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| Research | | ACW | | US War Dept. | | Official Records | | HTML | | Ser. I, Vol. 2, Ch. IX–Reports. |
| April | 17, 1861.– | Ordinance of secession adopted by Virginia Convention. |
|---|---|---|
| 18, 1861.– | Maj. Gen. William B. Taliaferro assigned to command of Virginia forces at Norfolk, Va. | |
| 18, 1861.– | United States Armory at Harper’s Ferry, W. Va., abandoned and burned by its garrison. | |
| 19, 1861.– | Conflict between United States troops and mob in Baltimore, Md. | |
| 19, 1861.– | Maj. Gen. Robert Patterson, Pennsylvania Militia, assigned to command over the States of Delaware, Pennsylvania, and Maryland, and the District of Columbia. | |
| 20, 1861.– | General Butler’s command arrives at Annapolis, Md. Expedition to destroy the dry-dock at Norfolk, Va. | |
| 23, 1861.– | Maj. Gen. Robert E. Lee assigned to command of the military and naval forces of Virginia. | |
| 26, 1861.– | Maj. Gen. Joseph E. Johnston, Virginia Volunteers, assigned to command of the State forces in and about Richmond, Va. | |
| 26, 1861.– | Maj. Gen. Walter Gwynn, Virginia Volunteers, assigned to command of State forces in and about Norfolk, Va. | |
| 27, 1861.– | Major-General Patterson, Pennsylvania Militia, assigned to command of the Department of Pennsylvania. Brig. Gen. B. F. Butler, Massachusetts Militia, assigned to command of the Department of Annapolis. Col. Joseph K. F. Mansfield, U. S. Army, assigned to command of the Department of Washington. Col. T. J. Jackson, Virginia Volunteers, assigned to command of State troops at and about Harper’s Ferry, W. Va. | |
| May | 1, 1861.– | Volunteer forces called out in Virginia. |
| 3, 1861.– | Governor of Virginia issues call for additional forces. | |
| 4, 1861.– | Col. G. A. Porterfield assigned to command of State forces in Northwestern Virginia (W. Va.). {p.2} | |
| 5, 1861.– | Alexandria, Va., abandoned by State troops. (Reoccupied.) | |
| 7, 1861.– | Routes between Philadelphia, Harrisburg, and Washington, via Baltimore, re-established. | |
| 9, 1861.– | Exchange of shots between the United States steamer Yankee and the batteries at Gloucester Point, Va. | |
| 10, 1861.– | Maj. Gen. R. E. Lee assigned to command of the Confederate States forces serving in Virginia. | |
| 13, 1861.– | Baltimore, Md., occupied by United States troops. Maj. Gen. Geo. B. McClellan, U. S. Army, assumes command of the Department of the Ohio, embracing a portion of West Virginia. | |
| 14, 1861.– | Seizure of a train of cars at Harper’s Ferry, W. Va. | |
| 15, 1861.– | Bvt. Maj. Gen. George Cadwalader, Pennsylvania Militia, supersedes General Butler in Department of Annapolis. Brig. Gen. Joseph E. Johnston, C. S. Army, assigned to command of troops near Harper’s Ferry, W. Va. | |
| 18-19, 1861.– | Engagement at Sewell’s Point, Va. | |
| 21, 1861.– | Col. John B. Magruder, Provisional Army of Virginia, assigned to command at Yorktown, Va. | |
| 21, 1861.– | Brig. Gen. M. L. Bonham, C. S. A., assigned to command on the “Alexandria Line,” Va. | |
| 22, 1861.– | Brig. Gen. B. F. Butler, Massachusetts Militia, assigned to command at Fort Monroe, Va. | |
| 23, 1861.– | Brig. Gen. Benjamin Huger, Virginia Volunteers, assigned to command at Norfolk, Va. Demonstration on Hampton, Va. | |
| 24, 1861.– | Advance of Union Army into Virginia, and its occupation of Arlington Heights and Alexandria. | |
| 26-30, 1861.– | Advance upon and occupation of Grafton, W. Va., by Union forces. | |
| 27-29, 1861.– | Occupation of Newport News, Va., by Union forces. | |
| 28, 1861.– | Brig. Gen. Irvin McDowell, U. S. Army, assumes command of the Department of Northeastern Virginia. | |
| 31-June 1, 1861.– | Attack on Aquia Creek batteries, Va. | |
| June | 1, 1861.– | Skirmishes, at Arlington Mills and Fairfax Court-House, Va. |
| 2, 1861.– | Brig. Gen. G. T. Beauregard, C. S. Army, supersedes General Bonham in command on the “Alexandria Line” (sometimes called the “Department of Alexandria,” the “Potomac Department,” and afterwards the “Army of the Potomac”). | |
| 3, 1861.– | Action at Philippi, W. Va. | |
| 5, 1861.– | Attack upon Pig Point batteries, Va. | |
| 6, 1861.– | Brig. Gen. Henry A. Wise, C. S. Army, ordered to command of troops in the Kanawha Valley, W. Va. | |
| 7, 1861.– | Reconnaissance from Yorktown to Newport News, Va. | |
| 8, 1861.– | Virginia State troops transferred to the Confederate States. Brig. Gen. R. S. Garnett, C. S. Army, assigned to command of troops in Northwestern Virginia (W. Va.). | |
| 10, 1861.– | Brig. Gen. Beauregard in command of all Confederate forces in Prince William, Fairfax, and Loudoun Counties, Va. Engagement at Big Bethel, or Bethel Church, Va. | |
| 10-July 7, 1861.– | The Rockville (Maryland) expedition. | |
| June | 11, 1861.– | Maj. Gen. Banks supersedes Bvt. Maj. Gen. Cadwalader in Department of Annapolis. |
| 13, 1861.– | Descent of Union troops upon Romney, W. Va. | |
| 15, 1861.– | Skirmish at Bowman’s Place, Cheat River, W. Va. Harper’s Ferry, W. Va., evacuated by Confederate forces. | |
| 17, 1861.– | Action near Vienna, Va. {p.3} | |
| 19, 1861.– | Skirmish at New Creek, W. Va. | |
| 23, 1861.– | Skirmish at Righter, W. Va. | |
| 24, 1861.– | Affair on the Rappahannock, Va. | |
| 25, 1861.– | Descent on Mathias Point, Va. | |
| 26, 1861.– | Skirmishes at Frankfort and on Patterson’s Creek, W. Va. | |
| 27, 1861.– | Attack on Mathias Point, Va. | |
| July | 1, 1861.– | Arrest of the Baltimore Police Commissioners. |
| 2-25, 1861.– | Operations in the Shenandoah Valley. | |
| 5, 1861.– | Skirmish near Newport News, Va. | |
| 6-17, 1861.– | Campaign in West Virginia. | |
| 9, 1861.– | Skirmish at Vienna, Va. | |
| 12, 1861.– | Skirmish near Newport News, Va. | |
| 14, 1861.– | Reconnaissances from Alexandria, Va. | |
| 16-22, 1861.– | The Bull Run, or Manassas, campaign, Va. | |
| 19, 1861.– | Affair on the Back River Road, Va. Affair near New Market Bridge, Va. | |
| 20, 1861.– | Brig. Gen. William W. Loring, C. S. Army, assigned to command of “Northwestern Army” (W. Va.). | |
| 21, 1861.– | Maj. Gen. N. P. Banks, U. S. Army, ordered to relieve Major-General Patterson in command of the Department of the Shenandoah. | |
| 22, 1861.– | Maj. Gen. Geo. B. McClellan, U. S. Army, ordered to Washington, D. C. | |
| 23, 1861.– | Maj. Gen. John A. Dix, U. S. Army, assumes command of the Department of Maryland. Brig. Gen. W. S. Rosecrans, U. S. Army, assumes command of the Department of the Ohio, embracing portion of West Virginia. | |
| 24, 1861.– | Operations on Back River, Va. Retreat of General Wise’s command up the Kanawha Valley. | |
| 25, 1861.– | Major-General Banks assumes command of the Department of the Shenandoah. | |
| 24, 1861.– | Major-General Dix assumes command of the Department of Pennsylvania. | |
| 27, 1861.– | Major-General McClellan assumes command of the Division of the Potomac. | |
| 29, 1861.– | Skirmish at Edwards Ferry, Md. |
* The State Of West Virginia was not admitted into the Union until June 20, 1863. For that reason, and because the Confederates did not recognize the partition of Virginia a thus made, places in the new State are frequently referred to, in the text of these Records, as being either in Virginia or in Western Virginia. The transfer of the counties of Berkeley and Jefferson from Virginia to West Virginia was not recognized by Congress until March 10, 1866.
** Of some of the skirmishes, and other minor conflicts, noted in this “Summary,” no circumstantial reports are on file, the only official record of such events being references thereto on muster rolls and returns.
No. 1.
Reports of First Lieut. B. Jones, Mounted Rifles, U. S. Army.
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES ARMORY, Harper’s Ferry, Va., April 18, 1861-9 p. m.
SIR: Up to the present time no assault or attempt to seize the Government property here has been made, but there is decided evidence that the subject is in contemplation, and has been all day, by a large number of people living in the direction of Charlestown; and at sundown this evening several companies of troops had assembled at Halltown, {p.4} about three or four miles from here on the road to Charlestown, with the intention of seizing the Government property, and the last report is that the attack will be made to-night. I telegraphed this evening to General Scott that I had received information confirming his dispatch of this morning, and later to the Adjutant-General that I expected an attack tonight. I have taken steps which ought to insure my receiving early intelligence of the advance of any forces, and my determination is to destroy what I cannot defend, and if the forces sent against me are clearly overwhelming, my present intention is to retreat into Pennsylvania.
The steps I have taken to destroy the arsenal, which contains nearly 15,000 stand of arms, are so complete that I can conceive of nothing that will prevent their entire destruction.
If the Government purposes maintaining its authority here, no time should be lost in sending large bodies of troops to my assistance, and as many of them as possible should be regulars.
A courier has just reported the advance of the troops from Halltown.
Respectfully, I am, I sir, your obedient servant,
R. JONES, First Lieutenant, Mounted Riflemen, Commanding.
To the ASSISTANT ADJUTANT-GENERAL, Headquarters of the Army, Washington, D. C.
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CHAMBERSBURG, April 19, 1861.
Finding my position untenable, shortly after 10 o’clock last night I destroyed the arsenal, containing 15,000 stand of arms, and burned up the armory building proper, and under cover of the night withdrew my command almost in the presence of twenty-five hundred or three thousand troops. This was accomplished with but four casualties. I believe the destruction must have been complete. I will await orders at Carlisle.
R. JONES.
General WINFIELD SCOTT.
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CARLISLE BARRACKS, PA., April 20, 1861.
SIR: Immediately after finishing my dispatch of the night of the 18th instant, I received positive and reliable information that 2,500 or 3,000 State troops would reach Harper’s Ferry in two hours, from Winchester, and that the troops from Halltown, increased to 300 men, were advancing and were at that time (few minutes after 10 o’clock) within twenty minutes’ march of the Ferry. Under these circumstances I decided the time had arrived to carry out my determination, as expressed in the dispatch above referred to, and accordingly gave the order to apply the torch. In three minutes, or less, both of the arsenal buildings, containing nearly 15,000 arms, together with the carpenter’s shop, which was at the upper end of a long and connected series of workshops of the armory proper, were in a complete blaze.
There is every reason for believing the destruction was complete. After firing the buildings I withdrew my command, marching all night, and arrived here at 2 1/2 p. m. yesterday, where I shall await orders. Four {p.5} men were missing on leaving the armory, and two deserted during the night.
Respectfully, I am, sir, your obedient servant,
R. JONES, First Lieut. Mounted Riflemen, Comdg. Detachment Recruits.
To the ASSISTANT ADJUTANT-GENERAL, Headquarters of the Army, Washington, D. C.
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CARLISLE BARRACKS, PA., April 22, 1861.
SIR: Last evening three of my missing men arrived here, having left Harper’s Ferry the previous afternoon. They report that fifteen minutes after my command left the armory nine hundred troops marched into town, and that they continued to arrive every hour during the night, so that by morning there were probably nearly five, thousand troops there. They also report that the fire in the workshops was arrested, but that the arsenal buildings containing the arms, together with their contents, were completely demolished, and that it is probable not a single gun was saved from them.
I remain, sir, with respect, your obedient servant,
R. JONES, First Lieutenant Mounted Riflemen.
To the ASSISTANT ADJUTANT-GENERAL, Headquarters of the Army, Washington, D. C.
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No. 2.
Congratulatory letter from United States Secretary of War.
WAR DEPARTMENT, Washington, April 22, 1861.
Lieut. ROGER JONES, Commanding at Harper’s Ferry:
My DEAR SIR: I am directed by the President of the United States to communicate to you, and through you to the officers and men under your command at Harper’s Ferry Armory, the approbation of the Government of your and their judicious conduct there, and to tender to you and them the thanks of the Government for the same.
I am, sir, very respectfully,
SIMON CAMERON, Secretary of War.
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No. 3.
Report of Lieut. Col. William Maynadier, U. S. Ordnance Department, of the expenditures upon and losses at the armory.
ORDNANCE OFFICE, Washington, November 16, 1861.
SIR: In answer to the letter [following] of the Hon. John P. Hale, chairman of the committee of the Senate, which you referred to this {p.6} office, I have the honor to report that the U. S. Armory at Harper’s Ferry was established in the year 1796.
The amount expended on the same is–
| For land purchased at different times | $45,477 |
|---|---|
| For improvements thereon for water-power, canals, embankments, walls, and water privileges, and for hydraulic machinery and buildings of an kinds | 1,787,430 |
| Total, exclusive of the amount expended in the manufacture and repair of arms | 1,832,907 |
The latest annual inventory of the property belonging to the United States at that armory is dated June 30, 1860, in which the value of all the property on hand at that date is appraised as follows, viz:
| 1,6691 acres of land | $37,457 | |
|---|---|---|
| Mill-dams, canals, water-powers, and hydraulic machinery | 233,279 | |
| Forges, rolling-mills, machine-shops, storehouses, dwellings, and other buildings | 341,221 | |
| Amount of real estate | 611,957 | |
| Machines used in workshops | $270,235 | |
| Tools used in service | 109,560 | |
| 379,795 | ||
| Unwrought materials on hand | 100,043 | |
| Parts of arms in progress | 93,573 | |
| 193,616 | ||
| 20, 507 arms of different models in store | 285,145 | |
| Total appraised value June 30, 1860 | 1,470,513 | |
By the latest returns received at this office from the armory, it appears that the number of arms in store when the armory was destroyed in April, 1861, was reduced to 4,287, the value of which was about $64,000.
We may assume that the quantity and value of all other property than the arms in store remained without material change from June, 1860, to April, 1861. The diminished number of arms in store at the latter date reduces that item in the inventory from $285,145 to $164,300, and the total appraised value of all the property from $1,470,513 to $1,207,668.
Respectfully, &c.,
WM. MAYNADIER, Lieutenant-Colonel, Ordnance.
Hon. SIMON CAMERON, Secretary of War.
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U. S. CAPITOL, November 14, 1861.
Hon. SIMON CAMERON, Secretary of War:
SIR: The committee of the Senate “to inquire into the circumstances attending the destruction of the property of the United States at the armory at Harper’s Ferry,” &c., desire to be informed by the War Department of the date of the establishment of the Harper’s Ferry Armory, the amount expended upon the same by the Government previous to its destruction, the character of the buildings, machinery, &c., and the quantity and description of arms destroyed there, and of the material on hand at that time.
Respectfully, yours,
JOHN P. HALE, Chairman.
{p.7}No. 1.
Report of Col. Edward F. Jones, Sixth Massachusetts Militia.
HDQRS. 6TH REGIMENT, 3D BRIG., 2D DIV., M. V. M., Capitol, Washington, April 22, 1861.
In accordance with Special Orders, NO. 6, I proceeded with my command towards the city of Washington, leaving Boston on the evening of the 17th April, arrived in New York on the morning of the 18th, and proceeded to Philadelphia, reaching that place on the same evening.
On our way John Brady, of Company H, Lowell, was taken insane, and deeming it unsafe to have him accompany the regiment, I left him at Delanco, N. J., with J. C. Buck, with directions that he should telegraph Mayor Sargent, of Lowell, as to the disposition of him, and we proceeded thence to Baltimore, reaching that place at noon on the 19th. After leaving Philadelphia I received intimation that our passage through the city of Baltimore would be resisted. I caused ammunition to be distributed and arms loaded, and went personally through the cars, and issued the following order, viz:
The regiment will march through Baltimore in column of sections, arms at will. You will undoubtedly be insulted, abused, and, perhaps, assaulted, to which you must pay no attention whatever, but march with your faces square to the front, and pay no attention to the mob, even if they throw stones, bricks, or other missiles; but if you are fired upon and any one of you is hit, your officers will order you to fire. Do not fire into any promiscuous crowds, but select any man whom you may see aiming at you, and be sure you drop him.
Reaching Baltimore, horses were attached the instant that the locomotive was detached, and the cars were driven at a rapid pace across the city. After the cars containing seven companies had reached the Washington depot the track behind them was barricaded, and the cars containing band and the following companies, viz: Company C, of Lowell, Captain Follansbee; Company D, of Lowell, Captain Hart; Company I, of Lawrence, Captain Pickering, and Company L, of Stoneham, Captain Dike, were vacated, and they proceeded but a short distance before they were furiously attacked by a shower of missiles, which came faster as they advanced. They increased their steps to double-quick, which seemed to infuriate the mob, as it evidently impressed the mob with the idea that the soldiers dared not fire or had no ammunition, and pistol-shots were numerously fired into the ranks, and one soldier fell dead. The order “Fire” was given, and it was executed. In consequence, several of the mob fell, and the soldiers again advanced hastily. The mayor of Baltimore placed himself at the head of the column beside Captain Follansbee, and proceeded with them a short distance, assuring him that he would protect them, and begging him not to let the men fire; but the mayor’s patience was soon exhausted, and he {p.8} seized a musket from the hands of one of the men and killed a man therewith, and a policeman, who was in advance of the column, also shot a man with a revolver.
They at last reached the cars, and they started immediately for Washington. On going through the train I found there were about one hundred and thirty missing, including the band and field music. Our baggage was seized, and we have not as yet been able to recover any of it. I have found it very difficult to get reliable information in regard to the killed and wounded, but believe there were, only three killed, viz:
Wounded.
As the men went into the cars I caused the blinds to the cars to be closed, and took every precaution to prevent any shadow of offense to the people of Baltimore; but still the stones flew thick and fast into the train, and it was with the utmost difficulty that I could prevent the troops from leaving the cars and revenging the death of their comrades.
After a volley of stones some one of the soldiers fired and killed a Mr. Davis, who I have since ascertained by reliable witnesses threw a stone into the car; yet that did not justify the firing at him, but the men were infuriated beyond control. On reaching Washington we were quartered at the Capitol, in the Senate Chamber, and are all in good health and spirits.
I have made every effort to get possession of the bodies of our comrades, but have not yet succeeded. Should I succeed I shall forward them to Boston, if practicable; otherwise shall avail myself of a kind offer of George Woods, esq., who has offered me a prominent lot in the Congressional burying-ground for the purpose of interment.
We were this day mustered into the United States service, and will forward the rolls at first opportunity after verification.
EDWARD F. JONES, Colonel Sixth Regiment, M. V. M., in service of United States.
Brigade Maj. WILLIAM H. CLEMENCE.
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No. 2.
Extracts from report of the Baltimore Police Commissioners.
OFFICE BOARD OF POLICE COMMISSIONERS, Baltimore, May 3, 1861.
To the honorable the General Assembly of Maryland:
The board of police of the city of Baltimore, created and appointed by your honorable body by the provisions of the fourth article of the Code of Public Local Laws, section 806, &c., deem it their duty respectfully to report:
...
The board continued from the date of their above report to exercise their regular functions until Friday, the 19th April. On that day a large detachment of it is understood, about 1,800 men of the Massachusetts and Pennsylvania Militia arrived in the forenoon in the city via the Philadelphia, Wilmington and Baltimore Railroad. No member of the board of police had any information that these troops were expected on that day until from half an hour to one hour of the time at which they were to arrive. The marshal of police was immediately notified, and called out at once a large portion of his force to preserve order during their transit through the city. When they arrived, there were manifestations to interfere with their passage; and after some had been transported by cars through the streets to the Washington depot obstructions were placed on the track in the city which stopped the progress of the {p.10} remainder. These alighted to march to the depot, and to prevent any difficulty the mayor placed himself at their head, and they thus proceeded on their route. Missiles were, notwithstanding, thrown at the troops, and some of them were injured. Their assailants were fired upon, and in some instances with fatal effect. An intense and irrepressible feeling appeared to be at once aroused, and repeated conflicts between parties of citizens and the Massachusetts troops took place, several being killed on both sides.
The marshal, who had been on active duty at the Camden-street depot, and did not know that these troops were on their route or expected, hearing of this, hastened to meet them with a force of the police, and under their escort they reached the Washington depot, and after some delay the train finally started for Washington. Attempts were made to hinder it by placing obstructions on the track of the railroad, but by the interference of the police these were soon removed.
The city authorities were meanwhile informed that there had been another arrival of military, who were then at the Philadelphia depot. The marshal of police hastened to that point, and as it was impossible for them at that time to be taken through the streets without a general and bloody conflict, he protected them with a party of his police until they were sent back by the railroad company in the cars to Havre de Grace.
During the afternoon and night a large number of stragglers from some of the above detachments of troops sought the aid and protection of the police; they were safely cared for at the several station-houses, and were sent off in security by the earliest opportunity to Havre do Grace or Philadelphia in the cars.
The same night the board had a meeting, when the opinion was unanimously expressed that it was utterly impossible from the state of the public mind that any more forces from other States could, by any probability, then pass through the city to Washington without a fierce and bloody conflict at every step of their progress, and that whatever might be the result, great loss of life and imminent danger to the safety of the city would necessarily ensue. The board were equally unanimous in their judgment that, as good citizens, it was their duty to the city, and to the State of Maryland, to adopt any measures whatsoever that might be necessary at such a juncture to prevent the immediate arrival in the city of further bodies of troops from the Eastern or Northern States, though the object of the latter might be solely to pass through the city. It was suggested that the most feasible, if not the most practicable, mode of thus stopping for a time the approach of such troops would be to obstruct the Philadelphia, Wilmington and Baltimore, and the Northern Central Railroads by disabling some of the bridges on both roads. His honor the mayor stated to the board that his excellency the governor, with whom he had a few minutes before been in consultation in the presence of several citizens, concurred in these views; they were likewise those of the board, and instructions were given for carrying them into effect. This was accordingly done. The injury thus done on the railroads amounted to but a few thousand dollars on each; subsequently, as has been stated, further and greater damage was done to other structures on the roads by parties in the country or others, but this was without the sanction or authority of the board, and they have no accurate information on the subject.
The absolute necessity of the measures thus determined upon by the governor, mayor, and police board is fully illustrated by the fact that early on Sunday morning reliable information reached the city of the {p.11} presence of a large body of Pennsylvania troops, amounting to about twenty-four hundred men, [who] had reached Ashland, near Cockeysville, by the way of the Northern Central Railroad, and were stopped in their progress toward Baltimore by the partial destruction of the Ashland Bridge. Every intelligent citizen at all acquainted with the state of feeling then existing must be satisfied that if these troops had attempted to march through the city an immense loss of life would have ensued in the conflict which would necessarily have taken place. The bitter feelings already engendered would have been intensely increased by such a conflict; all attempts at conciliation would have been vain, and terrible destruction would have been the consequence, if, as is certain, other bodies of troops had insisted upon forcing their way through the city.
The tone of the whole of the Northern press and of the mass of the population was violent in the extreme. Incursions upon our city were daily threatened, not only by troops in the service of the Federal Government, but by the vilest and most reckless desperadoes, acting independently, and, as they threatened, in despite of the Government, backed by well-known, influential citizens, and sworn to the commission of all kinds of excesses. In short, every possible effort was made to alarm this community. In this condition of things the board felt it to be their solemn duty to continue the organization which had already been commenced for the purpose of assuring the people of Baltimore that no effort would be spared to protect all within its borders to the full extent of their ability. All the means employed were devoted to this end, and with no view of producing a collision with the General Government, which the board were particularly anxious to avoid, and an arrangement was happily effected by the mayor with the General Government that no troops should be passed through the city. As an evidence of the determination of the board to prevent such collision, a sufficient guard was sent in the neighborhood of Fort McHenry several nights to arrest all parties who might be engaged in a threatened attack upon it, and a steam-tug was employed, properly manned, to prevent any hostile demonstration upon the receiving-ship Allegheny, lying at anchor in the harbor, of all which the United States officers in command were duly notified.
Property of various descriptions, belonging to the Government and individuals, was taken possession of by the police force with a view to its security. The best care has been taken of it. Every effort has been made to discover the rightful owners, and a portion of it has already been forwarded to order. Arrangements have been made with the Government agents satisfactory to them for the portion belonging to it, and the balance is held subject to the order of its owners.
Amidst all the excitement and confusion which has since prevailed, the board take great pleasure in stating that the good order and peace of the city have been preserved to an extraordinary degree. Indeed, to judge from the accounts given by the press of other cities of what has been the state of things in their own communities, Baltimore, during the whole of the past week and up to this date, will compare favorably, as to the protection which persons and property have enjoyed, with any other large city in the United States.
All of which is respectfully submitted.
By order of the board:
CHARLES HOWARD, President..
{p.12}–––
No. 3.
Report of Hon. George William Brown, Mayor of Baltimore.
[BALTIMORE, May 9 (?), 1861.]
To the honorable the General Assembly of Maryland:
In the report recently made to your honorable body by the board of police commissioners of the city of Baltimore it is stated that, in the great emergency which existed in this city on the 19th ultimo, it was suggested that the most feasible, if not the only practicable, mode of stopping for a time the approach of troops to Baltimore was to obstruct the Philadelphia, Wilmington and Baltimore and the Northern Central Railroads by disabling some of the bridges on both roads; and it is added that “his honor the mayor stated to the board that his excellency the governor, with whom he had a few minutes before been in consultation, in the presence of several citizens, concurred in these views.”
As this concurrence has since been explicitly denied by his Excellency Governor Hicks in an official communication addressed to the senate of Maryland on the 4th instant, which I have just seen, it is due to myself that I should lay before you the grounds on which the statement was made to the board of police, on which they, as well as myself, acted. I seriously regret that so grave a misunderstanding exists between the governor and myself on so important a subject.
On the evening of the 19th ultimo, and after the collision had taken place, I mentioned to Governor Hicks that I had begun to fear it might be necessary to burn the railroad bridges, but I did not then, in consequence of intelligence which had been received, think it would be; to which he replied that he had no authority to give such an order.
At about 11 o’clock p. m. of the same day, the Hon. H. Lenox Bond, George W. Dobbin and John C. Brown, esqs., were requested by Governor Hicks and myself to go to Washington in a special train, which was provided for the purpose, to explain in person the condition of things in Baltimore, and to bear the following communications from Governor Hicks and myself, which were addressed to the President:
SIR: This will be presented to you by the Hon. H. Lenox Bond, George W. Dobbin and John C. Brown, esqrs., who will proceed to Washington by an express train at my request in order to explain fully the fearful condition of affairs in this city. The people are exasperated to the highest degree by the passage of troops, and the citizens are universally decided in the opinion that no more should be ordered to come.
The authorities of the city did their best to-day to protect both strangers and citizens, and to prevent any collision but in vain; and but for their great efforts a fearful slaughter would have occurred.
Under these circumstances it is my solemn duty to inform you that it is not possible for more soldiers to pass through Baltimore, unless they fight their way at every step.
I therefore hope and trust, and most earnestly request, that no more troops be permitted or ordered by the Government to pass through the city. If they should attempt it the responsibility for the blood shed will not rest upon me.
With great respect, your obedient servant,
GEO. WM. BROWN, Mayor.
The following, from Governor Hicks, was appended to my communication:
To his Excellency ABRAHAM LINCOLN, President of the United States:
I have been in Baltimore since Tuesday evening last, and co-operated with Mayor G. W. Brown in his untiring efforts to allay and prevent the excitement anti suppress the fearful outbreak as indicated above, and I fully concur in all that is said by him in the above communication.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
THOMAS H. HICKS, Governor of Maryland.
At about 12 o’clock p. m. the Hon. E. Louis Lowe and Marshall George P. Kane called at my house, where Governor Hicks was passing the night, and Marshal Kane informed me that a telegram had been received that other troops were to come to Baltimore over the Northern Central Railroad. There was also a report that troops were on their way who, it was thought, might even then be at Perryville, on their way to Baltimore. Mr. Lowe, Marshal Kane, my brother, John Cumming Brown, and myself went immediately to the chamber of Governor Hicks and laid the matter before him. The point was pressed that if troops were suddenly to come to Baltimore with a determination to pass through, a terrible collision and bloodshed would take place, and the consequences to Baltimore would be fearful, and that the only way to avert the calamity was to destroy the bridges. To this the governor replied, “It seems to be necessary,” or words to that effect.
He was then asked by me whether he gave his consent to the destruction of the bridges, and he distinctly, although apparently with great reluctance, replied in the affirmative. I do not assert that I have given the precise language used by Governor Hicks, but I am very clear that I have stated it with substantial correctness, and that his assent was unequivocal, and in answer to a question by me which elicited a distinct affirmative reply.
After this, but before the interview was over, two gentlemen came into the room, both of them strangers to me, but one was introduced as the brother of Governor Hicks, and I am confident that the assent of the governor to the burning of the bridges was repeated in the presence of those gentlemen.
I went immediately from the chamber of the governor to the office of the marshal of police, where Charles Howard, esq., the president of the board of police, was waiting, and reported to him the assent of the governor to the destruction of the bridges.
Mr. Howard, or some one else, made a further inquiry as to what had been said by the governor, whereupon Mr. Lowe, Marshal Kane, and my brother, John C. Brown, all declared that they were present at the interview and beard Governor Hicks give his assent.
The order to destroy the bridges was accordingly given, and carried out in the manner already reported to your honorable body.
I refer to the accompanying statements of Colonel Kane and Mr. J. C. Brown in confirmation of the correctness of my recollection of what occurred at the interview with Governor Hicks.
With great respect, your obedient servant,
GEO. WM. BROWN, Mayor.
[Inclosures.]
POLICE DEPARTMENT, OFFICE OF THE MARSHAL, Baltimore, May 9, 1861.
Near the hour of 12 p. m. on Friday, the 19th April, the day on which the collision with the Massachusetts troops occurred, I received intelligence that the president of the Pennsylvania Central Railroad Company had sent a dispatch to a gentleman here that additional troops would pass through Baltimore on their way to the capital.
I immediately sent to the president of the police board the intelligence referred to, and called at the residence of his honor Mayor Brown, to whom I also communicated the information which I had received.
The mayor immediately had an interview with the governor, who was then staying at his (mayor’s) house, and afterwards invited me to accompany him to the chamber of his excellency, to whom I communicated the information of the purposed coming of the troops.
{p.14}A general conversation then ensued, in which it was agreed to by all present that any attempt to pass troops through the city, in the then excited condition of the public mind, would lead to the most fearful consequences, and that any such passage must be prevented or delayed. The governor fully accorded in these views.
The conversation resulted in the governor’s distinctly and unequivocally consenting, in response to the direct question put to him by the mayor, that the bridges on the roads by which the troops were expected to come should be destroyed as the only means of averting the consequences referred to of their coming at that time.
GEO. P. KANE, Marshal.
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BALTIMORE, May 9, 1861.
About 12 o’clock on the night of Friday, 19th April last, I was present when a conversation took place between Governor Hicks and my brother, the mayor of Baltimore, in reference to the best course to be pursued, by which a repetition of the troubles which had occurred on that day could be prevented. It was represented to them by Marshal Kane that troops from the North were on their way to Baltimore, and might by the following morning reach the city.
The destruction of the bridges on the Northern Central and the Philadelphia, Wilmington and Baltimore Railroads was, in the opinion of my brother, the best and most effective method to obstruct their progress. In this opinion Governor Hicks fully concurred. When asked by my brother whether or not he gave his consent to the measure, the governor expressed a desire for time for reflection. Being reminded by those present of the lateness of the hour, and the necessity for prompt action, my brother again earnestly appealed to Governor Hicks and asked him for his consent. Governor Hicks’ answer was, in substance, although I may not use his exact words, “I see nothing else to be done.” “But, sir,” said my brother, “I cannot act without your consent; do you give it?” The governor’s reply was distinctly given in the affirmative.
J. CUMMING BROWN.
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FREDERICK, MD., May 10 [?], 1861.
Hon. JOHN C. BROWN:
DEAR, SIR: As reference has been made by his honor the mayor of Baltimore City to my knowledge of the facts connected with the interview between him and the governor of Maryland on the night of the 19th ultimo, it gives me pleasure to furnish the desired statement.
I was present between 11 and 12 o’clock p. m. on Friday, the 19th of April, at the residence of a prominent citizen of Baltimore when Marshal Kane, who was one of the company, received information by one of his officers that a telegram had been sent by the president of the railroad company at Philadelphia, announcing the approach of troops to Baltimore. It was the spontaneous opinion of all present that, in the terribly excited condition of the public mind, an attempt to pass troops through the city would inevitably lead to a bloody collision, and perhaps to other very serious consequences. It was therefore proposed to repair at once to the office of the marshal of police, and to send immediately for the mayor and governor.
It was supposed at the time that Governor Hicks was stopping at the Fountain Hotel. Marshal Kane asked me to accompany him to Mayor Brown’s house, and the other gentlemen proceeded to the marshal’s office. Marshal Kane and I accordingly went to the mayor’s residence, {p.15} and were admitted by his brother, who said that the mayor had retired. In a few moments the mayor came down to the parlor, when Marshal Kane stated to him the substance of the information received, and reminded him of the excited condition of the city, which rendered it imperatively necessary to adopt some prompt and efficient measures to delay the advent of the troops, so as to give time for the Federal Government to be correctly apprised of the state of affairs, and to arrest the threatened danger. For that purpose the partial destruction of the bridges was suggested. Mayor Brown immediately assented to the suggestion as one of absolute necessity, but said that as mayor of the city his jurisdiction terminated with its corporate limits, and that consequently he could not assume to exercise powers beyond those limits. The mayor added, “The governor, however, is here, and I will go up and see him.” In a few moments he returned and said that Governor Hicks was not well and would therefore receive us in his room. Immediately upon entering the room Mayor Brown and Marshal Kane, gave to Governor Hicks a full statement of the matter and solicited his authority to destroy the bridges. Governor Hicks replied that it was a serious affair to undertake to destroy the bridges, and he expressed some doubt as to his authority to give such an order. It was urged in reply that it was a case of absolute self-preservation; that in three or four hours’ time a large body of troops would probably be in the city inflamed with passionate resentment against the people of Baltimore for the assault made on their comrades in the Pratt-street encounter, and that as the city was filled with hundreds of excited men, armed to the teeth, and determined to resist the passage of troops, a fearful slaughter must necessarily ensue, and the safety of the city itself be put in peril, unless by the destruction of the bridges time could be gained to avoid the difficulty by peaceable arrangement of some sort. Governor Hicks fully and most distinctly assented to all this, and said, “Well, I suppose it must be done,” or words of precisely that import, to which the mayor replied, substantially, “Governor, I have, no authority to act beyond the city limits, and can do nothing in this matter except by your direction; shall the bridges be destroyed?” Governor Hicks emphatically and distinctly replied in the affirmative.
It is absolutely impossible for any misapprehension to exist on this point.
The mayor, Marshal Kane, and I then proceeded to the marshal’s office, where we found several highly respectable citizens gathered, to whom the mayor and marshal gave a statement of their interview with the governor. The mayor then issued written orders for the destruction of the bridges. The next morning I learned by the newspaper extras that the orders had been carried into effect.
Respectfully, yours, &c.,
E. LOUIS LOWE.
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No. 4.
Extracts from the message of the Mayor of Baltimore.
[BALTIMORE, July 11, 1861.]
To the honorable the Members of the First and Second Branches of the City Council:
GENTLEMEN:
On the 19th of April last an attack was made by a mob in the streets of Baltimore on several companies of a regiment of Massachusetts troops, {p.16} who were on their way to the city of Washington in pursuance of a call for 75,000 men made by the President of the United States. On the day previous troops had been safely passed through the city under the escort of the police. In the afternoon of the same day (18th) the regiments from Massachusetts were expected, and provision was made by the police for their reception; but they did not arrive, and the board of police could not ascertain when they would come, although two of the members of the board went in person to the station of the Philadelphia Railroad Company to obtain the necessary information.
On the morning of the 19th, about 10 o’clock, I was at my law office engaged in the performance of professional business, when three members of the city council came to me with a message from Marshal Kane, to the effect that he had just learned that the troops were about to arrive, and that be apprehended some disturbance. I immediately hastened to the board of police and gave notice. George M. Gill, esq., counselor of the city, and myself got into a carriage, and drove rapidly to the Camden station, and the police commissioners followed without delay. On reaching Camden station we found Marshal Kane in attendance, and the police coming in squads to the spot. The plan of the agents of the railroad companies was that the troops which were to arrive in the cars at the President-street station should in the same way be conveyed through the city, and be transferred to the cars for Washington at the Camden-street station. Accordingly, the police were requested by the agent of the road to be in attendance at the latter station. After considerable delay the troops began to arrive, and were transferred, under the direction of the police, to the Washington cars as rapidly as possible. There was a good deal of excitement, and a large and angry crowd assembled, but the transfer was safely effected. No one could tell whether more troops were expected or not. At this time an alarm was given that a mob was about to tear up the rails in advance of the train on the Washington road, and Marshal Kane ordered some of his men to go out on the road as far as the Relay House, if necessary, to protect the track.
Soon afterwards, and when I was about to leave the station, supposing all danger to be over, news was brought to Commissioner Davis and myself, who were standing together, that other troops were left at the President-street station, and that the mob was tearing up the track on Pratt street. Mr. Davis immediately ran to summon a body of police to be sent to Pratt street, while I hastened alone down Pratt street towards President-street station. On arriving at the head of Smith’s wharf I found that anchors had been piled on the track so as to obstruct it, and Sergeant McComas and a few policemen who were with him were not allowed by the mob to remove the obstruction. I at once ordered the anchors to be removed, and my authority was not resisted.
On approaching Pratt-street bridge I saw several companies of Massachusetts troops, who had left the cars, moving in column rapidly towards me. An attack on them had begun, and the noise and excitement were great. I ran at once to the head of the column, some persons in the crowd shouting, as I approached, “Here comes the mayor.” I shook hands with the officer in command, saying, as I did so, “I am the mayor of Baltimore.” I then placed myself by his side and marched with him as far as the head of Ligbt-street wharf, doing what I could by my presence and personal efforts to allay the tumult. The, mob grew bolder and the attack became more violent. Various persons were killed and wounded on both sides. The troops had some time previously begun to fire in self defense, and the firing, as the attack increased in violence became more general.
{p.17}At last, when I found that my presence was of no use, either in preventing the contest or saving life, I left the head of the column, but immediately after I did so Marshal Kane, with about fifty policemen, from the direction of the Camden station, rushed to the rear of the troops, forming a line across the street and with drawn revolvers checking and keeping off the mob. The movement, which I saw myself, was perfectly successful and gallantly performed. I submit herewith Marshal Kane’s account of the affair, published on the 4th of Kay last,* which substantially agrees with my own.
It is doing bare justice to say that the board of police, the marshal of police, and the men under his command, exerted themselves bravely, efficiently, skillfully, and in good faith to preserve the peace and protect life. If proper notice had been given of the arrival of the troops and of the number expected, the outbreak might have been prevented entirely; and but for the timely arrival of Marshal Kane with his force, as I have described, the bloodshed would have, been great. The wounded among the troops received the care and medical attention at the expense of the city, and the bodies of the killed were carefully and respectfully returned to their friends.
The facts which I witnessed myself, and all that I have since heard, satisfy me that the attack was the result of a sudden impulse, and not of a premeditated scheme. But the effect on our citizens was for a time uncontrollable. In the intense excitement which ensued, which lasted for many days, and which was shared by men of all parties, and by our volunteer soldiers as well as citizens, it would have been impossible to convey more troops from the North through the city without a severe fight and bloodshed. Such an occurrence would have been fatal to the city, and accordingly to prevent it the bridges on the Northern Central Railroad and on the Philadelphia, Wilmington and Baltimore Railroad were, with the consent of the governor and by my order, with the co-operation of the board of police (except Mr. Charles D. Hinks, who was absent from the city), partially disabled and burned, so as to prevent the immediate approach of troops to the city, but with no purpose of hostility to the Federal Government. This act, with the motive which prompted it, has been reported by the board of police to the legislature of the State and approved by that body, and was also immediately communicated by me in person to the President of the United states and his Cabinet. I inclose a copy of the report made by the board of police to the legislature on the 3d of May last. **
On the evening of the 19th of April, a portion of the military of the city were called out. On the 20th of April, your honorable body, by a unanimous vote, placed at my disposal the sum of $500,000 for the defense of the city, and the banks, with great patriotism and unanimity voluntarily offered to advance the money through a committee of their presidents, consisting of Messrs. Columbus O’Donnell, Johns Hopkins, and John Clark-, who notified me, in person, of the fact, on the morning of the 20th of April, at the mayor’s office. A number of citizens in all the wards volunteered for the purpose of defense, and were enrolled under the direction of the board of police; and for their use arms were partially provided. The Commander-in-Chief of the forces of the United States, with the approbation of the President, in view of the condition of affairs then existing in the city, on the earnest application of the governor of the State, of prominent citizens, and myself, ordered that hereafter the troops should not be brought through Baltimore, and {p.18} they were accordingly transported to Washington by way of Annapolis. But great danger existed to Baltimore from large bodies of unauthorized men at the North, who threatened to cut their way through the city, and visit upon it terrible vengeance for the acts of the 19th of April.
As soon as this danger had passed away, and the excitement among our own citizens had sufficiently subsided, the military were dismissed, and the citizens who enrolled were disbanded by order of the board of police. The peace of the city had been preserved, and its safety and the persons and property of men, and men of all parties, protected under the circumstances of great peril and the most intense excitement, and it was hoped that affairs would be allowed to return as nearly as possible to their previous condition. To this end my efforts and those of the board were devoted. Large bodies of troops from the North have ever since passed through the city without molestation, and every proper precaution to accomplish that object was taken by the board of police, and carried out by the force.
But civil war had began on the immediate border of our State. A great division of opinion in regard to it existed among the people, and the events which had occurred in the city, and their consequences, seem to have made an indelible impression on the minds of the authorities at Washington that the police force of the city of Baltimore was prepared to engage in hostility against the General Government whenever an opportunity should occur.
The result has been very unfortunate. On the ground of military necessity, of the existence of which and of the measures required of it the Federal officers claim to be the sole judges, our city has been occupied by large bodies of troops in its central points; picket guards have been stationed along many of our streets; the arms provided by the city for its defense and those left by private individuals with the authorities for safe-keeping, the station-houses and other property of the city have been seized; operators in the police and fire-alarm telegraph office have been displaced and others substituted in their stead; the marshal of police and the board of police, with the exception of myself, have been arrested and are now imprisoned, in Fort McHenry, one only, who is in bad health, has been released on his parole; the writ of habeas corpus has been suspended; the police force, established under a law of the State, has been set aside by superseding the only power which could lawfully control it; a new police, without authority of law, has been established under the control of a marshal appointed by the commanding general, and all power to hold elections in the city has been for the present set aside by suspending the functions of the board under which alone, elections can lawfully be held.
The grounds taken by Major-General Banks as a justification for these proceedings, and the position assumed by the board of police, respectively, will be found in the proclamations of the general and the protest of the board, which I inclose.***
The hidden deposits of arms and ammunition referred to in the proclamation of June 27 are, I suppose, those found in the city hall, in reference to which a few words of explanation may be made. The arms consisted in part of muskets which belonged to the old police, established under the administration of Mr. Swann; of revolvers procured for the police, and of some rifles, carbines, &c., lately procured in part for the use of the police and in part for the defense of the city. The board of police considered it proper that there should be a sufficient {p.19} number of efficient weapons to arm the entire, police force in case of an emergency. There were not enough in the city hall for that purpose. An allegation has been made that some of the arms and ammunition belonged to the Massachusetts troops; but I am informed that this is not the case, except as to two muskets which were taken by the police from the hands of the mob. The ammunition at the hall, which was purchased for the defense of the city, was more than was entirely safe. Of this I was well aware, and should have ordered it to be removed if the city had any proper place of deposit; but I apprehended that any attempt at removal at this time would only lead to a seizure on the part of the officers of the General Government and to unfounded rumors and suspicions; for all the rest of the arms and ammunition belonging to the city, and all the arms left with the city authorities for safe-keeping, which were placed in depositories procured expressly for the purpose and in no way concealed, had been previously seized by the authorities of the United States under circumstances very mortifying to the pride of the people. That some of the arms and ammunition were concealed about the building is sufficiently explained by the fact that the officers in charge desired to secure them from seizure, but such concealment was made without my knowledge.
The proclamation charges the existence of unlawful combinations of men organized for the resistance to the laws, for accumulating hidden deposits of arms, and encouraging contraband trade.
Although I am only ex officio member of the board, and by reason of other engagements not able to be present at all their meetings, yet, from the free and fall interchange of views among us, and the custom of the members to consult me on all important questions, and my knowledge of all their proceedings, I feel that I have a right to say, of my own personal knowledge, that the board had no notice or information of any such combination, if any such existed, which I have no reason to suspect.
Indeed, my experience of the fidelity of the board to its legal obligations during my whole official connection with it, and the common understanding between myself and my colleagues as to our course of duty since the present troubles began, justify me in saying that if any organization in this city for resistance to the laws could have been discovered by proper vigilance they would have been found out and suppressed to the extent of the powers conferred on the board by law.
After the board of police had been superseded, and its members arrested by the order of General Banks, I proposed, in order to relieve the serious complications which had arisen, to proceed, as the only member left free to act, to exercise the power of the board as far as an individual member could do so. Marshal Kane, while he objected to the propriety of this course, was prepared to place his resignation in my hands whenever I should request it; and the majority of the board interposed no objection to my pursuing such course as I might deem it right and proper to adopt in view of the existing circumstances, and upon my own responsibility, until the board should be enabled to resume the exercise of its functions.
If this arrangement could have been effected it would have continued in the exercise of their duties the police force, which is lawfully enrolled, and which has won the confidence and applause of all good citizens by its fidelity and impartiality at all times and under all circumstances. But the arrangement was not satisfactory to the Federal authorities.
As the men of the police, force, through no fault of theirs, are now {p.20} prevented from discharging their duty, their pay constitutes a legal claim on the city, from which, in my opinion, it cannot be relieved.
The new force which has been enrolled is in direct violation of the law of the State; and no money can be appropriated by the city, for its support without incurring the heavy penalties provided by the act of assembly. Officers in the fire-alarm and police telegraph department, who are appointed by the mayor and city council and not by the board of police, have been discharged, and others have been substituted in their place.
I mention these facts with profound sorrow, and with no purpose whatever of increasing the difficulties unfortunately existing in this city, but because it is your right to be acquainted with the true condition of affairs, and because I cannot help entertaining the hope that redress will yet be afforded by the authorities of the United States upon a proper representation made by you. I am entirely satisfied that the suspicion entertained of any meditated hostility on the part of the city authorities against the General Government is wholly unfounded, and, with the best means of knowledge, express the confident belief and conviction that there is no organization of any kind among the people for such a purpose. I have no doubt that the officers of the United States have acted on information, which they deemed reliable, obtained from our own citizens, some of whom may be deluded by their fears, while others are actuated by baser motives; but suspicions thus derived can, in my judgment, form no sufficient justification for what I deem to be grave and alarming violations of the rights of individual citizens, of the city of Baltimore, and of the State of Maryland.
Very respectfully,
GEO. WM. BROWN, Mayor.
* Not found, but see Kane’s statement of May 9, p. 13.
** No. 2, pp. 9-11.
*** See “Arrest of the Baltimore Police Commissioners,” July 1, pp. 141,143.
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No. 5.
Statement of George M. Gill.
BALTIMORE, July 12, 1861.
Hon. GEO. Wm. BROWN, Mayor of the City of Baltimore:
In your communication to the city council of yesterday, which I did not see until after it was communicated to the council, you refer to the fact that I accompanied you on Friday, April 19, to the Camden station. There were some additional circumstances which I deem it proper to state. You desired me to accompany you, hoping that I might aid in preventing any violence on that day, or interruption to the troops then about to pass through, in case any should be attempted. Your impression was that no such attempt would be made, but nevertheless you thought every precaution should be taken, in case of any such attempt, to resist it. For the sole purpose of doing this I accompanied you.
After we reached the Camden station there were manifestations of excitement among the crowd there assembled, and the police commissioners (excepting Mr. Hinks, then absent from the city) gave directions to Marshal Kane, in my presence, to use his whole force in keeping order and protecting the troops from being interrupted. The reply of Marshal Kane then made was, that if he and his whole force lost their lives the troops should be protected.
After the first of the troops reached Camden station a rush of people was made at the cars in which they then were, but the police interfered {p.21} and drove them off. A cry was then raised to tear up the track outside of the Camden station, and a rush was made to accomplish this purpose; but the police a-gain interfered, and prevented this from being done.
I supposed for some time that all the troops would pass in safety, and such was my anxious wish, and to the extent of my ability I united in the effort to produce this result.
While I was at Camden station the events on Pratt street took place, none of which did I see, and therefore cannot speak of them further than I saw at a distance, and heard the firing of the troops as they passed up Pratt street.
My impression on that day was and still is that the events arose from a sudden impulse which seized upon some of our people, and that after the firing commenced and blood was shed many persons took part under an impression that the troops were killing our people, and with out knowing the circumstances of provocation which induced the troops to fire. Matters reached their height after Mr. Davis was killed, and the intense excitement resulting from this and other causes produced a state of feeling which for a time was beyond control on the part of the city authorities.
On Sunday, the 21st of April, whilst you were in Washington, where you had been summoned by the President, a regiment arrived from Pennsylvania, but were fortunately stopped at Cockeysville, about 14 miles off, by the disabled bridge at that point. Any rational man who witnessed the condition of things in Baltimore on that day can judge of the sad consequences which would have followed if the regiment had entered the city.
Yours, very respectfully,
GEO. M. GILL.
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Report of Capt. H. G. Wright, U. S. Engineer Corps.
WASHINGTON, D. C., April 26, 1861.
COLONEL: I have the honor to report that, in obedience to the instructions [following] received from the headquarters of the Army on the 19th instant, I proceeded on the evening of the same day, on the United States steamer Pawnee, to Fort Monroe, where we arrived the next day at about 2 o’clock p. m., and communicated with commanding officer, Colonel Dimick. The object of the expedition was to secure to the United States, if possible, the navy-yard and property at Norfolk, with the ships of war then in that harbor; and, in furtherance of that object, My instructions authorized me to call upon the commanding officer at Fort Monroe for such force, to the extent of one regiment, as he could spare from the garrison without jeopardizing the safety of the fort. He accordingly assigned to the expedition one of the two regiments which had that morning arrived. This regiment, about 370 strong, under Colonel Wardrop, was promptly marched on board, and late in the afternoon the steamer proceeded to Norfolk, where she arrived some time after dark the same evening, the 20th instant.
On reaching the yard it was found that all the ships afloat except the Cumberland had been scuttled, by order of Commodore McCauley, the commandant of the yard, to prevent their seizure by the Virginia forces, {p.22} and that they were fast sinking. One of the objects of the expedition-that of removing those vessels and taking them to sea-was therefore frustrated.
On reporting to the commodore of the yard, I found him disposed to defend the yard and property to the last, and the troops were accordingly landed and some dispositions for defense taken. It was soon determined, however, by Commodore Paulding, who had come on the Pawnee from Washington, to finish the destruction of the scuttled ships, to burn and otherwise destroy, as far as practicable, the property in the yard, and withdraw with the frigate Cumberland, in tow of the Pawnee and a steam-tug which was lying at the yard.
To Commander John Rodgers, of the Navy, and myself was assigned the duty of blowing up the dry-dock, assisted by forty men of the volunteers and a few men from the crew of the Pawnee. The dock, which is a massive structure of granite masonry, has a pumping gallery running along the back of one of the side walls, entering from the level of the bottom near the entrance gate, and terminating, as is understood, in the pumping-house, near the farther end of the dock. Under the circumstances of want of time for preparation and the darkness of night this gallery offered the only means for the establishment of a mine. Had the dock been full of water this advantage could not have been availed of but we found in it a depth of only about two feet. We accordingly proceeded to construct in this gallery a platform of such materials as could be collected to a height above the surface of the water, and on this we, placed the powder (2,000 pounds) which we had brought from the ship, established a train from the gallery to the outside, and connected with it four separate slow matches.
Everything being arranged, all the men were sent to the ship, except one of the crew of the Pawnee, who was retained to watch for the signal from the commodore for lighting the matches and returning to the ship. On the signal, the matches were lighted by Captain Rodgers and myself, and we made the best of our way towards the landing, but before we could reach it the flames of the burning buildings had become so intense, that the boats had undoubtedly been driven off, and, indeed, we could not approach it. After some delay we succeeded in getting out of the yard through the burning gateway, and seized a boat, in the hope of making our escape by the river. We had proceeded but a short distance, however, when several shots were, fired at us from the Portsmouth side, and as the armed force was rapidly accumulating against us at a point below, where the river was narrow, and where we should have had to pass within effective musket range, we concluded to land on the Norfolk side and deliver ourselves up to the commanding general of the Virginia forces. He received us very kindly and courteously, and on giving him our parole he provided us with comfortable quarters at the Atlantic Hotel. This was on Sunday morning, about 6 o’clock. On Monday, at noon, he sent us with an officer to Richmond, where we were most kindly treated by the governor and his family, and by the gentlemen there present from the various parts of Virginia. We remained as guests of the governor, on parole, till Wednesday, the 24th, when we were released, and on Thursday morning we left for Washington.
To Governor Letcher our especial thanks are due for the uniform kindness and consideration with which he treated us. Probably to protect us from any annoyance from the populace of Richmond he accompanied us to the cars at 6 o’clock in the morning, and to further shield us from possible annoyance along the road he detailed two officers of the Virginia forces to conduct us safe, to Washington, where we arrived yesterday, between 4 and 5 o’clock p. m.
{p.23}From what we could learn in Norfolk, I am of opinion that the attempt to destroy the dock did not succeed. We were told that the mine did explode and that it did not. Three separate explosions took place after we got clear of the yard, one of which I presumed at the time to have been the dock mine, yet after considering all the contradictory rumors it seems probable that the structure is uninjured.
In addition to this report, I desire to submit a rather more extended narrative, which may possess some interest hereafter.
I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
H. G. WRIGHT, Captain of Engineers.
Lieut. Col. E. D. TOWNSEND, Asst. Adjt. Gen., Hdqrs. of the Army, Washington, D. C.
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HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, Washington, April 19, 1861.
Capt. H. G. WRIGHT, Corps of Engineers, Washington;
SIR: You are selected as an engineer officer of high science and judgment, to repair promptly to the United States navy-yard at Gosport, Va., and to tender your professional services to the commodore there in command in designing and executing a plan of defense for the same.
You will find the commodore instructed by his Department to expect you in your professional capacity.
I think it best that you should first call at Fort Monroe and consult Colonel Dimick on sending a portion of its garrison to assist in the defense of the navy-yard.
If two volunteer regiments shall have joined him, he may spare one of them for that purpose perhaps, but this must depend on the threatening circumstances about him; and if but one volunteer regiment has joined, the colonel may, after consulting you, deem it safe to detach two or three companies of regulars for duty at the navy-yard Show him this letter and give him a copy of it for his warrant.
Both of you will bear in mind that, although the navy-yard and its contents are deemed to be of very great importance, Fort Monroe is still more so to the Union.
You will lose no opportunity of reporting to the Adjutant-General your progress in carrying out these instructions.
WINFIELD SCOTT.
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| No. 1.– | Brig. Gen. P. St. George Cocke, C. S. A., with correspondence. |
|---|---|
| No. 2.– | Lieut. Col. A. S. Taylor, Va. Vols., transmitted by General Cocke. |
No. 1.
Reports of Brig. Gen. P. St. George Cocke, C. S. A., with correspondence.
HEADQUARTERS POTOMAC DEPARTMENT, Culpeper Court-House, May 6, 1861-10 p. m.
For the information of the commanding general-in-chief, I herewith transmit a copy of the letter of instructions sent by me on the 5th instant, by an express, “by rail,” to Colonel Taylor, commanding at {p.24} Alexandria. I report, in this connection, that I know the fact that Colonel Taylor received that letter of instruction upon the arrival of the messenger at Alexandria, on the 5th instant, by the regular train from this place on the morning of that day. Mr. F. G. Skinner, now here, and who was on the 5th instant in Alexandria, is my authority for the above statement; and Mr. Skinner tells me that he saw that letter of instruction in the hands of Colonel Taylor, and discussed with him the purport of it prior to the movement of the troops out of Alexandria on the afternoon or evening of that day (yesterday). I this day sent by telegraph to the commanding general-in-chief a full abstract of the only letter or communication I have received from Colonel Taylor alluding to or explaining the movement of the troops out of Alexandria. Nor have I been able, from any other source, except that furnished me by the arrival of Mr. Skinner, direct from Alexandria, by the train of this morning, to learn the cause of that movement; and, so far as I am informed up to this moment, there was no proper or justifiable cause whatsoever for any such movement. After waiting for further intelligence and receiving none, and duly considering and weighing all the circumstances and bearing of that movement with the information before me, I have ordered the return of the troops, as communicated by telegram, a duplicate of which has just been transmitted to the general-in-chief.
Very respectfully, your most obedient,
PHILIP ST. GEO. COCKE, Brigadier-General, Commanding Potomac Department.
Col. R. S. GARNETT, Adjutant-General, Richmond, Va.
[Inclosure.]
CULPEPER COURT-HOUSE, VA., May 5, 1861.
Colonel TAYLOR, Commanding at Alexandria, Va.:
SIR: You will not move the troops out of Alexandria unless pressed by overwhelming and irresistible numbers; and even then you should retire to Manassas Junction, to hold that point, assist in obstructing and breaking up the road between that point and Alexandria, harassing the enemy should he, attempt to use the road, and not retire farther in the interior unless overpowered and forced, as a last extremity, to so retire. You will use your cavalry and infantry in this connection, and, under these orders, which I have full authority from headquarters at Richmond for giving to you, keep up your communications with the various parts in your rear, so as to call every resource to your aid and support in making a gallant and fighting retreat, should you be forced to it, and can stand at all without danger of uselessly sacrificing your command.
Very respectfully, your most obedient,
PHILIP ST. GEO. COCKE, Brigadier General, Commanding Potomac Department.
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HEADQUARTERS POTOMAC DEPARTMENT, Culpeper Court-House, Va., May 7, 1861.
SIR: Shall I arrest Colonel Taylor for disobedience of orders and unsoldier-like conduct, in having evacuated Alexandria, under the circumstances, {p.25} now fully developed to you and myself by the inclosed papers? I shall await your orders in this particular connection.
Very respectfully, your most obedient servant,
PHILIP ST. GEO. COCKE, Brigadier-General, Commanding Potomac Department.
Major-General LEE, Commander-in-Chief.
[Inclosures.]
CULPEPER COURT-HOUSE, VA., May 7, 1861-6.45 a. m.
Col. R. S. GARNETT, Adjutant-General:
SIR: After writing you last night, and having previously ascertained during the day and up to 10 o’clock p. m. last night that I could not communicate with the command of Colonel Taylor after Colonel Terrett left Alexandria, to go to him at Springfield, because, after several attempts, through the telegraph operator at Alexandria, to send a dispatch through various persons, none of whom could be found in Alexandria, and when the operator finally advised me that not one single man connected with the military had been left to speak to me through the wires, I immediately determined to send one of my aides, Giles B. Cooke, to put myself in communication with Colonels Taylor and Terrett; and, accordingly, Mr. Cooke left me at 2 o’clock last night, by an extra train, bearing copies of the telegrams which I had failed to put through to Colonel Terrett, because of his departure from Alexandria for Springfield, no one having been left at Alexandria in whom I could confide and through whom I might have transmitted it; and bearing also a letter of instructions sent by me to Colonel Terrett, a copy of which is herewith transmitted. Mr. Cooke will proceed to Alexandria with dispatch, after having communicated with Colonel Terrett, and will once more enable me to have one person at least in Alexandria with whom I can, converse through the wires. He is instructed to give me information upon which I can rely the moment of his arrival at Alexandria.
Very respectfully,
PHILIP ST. GEO. COCKE, Brigadier-General, Commanding.
HEADQUARTERS POTOMAC DEPARTMENT.
Colonel TERRETT, Commanding Troops at or near Alexandria, Va.:
SIR: I have endeavored up to this moment to communicate with you by telegraph, through Alexandria, and learn through the operator there that not one single military man has been left at that end of the wire. I send Mr. Cooke, my second aide, by extra train, to put me in communication with you and your command, and to convey to you the substance of telegrams which have been stopped in Alexandria in the hands of the operator. By these you will find that I am not informed of any circumstance whatsoever that could have furnished just and sufficient cause, or any cause at all, for the movement of the troops out of Alexandria; and, as all my orders from headquarters, and all my own purposes in accordance therewith, and my late order to Colonel Taylor, enjoined the holding of the troops in Alexandria until absolutely driven out by force of arms, and even then to retire fighting, if possible without endangering the unnecessary destruction of your force, I must therefore now order that the troops return to Alexandria, if it be practicable, and if any movement of the enemy has taken place unknown to me, and which {p.26} would render that return impracticable and really dangerous, and if, as I believe, no such movement has taken place, return the troops to the position they occupied with as little delay as possible. If, however, there has been any new and threatening movement by the enemy unknown to me, and which in your judgment may render it impracticable or imprudent to return to Alexandria, communicate the fact to me, and, in the mean time, exercise a sound discretion as to your acting.
By order of Philip St. George Cocke, brigadier-general, commanding:
GILES B. COOKE, Aide-de-Camp.
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HEADQUARTERS VIRGINIA FORCES, Richmond, Va., May 8, 1861.
Col. P. ST. GEORGE COCKE, Commanding Potomac Division:
COLONEL: I am instructed by Major-General Lee to acknowledge the receipt of your communication of the 6th instant, with accompanying papers, in relation to the evacuation of Alexandria, asking whether you shall arrest Colonel Taylor, Virginia Volunteers. The general commanding directs that you will not arrest Colonel Taylor, but require from him an explanation.
Respectfully, &c.,
J. M. BROOKE, Virginia Navy, Acting Aide-de-Camp.
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No. 2.
Report of Lieut. Col. A. S. Taylor, Va. Vols., transmitted by General Cocke.
HEADQUARTERS POTOMAC DEPARTMENT, Culpeper Court-House, Va., May 13, 1861.
Major-General LEE, Commander-in-Chief:
SIR: I have the honor to transmit herewith the reply of Col. A. S. Taylor to my call on him, at your suggestion, for a statement of the causes and reasons which induced him to evacuate the post of Alexandria on Sunday, May 5, as reported by me to headquarters some time since.
Very respectfully, your most obedient,
PHILIP ST. GEO. COCKE, Commanding Potomac Department.
[Inclosure.]
CULPEPER COURT-HOUSE, VA., May 9, 1861.
SIR: I have just received your communication of this date, calling upon me, by order of the general-in-chief, to give in writing my “reasons” and “causes” why I retired from Alexandria with the troops under ray command.
In the first place, because of the inefficient condition of a large proportion of the troops and my exposed and indefensible position. Under my command there were two companies of raw Irish recruits, numbering about one hundred and twenty privates in both, armed with the altered flint-lock muskets of 1818, and without cartridges or caps; Captain Devaughn’s company (Mount Vernon Guards), eighty-six privates, {p.27} armed with the new musket-fifty-two men without accouterments and fifteen without arms, and very little ammunition; Captain Simpson’s company of rifles, numbering in all fifty-three, and well armed with the minie rifle, and about nine rounds of ammunition complete; Captain Herbert’s company of rifles, numbering eighty-five, rank and file, armed with the minie rifle, and with an average of five rounds of cartridges and four of caps; Captain Balls company of cavalry, numbering forty privates, armed with carbines and sabers, and with a very limited amount of ammunition; Captain Powell’s company of cavalry, numbering about thirty, and twenty-two horses, no arms or equipments of any kind except a few of Colt’s revolvers.
In the second place, the men were becoming almost useless from home influences. All but Captain Simpson’s company belonged to Alexandria (and were necessarily scattered over the city), and it would have been impossible to have assembled the command at any particular point in time to have defended itself with the slightest possibility of success, or even to have made anything but a disastrous and demoralizing retreat in the face of an enemy.
In the third place, I was possessed of apparently, such reliable information that the Government at Washington would occupy Alexandria on the 6th or 7th instant, and knowing that a large force was being concentrated at Fort Washington and that two steamers were anchored off Mount Vernon, I was induced to suppose that from that point an attempt would be made, in concert with a force from Washington City, to hem in my small and inefficient command, and thereby the services of good material be lost to my State and our cause.
I inclose herewith an order,* which was obtained secretly by Mr. J. D. Hutton, who was formerly employed in the War Department, and which shows the intention of the Federal Government as to Alexandria. The foregoing are my reasons and the causes for retiring to. Springfield, and, in addition to which, from that position I could the more successfully assist in breaking up and destroying the road.
Very respectfully,
A. S. TAYLOR, Lieutenant-Colonel, Virginia Volunteers.
Col. P. ST. GEORGE COCKE, Commanding Potomac Department of Virginia Volunteers.
* Not found.
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Report of Bvt. Col. Justin Dimick, Second U. S. Artillery.
HEADQUARTERS FORT MONROE, VA., May 10, 1861.
COLONEL: I have been informed by Flag Officer Pendergrast that on the 7th instant a battery of three guns was discovered at Gloucester Point, on the York River, nearly opposite Yorktown. One of the small steamers attached to the Home Squadron (the Yankee) exchanged several shots with it yesterday, but as there was one 8-inch gun in the battery and those of the steamer were of much shorter range her commander hauled off.
With regard to the force necessary here, the portions of the surrounding country which should be occupied, and the defenses erected for the {p.28} protection of the fort, the commanding general and General Totten are much better able to judge than myself. It appears to me, however, that the sand hills, some two thousand yards from the fort, should be occupied and a battery built there. To do this will require a larger force than I have at my disposal. Colonel De Russy suggests that a battery should be erected near the picket bridge on the Hampton side. In the vicinity is a spring (apparently inexhaustible) of fine water, which may be of the highest importance, though with the present command I entertain no apprehension of a scarcity of water, as, in addition to the supply in the fort, there is a large quantity at the hotel.
The mail-boat from Baltimore was allowed to land the mails here yesterday, and the mail for Norfolk sent there in the steamer William Selden. She has not, however, returned, and I presume has been seized.
I inclose herewith a copy of a letter which was yesterday transmitted by mail, and will add that I cannot urge too strongly the necessity of immediately authorizing the repairing of the wharves and of sending the laborers asked for.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
J. DIMICK, Col. Comdg.
Lieut. Col. E. D. TOWNSEND, Asst. Adjt. Gen., Hdqrs. Army, Washington, D. C.
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| No. 1.– | Dispatches from General Scott to General Butler. |
|---|---|
| No. 2.– | Report of Brig. Gen. B. F. Butler, Massachusetts Militia. |
| No. 3.– | General Butler’s proclamation. |
No. 1.
Reports of Brig. Gen. Walter Gwynn, commanding at Norfolk.
WASHINGTON, D. C., May 14, 1861.
Brig. Gen. BENJAMIN F. BUTLER, Commanding Department of Annapolis, Md.:
SIR: Your hazardous occupation of Baltimore was made without my knowledge, and of course without my approbation. It is a God-send that it was without conflict of arms. It is also reported that you have sent a detachment to Frederick, but this is impossible. Not a word have I received from you as to either movement. Let me hear from you.
Very respectfully, yours,
WINFIELD SCOTT.
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WASHINGTON, D. C., May 15, 1861-2.17 a. m.
Brigadier-General BUTLER, Commanding Dep’t of Annapolis, at Baltimore, Md.:
I do not understand your telegram, “Send us more detachments till further orders.”
Issue no more proclamations.
Why assume the authority to call for re-enforcements from General Patterson?
Answer my letter of last evening.
Did you leave any men it Relay House? Look to their safety.
Not a word received from you in several days.
Patterson’s re-enforcements will beat Locust Point this morning early.
WINFIELD SCOTT.
{p.29}–––
No. 2.
Report of Brig. Gen. Benjamin, F. Butler, Massachusetts Militia.
HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF ANNAPOLIS, Federal Hill, Baltimore, May 15, 1861.
I received your telegram this morning, and hasten to reply in detail.
In obedience to verbal directions, received from the War Department through Mr. Harriman at 1 1/2 o’clock on Monday [12th instant], at the Relay Station, I caused a portion of the force there situated-that is to say, 500 men of the Sixth Massachusetts Regiment, under Colonel Jones; 450 men of the Eighth New York Regiment, under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Waterbury; and a section of Cook’s battery, with Major Cook-to march for Baltimore at 6 o’clock.
We disembarked from, the cars without difficulty, and took possession of Federal Hill amid the plaudits of many of the people and a violent thunder-storm. We were disturbed during the night by a report of a riot, in which the United States recruiting regiment was being attacked. This called us to arms about midnight, and the men so remained until morning in a drenching rain with the utmost patience. It turned out upon investigation that this was only a feint of the secessionists to cover a plundering of a quantity of arms between 1 and 2 o’clock from those stored by the city nearly opposite the customhouse.
Thus the carrying off of some four or five hundred stand of arms was accomplished by the police under the direction of the board of police. I found certain other arms being shipped, apparently for improper purposes, to a place called Snow Hill. I have sent out and brought in forty minie rifles. The remaining arms stored opposite the custom-house, amounting to twenty-seven hundred stand, I have caused to be seized and sent to Fort McHenry. I have caused Mr. Ross Winans to be arrested and sent to Annapolis; but for greater safety, as I have no place of confinement save a jail, I shall cause him to be removed to Fort McHenry, there to await the action of the civil authorities, unless otherwise ordered. I have found several manufactories of arms, supplies, and munitions of war for the rebels, who are being constantly supplied from the city.
A specimen of an explosive minie rifle-ball, the experiments with which, under Crosby, at Woolwich, were so satisfactory, I herewith inclose for your inspection. This manufactory (carried on, I am ashamed to say, by a Massachusetts man) I shall cause to be stopped. I propose this morning to seize a quantity of powder stored in Greenmount Cemetery, of which I will report to you. I had an interview with the mayor and some other gentlemen. He, informed me that he did not consider it the duty of the city authorities actively to co-operate in preventing the forwarding of arms and munitions of war to the rebels.
I have issued a proclamation, a copy of which I inclose [No. 3], and which I trust you will approve. It became necessary, in my judgment, in order to set right the thousand conflicting stories and rumors of the intentions of the Government as to Baltimore, which were taken advantage of by the mob to incite insubordination and encourage a spirit of insurrection, and which showed itself upon our taking possession of the Government arms, but was instantly suppressed upon a show of force.
I have not assumed to order re-enforcements from General Patterson. I have no need of either them or him, and can get along very well without either, with accustomed deliberation. I have had no report of the arrival of his troops early this morning. I have received no letter from {p.30} the Lieutenant-General for many days, and the first telegram this morning, to which I have replied with some degree of promptness. General Shriver, at Frederick, has telegraphed me frequently for aid to protect Monocacy Bridge. I sent his telegram to the Lieutenant-General asking for instructions, and that is the telegram misunderstood. I have provided for the safety of my camp at the Relay. I have asked for and obtained the Eighth Massachusetts Regiment from General Mansfield, on the promise that he should receive in their stead the Eighth New York.
From some unexplained reason General Mansfield retained from the Eighth Massachusetts their camp equipage, which is the property of the State of Massachusetts, which retention has somewhat disordered my plans. But the Eighth Massachusetts are at the camp at the Relay House, and unless I have entirely mistaken my men, they, together with the balance of Jones’ Sixth Regiment and that part of the New York Eighth (consisting of about five hundred men) which I have left there, together with two sections of Cook’s battery, will be able, to hold that point against all comers, if not in safety, with success. I should be deeply grieved if in any of my acts I should exceed propriety of action by going either too fast or too far. I shall await and obey instructions implicitly, and keep the General-in-Chief advised of every movement so far as possible, so that I may have the instructions and directions to which the country looks for control and safety in the peril of the hour.
I have the honor to announce further the completion of the railroad connection between Washington and tide-water at Annapolis. With the means of transportation now provided, we can move 5,000 troops daily between Washington and Annapolis. As soon as I receive further communication I will send a more detailed report. I have also the honor to communicate the capture of the steam gun, and the fact that I have found men in the Sixth Massachusetts Regiment who have been able to put it in operation, and it is now in full working order.
I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
BENJ. F. BUTLER, Brigadier-General, Commanding.
Lieutenant-General SCOTT.
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No. 3.
General Butler’s proclamation.
DEPARTMENT OF ANNAPOLIS, Federal Hill, Baltimore, May 14, 1861.
A detachment of the forces of the Federal Government under my command have occupied the city of Baltimore for the purpose, among other things, of enforcing respect and obedience to the laws, as well of the State-if requested thereto by the civil authorities-as of the United States laws, which are being violated within its limits by some malignant and traitorous men, and in order to testify the acceptance by the Federal Government of the fact that the city and all the well-intentioned portion of its inhabitants are loyal to the Union and the Constitution, and are to be so regarded and treated by all. To the end, therefore, that all misunderstanding of the purpose of the Government may be, prevented, mid to set at rest all unfounded, false, and seditious rumors; to relieve all apprehensions, if any are felt, by the well-disposed portion {p.31} of the community, and to make it thoroughly understood by all traitors, their aiders and abettors, that rebellious acts must cease, I hereby, by the authority vested in me as commander of the Department of Annapolis, of which Baltimore forms a part, do now command and make known that no loyal and well-disposed citizen will be disturbed in his lawful occupation or business; that private property will not be interfered with by the men under my command, or allowed to be interfered with by others, except in so far as it may be used to afford aid and comfort to those in rebellion against the Government, whether here or elsewhere, all of which property, munitions of war, and that fitted to aid and support the rebellion, will be seized and held subject to confiscation; and, therefore, all manufacturers of arms and munitions of war are hereby requested to report to me forthwith, so that the lawfulness of their occupation may be known and understood, and all misconstruction of their doings be avoided. No transportation from the city to the rebels of articles fitted to aid and support troops in the field will be permitted, and the fact of such transportation, after the publication of this proclamation, will be taken and received as proof of illegal intention on the part of the consignors, and will render the goods liable to seizure and confiscation.
The Government being ready to receive all such stores and supplies, arrangements will be made to contract for them immediately, and the owners and manufacturers of such articles of equipments and clothing and munitions of war and provisions are desired to keep themselves in communication with the Commissary-General, in order that their workshops may be employed for loyal purposes, and the artisans of the city resume and carry on their profitable occupations.
The acting assistant quartermaster and commissary of subsistence of the United States here, stationed has been instructed to proceed and furnish at fair prices 40,000 rations for the use of the Army of the United States, and further supplies will be drawn from the city to the full extent of its capacity, if the patriotic and loyal men choose so to furnish supplies.
All assemblages, except the ordinary police, of armed bodies of men, other than those regularly organized and commissioned by the State of Maryland, and acting under the orders of the governor thereof, for drill and other purposes, are forbidden within the department.
All officers of the militia of Maryland having command within the limits of the department are requested to report through their officers forthwith to the general in command, so that he may be able to know and distinguish the regularly commissioned and loyal troops of Maryland from armed bodies who may claim to be such.
The, ordinary operations of the corporate government of the city of Baltimore and of the civil authorities will not be interfered with, but, on the contrary, will be aided by all the power at the command of the general, upon proper call being made, and all such authorities are cordially invited to co-operate with the general in command to carry out the Purposes set forth in the proclamation, so that the city of Baltimore may be shown to the country to be, what she is in fact, patriotic and loyal to the Union, the Constitution, and the laws.
No flag, banner, ensign, or device of the so-called Confederate States, or any of them, will be permitted to be raised or shown in this department, and the exhibition of either of them by evil-disposed persons will be deemed and taken to be evidence of a design to afford aid and comfort, to the enemies of the country. To make it more apparent that the Government of the United States by far more relies upon the loyalty, patriotism, {p.32} and zeal of the good citizens of Baltimore and vicinity than upon any exhibition of force calculated to intimidate them into that obedience to the laws which the Government doubts not will be paid from inherent respect and love of order, the commanding general has brought to the city with him, of the many thousand troops in the immediate neighborhood, which might be at once concentrated here, scarcely more than an ordinary guard, and until it fails him, he will continue to rely upon that loyalty and patriotism of the citizens of Maryland which have never yet been found wanting to the Government in time of need. The general in command desires to greet and treat in this part of his department all the citizens thereof as friends and brothers, having a common purpose, a common loyalty, and a common country. Any infractions of the law by the troops under his command, or any disorderly, unsoldierlike conduct, or any interference with private property, he desires to have immediately reported to him, and pledges himself that if any soldier so far forgets himself as to break those laws that he has sworn to defend and enforce, he shall be most rigorously punished.
The general believes that if the suggestions and requests contained in this proclamation are faithfully carried out by the co-operation of all good and Union-loving citizens, and peace and quiet and certainty of future peace and quiet are thus restored, business will resume its accustomed channels, trade take the place of dullness and inactivity, efficient labor displace idleness, and Baltimore will be in fact, what she is entitled to be, in the front rank of the commercial cities of the nation.
Given at Baltimore the day and year herein first above written.
BENJ. F. BUTLER, Brigadier-General, Commanding Department of Annapolis.
E. C. PARKER, Lieutenant-Colonel, Aide-de-Camp.
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Report of Brig. Gen. B. F. Butler, Massachusetts Militia.
BALTIMORE, May 15, 1861-1.25 a. m.
I have just received the following telegram:
FREDERICK, May 14-11.10 p. m.
Danger is apprehended at the Monocacy Bridge to-night. An engine and cars were seized at Harper’s Ferry at 2 o’clock to-day. All connections west are cut off since 8 o’clock to-night. We are guarding the wires as far as our forces enable us. Please send us immediate relief. Answer quick as possible by telegraph.
EDWARD SHRIVER, Brigadier-General.
What instructions have I upon this point, which is not within my department? Please answer immediately. Ross Winans is now in Annapolis under arrest.
B. F. BUTLER, Brigadier-General, Commanding.
Lieutenant-General SCOTT.
{p.33}| No. 1.– | Brig. Gen. Walter Gwynn, commanding Confederate forces at Norfolk. |
|---|---|
| No. 2.– | Capt. Peyton H. Colquitt, commanding at Sewell’s Point. |
No. 1.
Reports of Brig. Gen. Walter Gwynn, commanding at Norfolk.
NORFOLK, VA., May 20, 1861.
The enemy fired on the unfinished battery at Sewell’s Point on the 18th, but did no damage. There were at that time no gun’s mounted or nearer than Norfolk. I sent forward three guns immediately and two of the rifled cannon. Got them in position at 5 p. m. on the 19th. Soon after the enemy opened fire, which was returned and kept up one and a half hours, when the vessel from which the guns were fired withdrew. A fuller report will be made to-morrow. Just returned from Sewell’s Point. Reports in from the pickets at all points.
No immediate attack apprehended. Troops thrown forward and in position. Confident of making defense good. I am strengthening, to some extent, my position. Want six hundred laborers, and am re-enforcing the batteries, which takes off so many men that additional troops are required.
WALTER GWYNN.
R. S. GARNETT, Adjutant-General Virginia Forces.
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HEADQUARTERS FORCES OF VIRGINIA AROUND NORFOLK, May 20, 1861.
SIR: I have the honor to inform you that, late in the evening of the 18th instant, I received intelligence of an attack, made by the enemy’s steamer Monticello, on the unfinished works at Sewell’s Point. This battery was not sufficiently advanced at the time to receive its armament and garrison. The Monticello carried three guns, one of which was a heavy 10-inch Dahlgren. With these she kept up a constant fire with solid shot and shell for more than an hour, when a steam-tug, from Old Point, carrying one gun, came to her aid, and the two vessels continued the cannonade until the close of the day, without any serious injury to the works. The tug then returned to Old Point, and the Monticello moored, with broadside on, with the intention, apparently, of continuing the attack, in order to demolish the works or prevent their progress. Early on the morning of the 19th I hurried on the guns and equipment, and repaired to Sewell’s Point, to expedite the works for their reception, and by 5 p. m. succeeded in getting three 32-pounders and two small rifled guns into position, while detachments of infantry and artillery, ordered from neighboring posts, occupied the battery and contiguous points. During all this time the Monticello, apparently not suspecting the operations going forward, was engaged in preparing for another effort, by calculating the range and distance and adjusting her guns to suit. With instructions to Captain Colquitt, of Georgia, to whom I gave the command of all the forces and guns at the post, to continue {p.34} the preparations, reserving his fire until the enemy renewed the cannonade, I returned to Norfolk. At 5.30 o’clock the Monticello again opened fire from all her guns, and with much greater precision than on the preceding day. It was instantly returned, and with such effect that she was driven off and returned to Old Point. The engagement continued for an hour and a half without intermission on either side, and, though the enemy’s fire was well directed, one shell bursting within an embrasure and several others directly over the battery, while solid shot repeatedly passed through the embrasures and struck the crest and sides of the merlons, hurling masses of earth from the outside among the gunners, I am happy to inform you that no casualty of moment occurred to the troops, nor was material injury done to the battery. What damage or loss was sustained by the enemy I was not able to discover, but his retreat indicated that our fire had become too warm for further endurance. As early as I received information of the second attack and repulse, I ordered forward more troops, and hastened, during the night, to Sewell’s Point, to make such other dispositions as might be necessary to defend the post against any further and more formidable assaults which the enemy’s large naval and military forces at Old Point would enable him to make.
I cannot close this brief account of the engagement without expressing my admiration of the enthusiasm and bravery manifested by the troops. Where officers and men displayed so much merit it would be invidious to discriminate, and I therefore refer you to the accompanying report of Captain Colquitt for further particulars. His position, as commanding officer of the post, gave him an opportunity of displaying the qualities which adorn the soldier, and the general appreciation of his gallantry and merit by those under his command enable me to commend him most warmly to your consideration.
In conclusion, I would state that, in consequence of the want of a Virginia or Confederate flag for the occasion, the flag of Georgia, belonging to Captain Colquitt’s company, was planted on the ramparts during the engagement, and, while the hottest fire was prevailing, two members of his company, whose names I will forward you when reported to me as deserving particular notice, fearlessly passed to the outside of the battery, and deliberately removed the sand and other obstructions to the range of one of the guns while shot and shell were striking all about them.
I am, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
WALTER GWYNN.
Major-General LEE, Commanding Forces of Virginia, Richmond, Va.
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No. 2.
Report of Capt. Peyton H. Colquitt, Commanding at Sewell’s Point.
SEWELL’S POINT, VA., May 19, 1861.
SIR: I have the honor to report to you an engagement this evening between the Confederate troops, consisting of the City Light Guards, Columbus, Ga.; Wood’s Rifles, Captain Lamb; detachment of the Norfolk Juniors, under Lieutenant Holmes; detachment of Light Artillery Blues, under Lieutenant Nash, all under my command, and the steamer Monticello and Federal steam-tug, which lasted for one hoar and a half, {p.35} in which nobody was hurt on our side. The enemy fired with great accuracy, several balls passing through the embrasures of the fort, one striking a 32-pounder within the battery, and one shell bursting in the fort. From three to five shots from our battery took effect, we, think; others struck around the steamer. The troops acted with great bravery, and I had to restrain them in their enthusiasm. The flag of Georgia was hoisted over the fort in the absence of the Confederate flag. Our firing was less frequent than that of the enemy, as our ammunition was scarce; only two rounds left after the engagement. Your aides, Maj. William E. Taylor, R. R. Collier, and Col. Thomas Newton, were present and aided in the struggle.
I have the honor to be, your, obedient servant,
PEYTON H. COLQUITT.
Major-General GWYNN, Commanding forces, Norfolk Harbor.
P. S.-Two members of the City Light Guards (Georgia) dug away the sand in front of one of the port-holes during the hottest of the fire.
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| No. 1.– | Maj. J. B. Cary, Virginia Artillery. |
|---|---|
| No. 2.– | Col. John B. Magruder, commanding Confederate forces. |
No. 1.
Report of Maj. J. B. Cary, Virginia Artillery.
HAMPTON, VA., May 23, 1861.
SIR: I have the honor to inform you that quite a full regiment of the enemy, estimated, by count of companies, to contain eight hundred men, under command of Colonel Phelps, made a demonstration against this place this afternoon, between 4 and 5 o’clock, which seemed at first to wear a very ugly aspect, but which, happily, resulted in no damage, save the alarm of our women and children and the excitement of our citizens.
I had nearly perfected my arrangements for the defense indicated in your instructions, by making preparations for the destruction of all the bridges leading across the main tributary of Back River as well as the Hampton Bridge. Unfortunately, the absence during the day of the party chosen for the firing of the latter, and the consequent failure to have the combustibles on the spot, delayed operations so far that the enemy were in sight before the fire could be started, though it would have made sufficient progress, I think, to have arrested their entrance into the town. At this stage, meeting with Lieutenant Cutshaw, at his suggestion I sent him forward as my aid to demand of the colonel the intent of his approach with so large a body of men, and being assured that he came with no hostile purpose, but simply, as he said, by order of General Butler, to reconnoiter, and having received the subsequent assurance from him in person that be would make no attack upon our people nor injure, their property in any way unless he himself was molested, and coinciding in your view that defense at this point was Useless and hopeless, I aided him in extinguishing the fire, and gave the {p.36} assurance that be should not be fired upon by the volunteer force under my command (which, by the way, had by that time nearly retreated to the line of defense which I intended to occupy and where I designed making the first resistance). I also urged our citizens to abstain from any attack, which counsel, I am pleased to say, prevailed with them. The entire body then marched into the town as far as the intersection of our main streets, halted for a short while, and then returned. I have since learned that this body was supported by about three hundred men, with a battery of six brass pieces, and that there was a still further reserve on the march. But this latter information I do not consider so reliable. I have only to add, in this co