it, I should be glad to have three or four thousand more men; but I must content myself with asking for as many only as can be spared, in the judgement of the Government.

  We hear, though with what truth it is impossible to say, that the enemy is receiving accessions to his force. Twenty-two car loads are reported to have re-enforced the force at Cheat Bridge. This and some other movements of the enemy seem to indicate an intention of getting in my rear from that point by the Saint George road, and this will require another division of my force, or compel me to fall back to Leadsville, Where that road comes into this; but this operation would lose this position to us. I shall transfer to-day Colonel Heck’s regiment to that road, and send five companies, under Colonel Hansborough, to relieve him in his present position, which is a strong one. If necessary I shall send a regiment from this place to join Colonel Heck. The iron {p.240} guns will be very acceptable for this or the Buckhannon Pass. If I could get two others, it would give me the bronze batteries for service with my movable force.

  I have been waiting anxiously for a quartermaster of experience, but none has yet appeared. It would relieve me of much labor and anxiety if I had a competent officer to take these duties off my shoulders. The muster rolls have not yet arrived.

  Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

  S. GARNETT, Brigadier-General.

  P. S.-Unless I have been misinformed as to the state of feeling among the people and the condition of things in the Kanawha Valley, it is my opinion that General Wise’s command could be of more service to the cause by operating in the direction of Parkersburg and the Northwestern Railroad. It would produce a very effective diversion in favor of the operations from this point.

  R. S. GARNETT, Brigadier-General.

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  HEADQUARTERS, Richmond, Va., July 5, 1861.

  General R. S. GARNETT, Laurel Hill, Va.:

  GENERAL: In answer to your letter of the 1st instant, just received, I have the honor to state that the Forty-fourth regiment, Col. W. C. Scott, left here on the 2d instant for your command. There has been some delay in preparing the Georgia regiment for the field, but I hope to get it off to-morrow. It consists of over one thousand men, commanded by Col. Edward Johnson, an officer of experience. On the following day I will dispatch a North Carolina regiment, commanded by Col. Stephen Lee, twelve hundred strong. I will endeavor to send you two other field pieces. I will again apply to Colonel Myers for a quartermaster of experience for your command.

  Respectfully,

  R. E. LEE, General, Commanding.

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  HDQRS. DEP’T OF NORTHWESTERN VIRGINIA, Camp at Laurel Hill, Va., July 6, 1861.

  Lieut. Col. GEORGE DEAS, Assistant Adjutant and Inspector General:

  COLONEL: In the postscript to a communication which I had the honor to address to you on a few days ago, I ventured to suggest the expediency of giving a more northerly direction to General Wise’s column, in order to threaten the railroad and country east of Parkersburg, now in possession of the enemy. Some subsequent information has confirmed me in my convictions as to the propriety of such a movement. I learned a day or two since, from sources in my front, that twenty-eight hundred men, who had been put upon light-draught steamers in Pittsburgh to operate in the Kanawha Valley, were diverted from that purpose and landed at Parkersburg, from which place they came to Clarksburg and thence to Buckhannon, where, with others from Philippi, to the number, it is said, of three or four thousand, they have now taken up their position, with a supporting force at Weston and at Clarksburg-numbers unknown. This latter point, it is said, they are fortifying, {p.241} and making of it a place of detention for the secessionists whom they have arrested in the country occupied by their troops, and whom hitherto they have been sending to Ohio. It is my belief that as long as they can be made to apprehend any danger to their possession of the railroad and country in front of me they will not attempt any inroads in the Kanawha Valley, as the movement above reported indicates, and that one of the most effectual means of keeping that valley free of them is to occupy them fully here. I moreover think that if General Wise’s column should move from Charleston direct upon Parkersburg, by the road through Jackson, Wirt, and Wood Counties, it would have the effect not of withdrawing any troops from my front, but of bringing others into Virginia from Ohio and the West, as it could be done with equal facility and rapidity, and greater safety. But if he were to retrace his steps from Charleston to Summersville, in Nicholas County, and thence go to Bulltown, in Braxton, both of which counties are loyal to our cause, he would be within a day’s march of Weston, and threaten both it and Buckhannon, and the enemy would have to draw from his force in my front to meet him. Communication with me could be, had by way of Huttonsville.

  The valley of the Kanawha is comparatively loyal to our cause, and the force under General Floyd would be abundant to meet any force, which it is probable the enemy will send into that region for the present.

  The latest, and I believe the most accurate, information which I have yet received from the front is that the enemy has seven regiments of infantry at Philippi-say between five and six thousand men-and twenty pieces of artillery, two of which are mortars. I scarcely think they have as much artillery as that stated. At Grafton, a few days ago, there were only a few hundred; at Clarksburg they are represented as having about three thousand men; at Weston two thousand, and at Cheat River Bridge from two to three thousand. I cannot learn whether they have artillery at this bridge, or whether they are erecting any defenses about it. General McClellan, at last accounts, was at Grafton. General Morris in command at Philippi. Were these numbers correct it would put their force in Northwestern Virginia at about seventeen thousand men, though I hardly think it can amount to that number. The term of service of one of the Indiana regiments at Philippi expired a few days ago, and I learn that they are now kept there by force. I do not now think it probable that the enemy, notwithstanding his superiority of numbers, will attempt to attack my position unless the necessity for his force elsewhere becomes very imperative, for the simple reason that he has as much of northwestern country as he probably wants. He could have possessed himself of more of the country after Colonel Porterfield’s retreat, if he had desired it, yet refrained from doing so. The onus is upon us to drive him out of the country he already holds, if we can. It is impossible for me or any one else, in my judgment, to say what numbers (within our means) are necessary to effect this. The facilities, on the one hand, which they possess at present, of throwing men in my front from other States, and the numbers they have disposable for this purpose, with, on the other hand, the slow process to which we are subjected in re-enforcing our force, will always enable then, to exceed our numbers, whatever they may be, to any degree they may deem necessary; for secrecy in the movements of my re-enforcements in this disaffected country is a thing impossible. It then becomes a question which must be decided by the authorities of the Government, whether the mere paralyzation of a superior force of the enemy, in my front, with the hope of seizing the railroad, if an opportunity should {p.242} offer itself, is a sufficient object to warrant the maintenance of an our available force in this region; for as I have just said, I do not suppose that this force can ever obtain a strength, relative to that of the enemy, which would warrant us in offering him battle wherever we could meet him. I have by no means relinquished or abated my hope of being able, on some favorable occasion, to get at the road. But this is a contingency. The only certain result we can calculate upon is that our presence here will necessarily occupy a considerable force of the enemy, and, to that extent, relieve other points of the State where they might be employed against us. It is not for me to determine what the value of this very negative result is, but I have deemed it my duty to state the case as it presented itself to my judgment. I can only say I shall watch vigilantly, and strike whenever and wherever I can see a reasonable hope of success.

  Colonel Starke arrived yesterday, and I am gratified to learn that I am to have an addition to my force, and sufficient supplies to secure the health and efficiency of my command for the present. I am exhausting the country immediately around me of grain and other supplies, and the operation of supplying myself almost exclusively from Staunton is becoming a serious difficulty with me on account of the scarcity of transportation. The crops are backward in this region, and I shall not be able to draw from them earlier than the end of August.

  I stated in my letter of the 1st instant that Colonel Heck’s regiment had been ordered to take up a position on the Saint George road, and that he had been relieved by Lieutenant-Colonel Hansborough’s battalion of five companies. This arrangement was countermanded in consequence of the appearance of the enemy in force at Buckhannon. Lieutenant-Colonel Hansborough took the positions on the Saint George road assigned to Lieutenant-Colonel Heck.

  I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

  R. S. GARNETT, Brigadier-General.

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  HEADQUARTERS OF THE FORCES, Richmond, Va., July 11, 1861.

  Brig. Gen. R. S. GARNETT, Commanding, &c., Laurel Hill, Va.:

  GENERAL: I received to-day your two letters, of the 6th instant,* and have communicated their contents to the President. Your opinion as to the advantage of giving a more northerly direction to General Wise’s column will be communicated to that officer,** and it is hoped that he will find himself in a condition to conform to it, and that with your united columns you will be able to fall upon the enemy. I do not think it probable that the enemy will confine himself to that portion of the northwest country which he now holds, but, if he can drive you back, will endeavor to penetrate as far as Staunton. Your object will be to prevent him, if possible, and to restrict his limits within the narrowest range, which, although outnumbered, it is hoped by skill and boldness you will accomplish.

  Your recommendation of the appointment of Mr. G. Thomas Getty a lieutenant in the C. S. Army will be complied with, and also the promotions of Capts. R. G. Cole and Julius A. De Lagnel. Should you feel embarrassed by the present rank of Capt. G. Jackson you will please {p.243} say so. Mr. S. M. Yost will also be appointed assistant quartermaster. The officers whom you state you have, found in that region were appointed by the governor, in the hope that their standing and political influence would enable them to organize regiments of volunteers. The appointment of Col. L. Wilson has not been confirmed by the convention. He is, therefore, not in the service. Maj. P. B. Adams is the major of the Thirty-fifth Virginia Regiment, whom you were directed, in a previous letter, to cause to report to Col. Alfred Beckley. W. L. Jackson was appointed lieutenant-colonel of the same regiment. The regiments commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Heck and Lieutenant-Colonel Jackson, I presume, are the Twenty-fifth, of which G. A. Porterfield is colonel, and the Thirty-first, of which, W. J. Willey is colonel. Should I be correct, please number them accordingly, and inform me the field officers which you have attached to them. Should Lieutenant-Colonel Arnett, Maj. Boston Stewart, Second Lieut. J. Bosworth, Second Lieut. B. Haymond, and Lieutenant Norment have no commands with the troops of your army, and be unable to organize any volunteer companies, please let me know. I am glad to hear that the troops and articles forwarded you have reached you in safety. A Georgia regiment, Col. E. Johnson, and a North Carolina regiment, Col. S. Lee, are on their way to join you.

  Respectfully, &c.,

  R. E. LEE, General, Commanding.

  * Only one found.

  ** Letter following.

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  HEADQUARTERS OF THE FORCES, Richmond, Va., July 11, 1861.

  Brig. Gen. H. A. WISE, Commanding, &c., Charleston, Va.:

  GENERAL: In a letter received to-day from General Garnett, commanding Northwestern Army, he reports having learned from reliable sources that two thousand eight hundred men, who had been embarked on light draught steamers at Pittsburgh to operate in the Kanawha Valley, have been diverted from that purpose and landed at Parkersburg, from which place they have been advanced to Clarksburg and Buckhannon, and with other troops have taken up their position in his front. He thinks they will not attempt an invasion of the Kanawha Valley if made to apprehend danger of losing possession of the Northwestern Railroad and country, and that one of the most effective means of keeping that valley free is to give General McClellan full occupation where he now is. He thinks that if your column should move from Charleston direct upon Parkersburg it would merely have the effect of bringing further re-enforcements from Ohio; but if it were to march from Summersville, in Nicholas County, to Bulltown, in Braxton, both of which are loyal to our cause, it would be within a few days’ march of Weston, and would threaten both it and Buckhannon, and that the enemy would thus be divided, and might be struck at in detail. Communication with General Garnett can be had by way of Huttonsville. He estimates the enemy’s force at six thousand men; at Grafton, a few hundred; at, Clarksburg, about three thousand; at Weston, two thousand; and at Cheat River Bridge, from two to three thousand; making a total of about seventeen thousand men. General McClellan was said to be in command at Grafton and General Morris at Philippi.

  I have thought proper to give you the above information that you May be informed of the enemy’s supposed purposes on your right; and {p.244} should you not find employment for your command in the Kanawha Valley, and think it advisable, you might concert measures with General Garnett for a united attack on the forces of General McClellan.

  Respectfully, &c.,

  R. E. LEE, General, Commanding.

  –––

  No. 17.

  Reports from and instructions to Maj. M. G. Harman, C. S. Army, commanding at Staunton, Va.

  STAUNTON, VA., July 14, 1861.

  General R. E. LEE :

  Below is a note, sent in by Private Strain, from Colonel Scott. I can form no idea of the extent of the loss we have sustained, but will communicate with you as I receive information. Have telegraph offices kept open night and day:

  HUTTONSVILLE, VA., July 12, 1861.

  DEAR SIR: Camp Garnett has been taken, and General Garnett will retire through Hardy. I am directed to unite with your regiment and Colonel Johnson’s, and fortify Cheat Mountain. Therefore hasten your march by forced marches.

  W. C. SCOTT, Colonel Forty-fourth Regiment.

  I will do all in my power to raise one thousand men in this county, to march to General Garnett’s aid before the governor returns, and win do all that can be done to procure transportation to Send off the Arkansas regiments without delay.

  M. G. HARMAN, Major, Commanding.

  –––

  STAUNTON. VA., July 14, 1861.

  Maj. Gen. ROBERT E. LEE:

  DEAR SIR: I have received the inclosed from W. C. Scott, of the Forty-fourth Regiment Virginia Volunteers.* I telegraphed you the same, but send it, for fear it has not reached you. Have the offices kept open night and day. I have had all the colonels of the militia of the county summoned to be here at 7 o’clock this morning, and will, according to your orders, have the whole militia of the county called out to-day. Every exertion shall be made to have all pushed up with promptness and dispatch. I will advise you by telegraph as further information reaches me. I cannot yet tell the extent of the disaster, but fear, from Colonel Scott’s retrograde movement, that it is serious, and also much fear that General Garnett will at least lose all his wagons and baggage going through Hardy.

  Mr. Hughes, a member of the Convention, from the county of Randolph, I think, was sent by Colonel Scott to Colonel Pegram, and was killed by our own men. Captain De Lagnel was dangerously wounded, and reported left on the field. Give my orders by telegraph as anything occurs. Please see the Quartermaster-General. I wrote to him by to-day’s mail, and you will see, from his letter, that I need instructions to purchase horses for the transportation required. I have asked to be furnished with $20,000. My letter will give you particulars. The cars are waiting.

  Hastily and respectfully,

  M. G. HARMAN, Major, Commanding.

  * See next preceding dispatch.

  {p.245}

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  HEADQUARTERS OF THE VIRGINIA FORCES, Richmond, Va., July 14, 1861.

  Maj. M. G. HARMAN, Staunton, Va.:

  Send by express the following:

  General H. R. JACKSON:

  Take command of Scott’s, Johnson’s, and Lee’s regiments, and such other forces as may be at hand. Oppose the advance of the enemy, and move to the relief of General Garnett. Four hundred rounds of ammunition, for the guns forwarded, has been sent.

  R. E. LEE, General, Commanding.

  –––

  STAUNTON, VA., July 15, 1861.

  President DAVIS:

  Our force has retreated to Monterey. We have no certain knowledge that the enemy have taken possession of Cheat Mountain in force. We hope that by prompt action it can be taken and held by our troops with suitable re-enforcements. Certainly they can hold other mountains west of Monterey. The enemy is in possession of Cheat, Mountain, and still more at Monterey will find free passage to the Central Railroad, and to the valley in rear of General Johnston, unless vigorously opposed. There is a turnpike road from Huttonsville to Huntersville, and thence to the Warm Springs, and thence to the Central Railroad at Millborough, as well as to Jackson’s River and Lewisburg, from Monterey to the Warm Springs, and to Hardy County. There are turnpike roads to prevent the enemy coming from the direction of Warm Springs, or northeastwardly into the valley. We, should hold Cheat Mountain, or be as near it as possible, so as to threaten his rear and flank in any movement he makes, besides checking his advance in this direction, and keeping command of several roads for the advance of our troops. A force may be sent also to Jackson’s River, by the Central Railroad, or by canal and turnpike from Lynchburg. A piece or two of artillery, with powder, lead, and buckshot, for the militia, should be sent with this force. They cannot be bought in this county. Without prompt action a local reverse may become a general disaster. Excuse these suggestions.

  M. G. HARMAN, Major, Commanding.

  –––

  STAUNTON, VA., July 15, 1861.

  Major-General LEE:

  Lieutenant Smith, of Lee’s Rifles, just arrived, reports that the fight commenced about 4 p. m., and lasted about one hour and a half The enemy outnumbered us ten to one. We repulsed them three times. We lost forty killed and prisoners. Among the killed, Captain De Lagnel. We killed quite one hundred and fifty of the enemy. Captain Curry, who was wounded, came down the hill to the fort, and was the only one who did. The men in the engagement were not re-enforced from Heck’s command, because he was fearing an attack from the front, the enemy being in view. Heck brought his regiment out of the fortifications to retreat, about 11 o’clock at night, by order of Pegram, who had returned from the battle-field, hurt from a fall from his horse. Heck formed in the road, Lilley’s company in front, and started through the mountains in the dark, and soon got separated, about three hundred having arrived at Monterey. Nearly the whole of Pegram’s regiment are safe. It is {p.246} supposed that the missing will yet reach the camp. Heck left his four cannon, and about twenty teams and ordnance. Curry and Pegram were not in condition to leave the fort, and insisted on being left, and are supposed to be prisoners.

  M. G. HARMAN, Major, Commanding.

  –––

  HEADQUARTERS FORCES, Staunton, Va., July 15, 1861.

  Maj. Gen. ROBERT E. LEE:

  DEAR SIR: After your dispatch of to-day, I have informed all that no company would be received as a volunteer company for less than three years or the war, except those companies that were in process of organization before the proclamation.

  I would earnestly suggest for your consideration and prompt action the great importance of fortifying Cheat Mountain, and sending forces on the right and left, so as to guard the road from Huttonsville to Huntersville, and prevent the enemy from approaching the Central Railroad, at either Millborough or Jackson’s River, and from near Beverly, through Hardy and Pendleton, and thence to Rockingham, in rear of General Johnston. I would call your attention to the fact that there is a very good road down on the eastern base of Cheat Mountain to Huntersville.

  Our retreat, in my opinion, to Monterey, is disastrous to us. If not changed, by marching at once upon Cheat Mountain and taking possession of it and fortifying it, so that we can hold them in check in front, and flank them on the right and left, the retreat to Monterey will have a very demoralizing effect upon our people. And I would urge upon you the great importance of keeping the enemy from ever touching this country, for Union men, in great numbers, would be found here in this county, and other counties in the valley, if the Federal troops were here in force to protect them. It is necessary, to keep all our people loyal, to keep the enemy from having an opportunity to tamper with many of them. Of course, I would not express this opinion where it would be spoken of as it would have a bad effect; but I assure you it is nevertheless true.

  I hope you will not consider me as desiring to press my opinions, but my knowledge of the country induces me to make these suggestions. I feel confident that if Colonel Scott had gone to the aid of Colonel Pegram we would have gained a victory instead of meeting with a serious defeat. The enemy displayed no courage after defeating us on the top of Rich Mountain, or the whole force at Camp Garnett would have been cut to pieces. If President Davis would take twelve-months’ volunteers, the call for the militia could be turned to a good account.

  Very respectfully,

  M. G. HARMAN, Major, Commanding.

  –––

  STAUNTON, VA., July 16, 1861.

  President DAVIS and Col. GEORGE DEAS:

  Below is a dispatch from General Jackson. Send on re-enforcements. I will prepare transportation:

  CAMP AT MONTEREY, VA., July 15, 1861.

  Col. GEORGE DEAS, Assistant Adjutant-General:

  Reliable information received that General Garnett, on his retreat from Laurel Hill, through the counties of Tucker and Hardy, towards this point, was pursued and {p.247} attacked in the rear several times by the enemy and defeated; that on Saturday he himself was killed, and it would seem that his command had been routed and dispersed. It is reported that Colonel Heck surrendered. The enemy may advance upon this line towards Staunton, or upon the line by Huntersville and the Warm Springs, to the Central Railroad. Speedy re-enforcements, especially of engineers and artillery, are needed, to enable us to hold our position should he advance. The effective force under my command amounts to from twenty-five hundred to three thousand men, with three pieces of artillery-6-pounders. More circumstantial accounts will be transmitted at the earliest moment.

  HENRY R. JACKSON, Brigadier-General.

  Will inform you as further details reach me. Allow me to establish a pony express from this place to Monterey and Winchester.

  M. G. HARMAN, Major, Commanding.

  [Answer.]

  JULY 16, 1861.

  Establish both pony expresses without delay. I will do all in my power to comply with General Jackson’s request. Send all reliable information to me.

  JEFFERSON DAVIS.

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  HEADQUARTERS FORCES, Staunton, Va., July 16, 1861.

  Col. GEORGE DEAS, Assistant Adjutant-General:

  DEAR SIR: Inclosed is a communication sent you by telegraph, after waiting hours for the office to open.* It is most important that the telegraph offices should be open night and day, and that we should have a through connection between Richmond and Staunton, instead of having a relay at Gordonsville, and thereby creating great delay. The instrument at this office is nearly worn-out, as I months ago informed the superintendent of the telegraph line at Richmond in person. See that these matters are corrected.

  Yours, very respectfully,

  M. G. HARMAN, Major, Commanding.

  P. S.-I have asked the President to allow me to establish a pony express from this place to Monterey and Winchester. By all means, ammunition of all sorts should be sent to this point immediately. I have been notified to report at Richmond, for settlement of my accounts as quartermaster, on the 15th of this month. My accounts are all ready, but the present unfortunate state of affairs will prevent my attendance. Is anything necessary for me to do in regard to it? Please advise me.

  * Inclosure given in next preceding dispatch.

  –––

  No. 18.

  Reports of Brig. Gen. H. R. Jackson, C. S. Army, of events front July 11 to 16, with correspondence.

  BRIGADE HEADQUARTERS, Camp at Monterey, Va., July 16, 1861.

  SIR: There can be no doubt that during the earlier days of last week the enemy engaged the attention of General Garnett at Laurel Hill by {p.248} repeated feints and, skirmishes, on the afternoon of Thursday the 11th, turning the left flank of our position at Camp Garnett-in large force. He succeeded, after a protracted and, on our side, a desperate struggle, in seizing the summit of the mountain, which had been held by a small body of our troops. Camp Garnett was thereupon abandoned. A portion of the force, which had occupied it, attempting, by a flank movement, to join General Garnett, were intercepted, and, it is said, taken prisoners. Other parties, from the same command, succeeded in making their escape by mountain paths, and are daily coming into this Camp. General Garnett, abandoning his position at Laurel Hill, retreated upon the road, towards Beverly, with the design of joining Colonel Scott. Finding this impracticable, be renewed his retreat, following the road to Saint George, and intending to fall back through Petersburg and Franklin upon this point. The enemy, in superior force, with cavalry and flying artillery, pursued him, and on Saturday, in the vicinity of the left branch of Cheat River, attacked his rear, defended by the First Georgia Regiment. It is said that the enemy was at first repulsed, and repulsed three times, with great loss; but, while a portion of his infantry was scattered in the wood, his artillery was finally brought to bear successfully upon our column. It was during one of these engagements that General Garnett, proceeding in person to the rear, himself fell. Yesterday, when I sent you a telegram, I was quite satisfied, from the reports of fugitives, and from the absence of all Communication with his command, that it must have been disorganized. I have since been led to hope (through no official channel, however) that a considerable body of them, disencumbered by abandonment of their wagon train, succeeded in continuing an organized retreat, and were yesterday upon the eastern declivity of the Alleghany Mountain, some fifteen miles from Petersburg. If this be true, I look for their arrival at this point on Friday next.

  Colonel Johnson, pursuing the turnpike road towards Huttonsville, had made a forced march on Saturday, to form a connection with Colonel Scott’s regiment, expecting to occupy Cheat Mountain. At Greenbrier River, however, some fifteen miles this side of the mountain stronghold, he met Colonel Scott in full retreat, was apprised of the retreat of General Garnett, and of the presence of the enemy, in large numbers, in the immediate vicinity. The troops having been wearied by long marches, &c., he, felt too weak to continue his forward movement, and determined to fall back upon this point.

  On Sunday morning I met him, and, after frank consultation, concerning some scruples, assumed command. My own judgment approving of what he had previously done, the backward march was continued to this place, for the purpose of relieving ourselves of heavy wagon trains, of forming a connection with the North Carolina Regiment, of resting and rallying the troops, and of holding them in readiness either to resist the advance of the enemy on the Huttonsville road, or to move to the relief of General Garnett in the direction of Franklin and Petersburg. Hearing nothing from that direction, however, I was contemplating a renewed movement towards the Cheat Mountain, when I received intelligence yesterday of General Garnett’s death and the uncertain condition of his retreating column. This movement was contemplated, however, rather with a view to the moral effect to be produced by it, not simply at a distance, but upon the people of the intervening districts, who are really in a most pitiable state of panic, than with a hope of effectively preventing the enemy’s progress towards the east, should he propose to make it at once. You are, doubtless, already aware {p.249} that from Huttonsville, where, he now is, there is a good road passing through Huntersville, and, by the Warm Springs, to the Central Railroad, above Staunton.

  I inclose herewith a rough sketch of the surrounding country, with its passes, roads, and distances, to which you may possibly have an occasion to refer.

  I am impressed with the opinion that if the enemy advance farther it will be by the Huntersville and Warm Springs road. I have scouts, deemed to be reliable, put out upon that road to watch and report his movements; others upon the Huttonsville road and through the country towards Franklin and Petersburg for the same purpose, and to direct our scattered troops into this camp.

  It is needless to add that we are encountering many difficulties and annoyances from the want of tents, blankets, clothing, &c., for the men who are coming in almost hourly, and even from their disorganized and depressed condition. However, I think I can report the command as being on the whole, in fair condition, constantly increasing in numbers, and improving in every respect; the officers generally, and especially Colonel Johnson, energetic, and rendering cheerful and effective service. The returns indicate the presence of from three thousand to thirty-five hundred effective troops, among them two companies of cavalry. I have three pieces of artillery (6-pounders), with horses and ammunition, and I am organizing a company of officers and men, who are experienced, to a greater or less degree in the use of that arm, and will take them in charge. I would beg once again to urge the importance of our being speedily re-enforced, especially in artillery and engineers.

  I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

  H. R. JACKSON, Brigadier-General, Provisional Army C. S., Commanding.

  Col. GEORGE DEAS, Assistant Adjutant-General, Richmond, Va.

  –––

  BRIGADE HEADQUARTERS, Camp at Monterey, Va., July 16 [18?], 1861.

  SIR: Inclosed herewith I have the honor to transmit copies of correspondence with Major-General McClellan, of the U. S. Army, which will explain themselves. Further information received has confirmed into assurance the hope expressed in my last letter that the retreating column of General Garnett had not been so wholly [dispersed] after his death as was first supposed. I have good reason to believe that by Friday next some twenty-five hundred or three thousand men connected with it will join me here.

  I also learn that a Company of artillery with four pieces, and capable of effective, service, has escaped the disasters of the last week almost intact. With an Arkansas regiment, understood to be approaching from Staunton, this accession will raise my command to some seven thousand men. I have sent a courier to meet Colonel Ramsey, with a direction that the artillery and cavalry be advanced with all possible dispatch. So soon as I can control their services, I hope to occupy the stronghold of the Alleghany Mountains, which commands this road, the indications Of Yesterday having suggested that the enemy may conclude to advance by that route.

  The work of reorganization is going on in this camp quite perceptibly, I think, but I have been somewhat alarmed by a notification from Major {p.250} Harman, quartermaster at Staunton, that within the next five days five thousand troops, whom I suppose to be the militia of the adjoining County, will be upon the march to join me here. It is questionable whether so large a body of wholly undisciplined men, however zealous and patriotic they may be, will be able to compensate, by service in the field, for the disorganization they must occasion in the camp, and for the labor of arming, transporting, and supplying them. Supposing that the death of General Garnett, and the relief of his command from immediate danger in removing the necessity for their services, may prevent their assemblage and, forward movement, and exceedingly loth to interfere with any direction from the State authorities, I shall leave all communication with Major Harman upon this subject to the Commander-in-Chief.

  Permit me again to reiterate that what we need upon this line is good engineers, artillery of a heavier caliber than we now have to meet such moving with the enemy, and mountain howitzers, which the character of this country would render eminently effective.

  I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant

  HENRY R. JACKSON, Brigadier-General, &c.

  Col. GEORGE DEAS, Assistant Adjutant-General.

  P. S.-Since writing the above I have received a note from Colonel Ramsey, a copy of which, together with a copy of my response thereto, I have deemed it proper to inclose to you. You will perceive that he contemplated moving his, command in the direction of Staunton. While I had previously dispatched a courier with such instructions as would prevent such a result, and who had not reached Colonel Ramsey at the date of his note, and while I have no doubt that his column will now be moved to this point, nevertheless I have not felt authorized to withhold this information from the commanding general.

  [Inclosure No. 1.]

  HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE OHIO, Camp near Huttonsville, Va., July 15, 1861.

  To the COMDG. OFFICER Of Forces near Staunton, Va.:

  SIR: I have to-day received orders from the Commander-in-Chief of the U. S. Army respecting the disposition to be made of the prisoners of war now in my hands. These orders are substantially that the non-commissioned officers and privates shall be permitted to return to their homes, provided they willingly subscribe an oath or affirmation binding them not to bear arms or serve in any military capacity against the United States until released from this obligation according to the ordinary usages of war; the officers to be permitted to return to their homes upon giving a similar parole of honor. From this privilege are excepted, however, such officers as may have recently left the United States service with the intention of taking arms against the United States. Such officers will for the present be sent to Fort McHenry, where they will, without doubt, be kindly treated.

  There are at Beverly some thirty-three officers, five surgeons, and about six hundred non-commissioned officers and privates. There are others at Laurel Hill, &c., the numbers of whom I do not yet accurately know. With the wounded the number will probably amount to at least eight hundred men, besides officers.

  It is my desire to arrange with you for the return to their homes of {p.251} such of these as may accept the terms offered them. I would be glad to know what transportation, &c., you can provide for them, and at what point I may expect it. If no other arrangement will be convenient to you, I will provide wagons and tents, as well as cooking utensils, for the party, with the understanding that the proper authorities shall undertake, to return them to me. The wagons and tents will probably be of those captured at Camp Garnett. Please inform me how many days’ rations it will be necessary to furnish to the party. I will be glad also to arrange for the return of the wounded as soon as their condition will permit it. In the mean time their friends may rest assured that every attention will be paid to them.

  You will, ere this, no doubt, be informed of the unhappy fate of General Garnett, who fell while acting the part of a gallant soldier. His remains are now at Grafton, preserved in ice, where they will await the instructions of his relatives, should they desire to remove them to his home.

  While I am determined to play my part in this unhappy contest to the utmost of my energy and ability, permit me to assure you of my desire to do all in my power to alleviate its miseries, and to confine its effects to those who constitute the organized armies and meet in battle. It is my intention to cause the persons and property of private citizens to be respected, and to render the condition of prisoners and wounded as little oppressive and miserable as possible. I trust that I shall be met in the same spirit, and that this contest shall remain free from the usual horrible features of civil war.

  I send this by Lieut. R. G. Lipford, of the Forty-fourth Regiment Virginia Volunteers, who chances to be the captured officer most convenient. I have not yet taken his final parole, but have given him a Special one for the purpose of conveying this letter and bringing back an immediate reply. Upon his return the will be accorded the same parole as the others. For obvious reasons I request that your reply be transmitted by Lieutenant Lipford.

  I will proceed, with as little delay as possible, to the release of the Prisoners, and, if ready to forward before your reply reaches me, will take it for granted that you accede to my proposals in regard to the return of the property sent with them.

  I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

  GEO. B. MCCLELLAN, Major-General, U. S. Army, Comdg. Department of the Ohio.

  [Inclosure No. 2.]

  HDQRS. CONFEDERATE ARMY NORTHWESTERN VIRGINIA, July 17, 1861.

  Maj. Gen. GEORGE B. MCCLELLAN, Commanding U. S. Forces:

  SIR: It affords me pleasure to acknowledge the receipt of your communication of the 15th instant, and to respond, as I do most cordially, to the expressions of humane feeling by which it is characterized. I shall this morning dispatch ten wagons for the transportation of such of the prisoners referred to as may accept their release upon the terms required by the Commander-in-Chief of the U. S. Army. The officer in charge of them will be instructed to proceed to the western base of the Cheat Mountain range, and to await the released prisoners there. Should he chance to require the use of any of the camp equipage which may {p.252} accompany the wagons transporting them to that point, it will be returned to your order as scrupulously as the tender of it was courteously made. The friends of the sick and wounded who, may be too feeble to come with these trains will rest altogether tranquil in the assurances which you have given respecting the treatment of the latter. Permit me to add that your well known character as a man had rendered even those assurances a matter of supererogation.

  Lieutenant Bruce and Dr. Garnett (the latter a relative and aide-de-camp of the late and much lamented General Garnett) will bear to you this communication, and will make the necessary arrangements for the removal of the remains of that gallant officer to his home. That his relatives and many friends will most sensibly appreciate your kind acts and words respecting him cannot be a subject of surmise.

  I regret to say that there, are peculiar reasons which have constrained me to place R. I. Lipford, the bearer of your letter, under arrest. By representing himself to be a lieutenant, when he was simply a private in the Forty-fourth Regiment Virginia Volunteers, he was guilty of a gross imposition, exhibited his utter unworthiness of any confidence whatsoever, and I could not place this letter in his charge with any sense of security that it would reach you. In detaining him from you for the present, I need hardly assure you that he will not be allowed to violate the parole he has undertaken to give. He will be held in strict custody.

  I am, sir, with great respect, your very obedient servant,

  HENRY R. JACKSON, Brigadier-General, C. S. Army, Commanding.

  [Inclosure No. 3.]

  HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE OHIO, Huttonsville, Randolph County, Virginia, July 15, 1861.

  To the OFFICER Commanding the Forces Commanded by the late Robert S. Garnett, Esq., styling himself Brigadier-General, Confederate States Army:

  SIR: As the commander of this department, I have protected the persons of all citizens of Western Virginia, except those engaged in active hostilities against the United States, and, when under a misapprehension of patriotic duty, arrests have been made because of political opinions or sympathies, I have promptly ordered releases. I have protected all private property, by whomsoever owned. My proclamations and general orders on this subject have doubtless been brought to your knowledge. I am informed that arrests have been made in Western Virginia of citizens loyal to the Government of the United States but not in arms for the support of it, and that such prisoners, or some of them, are within your control. I suggest to you the propriety of releasing all such persons, their detention being not only individual hardships, but calculated to increase the troubles of this section of the country, without contributing to any military result. Among the prisoners now within your control, and belonging to the class above mentioned, my attention has been called specially to the following names: W. M. Smith, John Brooks, Quilby Osborn, J. L. Forton, Quillers Herron, and I beg leave to call your attention to those and all similar cases.

  I am, sir, your obedient servant,

  GEO. B. McCLELLAN, Major-General, U. S. Army, Commanding Department. {p.253} [Inclosure No. 4.]

  HDQRS. CONFEDERATE ARMY IN NORTHWESTERN VIRGINIA, July 16, 1861.

  Maj. Gen. GEORGE B. MCCLELLAN, Comdg. U. S. Forces:

  SIR: Your letter of the 15th instant, with its anomalous address, has been received. In response, I have simply to say that I am as yet wholly unapprised that a different policy in regard to the arrests of suspected persons, or the protection of private property from the line you have so naturally proposed for yourself, has been pursued by the chief of the division of the Confederate Army. Hence your suggestion as to the propriety of abandoning any other would seem to be uncalled-for. Begging to remind you that any information you may receive as to the absence of sufficient grounds for the arrest and detention of the persons you name (or any others) may, to say the least of it, be quite as unreliable as the evidence upon which such persons are held, I will conclude by saying to you that justice will be duly regarded by me in the treatment of all persons whatsoever.

  I am, sir, your obedient servant,

  H. R. JACKSON, Brigadier-General, C. S. Army.

  [Inclosure No. 5.]

  PETERSBURG, VA., July 16, 1861.

  Colonel JOHNSON:

  My command is here, marching to Harrisonburg. We have suffered awfully. Not many men were killed by the enemy, but there are hundreds missing. We were near starvation. The cavalry scouts still hang on our rear, but I do not think they are pursuing in force. What is left of this army will not be fit for service in a mouth.

  Very respectfully,

  J. N. RAMSEY, Colonel, Commanding.

  P. S.-Let me know if you are threatened by the enemy.

  [Inclosure No. 6.]

  BRIGADE HEADQUARTERS, Camp near Monterey, Va., July 17, 1861.

  J. N. RAMSEY, Colonel, Commanding, &c.:

  SIR: Your note of yesterday is at hand. I am surprised and pained to learn by it that you may not be on the road to this point. If so, you will at once change your line of march, and, with all practicable dispatch, join me here. You will send forward, with directions to move as rapidly as possible, the artillery and cavalry attached to your command; also the engineer officers, and Lieutenants Washington and Humphries, Of the C. S. Army.

  Respectfully,

  R. R. JACKSON, Brigadier-General, Commanding, &c.

  {p.254}

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  No. 19.

  Instructions from General Lee to General Jackson.

  HEADQUARTERS OF THE FORCES, Richmond, Va., July 16, 1861.

  Brig. Gen. H. R. JACKSON, Monterey, Va.:

  GENERAL: In the dispatch of the 14th instant you were directed to take command of the available troops of the Northwestern Army, and oppose the advance of the enemy. I infer, from your dispatch from Monterey of this date, that our troops have retreated to that point. It is important that the passes of the Cheat Mountain, or at least those of the Alleghany, should, if practicable, be defended, to prevent the advance of the enemy by the road through Huntersville to Jackson’s River and Millborough, where he would obtain command of the Virginia Central Railroad. Re-enforcements for the Northwest are collecting at Staunton, and I shall leave here on the 18th instant to join them.

  Respectfully,

  R. E. LEE, General, Commanding.

  –––

  No. 20.

  Report of Lieut. Col. J. M. Heck, Twenty-fifth Virginia Infantry, of operations from May 24 to July 13, including skirmishes July 7 to 9, and engagement at Rich Mountain.

  -, - -, 1861.

  On May 24 I reported for duty to Col. George A. Porterfield, who was then, with about 100 men, holding the town of Fetterman, three miles west of Grafton, on the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad.

  On the 25th Colonel Porterfield received a re-enforcement of six or seven raw recruits, infantry and cavalry, under Col. R. Turk.

  On May 26 Colonel Porterfield, with his small force of half-armed and undisciplined troops, took possession of Grafton.

  At 12 o’clock on the night of the 26th I was ordered by Colonel Porterfield to proceed to Richmond without delay, and report the condition of his little army, and the necessity of his being re-enforced. I started immediately, and by constant traveling reached Richmond in time to report to General Lee on the evening of the 28th. The general informed me that owing to the movements of the enemy at Alexandria and other points it would be impossible for him to do anything more for the army in the Northwest than to furnish me with some arms at Staunton, Va., and authority to recruit a regiment in the valley and mountain Counties immediately on the route to Grafton.

  In compliance with his order and instructions I repaired to Staunton on the 29th in company with Maj. R. E. Cowan, where we proceeded with all possible dispatch, assisted by Col. M. G. Harman (at that time major and quartermaster at that point), to raise troops and get up supplies. While thus engaged the news of Colonel Porterfield’s retreat from Grafton and his subsequent defeat at Philippi reached us. This caused us some delay, as we had to provide clothing as well as provisions, as the army was then suffering, having lost all their clothing, provisions, ammunition, and many of them their guns. We also had some difficulty in fitting up a battery of four pieces (6-pounders), which had been furnished us by Governor Letcher, but was without caissons.

  {p.255}

  On June 7 we left Staunton with one battery of four pieces (6-pounder brass cannon), temporarily assigned to the Eighth Star Artillery, from Shenandoah County, commanded by Captain Rice, afterwards assigned to the Lee Battery, commanded by Captain Anderson; one company of cavalry, commanded by Captain Moorman, and three companies of infantry. About the same time we received orders from the governor to call out the militia of Pendleton, Highland, Bath, Pocahontas, Randolph, and Barbour. We immediately dispatched Lieut. John T. Cowan (who had been ordered to report to me for duty) and others to these counties with the governor’s proclamation and orders for the militia of the three first-named counties to meet us at Monterey, in Highland County, on June 10. Having authority from the governor to use the militia or not, as we saw proper, we arranged for each county to furnish a company of 100 men, which was done, and the rest were discharged. We considered that many volunteers to be worth more than the whole militia force; besides, it was necessary for some to remain at home to take care of the crops, as our army had to be supplied principally from those counties. Three companies were formed from the militia of Highland, Bath, and Pendleton, and the militia from those counties sent home.

  With this force (in all eight companies) we reached Colonel Porterfield’s headquarters, at Huttonsville, on June 15. General Garnett, who had reached there one day in advance with one staff officer, ordered Lieut. Col. W. L. Jackson and myself to form a regiment each from the companies then there, about twenty-four in number. My regiment was composed of ten companies of infantry, to which was attached one company of cavalry and one of artillery.

  Immediately after the formation of my regiment I received orders to march that night to Rich Mountain Pass. Captain Corley, of the general staff, was sent with me to select the location for fortifications.

  We marched that night, and early the next morning, June 16, occupied the western slope of the mountain near its base, seven miles west of Beverly.

  We worked our whole force on the fortifications for several days, but made rather slow progress, as we had but few tools and no engineer until Prof Jed. Hotchkiss joined the command.

  On the same day that I occupied this position General Garnett, with Colonel Jackson’s regiment, occupied the Laurel Hill Pass, seventeen miles northwest of Beverly. The enemy was at this time holding Philippi with a considerable force and Buckhannon with a small force.

  On June – I was ordered by General Garnett to take part of my regiment and all the wagons under my command and go to Buckhannon on a foraging expedition, a report of which you have.

  The day after we left Buckhannon, June -, the enemy, under General Rosecrans, about 5,000 strong, occupied the place and was very soon largely re-enforced.

  On July [6] a detachment of about 100 men made an attack on our picket at Middle Fork Bridge, about halfway between our camp and Buckhannon. Notwithstanding their superior numbers they were repulsed, leaving one dead on the field. Three of our pickets were wounded-one slightly, the other two severely. The enemy soon afterwards appearing in large force, our picket was compelled to withdraw from the bridge.

  On July 7 I sent out Major Tyler, of the Twentieth Virginia Regiment, who had been sent with seven companies to re-enforce me, with two companies to reconnoiter the enemy’s force and position at the {p.256} bridge. This little force, under their gallant leader, attacked and drove in the enemy’s pickets, but finding the enemy in large force, withdrew in good order and returned to camp.

  On the evening of the same day Lieutenant-Colonel Pegram arrived with the remainder of the Twentieth Regiment and assumed the command. I then offered to give him all the information I had of the surrounding country, fortifications, &c., and immediately introduced him to Professor Hotchkiss, my engineer.

  On July 9 the enemy in large force moved up and occupied the Roaring Run Flats, about two miles from and in sight of our position, and on the evening of the same day made a reconnaissance in force, driving in our pickets. Colonel Pegram at this time very much underrated the force of the enemy, and wrote to General Garnett for permission to surprise and attack him in his position. General Garnett, I believe, advised against an attack, but I think this underrating of the enemy’s force kept General Garnett from ordering Colonel Pegram to fall back from the position, as I have no doubt he would have done, at the same time falling back from his own position to Cheat Mountain, had he learned or even supposed the enemy in front of our position half as strong as he was. I say this because I know General Garnett did not consider us strong enough in that position to resist a force so superior in numbers, even against a front attack only, as he inspected the position in person after the fortifications had been commenced, and remarked that we could defend the position against the attack of an enemy three or four times our number. The force brought against us was at least ten to one. I deem the foregoing statement due to the memory of one of Virginia’s noblest sons, a devoted patriot, a wise and sagacious general, who fell a victim to a combination of circumstances over which he had no control.

  On July 10 the enemy made a second reconnaissance in force, which returned to camp late in the evening. Lights were seen in the enemy’s camp until after midnight, and he appeared to be in considerable commotion, as if preparing for some expedition requiring extra rations, &c. Colonel Pegram, in anticipation of a rear attack, sent to the top of the mountain, about two miles in our rear, two companies of the Twenty-fifth Regiment, Captain Curry’s, and -, of his own regiment, which remained out all night.

  Early on the morning of the 11th a cavalry sergeant of the enemy (who had been detailed to assist in keeping open the communication between General Rosecrans, who had started very early that morning with six regiments of infantry to turn our left flank, and General McClellan, who, with the main body of the enemy and eighteen pieces of artillery, was to attack us in front as soon as Rosecrans made the attack in the rear) missed his way and rode up to our lines and was wounded and captured. Colonel Pegram learned from him that the enemy had moved a force to his rear, but could not learn by which flank, so he sent two more companies, with one piece of artillery, to re-enforce the picket on the mountain, which made in all a force of about 300 men, which was placed under the command of Captain De Lagnel, whose deed of daring on that day has won for him a name as lasting as history itself.

  Colonel Scott, who was marching with a regiment to re-enforce General Garnett, was requested by Colonel Pegram to hold a road one mile west of Beverly. This was done because Colonel Pegram thought that the enemy would try to turn his right flank by a very circuitous route, coming in at that road, but the enemy made the attack about 11 o’clock on {p.257} the mountain from the left flank, having made a circuit through the woods.

  Our brave little band of heroes under Captain De Lagnel met the enemy with great resolution and repulsed him twice, but were finally overpowered by overwhelming numbers and compelled to retreat, having lost in killed and wounded in the three hours’ fight about one-third of their whole force. After the brave Captain De Lagnel had been shot down, while, with the assistance of a boy-all the rest of the [men] at the guns having been killed or wounded-he was loading and firing his pieces, the gallant Captain Curry, of the Rockbridge Guards, assumed the command of the few remaining men and conducted the retreat in as good order as possible, being under the concentrated fire of four regiments, which made a perfect hail of leaden missiles.

  The enemy, having charged and taken our piece of artillery, were bayoneting our wounded soldiers, who had been shot at their posts. As soon as Colonel Pegram learned that we had been driven from our position at Hart’s house and lost our piece of artillery, he determined to take about half of the command and charge and retake the lost position, and immediately organized them and marched from our camp, leaving me in command, with instructions to hold that position at all hazards.

  In the mean time the enemy was busy making preparations for an attack in front, cutting roads and placing a large number of pieces of artillery in position. Our force had been so weakened by the heavy detail made by Colonel Pegram that we could do nothing but strengthen our position and await the attack of the enemy.

  About 11 o’clock at night, having heard nothing from Colonel Pegram, his adjutant and other officers insisted on a council of war being called. I called a few officers together and repeated to them my orders from. Colonel Pegram, instructing me to hold the position until I heard from him, which might not be before morning, as he had not then determined whether he would attack General Rosecrans that night or in the morning.

  We were about returning to our several posts, as we were expecting an attack every moment, when Colonel Pegram returned and informed us he had determined not to make the attack at Hart’s house, and had sent the men he had selected for that purpose away under the command of Maj. Nat. Tyler, and he ordered me to call in all the companies and pickets, and retreat with them immediately in the direction of General Garnett’s camp, at Laurel Hill. I proceeded without delay to execute the order; had the remaining pieces of artillery spiked; the men formed single file; a pass-word by which they might recognize each other in the dark was given them, and they were marching out of the camp when Colonel Pegram came up and assumed command, he having before determined to remain in camp, owing to his weak condition, having been thrown from his horse during the day. His orderly, in halting the command until the colonel could get in front, failed to reach the head of the column, and forty or fifty, men, under the command of Captain Lilley (guided by Major Stewart and Professor Hotchkiss), did not receive the orders to halt, and marched for some time, thinking they were followed by the rest of the command. On discovering that they had got separated from us, they changed their course, marched through Beverly, and escaped.

  Soon after leaving Camp Garnett this little force passed between two regiments of the enemy, as we afterwards learned, and escaped being fired upon by replying by chance with the signal adopted by the enemy. The night being very dark and our route being over precipitous mountains {p.258} and through almost impassable undergrowth, we made but little progress until after daylight

  Soon after sunup on the 12th we were in sight of Beverly on a high mountain, and could see the river valley for many miles both to our right and left. Had we gone directly down into this valley as urged by Colonel Wirt in person [and] some of the officers we would have escaped, as the enemy did not enter Beverly until about 1 p. m. on that day. I suppose that we would have gone into the valley at this point if Colonel Pegram had not mistaken some of our own (Lilley’s) men for the enemy’s advance; as it was we were kept in the mountains, marching slowly in the direction of General Garnett’s camp at Laurel Hill.

  Late in the evening I asked permission of Colonel Pegram to go down into the valley and see if the road leading from Beverly to General Garnett’s camp was clear, which was granted. Taking with me a citizen that I could rely upon, I sent him to a house where he learned from the inmates that there was no news in that neighborhood of any movements of the enemy in the valley; but as they were three miles from the main road and could give no certain news as to the movements on it, I returned and reported to Colonel Pegram, and he determined to move his men to the main road without delay.

  We found this march through the valley to the main road rather difficult, as we had to wade the Valley River three times and cross much swampy land. When we were within a half mile of the main road the head of our column, having crossed the river, was halted till the rest of the command came up, when we were fired into, which caused some confusion, as it was very dark.

  Colonel Pegram ordered me to recross the river with the command and form them, as he had just, learned that the enemy was at Leadsville Church (3,000 strong), at the point where we would strike the main road. He soon afterwards ordered me to march the men back again to the foot of the mountain, he riding on in advance, having procured a horse after he got into the valley. When I arrived at the house late at night I found Colonel Pegram, who was much exhausted and very weak, asleep. I awoke him, and he told me to call together the commandants of companies and procure a private room. I did so, and sent for the colonel, who informed the officers that he had concluded to surrender the command, as he believed it would be impossible to escape, being, as he believed, so surrounded by the enemy that it would be impossible for us to cross the valley to the mountains on the other side, and admitting that if we were able to do so, he thought that in their present exhausted And starving condition it would be impossible for the men to reach the nearest settlement.

  All the officers seemed to agree with the colonel except Capt. J. B. Moorman, of the Franklin Guards, and myself. The captain had marched his company by the same route after the defeat at Philippi, and thought that it could be done again. I argued that we could try the experiment, and if we came across a very, superior force we could then surrender to it, which I thought would be much better than to send a proposition to surrender to Beverly, seven miles distant. I thought that with what meal, flour, and meat we could get in the neighborhood (there being several houses near) we could manage to subsist the men on short rations until we could get something in the mountains. But, as stated before, a majority of the officers thought it would be better to surrender at once. Colonel Pegram then wrote a note to the commanding officer of the U. S. forces at Beverly and dispatched it about 12 {p.259} o’clock that night (July 12) by a messenger, who returned a little after sunrise the next day with one of General McClellan’s staff officers, Colonel Key, and about twenty cavalry. Colonel Key brought Colonel Pegram a reply to his note from General McClellan (copies of which you have). Colonel Pegram and Colonel Key had a long conference, at the end of which the men were marched to Beverly and stacked their guns. There being no formal surrender or officer to surrender their swords to, Colonel Pegram and most of the officers who had swords hung them on the stacked arms, and many of them were soon stolen by the Yankee guards.

  We were kept at Beverly and well treated by our captors until July 17, when all but Colonel Pegram were released on parole by order of General Scott, Pegram being refused his parole because he had been an officer in the U. S. Army.

  The foregoing account has been written hastily and from memory, but I think in the main is correct. There are undoubtedly many points of interest that have been forgotten, but as I have been informed that you will have written statements from several of the officers, and among others one from Lieut. John T. Cowan, who was with me all the time, and to whom I am much indebted. He is a cool and intrepid young officer, and certainly deserves a much better fate.

  There are many officers who deserve honorable mention, and foremost among those is the brave Captain Curry, who was wounded in the fight at Rich Mountain; but where many acted so well distinction would be invidious.

  Yours, very truly,

  J. M. HECK, Late Lieutenant-Colonel, Commanding 25th Regiment.

  R. R. HOWISON, Richmond, Va.

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  No. 21.

  Report of Maj. Nat. Tyler, Twentieth Virginia Infantry, of operations from July 1 to 14, including skirmish July 7, and the engagement at Rich Mountain.

  -, - -, 1861.

  During the night of July 1, I was ordered by General Garnett, at Laurel Hill to re-enforce Lieutenant-Colonel Heck at Rich Mountain with seven companies of the Twentieth Regiment Virginia Volunteers. Starting from Laurel Hill at 2 a. m. I arrived at Rich Mountain the next day at 12 m. Lieutenant-Colonel Heck’s command at Rich Mountain was One, regiment of infantry, a battery of four 6-pounders, and one company of cavalry.

  The sketch furnished you will show very accurately the fortifications that had been made to protect the camp from front assault.

  On Sunday, July 7, I was ordered to reconnoiter the bridge over Middle Fork, about fifteen miles in front of our position. I proceeded with two companies, Captain Atkinson, Twentieth Virginia Volunteers, and Captain Higginbotham, of Lieutenant-Colonel Heck’s regiment. When about one mile from the bridge I was informed by a country woman that a very large army occupied the bridge, and was entreated to return, as the Federal cavalry had but a few moments before left the house. The evidences of the cavalry were to be seen in the mud of the road. Proceeding carefully, I ascertained that a large force of infantry, artillery, {p.260} and cavalry were at the bridge. Soon their pickets were seen and driven in by our force. I found it prudent to return, and immediately after the skirmish was over made disposition for an orderly return. The enemy were a considerable time getting ready to pursue us, which enabled us to get some distance ahead, so we were able to reach camp without annoyance from them.

  Upon my return to camp I found Colonel Pegram with the remaining companies of the Twentieth Regiment, and he immediately assumed the command. We continued to strengthen our fortifications in front and to ascertain the character of the country on our flanks, to ascertain if it were possible for an army to march over the mountains on either flank. Every assurance from the people of the neighborhood was given that it was impossible for any force to march around our position.

  Thus matters continued until the morning of July 11, when our picket wounded and captured a Federal sergeant, who stated that McClellan had arrived the night before, and that Rosecrans had that morning at 2 o’clock started with a large force to turn our flank, but he was unable or unwilling to state which flank the enemy were threatening.

  About 11 o’clock firing was heard from the pickets at our rear and towards our left flank, and three companies were immediately ordered to Hart’s house. Colonel Pegram had sent to General Garnett that the enemy were endeavoring to turn our right flank, and requested that Colonel Scott might be ordered to comply with his request and occupy a position at the foot of the road one mile from Beverly and about five miles from our position at Hart’s house. This position was promptly taken by Colonel Scott; but as the enemy were then marching around our left flank, the position occupied by Colonel Scott was useless, and he was of no aid to us whatever.

  The fight began about 11 o’clock and lasted for three hours, when the enemy succeeded in getting to the road between our position and Beverly. Captain De Lagnel had used with great effect the one piece of artillery sent to him by Colonel Pegram, but when the second cannon arrived the enemy opened such a destructive fire upon it that neither men nor horses could maintain the position. The horses becoming unmanageable ran off and upset the gun and caisson down a precipice, depriving Captain De Lagnel of all ammunition. Wounded and in immediate danger of imminent capture, Captain De Lagnel ordered the infantry to return and make their way towards Beverly. The firing had now ceased, and the enemy were in possession of Hart’s house, and all opportunity and chances of escape along the road to Beverly were cut off., Colonel Pegram ordered me before the firing ceased to re-enforce Captain De Lagnel with the Twentieth Regiment, and as we were marching up the mountain he determined to take command of a storming party and attempt the recapture of Hart’s house. Before arriving in position he ascertained the impossibility of successfully storming the enemy’s position, and ordered me to continue the retreat with the Twentieth Regiment while he returned and brought the remainder of the command. He parted from us and marched the regiment all that night through a pathless, unexplored mountain, with no guide but the stars and no path by the general direction of the running streams, and arrived in Beverly at daybreak.

  Continuing our march, we overtook Colonel Scott at Huttonsville about 9 o’clock in the morning, and continued the retreat over Cheat Mountain to the Greenbrier River, where we arrived at daybreak on the morning of the 14th. There we were received by Governor Letcher. Soon Colonel Johnson, with a Georgia regiment, arrived. The retreat {p.261} of the whole command under Colonel Johnson was resumed to Monterey, where General Jackson, of Georgia, assumed the command, and where a halt was made until the remainder of General Garnett’s army arrived.

  NAT. TYLER.

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  No. 22.

  Report of Mr. Ted. Hotchkiss, Topographical Engineer, Confederate service, of events from July 2 to 14.

  CHURCHVILLE, AUGUSTA COUNTY, VA., January 18, 1862.

  I was appointed engineer at Camp Garnett, Rich Mountain, Randolph County, Virginia, by you, as commander of the post, on Tuesday, July 2, 1861, and on Wednesday morning, the 3d, I commenced my duties by initiating a survey of the camp and its vicinity, preparatory to the construction of an accurate topographical map of the locality; and by the aid of parties detailed for the purpose I had nearly completed the necessary triangulations and measurements for the purpose indicated, and had also by barometrical observations ascertained the height of the points occupied by our forces, and had made considerable, progress in the drawing of the map of the camp and vicinity, when (the enemy having made their appearance before our lines on the evening of July 9), by your order I spent a portion of the 10th in the breastworks on the hill to the left of your position, and the whole of the 11th, during which day the battle of Rich Mountain was fought and lost. I remained at the breastworks until midnight of that day, the enemy having occupied the parallel ridge in front of us during the day.

  At midnight, by your order, I came down from the hill in company with the Augusta Lee Rifles, Capt. R. D. Lilley, of your regiment, and followed by the companies of Captains Moorman, Kiracofe, Smith, Hall, and Mullins, and marched with them to the turnpike between the center and right of our position, and was there informed by you that Lieutenant-Colonel Pegram, who had assumed the command on the morning of July 8-he having been ordered by General Garnett to report to you with his regiment, and then he claimed the command of the post as being of the same rank in the Confederate service that you were in the State, and therefore ranking you-had been injured by a fall from his horse on the 11th and had resigned the command to you, again ordering you to march to Laurel Hill, to General Garnett, through the forest on the right of our position. You directed me to lead the front of the Column over the hill on the right through the breastworks there, and so on towards the top of Rich Mountain. All the forces left at Camp Garnett were at that time formed in the road. As before said, I was directed to proceed at once, as the enemy was closing down upon our lines in overwhelming numbers, and you told me that you would bring up the rear. I then proceeded to the head of the column, occupied by Captain Lilley’s company, and the command to move forward having been passed, was proceeding up the road, intending to reach the top of the hill [by] its easy winding grade, and had proceeded some little distance, when you overtook me and informed me that the enemy occupied the turn of the road on the hill, and that we must go up along the hill and go over by the way of the breastworks on the right.

  The column was then countermarched in single file, and the counter-sign, “Indian,” said to be the countersign of the enemy for the night, {p.262} was communicated to the men, and then I started up the hill, accompanied by Major Reger, of your regiment, and Major Stewart and Colonel Wilson, who happened to be at our camp. When at the top of the hill, which is very steep and rough, we halted for the column to close up, and then struck into the forest. The rain pouring down in torrent’s and the night being very dark, the line of march could hardly be kept but by a constant effort on the part of the men to keep almost in contact with each other, and our line was often broken by the fallen trees, dense thickets, and precipices that we encountered. By the advice of Majors Reger and Stewart we took a course bearing to the left, but I soon found that that was bringing us too near the waters of Roaring Creek and the adjacent laurel swamps, as well as too near the position occupied by the camp of the enemy; therefore I protested against going farther in that direction, and was seconded in my views by Captain Lilley and others that were near; and as I had reconnoitered the ground on July 6, they yielded to my opinion and my guidance from that time. We then pushed on, bearing gradually to the right, that we might reach the gap to the north of Hart’s, suffering much from the cold, as we were all drenched, and many of us had not eaten since morning. We did not halt much, and one time, shortly after leaving the camp, a low whistle on our right arrested our attention, and most of the line halted. I replied to the whistle and passed the order quietly to press on, and I have since learned from a prisoner taken from the enemy that a whole regiment was drawn up parallel to our line of march, and was only kept from firing upon us by the reply to their signal and our continued moving.

  Daylight found us two-thirds of the way to the top of the mountain, and then and there, to our great surprise and regret, we found that, instead of the whole command, I was only followed by a portion of Captain Lilley’s company and some few others-some fifty men. We were sorely disappointed; but as there was no alternative for safety but rapid flight, as we were certain that the enemy would speedily occupy all the roads by which we could escape, therefore I urged upon the men the necessity for a prompt obedience of orders in marching forward, and they responded with cheerfulness and alacrity, and we pushed rapidly forward and across the summit of the mountain at sunrise through a notch, and following down a ravine we struck the Merritt road, much cut up by the passage of the Churchville cavalry and most of Lieutenant-Colonel Pegram’s regiment, which had passed over it the evening before, under the command of Maj. Nat. Tyler. We reached this road at about 8 a. m. of the 12th. Following down that road, we obtained a few mouthfuls of food at a house just on the edge of the valley, where Major Tyler and men had spent part of the night. Then we took across the fields and reached Beverly at about 11 a. m., where we found the people helping themselves to the abandoned commissary stores, and we were informed by Captain Stofer, who was seated on the porch of the hotel, that the enemy was expected every moment, and that our forces, under Colonel Scott had gone to Huttonsville. We then helped ourselves to a supply of crackers, &c., from the stores and proceeded towards Huttonsville. Finding a large quantity of tents, blankets, socks, &c., abandoned by the roadside, just across Files Creek, we took each one a supply of these needful articles, and had started on when we met a team going to Beverly, which we impressed and sent back and loaded up, and then went on towards Huttonsville. Overtaking stragglers from various companies by the way, and it being rumored that the enemy was in rapid pursuit of us, we had our men fire off their guns and reload them, each one having held on to his gun, and then made all fall into {p.263} ranks and so march in order, and having overtaken a wagon loaded with provisions, we kept it along and guarded it. Reaching Huttonsville at about 3 p. m., where we confidently expected to find Colonel Scott, we found the bridge just falling down from its conflagration by his order, and were told that he had gone to Stipe’s.

  We had already marched some, twenty-two miles, but we went on to Stipe’s and there found that he had gone, it was said, to the foot of Cheat Mountain; still pursuing, we reached the foot of Cheat Mountain, eight miles farther, and there, after eating a scanty supper, we disposed of ourselves upon the bluff commanding the road up the mountain and its approaches, and there spent the night, resting on our arms for fugitives had reported that 1,200 of the enemy’s cavalry was in close pursuit; but we decided that an encounter from an ambuscade was preferable to a farther retreat in our exhausted condition, having spent a whole day and half the night on our feet in the breastworks, and then retreated thirty miles through dense thickets, over fallen timber and ledges of rocks, through water-courses and along muddy roads; but every man had his arms and ammunition and was ready for an encounter.

  On the morning of the 13th we proceeded to the top of Cheat Mountain, at White’s, and there found the Churchville and Bath cavalry companies and portions of many other companies collected there after the retreat. All agreed that we would stay there and keep back the enemy, and I was selected as a committee of one by those on the top of the mountain to see Governor Letcher, who we had learned was at Greenbrier River, and get his consent to let us remain there.

  Dr. O. Butcher, of Huttonsville, took me down in his sulky, and I had an interview with the governor, whom I found at Yeager’s, where the regiment of Colonel Scott had encamped and Lieutenant-Colonel Pegram’s regiment, under the command of Major Tyler, and where the regiment of Colonel Johnson (the Twelfth Georgia) came up.

  The governor consented to our staying, and we had started back a short distance when a messenger came up and ordered all the men down, and we came down and proceeded up the Alleghany Mountains. That night slept a few hours on the summit, at Yearger’s, and then went on Sunday to Monterey, where we encamped. Major Reger procured a horse and left us at Beverly and went on to Yearger’s, and got his family and sent them on to Staunton, and then joined us at Monterey on the 14th.

  By your order I did not go to my tent on the night of the retreat, and therefore lost all my instruments, notes, maps, and baggage; therefore I am unable to report to you an accurate map of Camp Garnett; but I accompany this report with a map drawn from memory of the Camp and surrounding country, showing the route of the enemy, and also the route of our retreat as far as Beverly.*

  After we had been some days in Monterey we were informed that shortly after we left Camp Garnett Lieutenant-Colonel Pegram resumed the command of the forces and sent some one of his staff forward to halt the column, and that owing to the darkness and steepness of the hill he, was unable to reach the head of the column, and therefore he interposed himself and a musket into the midst of Captain Lilley’s company and so divided it. Private Brownlee Bell, who was at the head Of the forces cut off, gave us this information.

  As imputations have been cast upon you in reference to the management of the army, &c., at Rich Mountain, on the retreat., &c., I may be permitted, from the opportunity I had of knowing all the facts and circumstances {p.264} of your situation, to state that to my personal knowledge you sent one that came to you with information in reference to the designs or operation of the enemy in turning our left flank to communicate the same to Lieutenant-Colonel Pegram the day before the battle, and I heard you offer to communicate to him all the information you had in reference to the camp and its surroundings, referring him to me in person as having a partially-prepared map of it, and he did not avail himself but to a very limited extent of the large fund of information you had with diligence collected in reference to your position and the movements of the enemy. Being ordered by General Garnett, as he himself said, to report himself and command to you, he at once arrogantly demanded the command of the post because of his superiority in rank before asking for it or you had refused to give it to him; and after you had expressed a willingness to give it up to him if you could be assured that such was the desire of General Garnett, and afterwards by his arbitrary and selfish direction of affairs, in the opinion of many concerned and engaged, brought about the disasters that attended and followed the battle of Rich Mountain, and led to the surrender of 600 brave men to the enemy.

  My report has been delayed by pressing engagements in the army and sickness to this late day.

  Most respectfully submitted.

  JED. HOTCHKISS, Topographical Engineer at Camp Garnett.

  Lieut. Col. J. M. HECK, Commanding Post.

  –––

  No. 23.

  Report of Lieut. Col. John Pegram, C. S. Army, of the engagement at Rich Mountain and the surrender of his forces.

  BEVERY, VA. 7 July 14, 1861.

  Not knowing where a communication will find General Garnett, I have the honor to submit the following report of the fight at Rich Mountain, which occurred on the 11th instant:

  The battle-field was immediately around the house of one Hart, situated at the highest point of the turnpike over the mountain and two miles in rear of my main line of trenches, the latter being at the foot of the western slope of the mountain.

  The intricacies of the surrounding country seemed scarcely to demand the placing of any force at Hart’s, yet I had that morning placed Captain De Lagnel, of the Confederate artillery, with five companies of infantry and one piece of artillery, numbering in all about three hundred and ten men, with instructions to defend it to the last extremity against whatever force might be brought to the attack by the enemy, but also to give me timely notice of his need for re-enforcements. These orders had not been given two hours before General Rosecrans, who had been conducted up a distant ridge on my left flank and then along the top of the mountain by a man, attacked the small handful of troops under Captain De Lagnel with three thousand men. When from my camp I heard the firing becoming very rapid, without waiting to hear from Captain De Lagnel, I ordered up re-enforcements, and hurried on myself to the scene of action. When I arrived the piece of artillery was entirely unmanned, Captain De Lagnel having been severely wounded, after which his men had left their piece. The limber and {p.265} caisson were no longer visible, the horses having run away with them down the mountain, in doing which they met and upset the second piece of artillery, which had been ordered up to their assistance. Seeing the infantry deserting the slight breastworks hastily thrown up that morning by Captain De Lagnel, I used all personal exertions to make them stand to their work until even I saw that the place was hopelessly lost. The last companies which left their posts were the Rockingham Lee Guard, commanded by Capt. Carter H. Irving, and the Powhatan Rifles, commanded by Capt. William Al. Skipwith. On my way back to my camp I found the re-enforcing force under command of Captain Anderson, of the artillery, in the greatest confusion, they having fired upon their retreating comrades. I hurried on to camp and ordered the remaining companies of my own regiment in camp to join them. This left my right front and right flank entirely unmanned. I then went back up the mountain, where I found the whole force, composed of five companies of the Twentieth and one company of Colonel Heck’s regiment, drawn up in line in ambuscade near the road, under command of Maj. Nat. Tyler, of the Twentieth Regiment. I called their attention and said a few encouraging words to the men, asking them if they would follow their officers to the attack, to which they responded by a cheer. I was here interrupted by Captain Anderson, who said to me, “Colonel Pegram, these men are completely demoralized, and will need you to lead them.” I took my place at the head of the column, which I marched in single file through laurel thickets and other almost impassable brushwood up a ridge to the top of the mountain.

  This placed me about one-fourth of a mile on the right flank of the enemy, and which was exactly the point I had been making for. I had just gotten all the men up together and was about making my dispositions for the attack when Major Tyler came up and reported that during the march up the ridge one of the men in his fright had turned around and shot the first sergeant of one of the rear companies, which had caused nearly the whole of the company to run to the rear. He then said that the men were so intensely demoralized, that he considered it madness to attempt to do anything with them by leading them on to the attack. A mere glance at the frightened countenances around me convinced me that this distressing news was but too true, and it was confirmed by the opinion of the three or four company commanders around me. They all agreed with me that there was nothing left to do but to send the command under Major Tyler to effect a junction with either General Garnett at Laurel Hill or Col. William C. Scott, who was supposed to be with his regiment near Beverly. It was now 6 1/2 o’clock p. m., when I retraced my steps with much difficulty back to camp losing myself frequently on the way, and arriving there at 11 1/4 o’clock.

  I immediately assembled a council of war, composed of the field officers and company commanders remaining, when it was unanimously agreed that, after spiking the two remaining pieces of artillery, we should attempt to join General Garnett by a march through the mountains to our right. This act was imperative, not only from our reduced numbers, now being about six hundred and our being placed between two large attacking armies, but also because at least three-fourths of my command had no rations left; the other one fourth not having flour enough left for one meal. Having left directions for Sergeant Walke, and given directions to Assistant Surgeon Taylor to take charge of the sick and wounded in camp and to show a white flag at daylight, I then called the companies, G and H, of Twentieth Regiment, with which and {p.266} seven companies of Colonel Heck’s regiment I started at 1 o’clock a. m., and without a guide, to make, my way, if possible, over the mountains, where there was not the sign of a path, towards General Garnett’s camp.

  As I remained in camp to see the last company in column, by the time I reached the head of the column, which was nearly one mile long, Captain Silly’s [Lilley’s] company, of Colonel Heck’s regiment, had disappeared and has not been since heard from. The difficulties attending my march with the remaining eight companies it would be impossible for me to exaggerate. We arrived at Tygart’s Valley River at 7 o’clock p. m., having made the distance of about twelve miles in eighteen hours. Here we were met by several country people, who appeared to be our friends, and who informed us that at Leadsville Church, distant three miles, and situated on the Beverly and Laurel Hill turnpike, there was a small camp, composed of a portion of General Garnett’s command. Leaving Colonel Heck with instructions to bring the command forward rapidly, I hired a horse and proceeded forward until within sight of Leadsville Church, when I stopped at a farm house, where were assembled a dozen men and women. They informed me that General Garnett had retreated that afternoon up the Leading Creek road, in Tucker County, and that he was being pursued by three thousand of the enemy, who had come from the direction of Laurel Hill as far as Leadsville Church, when they turned up the Leading Creek road in pursuit.

  This of course rendered all chance of joining General Garnett, or of escape in that direction, utterly impossible. Hurrying back to my command 11 found them in much confusion, firing random shots in the dark, under the impression that the enemy was surrounding them. Reforming them, I hurried back to the point where we first struck the river, and persuaded a few of the country people to cook all the provisions they had, hoping it might go a little way toward satisfying the hunger of my almost famishing men.

  I now found, on examining the men of the house, there was, if any, only one possible means of escape, and that was by a road which, passing within three miles of the enemy’s camp at Beverly, led over precipitous mountains into Pendleton County. Along this road there were represented to me to be but a few miserable habitations, where it would be utterly impossible for even one company of my men to get food, and as it was now 11 o’clock p. m. it would be necessary to leave at once, without allowing them to get a mouthful where they were. I now called a council of war, composed like the one of the preceding night, when it was agreed, almost unanimously (only two members voting in the negative), there was left to us nothing but the sad determination of surrendering ourselves prisoners of war to the enemy at Beverly. The two members who voted in the negative, whilst they did so, stated that they considered our chances of escape very slim, to which I replied that if I thought them as good as slim I should certainly not entertain the idea of surrendering for one moment, and that I was perfectly convinced that an attempt on our part to escape would sacrifice by starvation a large number of the lives of the command. I now dispatched a messenger to Beverly, which was distant some six miles, with a note of which the following is the substance:

  HEADQUARTERS AT MR. KETTLE’S FARM HOUSE, July 12, 1861.

  To the COMMANDING OFFICER OF THE NORTHERN FORCES, Beverly, Va.:

  SIR: Owing to the reduced and almost famished condition of the force now here under my command, I am compelled to offer to surrender them to you as prisoners of {p.267} war. I have only to ask that they receive at your hands such treatment as Northern prisoners have invariably received from the South.

  I am, sir, your obedient servant,

  JOHN PEGRAM, Lieutenant-Colonel, P. A. C. S., Commanding.

  Between 7 and 8 o’clock next morning two officers of General McClellan’s staff arrived with his reply, of which the following is an exact copy

  HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF OHIO, Beverly, Va., July 13, 1861.

  JOHN PEGRAM, Esq., Styling himself Lieutenant-Colonel, P. A. C. S.:

  SIR: Your communication, dated yesterday, proposing to surrender as prisoners of war the force assembled under your command, has been delivered to me. As commander of this department I will receive you, your officers and men, as prisoners, and I will treat you and them with the kindness due to prisoners of war, but it is not in my power to relieve you or them from any disabilities incurred by taking arms against the United States.

  I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

  GEO. B. MCCLELLAN, Major-General, U. S. Army, Commanding Department.

  I replied to Major Williams, U. S. Army, the bearer of this letter, who told me that General McClellan had with him at Beverly a force of three thousand men, that I was in no condition to dictate terms, and was obliged to accept those of his general. I then formed the companies, and found that one officer and about forty men had left during the night. I now found my force to be twenty-two officers and three hundred and fifty-nine men of Colonel Heck’s regiment, and eight officers and one hundred and sixty-six men of my own (the Twentieth) regiment. With these I marched towards Beverly. On the way we were met by wagons containing hard bread for my men. On arriving at Beverly we stacked arms. Our men were at once put into comfortable quarters, under charge of a guard, and rations issued to them. The officers are on their parole, with the liberties of the town. I deem it my duty to return my thanks and the thanks of the officers here with me to General McClellan for the kind treatment our men have received from his troops.

  I have now to bring to your attention the gallantry of our troops at Hart’s. This is shown by the mere statement that they held their position for three hours in the face of a force ten times their own number, and did not retire until they had lost in killed and wounded nearly one third of their number. Having been confined to a bed of illness ever since my arrival here, I have been unable to find out our exact loss in killed and wounded, but from what I can gather it is as follows : Killed, Capt. William Al. Skipwith and Second Lieutenant Boyd, Twentieth Virginia Volunteers, and between 40 and 45 men, names not known. Wounded, Capt. C. H. Irving, Twentieth Virginia Volunteers, severely; Captains Curry and Higginbotham, Colonel Heck’s regiment, and Second Lieut. J. S. Dorset, Twentieth Virginia Volunteers, slightly; and about 20 men. Missing, Captain De Lagnel, C. S. Army, known to be badly wounded.

  I, of coarse, lost all my baggage and camp equipage. I now wish to add that had I known the number of the enemy, and their means of getting to my rear, which all of my so-called reliable woodsmen informed me was impossible, I would have retreated on the night before, cutting down trees on both sides of the mountain, thus giving time to General Garnett to retreat by the way of Beverly and Huttonsville.

  The loss of the enemy was not less than thirty killed and forty wounded.

  When all so distinguished themselves by their gallantry it would be invidious to particularize, so I will only give a list of the companies engaged under the gallant De Lagnel: Company B, Twentieth Regiment, {p.268} Lieutenant Williams commanding; Company D, Twentieth Regiment, Captain Skipwith and Lieutenant Dorset; et: Company E, Twentieth Regiment, Captain Irving; Company B, Colonel Heck’s regiment, Captain Curry; Company A, Colonel Heck’s regiment, Captain Higginbotham, besides a detachment of twenty-one men from the two regiments under Lieutenant Boyd, Twentieth Regiment Virginia Volunteers.

  Of the officers with the companies sent to re-enforce Captain De Lagnel I particularly observed Lieutenant Brander’s conduct in his efforts to rush his men on to their duty.

  BEVERLY, VA., July 15, 1861.

  I find on examination that I have failed to mention my whole force at Rich Mountain on the 11th instant. It was about thirteen hundred men, of whom certainly not more than three hundred and fifty at the utmost were engaged in the battle at Hart’s house. As I placed them there myself, I am positive on this point. The whole force opposed to me was nearly ten thousand; their force engaged at Hart’s, as before mentioned, three thousand.

  I have also failed to mention that very early on the morning of the 11th I made two most urgent appeals to the chief commissary stationed there for three days’ rations of hard bread and bacon.

  I have now only to give you a list of all the officers who are prisoners here, and to urgently request you will have our exchange effected at the earliest possible day, as it is and always will be our most ardent wish to shed the last drop of our blood in the defense of our noble cause.

  Lieut. Cols. John Pegram, Provisional Army C. S., and J. Al. Heck, Virginia Volunteers; Capts. J. B. Moorman and H. Hall, of Colonel Heck’s, regiment; Capts. J. All. P. Atkinson and John C. Coleman, Twentieth Virginia Volunteers; Capts. George H. Smith and J. H. Everly, Colonel Heck’s regiment; First Lieut. John Clark, First Lieut. A. F. Rice, and Third Lieut. T. M. McCorkle, Twentieth Virginia Volunteers; Second Lieut. Miles Harold, First Lieut. Al. W. Gamble, Second Lieut. G. S. Harness, Third Lieut. P. D. Turley, and First Lieut. John. F. Cowan, Colonel Heck’s regiment; First Lieut. A. R. H. Ransom, Provisional Army C. S.; Third Lieut. William H. Headspeth Twentieth Virginia Volunteers, First Lieut. George Bean, First Lieut. William J. Hopkins, Second Lieut. James W. Kee, Third Lieut. Granville J. Dyer, First Lieut J. C. Calhoun, First Lieut. P. Al. Terrill, Second Lieut. James P. Payne, and Second Lieut. A. G. McGriffin, Colonel Heck’s regiment; Second Lieut. John S. Dorset, Twentieth Virginia Volunteers; First. Lieut. J. S. Bowman, Second Lieut. J. K. Kiser, and Third Lieut. William E. Plecker, Colonel Heck’s regiment.

  Killed, two officers and between forty and forty-five men; wounded, five officers and about twenty men.

  I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

  JNO. PEGRAM, Lieutenant-Colonel, P. A. C. S.

  To the ADJUTANT-GENERAL OF THE FORCES, Richmond, Va.

  –––

  No. 24.

  Report of Capt. Pierce B. Anderson, Lee Battery, C. S. Army, of the engagement at Rich Mountain.

  CAMP ALLEGHANY, August 10, 1861.

  GENERAL: The reports made by Lieutenants Statham, Massey, and Raine of the parts borne by each of their detachments of the Lee {p.269} Battery, at Camp Garnett, near Rich Mountain, Va., on the 11th of July last, are herewith inclosed.

  The report of Lieutenant Raine shows that the movements of the enemy to attack us on the flank or in the rear were observed on the night of the 10th. Early on the morning of the 11th the observations of the night previous were confirmed by information from a wounded trooper of the enemy, who was captured. Communicating with Colonel Pegram early on the morning of the 11th, I received from him an order to take a gun that was stationed on an eminence on our left flank and locate it suitably on the turnpike road at Rich Mountain, about one mile and a half in the rear of Camp Garnett. Capt. J. A. De Lagnel, by orders of Colonel Pegram, took charge of this gun. I returned to the position of a gun one mile down the road toward the camp. Between 1 and 2 o’clock the first gun was fired by the gun on the hill. When I had planted that gun I asked Colonel Pegram if he would not have another gun there, to which he replied, “No; Captain De Lagnel will send to you for a gun when he needs one.” Between 4 and 5 o’clock I received a message from Captain De Lagnel that he needed a gun. Immediately I moved rapidly with the gun to his assistance, ordering Lieutenant Raine to bring on the caisson. Within a short distance of the scene of action one of the wheel-horses was killed and the other wounded. After this, meeting our retreating forces, I formed them in line and took position on the upper side of the road, in order to check the advance of the enemy. After being thus formed Colonel Pegram came up and proposed a night attack upon the enemy on the hill. In attempting to execute this movement Colonel Pegram advanced some distance beyond the position of the enemy on the hill. As we proceeded, finding that we had lost our way, I stopped with Lieutenant Raine and some others.

  It was now raining freely; the night was dark; the trail was zigzag through thick clustering bushes, over large, logs, and often steep and slippery. After resting a few hours I pursued the trail, and shortly overtook two companies of the column, from whose captains (Bruce and Jones) I learned that Colonel Pegram had returned to camp after directing Major Tyler to take the men on to Beverly. Being now about eight miles through the hills from General Garnett’s camp at Laurel Hill, I determined to attempt to communicate with him, for the purpose of obtaining such assistance as he could afford us, while we might attempt to unite our forces with his.

  Taking Lieutenant Raine and three of my men I moved rapidly towards his camp. Striking the turnpike road near his camp, I perceived by the desertion of the picket-houses and the felling of trees across the road that his camp was evacuated. Surrounded by foraging parties of the enemy, who were moving about in different directions, I was compelled to remain in the mountains of Cheat for several days and nights before I could come out safely. At length I succeeded in doing so. During this time Lieutenant Raine and my three men, each armed with a musket, suffered much from fatigue, hunger, and thirst, but they were prompt and fearless in the discharge of duty.

  I cannot close this report without referring to the conduct of the officers, and soldiers of the Lee Battery, who were engaged either in the conflict at Rich Mountain or on duty during the several days preceding the action Of the 11th and on that day. They were surrounded by an overwhelming force. The guns of the battery were widely separated, from one-half to two miles apart. The conduct of Lieut. J. R. Massey and the men under him, in defense of their position against a large {p.270} force on their left, and their retaining it during the night of the 11th until all hope had vanished of further successful resistance, is worthy of all praise. Lieut. C. I. Raine bore himself on all occasions with calmness, prudence, and courage. Lieut. C. W. Statham attested in the bloody fight on the hill at Rich Mountain that he did his duty truly and faithfully. He was wounded severely in his right hand. Of Capt. J. A. De Lagnel no words can express all that should be felt or known about his conduct on that day. After nearly all his cannoneers were either killed or wounded, he continued to load his gun until in the very act of bringing a cartridge from the limber-box to the gun (having then only two men at the gun) he was struck by a minie ball and fell. Fortunately, however, he escaped capture. The soldiers of the Lee Battery, noncommissioned officers and officers, have done their duty faithfully during this conflict.

  The total loss of my men and officers was two killed and ten wounded-two commissioned officers, two non-commissioned officers, and eight privates. Of the twenty-one in the detachment at Rich Mountain a majority were either killed or wounded. The number of prisoners captured by the enemy of my men was eighteen, the most of them severely wounded. The enemy’s loss in killed and wounded is believed to have been more than three hundred. The loss of our own forces, including the infantry, cavalry, and artillery, is believed to be in killed and wounded seventy.

  Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

  PIERCE B. ANDERSON, Captain Lee Battery, P. A. C. S.

  General S. COOPER, Adjutant-General, C. S. Army.

  –––

  No. 25.

  Report of First Lieut. Charles W. Statham, Lee Battery, C. S. Army, of the engagement at Rich Mountain.

  RICH MOUNTAIN PASS, July 13, 1861.

  SIR: I have to report that on the 11th instant, by your order, I moved with one gun and a detachment of twenty-one men to occupy this pass in Rich Mountain. We took our position about 1 o’clock p. m. In less than two hours the enemy made their appearance in large column, six regiments strong, immediately on the hill south of the pass. We reversed our gun, which was pointed down the pass, and prepared to receive the enemy in the direction in which he was approaching. In a few minutes the sharpshooters of the enemy commenced a fire upon us from behind trees and rocks at a distance ranging from two to three hundred yards, the body of the enemy being still farther. We opened upon the main body with spherical shot, which I cut at first one second and a quarter, and could distinctly see them burst in their midst. I knew we did good execution, as I could distinctly hear their officers give vehement commands to close up ranks. After firing this way some I little time at the rate of near four shots per minute we forced the enemy to retire.

  In about twenty minutes the enemy reappeared in a column of three regiments, advanced briskly upon us, when we moved our gun a little higher up the opposite hill and again opened upon them, and with our spherical shot cut as low as one second down to three-quarters. After {p.271} firing rapidly for some time the enemy again beat a hasty retreat, when my men, including the infantry not yet in action, rent the air with their shouts, confidently believing that we had gained the day. But in a short time the enemy again formed and renewed the attack with more swiftness than before, and soon played havoc with our horses. These, with the caisson, ran down the mountain with drivers and all, leaving us with only the small amount of ammunition in our limber-box. We then limbered and moved our gun near a small log stable, behind which we placed our horses for protection. By this time our, men were falling fast. Sergeant Turner, of the gun, had both legs broken and shot through the body; I. I. Mays had his left arm splintered with a musket ball; Isaiah Ryder shot through the head, and died instantly; John A. Taylor had his thigh broken; E. H. Kersey, shot in the ankle; Lewis Going, wounded in the arm; William W. Stewart, badly wounded in the bead and breast. This left me but few to man the gun. Captain De Lagnel, who was the commander of the post, having his horse shot under him and seeing our crippled condition, gallantly came and volunteered his valuable aid, and helped load and fire three or four times, when he was shot in the side, and, I think, in the hand. He then ordered us to make our escape, if we could, but the enemy was too close, and his fire too severe, to admit of safe retreat to many of us. I was shot through the right hand, and am now a prisoner, with the following of my men: Warren Currin, B. H. Davidson, James B. Creasey, William H. Broyles, and R. W. Walker. The rest of my command made their escape. I suppose we killed and wounded of the enemy some three hundred or more.

  I take great pleasure in saying that my command in this fight, both those with guns and those in the artillery, acted heroically, and deserve the highest commendation. Private W. H. Broyles was the last to leave the gun, and pricked the last cartridge that we fired.

  I have the honor to be, your obedient servant,

  CHAS. W. STATHAM, First Lieutenant Lee Battery.

  Capt. P. B. ANDERSON, Lee Battery, P. A. C. S.

  –––

  No. 26.

  Report of Lieut John R. Massey, Lee Battery, C. S. Army, of the engagement at Rich Mountain.

  CAMP ALLEGHANY, Pocahontas County, Va., August 8, 1861.

  SIR: On the morning of the 11th of July, 1861, I was stationed, with one gun and detachment under my command, in a gorge on the left of the front breastworks at Camp Garnett, near the Rich Mountain, in the County of Randolph, Va.

  On the morning of the 11th of July you notified me to hold myself in readiness for prompt action. Between 10 and 11 o’clock a. m. I was informed by Colonel Heck that it was your order that my gun should be moved to the top of the Stonecoal Hill, which was on the extreme left of the camp in front. I moved to that position thereafter. Discovering a number of the enemy’s cavalry on top of Rich Mountain, opposite Hart’s house, about one and a half miles in the rear of our breast. Works, I requested Colonel Reek to inform Colonel Pegram.

  {p.272}

  About 12 1/2 o’clock the firing of a gun at Hart’s Hill, on Rich Mountain, commenced. After the fire of that gun had continued for some time forty or fifty of the enemy’s infantry appeared on the turnpike road in front of our breastworks. I commenced firing on them as they retired. The fire on the Rich Mountain continued for some time-between two and three hours. Shortly after its cessation the enemy commenced chopping and working with picks on the ascent of the hill called the Sugar Hill, on my left. While this was going on we heard the noise of gun-carriages ascending the hill. The day had been cloudy and rainy. The appearance of the sun about thirty minutes discovered to me a large body of the enemy’s infantry marching along the side of Sugar Hill next to me. The sun was now about an hour high. I commenced firing upon them. The enemy were evidently thrown into confusion and retired.

  The loss of the enemy, I have been informed, in killed and wounded, was twenty-seven. In my detachment there were none killed or wounded. The men under my command, non-commissioned officers and privates, all performed their duty promptly and efficiently.

  Remaining at my position, between 2 and, 3 o’clock a. m. July 12 I was ordered to spike my gun and retreat. The companies supporting my gun all retired from the hill. At length a man came up the hill and spiked the gun, being ordered to do so, as he said, by Colonel Pegram. I then returned to the camp, and found the companies in camp forming to retreat. Captain Anderson and Lieutenant Raine had gone with Colonel Pegram and a portion of his command to make a night attack upon the enemy, and had not returned. Lieutenant Statham had been wounded at Rich Mountain, and was a prisoner. The command of the company devolving upon me, I ordered the musketeers to get their guns. I marched them and the cannoneers down into the road, and finally effected our retreat with the loss of the prisoners taken at Rich Mountain and a few others, in all amounting to eighteen men.

  Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

  JOHN R. MASSEY, Second Lieutenant, Lee Battery, P. A. C. S.

  Capt. P. B. ANDERSON, Commanding Lee Battery, P. A. C. S.

  –––

  No. 27.

  Report of Lieut. Charles I. Raine, Lee Battery, C. S. Army, of the engagement at Rich Mountain.

  CAMP ALLEGHANY, August 8, 1861.

  SIR: On the night of the 10th of July, 1861, I was stationed with a gun and detachment of the Lee Battery on the extreme right, in front of Camp Garnett. In the forepart of the night of the 10th you brought to the support of my gun about thirty of your musketeers. Immediately after dusk chopping of axes commenced on the creek leading from the gorge near which I was stationed. At the same time chopping was distinctly heard on the mountain to the left of Camp Garnett. This chopping in both directions continued the whole night. On the night of the 10th, about 12 o’clock, you called my attention, awaking me, to the sound of the enemy’s bugle. In about one half hour we heard the roll of their drum, and shortly thereafter another sound of their bugle. We then saw on the ridges lights as if in motion. You concluded that {p.273} the enemy were, moving, and ordered me, to report the fact to Colonel Pegram. I did so. This was about 1.30 o’clock a. m. Thursday, the 11th. Colonel Pegram sent Adjutant Ransom to you. I remained up with you watching the movements of the enemy till morning, when you returned to camp.

  About 9 o’clock a. m. of the 11th, as you passed with a gun to Hart’s house, on Rich Mountain, you ordered me to change the position of my gun, so as to rake the road and the ravines coming down into camp from near Hart’s house. About 1.30 o’clock, p. m. the fire of Lieutenant Statham’s gun was heard. In about two hours or more you received a message from Captain De Lagnel. You immediately took the gun forward, and ordered me to bring up the caisson with ammunition. The gun and cannoneers moved at a rapid rate. Proceeding on quickly to the turn of the road I met our forces retreating. I was then informed that before the gun reached the top of the hill one of the wheel-horses of the gun-carriage had been killed and another wounded; that the tongue of the gun-carriage had been broken off; that one of the drivers had been thrown, and the gun-carriage thrown down by the side of the hill. This occurred as reported to me. The enemy were in possession of the hill. I turned the caisson around in the road and brought it back. Proceeding a short distance back I found our retreating forces had been halted by you, and that you were urging them to go and retake the guns which had been lost. You immediately rallied the companies on the side of the hill, awaiting the advance of the enemy upon the retiring forces. While in this position Colonel Pegram came up and proposed a night attack upon the enemy. We advanced under Colonel Pegram and yourself toward Hart’s Hill, taking a route through the woods. The gun under my charge was left in the road, as hereinbefore stated. The caisson was sent back by me to the camp. The men under my command did their duty faithfully and promptly.

  Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

  CHAS. I. RAINE, Second Lieutenant, Lee Battery, P. A. C. S.

  Capt. P. B. ANDERSON, Commanding Lee Battery, P. A. C. S.

  –––

  No. 28.

  Report of Col. William C. Scott, Forty-fourth Virginia Infantry, of operations on the day of the engagement at Rich Mountain.*

  * Without date, but indorsed received A. and I. G. O. April 16, 1862.

  GENERAL: Being informed by General Lee, at Monterey, shortly after the fight at Rich Mountain, that a court of inquiry would be held in relation to that fight and the evacuation of Colonel Pegram’s camp at Rich Mountain and General Garnett’s camp at Laurel Hill, with the incidents connected with them, and intending to present before that court, when held, evidence in relation to my own movements on the day of the fight, I have hitherto omitted to make any report on the subject; but presumably from information derived from some members of the War Department and the length of time that has elapsed since the interval referred to occurred, that, the idea of holding such court has been abandoned, {p.274} and anxious that Colonel Pegram’s letters and General Garnett’s orders under which I acted shall be preserved, I now beg leave to supply the omission.

  In obedience to orders to proceed with my regiment to Laurel Hill, I left Richmond on the night of the 1st of July last, and after receiving two orders from General Garnett on my route, to hurry on as rapidly as possible, and after marching my men seven days in succession from Staunton, I encamped with my regiment at Beverly, the county seat of Randolph County, on the night of Wednesday, the 10th of the same month; and it is necessary that you should understand the localities of Beverly, Camp Garnett (Colonel Pegram’s camp), and Laurel Hill, with their surroundings, before you can fully understand and appreciate the remainder of my report. I will here insert a copy of a diagram drawn by General Garnett’s own hand, as I am informed by Colonel Corley, who then acted as his aid, and sent to me with order No. 5, hereinafter inserted. I have only taken the liberty of writing on it my own position during the greater part of the fight at Rich Mountain and the position of Huttonsville and Leadsville Church.

  Colonel Pegram’s camp, called Camp Garnett, was on the western slope of Rich Mountain, and his fortifications faced west in the direction of Buckhannon. It is sixteen miles from Beverly to Laurel Hill and eight miles from Beverly to Colonel Pegram’s camp, as I have been in formed. As you proceed from Beverly along the Buckhannon turnpike towards Colonel Pegram’s camp you will perceive a road on the right, which enters that turnpike about one, and one-half miles from Beverly. From that road, which is a county road, a path, indicated by dots, strikes off at the point B, and crossing Rich Mountain at A bends to the left and enters the turnpike again in the front or on the west of Colonel Pegram’s camp. It will be perceived in the sequel that Colonel Pegram expected a portion of the enemy’s force to be sent by that path around his right flank, and after entering the County road to get into the turnpike in his rear, one and one-half miles from Beverly; at least such was the understanding of General Garnett, who drew and sent me the fore-going diagram.

  {p.275}

  I have already stated that I spent the night of Wednesday, the 10th of July, at Beverly. Next morning early a messenger from General Garnett waited on me, informing me that it was General Garnett’s orders I should hasten to Laurel Hill, and that he was then on his way to meet Colonel Edward Johnson, who had left Staunton with his regiment on the previous Monday. Accordingly, immediately after breakfast I started on the Laurel Hill turnpike for Laurel Hill, but I had not proceeded with my regiment more than three or four miles on that turnpike before I was overtaken by a messenger, who delivered to me the following letter from Colonel Pegram.:

  HEADQUARTERS CAMP GARNETT, July 11, 1861.

  Col. Wm. C. SCOTT, Forty-fourth Virginia Volunteers:

  SIR: I think it almost certain that the enemy are working their way around my right flank, to come into this turnpike one and one-half miles this side of Beverly. I would suggest you place your regiment in position on that road, and take with you the two pieces of artillery at Leadsville Church. I have cavalry scouting between this and that road, and will re-enforce you as soon as I get information of the approach of the enemy. I shall at once write a letter to General Garnett, informing him of my opinion as to the movements of the enemy and of the request I have made of you. I need not tell you how fatal it would be to have the enemy in our rear, as it would entirely cut off our supplies.

  Very respectfully,

  JOHN PEGRAM, Lieutenant-Colonel, Commanding.

  After delivering this letter the messenger dashed on to Laurel Hill. This letter was read to most of my officers and to Mr. John N. Hughes, who resided in Beverly, with whom I had become acquainted in the late Virginia Convention, and who had expressed a determination to join my regiment. He said he was perfectly acquainted with the road on which Colonel Pegram desired me to take position. What was I to do? The exigency was pressing. If the enemy should get to Colonel Pegram’s rear and get possession of Beverly, where all our quartermaster and commissary stores, &c., were deposited, both Colonel Pegram and General Garnett would be compelled to retreat, for an army cannot live without supplies. I could not wait to send to Laurel Hill, twelve or thirteen miles distant, for orders, for, were I to do so, from the character Of Colonel Pegram’s letter I believed the enemy would get into the Buckhannon turnpike before me, for that letter says: “It is almost certain that, the enemy are working their way around my right flank to get into this turnpike one and a half miles this side of Beverly.” “Are working their way” being in the present tense, I supposed the enemy were already on their march by that route, hence I did not hesitate as to the course I should pursue. Having no writing materials, I sent Captain Shelton and Sergeant Spindle to Leadsville Church, about three or four miles in advance of me, for the two pieces of artillery spoken of in Colonel Pegram’s letter, and for the Greenbrier Troop of Cavalry, which I understood was stationed at that place. After distributing cartridges to the men I returned to Beverly, and then took the Buckhannon turnpike, which I followed until I reached the point at which the county road referred to by Colonel Pegram enters it on the right, one and a half miles from Beverly. At that point I took position with my regiment. While there Captain Shelton and Sergeant Spindle, who had been sent to Leadsville Church, brought me information that the two pieces of artillery had been removed from that place to Laurel Hill, and that the commander of the Greenbrier Cavalry refused to come, on the ground that my order was not in writing. The messenger, who had gone on to Laurel Hill with a {p.276} letter from Colonel Pegram to General Garnett, also returned, bringing me the following orders from General Garnett:

  HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT N. W. A., Camp at Laurel Hill, July 11, 1861.

  Colonel SCOTT, Commanding Regiment en route to Laurel Hill:

  COLONEL: General Garnett directs that you return to Beverly and take up the position in the Buckhannon road requested by Colonel Pegram, and defend your position to the last, if you should be attacked.

  Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

  JAMES L. CORLEY, Captain, C. S. Army, Acting Assistant Adjutant-General.

  Take some of Captain Moorman’s men with you from Leadsville Church, and inform me by a mounted express of any movement of the enemy of which you are positive.

  By order of General Garnett:

  JAMES L. CORLEY, Captain, C. S. Army.

  And for fear I should not know the point in the Buckhannon road which Colonel Pegram requested me to occupy, General Garnett sent me, with the order, the following extract from Colonel Pegram’s letter to him, viz:

  [General Garnett]

  I have reason to believe the enemy is trying to work his way to my rear by the road which comes into this turnpike, one and a half miles this side of Beverly. I have therefore suggested to Colonel Scott that he take position with his regiment on that road.

  Respectfully, &c.,

  JOHN PEGRAM, Lieutenant-Colonel, &c.

  From this extract and these orders there was no room for mistaking “the position in the Buckhannon road requested by Colonel Pegram.” It was at the junction of the county road and the Buckhannon turnpike. You will observe the stringency of these orders. They gave me no discretion. Let us analyze them:

  1. I was ordered to take position in the Buckhannon road, as requested by Colonel Pegram.

  2. I was ordered to defend my position to the last, if I should be attacked.

  3. In case there should be any movement of the enemy of which I was positive, I was not authorized to use my discretion whether or not I should leave my position to meet or counteract that movement, but I was to inform General Garnett by a mounted express, and of course wait for orders.

  There were but two contingencies on which I should have felt justified in leaving my position.

  1. If Colonel Pegram had requested me to go anywhere else, as he was the commanding officer at the fort, and was presumed to know from his pickets and scouts more of the movements of the enemy than any one, else, and as I had been placed in my position at his request, I should have abandoned it and gone anywhere else he desired on a like request, presuming that my doing so would meet with the approbation of General Garnett.

  2. The only other contingency on which I should have, felt justified in quitting my position was, if I should ascertain by any means that the enemy would not come along the county road which I was ordered to guard and along which Colonel Pegram thought it was almost certain they would come. I heard the firing on the mountain in the direction of Colonel Pegram’s camp. Indeed, it had commenced before I had received the foregoing orders. It was at first straggling, as if pickets {p.277} were engaged, as I presume was the case. After a while it became more animated, and a volley could occasionally be heard, though generally it seemed to be independent and at will. Ultimately artillery opened and was continued with great animation. I thought that the artillery was fired at Colonel Pegram’s fort and from his fort. I had no reason to believe that he had removed any of his artillery outside of his intrenchments. In short, from the firing of the artillery, I thought that the enemy had attacked his camp; but was that any reason why I should, in disobedience of General Garnett’s orders, quit my position and go to the firing? I thought not. For if the enemy were working their way around Colonel Pegram’s right flank, as he thought it almost certain they were doing, to get into his rear by the county road which I was ordered to guard, I thought it very natural they should make an attack on his camp, either a bona fide attack or a feigned attack, to attract his (Colonel Pegram’s) attention, and cover up their design of getting to his rear by the county road aforesaid. I therefore looked for the enemy by that road as eagerly after the firing commenced as I did before.

  Again, I reflected if I should leave my position, and the enemy in my absence should come along that road and go to Beverly and destroy our quartermaster and commissary stores, &c., there, or should go up the mountain and attack Colonel Pegram in his rear, and I should be arraigned before a court-martial for disobedience of orders, what defense could I make? I would say I thought a fight was going on at the camp and that my presence was necessary. But the judge-advocate would reply: Did not Colonel Pegram inform you in his letter that he was almost certain the enemy were working their way around his right flank to come into the turnpike at the point at which you were posted? Did not General Garnett order you to take position at that point and defend it to the last if you should be attacked? Did he give you any discretion whatever in regard to leaving your position? On the contrary, did he not order that if there was any movement of the enemy of which you were positive, you were to inform him of it by a mounted express, and of course wait for orders? Did not Colonel Pegram inform you in his letter he had cavalry scouting between his camp and your position, and ought you not to have known that he would have sent for you if he had wanted you? To these interrogations I could only have replied in the affirmative. I repeat, if I had left my position and the enemy had come along that way, as Colonel Pegram thought it almost certain they would do, I would have been, and would deserved to have been, cashiered for disobedience of orders.

  Again, it occurred to me, if I should go up the mountain and before getting to Colonel Pegram’s camp find men fighting in the woods-and it was nearly all woods between my position and his camp-upon which party should I direct my men to fire? There was no badge by which friends could be distinguished from enemies, and even if there had been, it Would have been of no use in the woods. I should as likely have fired on friend as foe. Should our friends have fired on me, by mistake I should have returned the fire, and thus the most disastrous consequences would have ensued. In such case both the public and a court-martial would have condemned me for disobeying orders by leaving my position. I have since ascertained I was right on this point. Our men engaged in the fight on Rich Mountain knew nothing of my position nor of my Presence in their immediate neighborhood, and many of them have since told me that had I gone up they certainly would have fired upon me. Lieutenant Statham, of Lynchburg, who commanded our piece of artillery in the fight after Captain De Lagnel was wounded, has informed {p.278} me that if I had come up the turnpike that day he would have riddled my regiment. Had I been furnished with a guide I might probably have rendered material service in that fight, but without a guide I was as likely to do as much damage to friends as foes.

  Again, I reflected, my position is occupied by me at the instance of Colonel Pegram. He has informed me in his letter that he has cavalry scouting between his camp and my position, and if he needs me elsewhere he will certainly inform me of it.

  From these considerations I did not think proper to disobey General Garnett’s orders and leave my position, unless I should get some message from Colonel Pegram that he desired me to do so. Although I constantly looked for the enemy on the county road along which it was almost certain they would come, yet I as eagerly looked for a message from Colonel Pegram by some of the cavalry, which he informed me were scouting between his camp and my position. But getting no such message or any information from the fight, and becoming impatient, I determined to send a messenger myself. I therefore ordered Mr. John N. Hughes, who volunteered for that purpose, to go to Colonel Pegram, and know from him whether or not he wished my services at any other point than the one I then occupied, and if so, to send me a guide. If not, I ordered Hughes to bring me information of whatever was going on.

  He dashed up the mountain at a rapid gallop. I awaited his return. At length I began to think it was time for him to be back. But then I recollected he would have to go more than six miles to Colonel Pegram’s camp and the same distance back, besides finding and having an interview with that officer. At length a cavalry officer and a few of his men came down the turnpike. He announced himself as Lieutenant Cochrane, of the Churchville Cavalry, from Augusta County, Virginia. He informed me that the enemy, to the number of four thousand or five thousand men, had come around Colonel Pegram’s left (not his right) flank, and were then engaged fighting some three hundred of our men about a mile and a half in the rear of Colonel Pegram’s camp, and between my regiment and that camp; that there had been no attack upon the camp itself; that our men were on the right and the enemy on the left of the turnpike as I would approach the camp; that our men had one piece of artillery in or near the road, and that I was wanted at the fight.

  Being satisfied then that the enemy would not come around Colonel Pegram’s right flank and the county road I was ordered to guard, as they had already gotten in his rear by coining around his left flank, I determined to quit my position, where I was no longer of use, and taking Lieutenant Cochrane and his men with me as guides, go up the mountain and join in the fight. That officer readily consented to accompany me as guide, and I put my men in motion at double-quick time. But for a detailed account of my march up the mountain and down again to Beverly I refer to the following letter of Lieutenant Cochrane, who was with me the whole time, premising that, with the exception of one or two unimportant particulars, his recollection coincides with mine:

  MONTEREY, March 6, 1862.

  Col. WILLIAM C. SCOTT, Forty-fourth Regiment Virginia Volunteers:

  COLONEL: Your letter, dated Powhatan Court-House, February 28, requesting me to state in my reply what occurred while I was with you on the 11th day of July last in relation to the Rich Mountain fight, has just been received, and I hasten to reply. I was sent out with a squad of six men by Captain De Lagnel, who commanded our forces engaged in the fight, to bring up some cavalry that he had fired on through {p.279} mistake. In going down the turnpike I unexpectedly met with your regiment drawn up in the road about a mile and a half from Beverly. I told you your regiment was needed at the battle which was then going on; that the enemy to the number of four or five thousand had gotten around Colonel Pegram’s left flank, and were engaged with a few hundred of our men about a mile and a half in the rear of Colonel Pegram’s camp; that the enemy were on the left, and our men in and on the right of the turnpike as you would approach the camp; that our men had but one piece of artillery. You asked me if I would go with you and act as guide. I consented. You instantly put your regiment in motion in double-quick time. I remonstrated; told you we had to go between four and five miles up the mountain before we would reach the battlefield, and if the men traveled at that rate they would not be fit to fight when they got there. You then brought them down to quick time.

  In going up the mountain we met with several men on horseback who had been in the battle; one, I recollect, of my company, who had been shot through the foot, and another whose coat had been shot across the shoulders. The latter told us that he was aid to Colonel Pegram, and that Colonel Pegram had been killed. Some of these men turned back and went with us part of the way up the mountain, but they all disappeared before your regiment stopped. On our way up I informed you of the death of Hughes, and you requested me not to mention it to your men, as it might dampen their spirit. When we arrived within about a mile of the battle the firing ceased, and in a few moments a loud huzza was heard coming from the position our forces had occupied when I left them. You asked me what that huzza meant. I told you that I was fearful the Yankees had driven our men from the field and captured our artillery, for the shout came from about the place where our artillery and fortifications stood. You continued your march to within half a mile of the battle-ground, when I informed you that it was unsafe to go farther; that you could not with one regiment encounter successfully four or five thousand of the enemy, with the advantage of position, fortifications, and a piece of artillery. You halted your regiment; you and I dismounted, and in company with some of your officers passed around a turn in the road that we might see, if possible, how things stood at the pass on top of the mountain when we did see more men, as I told you at the time, exulting and shouting, than Colonel Pegram had in his entire command.

  You were yet unwilling to go back, but requested me either to go myself or to send some of my men to reconnoiter. I told you I would not go, nor should any of my men go, for I was perfectly satisfied as to how things stood A young man named Lipford, of Your regiment, stepped forward and proposed to go if he could get a pistol and horse. Thus equipped, he went off up the road, but in a very short time we heard the shout from many voices, “Halt, shoot him,” and the firing of several guns, and then another loud huzza. It being now plain that the enemy had either killed or taken Lipford prisoner, you were satisfied that I was right, and that the enemy did have Possession of the field. You appearing still unwilling to go back, some of your officers suggested that as the enemy’s pickets could plainly be seen around the fields on each side of the road in which we stood, if you went forward the enemy would receive you in ambuscade whereas if you went back they would probably follow, and then you could take them in ambuscade. This suggestion being approved by all of us who expressed any opinion, you marched your regiment down the mountain, leaving men in the rear to give you information of the approach of the enemy. In going down information was brought you that the enemy were in pursuit, when you put your men in Position to receive them. After remaining there some time, and the alarm proving false, and all being quiet on the mountain, you returned to Beverly.

  Had the firing been renewed, I know it was your intention to have returned to the battle. Shortly after arriving in Beverly you had a private conference in a room in the hotel with Judge Camden and Mr. Berlin. During the conference I consulted you on the propriety of removing the military stores from Beverly, when you gave the order that every wagon that could be obtained should be filled with them, and all the prisoners should be taken out of jail and put under a guard of your regiment; all of which was accordingly done. I and my company were with you during your retreat as far as Greenbrier River, and acted as scouts, and am free to say that the retreat was conducted in good order, both by yourself and regiment-the men, worn-out by continued marching, in the rear, guarding prisoners and train. During the whole affair you conducted yourself with coolness and firmness becoming an officer.

  JAMES COCHRANE, Lieutenant, Churchville Cavalry.

  Some of those we met in going up the mountain estimated the enemy at from eight to ten thousand, and it turns out that I acted wisely in not making an attack upon the enemy when I went up the mountain. Colonel Pegram estimates the number of the enemy engaged in the fight at three thousand. I have no doubt they told him so in Beverly, {p.280} but, I have as little doubt, they underrated their strength. Colonel Pegram did not see the enemy engaged after the fight, and therefore had no means of forming a correct estimate for himself. Lieut. C. W. Statham, who commanded our artillery in the fight, and who was wounded and taken prisoner on the field, and who did have an opportunity of judging for himself, and others who were taken prisoners, have informed me that the enemy had six regiments engaged, under General Rosecrans, on that occasion. As it is said that Northern regiments are composed of twelve hundred men each, it is fair to presume that the six regiments, after making all allowances for sickness, &c., numbered at least five thousand or six thousand men. According to the estimate of my adjutant, I had with me on that day five hundred and seventy. What chance I would have stood with that number, without artillery, in an attack on five or six thousand men, or even three thousand, flushed with victory, with choice of position, and in possession of artillery and fortifications, every one can decide for himself. Every officer and, I believe, every man in my regiment approved of the course I pursued, and subsequent reflection has only confirmed my conviction that I acted wisely.

  It may be said that I should have renewed the attack, with the expectation that I would be re-enforced from the fort. I had heard from one who said his name was Bacon, and who styled himself Colonel Pegram’s aid, and who therefore ought to have, known that Colonel Pegram was killed before he (the aide) left the fight, and I concluded if his command in the camp would not or could not re-enforce a portion of their own men when engaged in the fight, and whom they knew needed their assistance, I had no reason to believe they would re-enforce me, when they did not know whether I needed their assistance or not. I believed the battle to be over, as far as Colonel Pegram’s command was concerned. Had the fight, however, been renewed by any of them, I should unquestionably have, gone to their assistance, and so expressed myself at the time.

  It is especially unbecoming in that portion of Colonel Pegram’s command who remained in the camp, and who took no part in the fight, to find fault with me, as I understand some of them have done, for not quitting my position earlier, or not renewing the attack after I went up the mountain. They knew, or had an opportunity of knowing, that the enemy in large force had come around Colonel Pegram’s left flank, and were engaged with a small number of their own men, who needed their assistance. I knew none of these facts until the moment I started up the mountain, nor whether our men who were engaged needed my assistance or not. If they say they could not leave their posts without disobeying orders, I say I could not leave my post, where I was informed I was wanted, to go to a place where I did not know whether I was wanted or not, without equally disobeying orders. If they sent no messenger to Colonel Pegram, I did send a messenger to him, to know whether my presence was wanted or not. If they say they could not leave their post because they expected the enemy in front, I say I could not leave my post because I expected the enemy by the right flank, by a road along which I was informed by the commanding officer it was almost certain they were coming. If they say that with one thousand two hundred men (for they did not lose one hundred in the fight), with artillery, they were too weak to renew the fight with so numerous an enemy to cut their way out, I say I was too weak with less than half that number, without artillery, to cut my way in.

  It has been said that I should have gone to the assistance of Colonel {p.281} Pegram. I did go to his assistance at the very time, at the very place, and in the very manner requested by him and ordered by General Garnett. If that time, place, and manner were not the right time, place, and manner, it was not my fault.

  It has been said that Hughes was drunk when I sent him to Colonel Pegram. This, in my opinion, and in the opinion of those of my regiment with whom I have conversed on the subject, is a foul slander on a gallant man and a patriot, who lost his life in serving his country. If Hughes had been drinking at all, I did not perceive it in his appearance, manner, or conduct.

  It is proper I should notice the following order, which I received from General Garnett some time during the day on which the fight took place:

  HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT N. W. A., Camp at Laurel Hill, July 11, 1861.

  Colonel SCOTT, Commanding Regiment en route to Laurel Hill:

  COLONEL: General Garnett directs that you take your position high up on the road indicated by Colonel Pegram, secrete your men, and cut down trees to block up the road in front of you. If you are forced back, block up the road as you go and defend every inch of it.

  By order of General Garnett:

  JAMES L. CORLEY Captain, C. S. A., Acting Assistant Adjutant-General.

  If you have not axes enough to block up the road with, send down to Beverly for them.

  The road to which that order refers is the county road I was ordered to guard. Candor compels me to say, that I do not recollect distinctly the time at which that order was received. I know it was not received before I sent Hughes as a messenger to Colonel Pegram. I am satisfied it was received after Lieutenant Cochrane came to me from the mountain, and I believe I received it after I returned from the mountain and reached Beverly. If I received it after I sent Hughes to Colonel Pegram, and before, I went up the mountain, I doubtless did not obey it, because I was anxious to hear from Colonel Pegram; and to go high up the county road and secrete my men would place it out of my power to reach him in time to render him any assistance in case he, should request my presence on the mountain. If I received it, as I am satisfied I did, after Lieutenant Cochrane came to me, I did not obey it, because I had ascertained from that officer and his men that the enemy would not come along that road, as they had already come around Colonel Pegram’s left flank. But whenever received, it made but little or no impression upon me, as I deemed it folly to be executed at that time. My decided impression is, however, that I received it after my return to Beverly, and late in the evening, while annoyed by a crowd.

  My retreat– Why I did not fortify Cheat Mountain, &c.-On arriving at Beverly I was immediately surrounded by a crowd of citizens and others. Seeing among them Mr. George W. Berlin, with whom I had been acquainted in the Convention, and Judge Camden, a member of the Provisional Congress, I requested an interview with them in a private room in the hotel. During that interview Lieutenant Cochrane Consulted me on the propriety of removing quartermaster and commissary stores from Beverly, and I ordered him to get all the wagons that could be procured and fill them with those stores, and take out of jail some twenty prisoners and place them under a guard of my regiment I consulted Mr. Berlin and Judge Camden as to the course I should pursue, and our interview ended by my determination to go to Laurel Hill with my regiment that night; but on going into the street {p.282} in which I left my regiment I found it had gone towards Huttonsville, the opposite direction to that of Laurel Hill, some one having informed my lieutenant-colonel it was my wish he should go that way. I mounted my horse, dashed off at a rapid rate, and overtook it between one and two miles from Beverly, and turned it back in the direction of Laurel Hill; but on reaching Beverly I saw two men, who informed me that they were just from Laurel Hill, that General Garnett himself was on the retreat, and that he had ordered his tents to be struck for that purpose before they left his camp. This changed my programme. I saw no use in going to General Garnett, as I would only serve to encumber his retreat. I therefore determined to retreat myself, and accordingly left Beverly, I suppose, between 10 and 11 o’clock that night.

  The night was dark, rainy, and dismal; the roads were muddy. My wagons, with those loaded with our quartermaster and commissary stores, munitions of war, &c., constituted a train one, two, or three miles in length. My regiment marched in the rear to protect them from attack. When one stopped all behind it stopped, and my regiment also; consequently my progress was slow. After getting about two or three miles from Beverly I was overtaken by a messenger from General Garnett with the following order, which I read by the lantern which the guard carried with the prisoners:

  HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT N. W. A., Camp at Laurel Hill, July 11, 1861.

  Colonel SCOTT, Commanding Regiment en route to Laurel Hill

  COLONEL: I am directed by General Garnett to furnish you with the inclosed sketch, and to say that he wishes you to march all night, if necessary to attain the point B on the sketch, and to block up the path so far towards A as you can, and the road towards C. If the enemy should have reached the point A., then block up as much as you can.

  By order of General Garnett:

  JAMES L. CORLEY, Captain, C. S. A., Acting Assistant Adjutant-General.

  The inclosed sketch to which he refers was the diagram, a copy of which is inserted above [p. 274]. Your honor cannot fully understand this order unless you read it in connection with the diagram. If you will turn to it you will see I was not directed to blockade the Buckhannon turnpike, leading from Colonel Pegram’s camp to Beverly, but that portion of the county road I had been ordered to guard which extends from B to C, and the path which struck off from that county road from B to the point A where it crossed the mountain. I saw at once the mistake under which General Garnett was laboring. He had heard of the fight at Rich Mountain, and from Colonel Pegram’s letter to him in the morning he believed that the enemy had gotten to Colonel Pegram’s rear by turning his right flank, and coming along that path and county road would still continue to come that way. Now I knew they had not come that way, but had come around Colonel Pegram’s left flank. I deemed it, therefore, an act of supreme folly to turn my regiment back at 12 o’clock at night, and march all night, and next day commence blockading a path and road in which I knew no enemy had put his foot and no enemy would put his foot. Besides, as neither artillery or cavalry could get over the mountain by that path, of what use, was it to blockade it on this side of the mountain against infantry, which could easily get around the blockade?

  Again, I reflected if I should obey General Garnett’s orders it would almost certainly insure the loss of my whole command. It would probably take me all night to reach the point B, and latter in the day to climb the mountain and reach the point A. This point A was but a {p.283} short distance from the place where the fight occurred, and where I understood the enemy would bivouac that night. As soon as the trees should begin to fall they would be heard by the enemy, their pickets or scouts, and almost immediately it would be ascertained that a regiment was blockading the path. In that case all that the enemy would have to do would be to come down the Buckhannon turnpike leading to Beverly with their piece of artillery until they should reach the county road I was ordered to guard that day and go up that road until they should reach the path I was blockading. What then would be my ,situation, blocked up in front by my fallen trees and hemmed in the rear by an overwhelming enemy? I therefore told the messenger who brought me the order to tell General Garnett that he was mistaken in supposing the enemy had gotten to Colonel Pegram’s rear by the path and road he had ordered me to blockade, for that they had come around Colonel Pegram’s left flank; that I should probably lose my whole command if I were to obey his order, and that therefore I should continue my retreat. I have since seen Colonel Corley, General Garnett’s aide, who wrote that order, and he informed me I was right in supposing that when that order was given General Garnett was under the belief the enemy had gotten to Colonel Pegram’s rear by the path and county road aforesaid and would continue to come that way.

  I have been charged with blockading a part of the turnpike between Laurel Hill and Beverly, which prevented General Garnett’s retreat by that town. The charge is false. No road was blockaded by me. No tree was cut by my orders or by my regiment anywhere.

  On arriving next morning near the Jeff. Davis Hotel, a log tavern, seven miles from Beverly, I was overtaken by another messenger from General Garnett with the following order:

  JULY 11, 1861.

  Colonel SCOTT:

  General Garnett directs that you endeavor to keep the enemy in check on the other side of Beverly until daylight. If you are forced back, send me a mounted expressman Stating the facts.

  JAMES L. CORLEY Captain, C. S. A., Acting Assistant Adjutant-General.

  As it was already sunrise when I received this order, and I was nearly seven miles from Beverly, its execution was impracticable. In answer to it I wrote a long note with a pencil on a fence rail to General Garnett, and sent it by the same messenger who brought me the order.

  On arriving at Huttonsville, eleven and a quarter miles from Beverly, I halted my regiment for breakfast. While there I was joined by Major Tyler with a few companies from the Twentieth (Colonel Pegram’s) Regiment and while there I received the following (the last) order from General Garnett:

  [JULY 12, 1861.]

  [Colonel SCOTT]

  General Garnett has concluded to go to Hardy County and towards Cheat Bridge. You will take advantage of a position beyond Huttonsville and draw your supplies from Richmond, and report for orders there.

  JAMES L. CORLEY, Captain, C. S. Army, Acting Assistant Adjutant-General.

  It has been stated that I was ordered by General Garnett to stop on Cheat Mountain and fortify. There is not a word in this order about Cheat Mountain. General Garnett, as he ought to have done, left it to my discretion where to stop. At the time I did think seriously of stopping On Cheat Mountain and fortifying, but I abandoned the idea on the following considerations:

  1. I had no adequate implements with which to fortify. I had thirty picks, ten shovels, and ten axes; and when it is recollected what a rocky {p.284} mountain Cheat is, it will be seen that it would have taken a long time to throw up the most ordinary field works.

  2. I thought that if I had all the implements I could desire the enemy would be upon me before I could make even respectable fortifications. My men were worn-out by marching nine days and one night continuously. I expected the enemy to pursue, as I thought he ought to pursue. Why should he not? He had from ten thousand to twenty thousand men in the valley which lay at the foot of the mountain, with no enemy there to engage his attention. General Morris pursued General Garnett; why should not General McClellan pursue me, as I was encumbered by a long train of wagons conveying our commissary and quartermaster’s stores, &c.? Indeed, information was brought me by my scouts, when near the top of Cheat Mountain, that the enemy’s cavalry had been seen between Beverly and Huttonsville, coming in our direction. I therefore expected if I stopped upon the mountain the enemy would be upon me before I could make much progress in making fortifications, and I have since ascertained I was right in my opinion, as the following letter of Adjutant Willis, of the Twelfth Georgia Regiment (who was sent by General Henry R. Jackson to General McClellan’s camp on Cheat Mountain to receive our men who had been taken prisoners on parole, and who there met Lieutenant Merrill, will show:

  CAMP BARTOW, VA., November 21, 1861.

  Col. Wm. C. SCOTT:

  SIR: You having expressed a desire that I should recount to you the conversation which passed between myself and Lieut. William E. Merrill, formerly an officer of the U. S. Army, Corps of Engineers, and at this time a prisoner of war in Richmond, Va., I comply by making this statement of facts, namely: That Lieutenant Merrill said that had Colonel Scott’s regiment attempted to make a stand on Cheat Mountain on the 12th day of July, the time his regiment passed that point on its retreat from Rich Mountain, McClellan would have bent every energy and employed every man, so that he (Colonel Scott) could not have held it an hour, and not only that he could not, but both his regiment and Colonel Johnson’s Georgia regiment would have been driven therefrom had they attempted to have stopped, the enemy being in such close pursuit that there would have been no time for them to have erected even light field fortifications. He admitted McClellan’s force to exceed twenty thousand men. I will add, sir, that Lieutenant Merrill is an old friend of mine, honorable and brave, and a consultation of the Army Register for the year 1859 will show that he carried away without division all the honors of his class; consequently his professional opinion as given above can but have weight.

  Hoping that should any of that class of brave fellow-citizens known as critics dispute the policy of either your not passing or Colonel Johnson not advancing on Cheat Mountain, this unvarnished recital of facts may be its refutation.

  I am, sir, yours, truly,

  EDWARD WILLIS, Second Lieutenant, First Infantry, C. S. Army.

  P. S.-Lieutenant Merrill said that McClellan and staff reached Cheat Mountain the next day about 3 o’clock.

  I passed the top of Cheat Mountain just before sunset Friday, the 12th of July. General McClellan and staff were there on the next day (Saturday) at 3 o’clock, and he occupied the place in force on Monday, as I am credibly informed. It is plain, therefore, that had I halted there I should have been overtaken by an overwhelming force of all arms before I could have made the most ordinary defenses.

  3. I ascertained that if I were to stop on Cheat Mountain, and could even make successful fortifications, my position could easily be turned, and the enemy could get into my rear and cut off my supplies. All that they would have to do for that purpose would be to leave the Staunton turnpike at Huttonsville, and go by a good road to Huntersville, some thirty or forty miles distant, and then by another read thirty {p.285} miles, where it intersects with the Staunton turnpike again at Greenbrier River, at the eastern base of Cheat Mountain. By doing this they could besiege me in front and rear. Nor had I any reason to expect that in the mean time I could get sufficient re-enforcements, to be of any practical utility, for the top of Cheat Mountain is more than eighty Miles from Staunton, from which our re-enforcements would have to march on foot.

  For these reasons, to say nothing of the want of artillery to defend fortifications when made, I concluded not to stop on the top of Cheat Mountain, but continue my march to Greenbrier River, at the eastern base of the mountain and some ten or twelve miles distant, where I expected to meet Col. Edward Johnson, who was due there with his regiment that (Friday) night, and who would have command both of his regiment and mine, and leave it to his discretion whether or not to return to the top of the mountain and fortify. I did so, accordingly, and met Colonel Johnson the next day (Saturday) at Greenbrier River, as I expected. He, without consulting me on the subject, ordered the retreat to be continued to the top of the Alleghany Mountains, where we met General H. R. Jackson, who continued it to Monterey.

  Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

  W. C. SCOTT, Colonel Forty-fourth Regiment Virginia Volunteers.

  General S. COOPER, Adjutant and Inspector General.

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  No. 29.

  Report of Col. W. B. Taliaferro, Twenty-third Virginia Infantry, of the action at Carrick’s Ford.

  MONTEREY, August 10, 1861.

  GENERAL: As no report has been required of me by the officer (Colonel Ramsey, of the First Regiment Georgia Volunteers) who succeeded to the command of General Garnett’s force on the death of that officer, of the action at Carrick’s Ford, at which my regiment with a section of artillery was engaged with the enemy, I beg in justice to the officers and men who were with me to make to you a brief report.

  On the evening of the 12th July General Garnett bivouacked at Kaler’s Ford, on Cheat River, the rear of his command being about two miles back on Pleasant Run. On the morning of the 13th July the command was put in motion about 8 o’clock, the Thirty-seventh Virginia and Colonel Jackson’s regiment and Lieutenant-Colonel Hansborough’s battalion, with a section of artillery, under Captain Shumaker, and a squadron of cavalry, under Captain Smith, forming the advance; then the baggage train, and then Colonel Ramsey’s First Georgia and the Twenty-third Virginia Regiment, constituting, with Lieutenant Lanier’s section of artillery and a cavalry force under Captain Jackson, the rear of the command. Before the wagon train (which was very much impeded by the condition of the county road over which it had to pass, rendered very bad by the heavy rains of the preceding night) had crossed the first ford half a mile above Kaler’s, the cavalry scouts reported that the enemy were close upon our rear with a very large force Of infantry well supported by cavalry and artillery. The First Georgia Regiment was immediately ordered to take position across the meadow on the river side and hold the enemy my in check until the train had passed {p.286} the river, and then retreat behind the Twenty-third Virginia Regiment, which was ordered to take position and defend the train until the Georgia troops had formed again in some defensible position.

  By the time the Georgians had crossed the river, and before some of the companies of that regiment who were thrown out to ambuscade the enemy could be brought over, the enemy appeared in sight of our troops, and immediately commenced firing upon them. This was briskly returned by the Georgia regiment, who after some rounds retired, in obedience to the orders received. The Twenty-third Virginia and the artillery were halted about three-quarters of a mile below the crossing, and were ordered to occupy a hill commanding the valley through which the enemy would have to approach and a wood which commanded the road. This position they held until the Georgia regiment was formed some distance in advance; then the former command retired and again reformed in advance of the Georgians. This system of retiring upon eligible positions for defense admirably selected by Captain Corley, adjutant-general to General Garnett, was pursued without loss on either side, a few random shots only reaching us, until we reached Carrick’s Ford, three and a half miles from Kaler’s. This is a deep ford, rendered deeper than usual by the rains, and here some of the wagons became stalled in the river and had to be abandoned.

  The enemy were now close upon the rear, which consisted of the Twenty-third Regiment and the artillery; and as soon as this command had crossed Captain Corley ordered me to occupy the high bank on the right of the ford with my regiment and the artillery. On the right this position was protected by a fence, on the left only by low bushes, but the hill commanded the ford and the approach to it by the road, and was admirably selected for defense. In a few minutes the skirmishers of the enemy were seen running along the opposite bank, which was low and skirted by a few trees, and were at first taken for the Georgians, who were known to have been cut off; but we were soon undeceived, and a hearty cheer for President Davis having been given by Lieutenant Washington, C. S. Army, reiterated with a simultaneous shout by the whole command, we opened upon the enemy. The enemy replied to us with a heavy fire from their infantry and artillery. We could discover that a large force was brought up to attack us, but our continued and well-directed fire kept them from crossing the river, and twice we succeeded in driving them back some distance from the ford. They again, however, came up with a heavy force and renewed the fight. The fire of their artillery was entirely ineffective, although their shot and shell were thrown very rapidly; but they all flew over our heads without any damage, except bringing the limbs of trees down upon us. The working of our three guns under Lieutenants Lanier, Washington, and Brown was admirable, and the effect upon the enemy very destructive. We could witness the telling effect of almost every shot.

  After continuing the fight until nearly every cartridge had been expended, and until the artillery had been withdrawn by General Garnett’s orders, and as no part of his command was within sight or supporting distance, as far as I could discover, nor, as I afterwards ascertained, within four miles of me, I ordered the regiment to retire. I was induced, moreover, to do this, as I believed the enemy were making an effort to turn our flank, and without support it would have been impossible to have held the position, and as already nearly thirty of my men had been killed and wounded. The dead and severely wounded we had to leave upon the field, but retired in perfect order, the officers and men manifesting decided reluctance at being withdrawn. After marching {p.287} half a mile I was met by Colonel Starke, General Garnett’s aide, who directed me to move on with my regiment to the next ford, a short distance in advance, where I would overtake General Garnett.

  On the farther side of this ford I met General Garnett, who directed me to halt my regiment around the turn of the road, some hundred and fifty yards off, and to detail for him ten good riflemen, remarking to me, “This is a good place behind this drift-wood to post skirmishers.” I halted the regiment as ordered, but from the difficulty of determining who were the best shots, I ordered Captain Tompkins to report to the general with his whole company. The general, however, would not permit them to remain, but after selecting ten men, under Lieutenant Depriest, ordered the company back to the regiment.

  By General Garnett’s orders, conveyed by Colonel Starke, I posted with that officer three of my companies on a high bluff overlooking the river, but, finding the undergrowth so thick that the approach of the enemy could not be well observed, they were withdrawn. A few minutes after these companies rejoined the regiment Colonel Starke rode up and said that General Garnett directed me to march as rapidly as I could and overtake the main body. In a few minutes afterwards Lieutenant Depriest reported to me that General Garnett had been killed. He fell just as he gave the order to the skirmishers to retire, and one of them was killed by his side.

  It gives me pleasure to bear testimony to the coolness and spirit displayed by officers and men in this affair. Lieutenant-Colonel Crenshaw and Major Pendleton set an example of courage and gallantry to the command, and the company officers behaved admirably, doing their whole duty. It would be invidious, when all behaved so well, to distinguish between them. The gallantry of Lieutenant Washington was conspicuous. After the 6-pounder rifled piece had been disabled and it was discovered it had to be abandoned, he spiked it under a heavy fire.

  It is not my province, perhaps, in this report to speak of officers outside of my own command, but I trust I shall be pardoned for bearing testimony to the coolness and judgement that characterized the conduct of Colonel Starke and Captain Corley during the whole of this day and afterwards on the march. These officers, but more particularly the latter, selected every position at which our troops made a stand, and we were never driven from one of them.

  The loss to the enemy in this action must have been very great, as they had from their own account three regiments engaged, and the People in the neighborhood whom I have seen since report a heavy

  loss, which they state the enemy endeavored to conceal by transporting the dead and wounded back to Belington in covered wagons, permitting no one to approach them.

  After receiving the order of General Garnett I marched my regiment four miles farther on to Parson’s Ford, a half mile beyond which I overtook the main body of our troops, who had been halted there by General Garnett, and which had been drawn up to receive the enemy.

  The enemy did not advance to this ford and after halting for some time our whole command moved forward, and marching all night on the road leading up the line of Horseshoe Run, reached about daylight the Red House, in Maryland, a point on the Northwestern turnpike near West Union.

  At this last place a large force of the enemy under General Hill was concentrated. This body did not attack us, and we moved the same day into Virginia as far as Greenland, in Hardy County. After seven days’ arduous march we reached this place.

  {p.288}

  I have not thought it proper to give any detailed account of the march of our troops either before or after the action at Carrick’s Ford. I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

  W. B. TALIAFERRO, Colonel Comdg. Twenty-third Regiment Virginia Volunteers.

  General H. R. JACKSON, Commanding Monterey Line.

  Casualties in Twenty-third Regiment Virginia Volunteers at battle of Carrick’s Ford: 13 killed; 15 wounded. Total, 28.

  Casualties in Twenty-third Regiment Virginia Volunteers at Laurel Hill: 2 killed; 2 wounded. Total, 4.

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  No. 30.

  Report of Major-General George B. McClellan of skirmish at Barboursville.

  BEVERLY, VA., July 19, 1861.

  Col. E. D. TOWNSEND:

  One of Cox’s regiments, Second Kentucky, defeated and drove 600 of Wise’s men out of Barboursville, Cabell County, on 16th.

  GEO. B. MCCLELLAN, Major-General, Commanding.

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  No. 31.

  Report of Major-General George B. McClellan of action at Scarey Creek.

  BEVERLY, July 19, 1861.

  Col. E. D. TOWNSEND:

  Cox checked on the Kanawha. Has fought something between a victory and a defeat. A wounded colonel of ours taken prisoner, and a possibility of having lost two colonels and a lieutenant-colonel, who amused themselves by a reconnaissance beyond the pickets. Have ordered him to remain where he is, and will start as soon as possible to cut Wise’s rear and relieve our credit. In Heaven’s name give me some general officers who understand their profession. I give orders and find some who cannot execute them unless I stand by them. Unless I command every picket and lead every column I cannot be sure of success. Give me such men as Marcy, Stevenson, Sacket, Lander, &c., and I will answer for it with my life that I meet with no disaster. Had my orders been executed from beginning, our success would have been brief and final.

  GEO. B. MCCLELLAN, Major-General.

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  No. 32.

  Reports of Brig. Gen. Henry A. Wise, C. S. Army, of skirmish July 16, and of action at Scarey Creek.

  CHARLESTON, W. VA., July 19, 1861.

  GENERAL: This will be handed to you by Maj. C. B. Duffield, who takes to you the official report of a fight with the enemy and six prisoners, {p.289} including two colonels and one lieutenant-colonel and two captains, and a member of the late Wheeling Convention, charged with treason. Major Duffield will personally give you details. This extraordinary war, in which the odds here are multiplied against us immensely by domestic enemies, requires absolutely an officer of high intelligence and responsibility to attend to prisoners. Rigid and harsh discipline of traitors in the Kanawha Valley and adjacent counties would fill all the jails of the trans-Alleghany. Dismissing all we can, from policy as well as necessity, Still the cases are very numerous, and would require the greater portion of my time, which is all now hard pressed upon by the enemy’s army. The traitors, their most efficient allies, spies, and soldiers, too, I have turned over to Major Duffield, who, since early after my arrival, has been examining them and applying the law to their cases. This he has been assiduously and laboriously doing, without any known mode of compensating him whatever. He is not of military education, and I therefore could not promise him a staff or line appointment, which might be detailed for this duty. Indeed, we require double the number of officers we have for military duty proper, and I therefore gave Mr. Duffield a special acting appointment, which he most devotedly accepted. I beg that you will authorize his appointment, fix his pay, and give him a proper rank on my staff. And there are two other descriptions of officers doing absolutely necessary service for whom there is no provision of pay-first, the engineers to locate the sites and plan the construction of works for defense, and the scientific explorers of mountains, gorges, rivers, passes, roads, &c. For the first I have employed Colonel Adler-a Hungarian-a man of consummate ability, science, and bravery, and for the last Prof. Thomas I. L. Snead, of William and Mary, and Lieut. J. B. Harvie, of the Provisional Army. The latter has commission in the Provisional Army and the former are treated as mere employés. They have two parties, Adler chief of both, one headed by Snead and the other by Harvie, performing very arduous and hazardous duties. I ask authority to allow them rank, pay, and forage for horses, with pay for a limited number of assistants, say six to each party. They have strengthened us far more than all the militia called out. Another unpaid corps is that of drill officers, without whom we could not make a stand or a good run from the enemy. The companies elect their officers, the drill officers train them, and then stand off to see them paid and win honors, I hope, whilst they are fed only and transported. Lastly, Major Duffield will tell you how much we need artillery. Do send us two rifled sixes, two 12-pounder howitzers, and allow us four small 4-pounders, which. Major Duffield can select at Gosport navy-yard. The enemy knocked over one of our little iron guns, as you will see, in the late fight. We now have in all eight pieces-three brass and five, superior iron guns. The, enemy’s artillery (rifled cannon) outfired us, doing double our execution. Welch lost his life spiking our disabled gun, thinking, poor fellow, it was to fall into the hands of the enemy, and not surviving to joy in victory. Supply us more ammunition. The force I sent to attack the enemy returned yesterday evening, having chased him to his intrenchments at Pocotaligo, Mouth. He is now there, about three thousand three hundred strong, awaiting re-enforcements. We are threatened by that number in the valley, by about one thousand five hundred from Ripley to Sissonville, and by forces from Weston, Glenville, and Sutton, via Summersville. If I go toward Point Pleasant they rush on Coal, on Two-Mile, and the Elk and Gauley, and if I move out of the valley in any direction with anything like an effective force, they rush in and take the valley, and if I stand still they move from all sides and shut me {p.290} in. By all means, then, hasten on re-enforcements, arms, and ammunition.

  To-day I send a flag of truce to obtain baggage of prisoners, at their request. Colonel Patton is doing as well as having done nobly well deserves. His arm I hope will not have to be amputated. We are throwing up breastworks and defenses at every pass, and mean never to be taken. Haste to prepare every means now shortens this report.

  Most respectfully,

  HENRY A. WISE, Brigadier-General.

  General S. Cooper, Adjutant and Inspector General.

  –––

  TWO-MILE, Near Charleston, Va., July 17, 1861.

  GENERAL: Yours of the 11th instant was received last evening. General Garnett was mistaken in his anticipations about the enemy not invading the Kanawha Valley and in his apprehension of my moving from Charleston direct upon Parkersburg. We are now on both sides [of] the Kanawha as high as the mouth of Coal River, front to front to the foe. He has about 1,600 approaching Coal, on the Guyandotte road; 3,000 coming up the Kanawha, with three steamers and several heavy pieces of artillery; 1500, it is supposed, on each side, with his artillery on this side, and intending, I think, to concentrate all his forces first against Coal, approaching and threatening the post at Two Mile and at Elk Mouth by the valley road, and at the same time by the road from Ripley, to which place, and ten miles below, they have advanced forces from Ravenswood, Murraysville, and Letart Falls, and it may be from Parkersburg. At Coal I have posted 900 efficient men, under Lieutenant-Colonel Patton. At Two-Mile and Elk I have posted in all, efficient and inefficient forces-say 800 efficient-about 1,600, and at Gauley Bridge, Summersville, and the Old Mill, on the Birch River, in all 1,000, with instructions to scout towards Suttonville, where the enemy are already in possession. I have anticipated General Garnett, you see, in this movement. I cannot re-enforce him, but he may me by the road leading from Huttonsville up Tygart’s Valley road to Rackstone; up that fork to where it crosses the range of Rich Mountain; thence between Grassy Creek and Back Fork of Elk to where it crosses Elk; thence southwest to the head of Laurel Creek; thence to the head of Big Birch River, and down the same to the old min near there, at the gorge of Birch Mountain, in my outpost from Summersville.

  Now, if General Floyd can re-enforce Coal River and General Garnett can, in considerable number, re-enforce Birch and Elk, I will make a diversion that shall distract and defeat the enemy. My plan of defending the valley of the Kanawha is to hold its head and Coal and Elk and Two-Mile and the head of summer navigation with, say, 3,000, and to expand outposts to Barboursville on the one side, say 1,000, and to Ripley, California, the Forks of Elk, Arnoldsville, Sutton, Old Mill, and Summersville, say 3,000, requiring in all 7,000 men at least, if not 10,000, and you see we have but 3,500 in all, facing 6,000 at least on this and the other side of the Ohio. We have now 10 small pieces of artillery-6 iron, 3 brass, 1 made at Malden, private property. Our troops, raw, unequipped, not half armed and accoutered, untented, out of reach of clothing, unofficered, unorganized, yet they are prime personnel and fight well. I have tried them at Ripley, and yesterday my {p.291} aide, Colonel Clarkson, with Brock’s and Becket’s troops of horse, about 120, thrashed about 200 of their infantry, charging them up the mountain side to its top, driving them in to their cannon, and killing eight known, with the loss of one horse only killed. All we want is your fostering attention. Give us arms and ammunition speedily and I will drive them into the Ohio River and across, and then turn on Master McClellan, with the co-operation of Generals Garnett and Floyd.

  I implore of you, sir, two things: First, re-enforce us with men, arms, and ammunition, and ask the President to allow me to increase the legion to 4,000 men. Please obtain for me these requests at once and I will be answerable for the rest.

  Inclosed is an inventory of arms, &c., two days past. The militia here are literally in the way of action. They require help from us. Let me add two more ideas: We are treading on snakes while aiming at the enemy. The grass of the soil we are defending is full of the copperhead traitors; they invite the enemy, feed him, and he arms and drills them. We are surrounded with extraordinary difficulty of defense. A spy is on every hill top, at every cabin, and from Charleston to Point Pleasant they swarm. We will fight hard, retire slowly if we must, and make a last stand at Gauley. The men we have are true, but there are no deserters to us, and if we advance to meet the enemy at the mouth of Kanawha he comes down behind us from the north, and if we advance to attack him in the north he comes up behind us from the mouth of the valley. He aligns us from Parkersburg to Philippi on the north, and from Guyandotte through Gallipolis, Letart Falls, Flesher’s, Ravenswood, and Murraysville to Parkersburg on the west. He has sent but few regiments, comparatively, as yet from Illinois, Indiana, and Ohio eastward, holds the whole Northwest in reserve; and has command of all the navigation and railroad steam-power. This all combined makes it wonderful that we make a stand at all. Besides, sir, remember this army here has grown by neglect at Richmond. It has been literally created by Colonel Tompkins, at first beginning with Patton’s company alone, since, assisted by my legion, which I have created between this and Richmond. General Garnett’s army was sent out with him equipped. Let him come to us; we need his help. In connection with this I have. Ordered Colonel Tompkins to account for pay-rolls. We have had no Pay for State troops, Paymaster-General Hill informs me, for want of rolls, and Colonel Tompkins and Captain Carr will account for them.

  Most respectfully,

  HENRY A. WISE, Brigadier-General.

  P. S.-

  THURSDAY, July 19, 1861.

  GENERAL : Since mine of yesterday I have the proud satisfaction to report to you a glorious repulse of the enemy, if not a decided victory.

  Colonel Norton,* of the Federal Army, yesterday approached the mouth of Coal with about 1,200 men, expecting, as he says, to be supported by two regiments, making in all about 3,000. I had ordered Colonel Patton to retire gradually from Scarey Creek, below Coal, to Coal Mountain and the Passes across Coal River, concentrating his forces finally at Bunker Rill, On Upton Creek, on the left bank of the Kanawha. But when Norton approached he returned to Scarey Creek and met him and his 1,200 there with about 800 men and two iron sixes. Norton had one heavy piece of artillery, and the battle across the creek ravine commenced {p.292} about 4 p. m. It was soon shown the enemy had better guns, both ordnance and small-arms, but our men stood steadily and firmly fighting for about half an hour, when a panic seized three-fourths of them; portions of each company fled. At this moment Colonel Patton dashed on horseback to rally his men, when his horse for a short distance became unruly and caused them to mistake his movement; but he rallied a portion of them, returned instantly to action, and in fifteen minutes received a bullet in his left shoulder, which took him off the field. Jenkins, Bailey, Swan, and Sweeney stood their ground, as also Col. F. Anderson, with two companies posted so far on the left that they up to this time, had not come into action. The most of the men who had fled again rallied, and were fighting bravely when the enemy’s superior piece of artillery disabled one of our sixes, killing Lieutenant Welch and mortally wounding a private, when First-Lieutenant Quarrier retired with the other piece of artillery and never returned into action, causing a second panic, when Captain Jenkins bravely took the command for the moment until Colonel Anderson came up from the left and rallied a forlorn hope, in which he and Bailey, Swan and Sweeney, bore the whole brunt of the enemy for some time, until they were re-enforced by Captain Coons from the post on Coal Mountain and by the rerally of those who had fled. This won the day, drove back the whole force of the enemy, captured Colonels Norton, Woodruff,** and De Villiers,*** Lieutenant-Colonel Neff, Captains Austin and Ward, and some 10 or 20 privates, and killing about 30. Our loss was 1 killed and 2 wounded, but 1 mortally.

  The enemy crossed the river and encamped below the mouth of Scarey.

  I immediately determined to attack him there, and last night moved upon him with three troops of cavalry and 650 infantry and artillery, under Colonel McCausland, by two roads. The enemy retreated, and I have just (at 3 p. m.) learned that our force of 800 followed him to near the mouth of the Pocotaligo. McCausland having the Blues with him, I ordered him to put the steel of his bayonet into their teeth. They are found intrenched at the Pocotaligo with heavy pieces. They have there at least three regiments, and we cannot attack them for want of some 12-pounder howitzers. I beg you for four such pieces. Gi